diff options
author | Victor Orlikowski <vjo@duke.edu> | 2016-08-23 16:43:01 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | FUJITA Tomonori <fujita.tomonori@lab.ntt.co.jp> | 2016-08-25 15:04:25 +0900 |
commit | 09644f186cf1b4eccb60ea37912fc2a79fd63e00 (patch) | |
tree | 04d68a4149a02aad65b9cfe65ea6bc023ffdad2b | |
parent | ba1fb5cf062ffe0f6402217ea8b7a147a76074af (diff) |
Validate OpenFlow message length in header, to prevent controller receive loop DoS
When the controller receive loop currently accepts an OpenFlow
message, it does not validate the message length. As a result, a
malicious or malfunctioning switch could cause send a message that
would result in the receive loop making no forward progress.
This patch ensures that the message length passed in the OpenFlow
message is validated against the specified minimum, and forced to that
value if it is smaller.
Thanks to Samuel Jero (at Purdue's Dependable and Secure Distributed
Systems Lab) for discovering this issue.
Signed-off-by: Victor J. Orlikowski <vjo@duke.edu>
Signed-off-by: FUJITA Tomonori <fujita.tomonori@lab.ntt.co.jp>
-rw-r--r-- | ryu/controller/controller.py | 26 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/ryu/controller/controller.py b/ryu/controller/controller.py index cf9deb99..8300f1a8 100644 --- a/ryu/controller/controller.py +++ b/ryu/controller/controller.py @@ -229,12 +229,15 @@ class Datapath(ofproto_protocol.ProtocolDesc): @_deactivate def _recv_loop(self): buf = bytearray() - required_len = ofproto_common.OFP_HEADER_SIZE - count = 0 + min_read_len = remaining_read_len = ofproto_common.OFP_HEADER_SIZE + while self.state != DEAD_DISPATCHER: try: - ret = self.socket.recv(required_len) + read_len = min_read_len + if (remaining_read_len > min_read_len): + read_len = remaining_read_len + ret = self.socket.recv(read_len) except SocketTimeout: continue except ssl.SSLError: @@ -248,10 +251,16 @@ class Datapath(ofproto_protocol.ProtocolDesc): break buf += ret - while len(buf) >= required_len: + buf_len = len(buf) + while buf_len >= min_read_len: (version, msg_type, msg_len, xid) = ofproto_parser.header(buf) - required_len = msg_len - if len(buf) < required_len: + if (msg_len < min_read_len): + # Someone isn't playing nicely; log it, and try something sane. + LOG.debug("Message with invalid length %s received from switch at address %s", + msg_len, self.address) + msg_len = min_read_len + if buf_len < msg_len: + remaining_read_len = (msg_len - buf_len) break msg = ofproto_parser.msg( @@ -268,8 +277,9 @@ class Datapath(ofproto_protocol.ProtocolDesc): for handler in handlers: handler(ev) - buf = buf[required_len:] - required_len = ofproto_common.OFP_HEADER_SIZE + buf = buf[msg_len:] + buf_len = len(buf) + remaining_read_len = min_read_len # We need to schedule other greenlets. Otherwise, ryu # can't accept new switches or handle the existing |