Implement memfd_create.

Memfds are simply anonymous tmpfs files with no associated
mounts. Also implementing file seals, which Linux only implements for
memfds at the moment.

PiperOrigin-RevId: 240450031
Change-Id: I31de78b950101ae8d7a13d0e93fe52d98ea06f2f

4 files changed, 212 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs/inode_file.go b/pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs/inode_file.go
index 25bf2b9dd..7c80d711b 100644
--- a/pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs/inode_file.go
+++ b/pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs/inode_file.go
@@ -15,10 +15,12 @@
 package tmpfs
 
 import (
+	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/abi/linux"
 	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/metric"
 	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/context"
 	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/fs"
@@ -29,6 +31,7 @@ import (
 	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/safemem"
 	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/usage"
 	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/usermem"
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/syserror"
 )
 
 var (
@@ -42,6 +45,8 @@ var (
 // These files are backed by pages allocated from a platform.Memory, and may be
 // directly mapped.
 //
+// Lock order: attrMu -> mapsMu -> dataMu.
+//
 // +stateify savable
 type fileInodeOperations struct {
 	fsutil.InodeGenericChecker `state:"nosave"`
@@ -74,6 +79,17 @@ type fileInodeOperations struct {
 	// mappings is protected by mapsMu.
 	mappings memmap.MappingSet
 
+	// writableMappingPages tracks how many pages of virtual memory are mapped
+	// as potentially writable from this file. If a page has multiple mappings,
+	// each mapping is counted separately.
+	//
+	// This counter is susceptible to overflow as we can potentially count
+	// mappings from many VMAs. We count pages rather than bytes to slightly
+	// mitigate this.
+	//
+	// Protected by mapsMu.
+	writableMappingPages uint64
+
 	dataMu sync.RWMutex `state:"nosave"`
 
 	// data maps offsets into the file to offsets into platform.Memory() that
@@ -81,6 +97,11 @@ type fileInodeOperations struct {
 	//
 	// data is protected by dataMu.
 	data fsutil.FileRangeSet
+
+	// seals represents file seals on this inode.
+	//
+	// Protected by dataMu.
+	seals uint32
 }
 
 var _ fs.InodeOperations = (*fileInodeOperations)(nil)
@@ -91,9 +112,30 @@ func NewInMemoryFile(ctx context.Context, usage usage.MemoryKind, uattr fs.Unsta
 		attr:     uattr,
 		kernel:   kernel.KernelFromContext(ctx),
 		memUsage: usage,
+		seals:    linux.F_SEAL_SEAL,
 	}
 }
 
+// NewMemfdInode creates a new inode backing a memfd. Memory used by the memfd
+// is backed by platform memory.
+func NewMemfdInode(ctx context.Context, allowSeals bool) *fs.Inode {
+	// Per Linux, mm/shmem.c:__shmem_file_setup(), memfd inodes are set up with
+	// S_IRWXUGO.
+	perms := fs.PermMask{Read: true, Write: true, Execute: true}
+	iops := NewInMemoryFile(ctx, usage.Tmpfs, fs.UnstableAttr{
+		Owner: fs.FileOwnerFromContext(ctx),
+		Perms: fs.FilePermissions{User: perms, Group: perms, Other: perms}}).(*fileInodeOperations)
+	if allowSeals {
+		iops.seals = 0
+	}
+	return fs.NewInode(iops, fs.NewNonCachingMountSource(nil, fs.MountSourceFlags{}), fs.StableAttr{
+		Type:      fs.RegularFile,
+		DeviceID:  tmpfsDevice.DeviceID(),
+		InodeID:   tmpfsDevice.NextIno(),
+		BlockSize: usermem.PageSize,
+	})
+}
+
 // Release implements fs.InodeOperations.Release.
 func (f *fileInodeOperations) Release(context.Context) {
 	f.dataMu.Lock()
@@ -170,6 +212,16 @@ func (f *fileInodeOperations) Truncate(ctx context.Context, _ *fs.Inode, size in
 
 	f.dataMu.Lock()
 	oldSize := f.attr.Size
+
+	// Check if current seals allow truncation.
+	switch {
+	case size > oldSize && f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_GROW != 0: // Grow sealed
+		fallthrough
+	case oldSize > size && f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_SHRINK != 0: // Shrink sealed
+		f.dataMu.Unlock()
+		return syserror.EPERM
+	}
+
 	if oldSize != size {
 		f.attr.Size = size
 		// Update mtime and ctime.
@@ -370,6 +422,34 @@ func (rw *fileReadWriter) WriteFromBlocks(srcs safemem.BlockSeq) (uint64, error)
 		return 0, nil
 	}
 
+	// Check if seals prevent either file growth or all writes.
+	switch {
+	case rw.f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_WRITE != 0: // Write sealed
+		return 0, syserror.EPERM
+	case end > rw.f.attr.Size && rw.f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_GROW != 0: // Grow sealed
+		// When growth is sealed, Linux effectively allows writes which would
+		// normally grow the file to partially succeed up to the current EOF,
+		// rounded down to the page boundary before the EOF.
+		//
+		// This happens because writes (and thus the growth check) for tmpfs
+		// files proceed page-by-page on Linux, and the final write to the page
+		// containing EOF fails, resulting in a partial write up to the start of
+		// that page.
+		//
+		// To emulate this behaviour, artifically truncate the write to the
+		// start of the page containing the current EOF.
+		//
+		// See Linux, mm/filemap.c:generic_perform_write() and
+		// mm/shmem.c:shmem_write_begin().
+		if pgstart := int64(usermem.Addr(rw.f.attr.Size).RoundDown()); end > pgstart {
+			end = pgstart
+		}
+		if end <= rw.offset {
+			// Truncation would result in no data being written.
+			return 0, syserror.EPERM
+		}
+	}
+
 	defer func() {
 		// If the write ends beyond the file's previous size, it causes the
 		// file to grow.
@@ -431,7 +511,27 @@ func (rw *fileReadWriter) WriteFromBlocks(srcs safemem.BlockSeq) (uint64, error)
 func (f *fileInodeOperations) AddMapping(ctx context.Context, ms memmap.MappingSpace, ar usermem.AddrRange, offset uint64, writable bool) error {
 	f.mapsMu.Lock()
 	defer f.mapsMu.Unlock()
+
+	f.dataMu.RLock()
+	defer f.dataMu.RUnlock()
+
+	// Reject writable mapping if F_SEAL_WRITE is set.
+	if f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_WRITE != 0 && writable {
+		return syserror.EPERM
+	}
+
 	f.mappings.AddMapping(ms, ar, offset, writable)
+	if writable {
+		pagesBefore := f.writableMappingPages
+
+		// ar is guaranteed to be page aligned per memmap.Mappable.
+		f.writableMappingPages += uint64(ar.Length() / usermem.PageSize)
+
+		if f.writableMappingPages < pagesBefore {
+			panic(fmt.Sprintf("Overflow while mapping potentially writable pages pointing to a tmpfs file. Before %v, after %v", pagesBefore, f.writableMappingPages))
+		}
+	}
+
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -439,7 +539,19 @@ func (f *fileInodeOperations) AddMapping(ctx context.Context, ms memmap.MappingS
 func (f *fileInodeOperations) RemoveMapping(ctx context.Context, ms memmap.MappingSpace, ar usermem.AddrRange, offset uint64, writable bool) {
 	f.mapsMu.Lock()
 	defer f.mapsMu.Unlock()
+
 	f.mappings.RemoveMapping(ms, ar, offset, writable)
+
+	if writable {
+		pagesBefore := f.writableMappingPages
+
+		// ar is guaranteed to be page aligned per memmap.Mappable.
+		f.writableMappingPages -= uint64(ar.Length() / usermem.PageSize)
+
+		if f.writableMappingPages > pagesBefore {
+			panic(fmt.Sprintf("Underflow while unmapping potentially writable pages pointing to a tmpfs file. Before %v, after %v", pagesBefore, f.writableMappingPages))
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 // CopyMapping implements memmap.Mappable.CopyMapping.
@@ -501,3 +613,42 @@ func (f *fileInodeOperations) Translate(ctx context.Context, required, optional
 func (f *fileInodeOperations) InvalidateUnsavable(ctx context.Context) error {
 	return nil
 }
+
+// GetSeals returns the current set of seals on a memfd inode.
+func GetSeals(inode *fs.Inode) (uint32, error) {
+	if f, ok := inode.InodeOperations.(*fileInodeOperations); ok {
+		f.dataMu.RLock()
+		defer f.dataMu.RUnlock()
+		return f.seals, nil
+	}
+	// Not a memfd inode.
+	return 0, syserror.EINVAL
+}
+
+// AddSeals adds new file seals to a memfd inode.
+func AddSeals(inode *fs.Inode, val uint32) error {
+	if f, ok := inode.InodeOperations.(*fileInodeOperations); ok {
+		f.mapsMu.Lock()
+		defer f.mapsMu.Unlock()
+		f.dataMu.Lock()
+		defer f.dataMu.Unlock()
+
+		if f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_SEAL != 0 {
+			// Seal applied which prevents addition of any new seals.
+			return syserror.EPERM
+		}
+
+		// F_SEAL_WRITE can only be added if there are no active writable maps.
+		if f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_WRITE == 0 && val&linux.F_SEAL_WRITE != 0 {
+			if f.writableMappingPages > 0 {
+				return syserror.EBUSY
+			}
+		}
+
+		// Seals can only be added, never removed.
+		f.seals |= val
+		return nil
+	}
+	// Not a memfd inode.
+	return syserror.EINVAL
+}
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/BUILD b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/BUILD
index 846601881..6e2843b36 100644
--- a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/BUILD
+++ b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/BUILD
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ go_library(
         "//pkg/sentry/fs/anon",
         "//pkg/sentry/fs/lock",
         "//pkg/sentry/fs/timerfd",
+        "//pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs",
         "//pkg/sentry/kernel",
         "//pkg/sentry/kernel/auth",
         "//pkg/sentry/kernel/epoll",
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/linux64.go b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/linux64.go
index e855590e6..888b5aa9f 100644
--- a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/linux64.go
+++ b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/linux64.go
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ var AMD64 = &kernel.SyscallTable{
 		//     316: Renameat2, TODO
 		317: Seccomp,
 		318: GetRandom,
-		//     319: MemfdCreate, TODO
+		319: MemfdCreate,
 		320: syscalls.CapError(linux.CAP_SYS_BOOT),  // KexecFileLoad, infeasible to support
 		321: syscalls.CapError(linux.CAP_SYS_ADMIN), // Bpf, requires cap_sys_admin for all commands
 		//     322: Execveat, TODO
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go
index cf6fdc190..3193718b5 100644
--- a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go
+++ b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import (
 	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/context"
 	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/fs"
 	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/fs/lock"
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs"
 	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel"
 	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/auth"
 	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/fasync"
@@ -933,6 +934,15 @@ func Fcntl(t *kernel.Task, args arch.SyscallArguments) (uintptr, *kernel.Syscall
 	case linux.F_SETOWN:
 		fSetOwn(t, file, args[2].Int())
 		return 0, nil, nil
+	case linux.F_GET_SEALS:
+		val, err := tmpfs.GetSeals(file.Dirent.Inode)
+		return uintptr(val), nil, err
+	case linux.F_ADD_SEALS:
+		if !file.Flags().Write {
+			return 0, nil, syserror.EPERM
+		}
+		err := tmpfs.AddSeals(file.Dirent.Inode, args[2].Uint())
+		return 0, nil, err
 	default:
 		// Everything else is not yet supported.
 		return 0, nil, syserror.EINVAL
@@ -2066,3 +2076,52 @@ func Sendfile(t *kernel.Task, args arch.SyscallArguments) (uintptr, *kernel.Sysc
 	// arbitrarily.
 	return uintptr(n), nil, handleIOError(t, n != 0, err, kernel.ERESTARTSYS, "sendfile", inFile)
 }
+
+const (
+	memfdPrefix     = "/memfd:"
+	memfdAllFlags   = uint32(linux.MFD_CLOEXEC | linux.MFD_ALLOW_SEALING)
+	memfdMaxNameLen = linux.NAME_MAX - len(memfdPrefix) + 1
+)
+
+// MemfdCreate implements the linux syscall memfd_create(2).
+func MemfdCreate(t *kernel.Task, args arch.SyscallArguments) (uintptr, *kernel.SyscallControl, error) {
+	addr := args[0].Pointer()
+	flags := args[1].Uint()
+
+	if flags&^memfdAllFlags != 0 {
+		// Unknown bits in flags.
+		return 0, nil, syserror.EINVAL
+	}
+
+	allowSeals := flags&linux.MFD_ALLOW_SEALING != 0
+	cloExec := flags&linux.MFD_CLOEXEC != 0
+
+	name, err := t.CopyInString(addr, syscall.PathMax-len(memfdPrefix))
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, nil, err
+	}
+	if len(name) > memfdMaxNameLen {
+		return 0, nil, syserror.EINVAL
+	}
+	name = memfdPrefix + name
+
+	inode := tmpfs.NewMemfdInode(t, allowSeals)
+	dirent := fs.NewDirent(inode, name)
+	// Per Linux, mm/shmem.c:__shmem_file_setup(), memfd files are set up with
+	// FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE.
+	file, err := inode.GetFile(t, dirent, fs.FileFlags{Read: true, Write: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, nil, err
+	}
+
+	defer dirent.DecRef()
+	defer file.DecRef()
+
+	fdFlags := kernel.FDFlags{CloseOnExec: cloExec}
+	newFD, err := t.FDMap().NewFDFrom(0, file, fdFlags, t.ThreadGroup().Limits())
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, nil, err
+	}
+
+	return uintptr(newFD), nil, nil
+}