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|
/* Copyright 2015-2016 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved. */
#include "wireguard.h"
#include "noise.h"
#include "messages.h"
#include "packets.h"
#include "hashtables.h"
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/bitmap.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
/* This is RFC6479, a replay detection bitmap algorithm that avoids bitshifts */
static inline bool counter_validate(union noise_counter *counter, u64 their_counter)
{
bool ret = false;
unsigned long index, index_current, top, i;
spin_lock_bh(&counter->receive.lock);
if (unlikely(counter->receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1 || their_counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES))
goto out;
++their_counter;
if (unlikely((COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + their_counter) < counter->receive.counter))
goto out;
index = their_counter >> ilog2(COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS);
if (likely(their_counter > counter->receive.counter)) {
index_current = counter->receive.counter >> ilog2(COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS);
top = min_t(unsigned long, index - index_current, COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG);
for (i = 1; i <= top; ++i)
counter->receive.backtrack[(i + index_current) & ((COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1)] = 0;
counter->receive.counter = their_counter;
}
index &= (COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1;
ret = !test_and_set_bit(their_counter & (COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS - 1), &counter->receive.backtrack[index]);
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&counter->receive.lock);
return ret;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
bool packet_counter_selftest(void)
{
bool success = true;
unsigned int test_num = 0, i;
union noise_counter counter;
#define T_INIT do { memset(&counter, 0, sizeof(union noise_counter)); spin_lock_init(&counter.receive.lock); } while (0)
#define T_LIM (COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1)
#define T(n, v) do { ++test_num; if (counter_validate(&counter, n) != v) { pr_info("nonce counter self-test %u: FAIL\n", test_num); success = false; } } while (0)
T_INIT;
/* 1 */ T(0, true);
/* 2 */ T(1, true);
/* 3 */ T(1, false);
/* 4 */ T(9, true);
/* 5 */ T(8, true);
/* 6 */ T(7, true);
/* 7 */ T(7, false);
/* 8 */ T(T_LIM, true);
/* 9 */ T(T_LIM - 1, true);
/* 10 */ T(T_LIM - 1, false);
/* 11 */ T(T_LIM - 2, true);
/* 12 */ T(2, true);
/* 13 */ T(2, false);
/* 14 */ T(T_LIM + 16, true);
/* 15 */ T(3, false);
/* 16 */ T(T_LIM + 16, false);
/* 17 */ T(T_LIM * 4, true);
/* 18 */ T(T_LIM * 4 - (T_LIM - 1), true);
/* 19 */ T(10, false);
/* 20 */ T(T_LIM * 4 - T_LIM, false);
/* 21 */ T(T_LIM * 4 - (T_LIM + 1), false);
/* 22 */ T(T_LIM * 4 - (T_LIM - 2), true);
/* 23 */ T(T_LIM * 4 + 1 - T_LIM, false);
/* 24 */ T(0, false);
/* 25 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES, false);
/* 26 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 1, true);
/* 27 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES, false);
/* 28 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 1, false);
/* 29 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 2, true);
/* 30 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1, false);
/* 31 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 2, false);
/* 32 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 2, false);
/* 33 */ T(REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES - 3, true);
/* 34 */ T(0, false);
T_INIT;
for (i = 1; i <= COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE; ++i)
T(i, true);
T(0, true);
T(0, false);
T_INIT;
for (i = 2; i <= COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1; ++i)
T(i, true);
T(1, true);
T(0, false);
T_INIT;
for (i = COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1; i-- > 0 ;)
T(i, true);
T_INIT;
for (i = COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 2; i-- > 1 ;)
T(i, true);
T(0, false);
T_INIT;
for (i = COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1; i-- > 1 ;)
T(i, true);
T(COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1, true);
T(0, false);
T_INIT;
for (i = COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1; i-- > 1 ;)
T(i, true);
T(0, true);
T(COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + 1, true);
#undef T
#undef T_LIM
#undef T_INIT
if (success)
pr_info("nonce counter self-tests: pass\n");
return success;
}
#endif
static inline size_t skb_padding(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/* We do this modulo business with the MTU, just in case the networking layer
* gives us a packet that's bigger than the MTU. Now that we support GSO, this
* shouldn't be a real problem, and this can likely be removed. But, caution! */
size_t last_unit = skb->len % skb->dev->mtu;
size_t padded_size = (last_unit + MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE - 1) & ~(MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE - 1);
if (padded_size > skb->dev->mtu)
padded_size = skb->dev->mtu;
return padded_size - last_unit;
}
static inline void skb_reset(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
skb_scrub_packet(skb, false);
memset(&skb->headers_start, 0, offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_end) - offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_start));
skb->queue_mapping = 0;
skb->nohdr = 0;
skb->peeked = 0;
skb->mac_len = 0;
skb->dev = NULL;
skb->hdr_len = skb_headroom(skb);
skb->mac_header = (typeof(skb->mac_header))~0U;
skb->transport_header = (typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U;
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
}
static inline void skb_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct packet_data_encryption_ctx *ctx)
{
struct scatterlist sg[ctx->num_frags]; /* This should be bound to at most 128 by the caller. */
struct message_data *header;
/* We have to remember to add the checksum to the innerpacket, in case the receiver forwards it. */
if (likely(!skb_checksum_setup(skb, true)))
skb_checksum_help(skb);
/* Only after checksumming can we safely add on the padding at the end and the header. */
header = (struct message_data *)skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct message_data));
header->header.type = MESSAGE_DATA;
header->key_idx = ctx->keypair->remote_index;
header->counter = cpu_to_le64(ctx->nonce);
pskb_put(skb, ctx->trailer, ctx->trailer_len);
/* Now we can encrypt the scattergather segments */
sg_init_table(sg, ctx->num_frags);
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct message_data), noise_encrypted_len(ctx->plaintext_len));
chacha20poly1305_encrypt_sg(sg, sg, ctx->plaintext_len, NULL, 0, ctx->nonce, ctx->keypair->sending.key);
/* When we're done, we free the reference to the key pair */
noise_keypair_put(ctx->keypair);
}
static inline bool skb_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int num_frags, uint64_t nonce, struct noise_symmetric_key *key)
{
struct scatterlist sg[num_frags]; /* This should be bound to at most 128 by the caller. */
if (unlikely(!key))
return false;
if (unlikely(!key->is_valid || time_is_before_eq_jiffies64(key->birthdate + REJECT_AFTER_TIME) || key->counter.receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) {
key->is_valid = false;
return false;
}
sg_init_table(sg, num_frags);
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
if (!chacha20poly1305_decrypt_sg(sg, sg, skb->len, NULL, 0, nonce, key->key))
return false;
return pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - noise_encrypted_len(0)) == 0;
}
static inline bool get_encryption_nonce(uint64_t *nonce, struct noise_symmetric_key *key)
{
if (unlikely(!key))
return false;
if (unlikely(!key->is_valid || time_is_before_eq_jiffies64(key->birthdate + REJECT_AFTER_TIME))) {
key->is_valid = false;
return false;
}
*nonce = atomic64_inc_return(&key->counter.counter) - 1;
if (*nonce >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES) {
key->is_valid = false;
return false;
}
return true;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PARALLEL
static void do_encryption(struct padata_priv *padata)
{
struct packet_data_encryption_ctx *ctx = container_of(padata, struct packet_data_encryption_ctx, padata);
skb_encrypt(ctx->skb, ctx);
skb_reset(ctx->skb);
padata_do_serial(padata);
}
static void finish_encryption(struct padata_priv *padata)
{
struct packet_data_encryption_ctx *ctx = container_of(padata, struct packet_data_encryption_ctx, padata);
ctx->callback(ctx->skb, ctx->peer);
}
static inline int start_encryption(struct padata_instance *padata, struct padata_priv *priv, int cb_cpu)
{
memset(priv, 0, sizeof(struct padata_priv));
priv->parallel = do_encryption;
priv->serial = finish_encryption;
return padata_do_parallel(padata, priv, cb_cpu);
}
static inline unsigned int choose_cpu(__le32 key)
{
unsigned int cpu_index, cpu, cb_cpu;
/* This ensures that packets encrypted to the same key are sent in-order. */
cpu_index = ((__force unsigned int)key) % cpumask_weight(cpu_online_mask);
cb_cpu = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask);
for (cpu = 0; cpu < cpu_index; ++cpu)
cb_cpu = cpumask_next(cb_cpu, cpu_online_mask);
return cb_cpu;
}
#endif
int packet_create_data(struct sk_buff *skb, struct wireguard_peer *peer, void(*callback)(struct sk_buff *, struct wireguard_peer *), bool parallel)
{
int ret = -ENOKEY;
struct noise_keypair *keypair;
struct packet_data_encryption_ctx *ctx = NULL;
u64 nonce;
struct sk_buff *trailer = NULL;
size_t plaintext_len, padding_len, trailer_len;
unsigned int num_frags;
rcu_read_lock();
keypair = rcu_dereference(peer->keypairs.current_keypair);
if (unlikely(!keypair))
goto err_rcu;
kref_get(&keypair->refcount);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (unlikely(!get_encryption_nonce(&nonce, &keypair->sending)))
goto err;
padding_len = skb_padding(skb);
trailer_len = padding_len + noise_encrypted_len(0);
plaintext_len = skb->len + padding_len;
/* Expand data section to have room for padding and auth tag */
ret = skb_cow_data(skb, trailer_len, &trailer);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
goto err;
num_frags = ret;
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (unlikely(num_frags > 128))
goto err;
/* Set the padding to zeros, and make sure it and the auth tag are part of the skb */
memset(skb_tail_pointer(trailer), 0, padding_len);
/* Expand head section to have room for our header and the network stack's headers,
* plus our key and nonce in the head. */
ret = skb_cow_head(skb, DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
goto err;
ctx = (struct packet_data_encryption_ctx *)skb->head;
ctx->skb = skb;
ctx->callback = callback;
ctx->peer = peer;
ctx->num_frags = num_frags;
ctx->trailer_len = trailer_len;
ctx->trailer = trailer;
ctx->plaintext_len = plaintext_len;
ctx->nonce = nonce;
ctx->keypair = keypair;
#ifdef CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PARALLEL
if (parallel && cpumask_weight(cpu_online_mask) > 1) {
unsigned int cpu = choose_cpu(keypair->remote_index);
ret = start_encryption(peer->device->parallel_send, &ctx->padata, cpu);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
goto err;
} else
#endif
{
skb_encrypt(skb, ctx);
skb_reset(skb);
callback(skb, peer);
}
return 0;
err:
noise_keypair_put(keypair);
return ret;
err_rcu:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
struct packet_data_decryption_ctx {
struct padata_priv padata;
struct sk_buff *skb;
void (*callback)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct wireguard_peer *, struct sockaddr_storage *, bool used_new_key, int err);
struct noise_keypair *keypair;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
uint64_t nonce;
unsigned int num_frags;
int ret;
};
static void begin_decrypt_packet(struct packet_data_decryption_ctx *ctx)
{
if (unlikely(!skb_decrypt(ctx->skb, ctx->num_frags, ctx->nonce, &ctx->keypair->receiving)))
goto err;
skb_reset(ctx->skb);
ctx->ret = 0;
return;
err:
ctx->ret = -ENOKEY;
peer_put(ctx->keypair->entry.peer);
}
static void finish_decrypt_packet(struct packet_data_decryption_ctx *ctx)
{
struct noise_keypairs *keypairs;
bool used_new_key = false;
int ret = ctx->ret;
if (ret)
goto err;
keypairs = &ctx->keypair->entry.peer->keypairs;
ret = counter_validate(&ctx->keypair->receiving.counter, ctx->nonce) ? 0 : -ERANGE;
if (likely(!ret))
used_new_key = noise_received_with_keypair(&ctx->keypair->entry.peer->keypairs, ctx->keypair);
else {
net_dbg_ratelimited("Packet has invalid nonce %Lu (max %Lu)\n", ctx->nonce, ctx->keypair->receiving.counter.receive.counter);
peer_put(ctx->keypair->entry.peer);
goto err;
}
noise_keypair_put(ctx->keypair);
ctx->callback(ctx->skb, ctx->keypair->entry.peer, &ctx->addr, used_new_key, 0);
return;
err:
noise_keypair_put(ctx->keypair);
ctx->callback(ctx->skb, NULL, NULL, false, ret);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PARALLEL
static void do_decryption(struct padata_priv *padata)
{
struct packet_data_decryption_ctx *ctx = container_of(padata, struct packet_data_decryption_ctx, padata);
begin_decrypt_packet(ctx);
padata_do_serial(padata);
}
static void finish_decryption(struct padata_priv *padata)
{
struct packet_data_decryption_ctx *ctx = container_of(padata, struct packet_data_decryption_ctx, padata);
finish_decrypt_packet(ctx);
kfree(ctx);
}
static inline int start_decryption(struct padata_instance *padata, struct padata_priv *priv, int cb_cpu)
{
priv->parallel = do_decryption;
priv->serial = finish_decryption;
return padata_do_parallel(padata, priv, cb_cpu);
}
#endif
void packet_consume_data(struct sk_buff *skb, size_t offset, struct wireguard_device *wg, void(*callback)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct wireguard_peer *, struct sockaddr_storage *, bool used_new_key, int err))
{
int ret;
struct sockaddr_storage addr = { 0 };
unsigned int num_frags;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
struct message_data *header;
struct noise_keypair *keypair;
uint64_t nonce;
__le32 idx;
ret = socket_addr_from_skb(&addr, skb);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
goto err;
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, offset + sizeof(struct message_data))))
goto err;
header = (struct message_data *)(skb->data + offset);
offset += sizeof(struct message_data);
skb_pull(skb, offset);
idx = header->key_idx;
nonce = le64_to_cpu(header->counter);
ret = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
goto err;
num_frags = ret;
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (unlikely(num_frags > 128))
goto err;
ret = -EINVAL;
rcu_read_lock();
keypair = (struct noise_keypair *)index_hashtable_lookup(&wg->index_hashtable, INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR, idx);
if (unlikely(!keypair)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto err;
}
kref_get(&keypair->refcount);
rcu_read_unlock();
#ifdef CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PARALLEL
if (cpumask_weight(cpu_online_mask) > 1) {
struct packet_data_decryption_ctx *ctx;
unsigned int cpu = choose_cpu(idx);
ret = -ENOMEM;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct packet_data_decryption_ctx), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!ctx))
goto err_peer;
ctx->skb = skb;
ctx->keypair = keypair;
ctx->callback = callback;
ctx->nonce = nonce;
ctx->num_frags = num_frags;
ctx->addr = addr;
ret = start_decryption(wg->parallel_receive, &ctx->padata, cpu);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
kfree(ctx);
goto err_peer;
}
} else
#endif
{
struct packet_data_decryption_ctx ctx = {
.skb = skb,
.keypair = keypair,
.callback = callback,
.nonce = nonce,
.num_frags = num_frags,
.addr = addr
};
begin_decrypt_packet(&ctx);
finish_decrypt_packet(&ctx);
}
return;
#ifdef CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PARALLEL
err_peer:
peer_put(keypair->entry.peer);
noise_keypair_put(keypair);
#endif
err:
callback(skb, NULL, NULL, false, ret);
}
|