summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffhomepage
path: root/pkg/sentry/socket/control/control.go
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorgVisor bot <gvisor-bot@google.com>2019-06-02 06:44:55 +0000
committergVisor bot <gvisor-bot@google.com>2019-06-02 06:44:55 +0000
commitceb0d792f328d1fc0692197d8856a43c3936a571 (patch)
tree83155f302eff44a78bcc30a3a08f4efe59a79379 /pkg/sentry/socket/control/control.go
parentdeb7ecf1e46862d54f4b102f2d163cfbcfc37f3b (diff)
parent216da0b733dbed9aad9b2ab92ac75bcb906fd7ee (diff)
Merge 216da0b7 (automated)
Diffstat (limited to 'pkg/sentry/socket/control/control.go')
-rw-r--r--pkg/sentry/socket/control/control.go421
1 files changed, 421 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/socket/control/control.go b/pkg/sentry/socket/control/control.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c0238691d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pkg/sentry/socket/control/control.go
@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The gVisor Authors.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+// Package control provides internal representations of socket control
+// messages.
+package control
+
+import (
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/abi/linux"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/binary"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/context"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/fs"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/auth"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/kdefs"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/socket/unix/transport"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/usermem"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/syserror"
+)
+
+const maxInt = int(^uint(0) >> 1)
+
+// SCMCredentials represents a SCM_CREDENTIALS socket control message.
+type SCMCredentials interface {
+ transport.CredentialsControlMessage
+
+ // Credentials returns properly namespaced values for the sender's pid, uid
+ // and gid.
+ Credentials(t *kernel.Task) (kernel.ThreadID, auth.UID, auth.GID)
+}
+
+// SCMRights represents a SCM_RIGHTS socket control message.
+type SCMRights interface {
+ transport.RightsControlMessage
+
+ // Files returns up to max RightsFiles.
+ //
+ // Returned files are consumed and ownership is transferred to the caller.
+ // Subsequent calls to Files will return the next files.
+ Files(ctx context.Context, max int) (rf RightsFiles, truncated bool)
+}
+
+// RightsFiles represents a SCM_RIGHTS socket control message. A reference is
+// maintained for each fs.File and is release either when an FD is created or
+// when the Release method is called.
+//
+// +stateify savable
+type RightsFiles []*fs.File
+
+// NewSCMRights creates a new SCM_RIGHTS socket control message representation
+// using local sentry FDs.
+func NewSCMRights(t *kernel.Task, fds []int32) (SCMRights, error) {
+ files := make(RightsFiles, 0, len(fds))
+ for _, fd := range fds {
+ file, _ := t.FDMap().GetDescriptor(kdefs.FD(fd))
+ if file == nil {
+ files.Release()
+ return nil, syserror.EBADF
+ }
+ files = append(files, file)
+ }
+ return &files, nil
+}
+
+// Files implements SCMRights.Files.
+func (fs *RightsFiles) Files(ctx context.Context, max int) (RightsFiles, bool) {
+ n := max
+ var trunc bool
+ if l := len(*fs); n > l {
+ n = l
+ } else if n < l {
+ trunc = true
+ }
+ rf := (*fs)[:n]
+ *fs = (*fs)[n:]
+ return rf, trunc
+}
+
+// Clone implements transport.RightsControlMessage.Clone.
+func (fs *RightsFiles) Clone() transport.RightsControlMessage {
+ nfs := append(RightsFiles(nil), *fs...)
+ for _, nf := range nfs {
+ nf.IncRef()
+ }
+ return &nfs
+}
+
+// Release implements transport.RightsControlMessage.Release.
+func (fs *RightsFiles) Release() {
+ for _, f := range *fs {
+ f.DecRef()
+ }
+ *fs = nil
+}
+
+// rightsFDs gets up to the specified maximum number of FDs.
+func rightsFDs(t *kernel.Task, rights SCMRights, cloexec bool, max int) ([]int32, bool) {
+ files, trunc := rights.Files(t, max)
+ fds := make([]int32, 0, len(files))
+ for i := 0; i < max && len(files) > 0; i++ {
+ fd, err := t.FDMap().NewFDFrom(0, files[0], kernel.FDFlags{cloexec}, t.ThreadGroup().Limits())
+ files[0].DecRef()
+ files = files[1:]
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Warningf("Error inserting FD: %v", err)
+ // This is what Linux does.
+ break
+ }
+
+ fds = append(fds, int32(fd))
+ }
+ return fds, trunc
+}
+
+// PackRights packs as many FDs as will fit into the unused capacity of buf.
+func PackRights(t *kernel.Task, rights SCMRights, cloexec bool, buf []byte, flags int) ([]byte, int) {
+ maxFDs := (cap(buf) - len(buf) - linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader) / 4
+ // Linux does not return any FDs if none fit.
+ if maxFDs <= 0 {
+ flags |= linux.MSG_CTRUNC
+ return buf, flags
+ }
+ fds, trunc := rightsFDs(t, rights, cloexec, maxFDs)
+ if trunc {
+ flags |= linux.MSG_CTRUNC
+ }
+ align := t.Arch().Width()
+ return putCmsg(buf, flags, linux.SCM_RIGHTS, align, fds)
+}
+
+// scmCredentials represents an SCM_CREDENTIALS socket control message.
+//
+// +stateify savable
+type scmCredentials struct {
+ t *kernel.Task
+ kuid auth.KUID
+ kgid auth.KGID
+}
+
+// NewSCMCredentials creates a new SCM_CREDENTIALS socket control message
+// representation.
+func NewSCMCredentials(t *kernel.Task, cred linux.ControlMessageCredentials) (SCMCredentials, error) {
+ tcred := t.Credentials()
+ kuid, err := tcred.UseUID(auth.UID(cred.UID))
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ kgid, err := tcred.UseGID(auth.GID(cred.GID))
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ if kernel.ThreadID(cred.PID) != t.ThreadGroup().ID() && !t.HasCapabilityIn(linux.CAP_SYS_ADMIN, t.PIDNamespace().UserNamespace()) {
+ return nil, syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ return &scmCredentials{t, kuid, kgid}, nil
+}
+
+// Equals implements transport.CredentialsControlMessage.Equals.
+func (c *scmCredentials) Equals(oc transport.CredentialsControlMessage) bool {
+ if oc, _ := oc.(*scmCredentials); oc != nil && *c == *oc {
+ return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+func putUint64(buf []byte, n uint64) []byte {
+ usermem.ByteOrder.PutUint64(buf[len(buf):len(buf)+8], n)
+ return buf[:len(buf)+8]
+}
+
+func putUint32(buf []byte, n uint32) []byte {
+ usermem.ByteOrder.PutUint32(buf[len(buf):len(buf)+4], n)
+ return buf[:len(buf)+4]
+}
+
+// putCmsg writes a control message header and as much data as will fit into
+// the unused capacity of a buffer.
+func putCmsg(buf []byte, flags int, msgType uint32, align uint, data []int32) ([]byte, int) {
+ space := AlignDown(cap(buf)-len(buf), 4)
+
+ // We can't write to space that doesn't exist, so if we are going to align
+ // the available space, we must align down.
+ //
+ // align must be >= 4 and each data int32 is 4 bytes. The length of the
+ // header is already aligned, so if we align to the with of the data there
+ // are two cases:
+ // 1. The aligned length is less than the length of the header. The
+ // unaligned length was also less than the length of the header, so we
+ // can't write anything.
+ // 2. The aligned length is greater than or equal to the length of the
+ // header. We can write the header plus zero or more datas. We can't write
+ // a partial int32, so the length of the message will be
+ // min(aligned length, header + datas).
+ if space < linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader {
+ flags |= linux.MSG_CTRUNC
+ return buf, flags
+ }
+
+ length := 4*len(data) + linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader
+ if length > space {
+ length = space
+ }
+ buf = putUint64(buf, uint64(length))
+ buf = putUint32(buf, linux.SOL_SOCKET)
+ buf = putUint32(buf, msgType)
+ for _, d := range data {
+ if len(buf)+4 > cap(buf) {
+ flags |= linux.MSG_CTRUNC
+ break
+ }
+ buf = putUint32(buf, uint32(d))
+ }
+ return alignSlice(buf, align), flags
+}
+
+func putCmsgStruct(buf []byte, msgType uint32, align uint, data interface{}) []byte {
+ if cap(buf)-len(buf) < linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader {
+ return buf
+ }
+ ob := buf
+
+ buf = putUint64(buf, uint64(linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader))
+ buf = putUint32(buf, linux.SOL_SOCKET)
+ buf = putUint32(buf, msgType)
+
+ hdrBuf := buf
+
+ buf = binary.Marshal(buf, usermem.ByteOrder, data)
+
+ // Check if we went over.
+ if cap(buf) != cap(ob) {
+ return hdrBuf
+ }
+
+ // Fix up length.
+ putUint64(ob, uint64(len(buf)-len(ob)))
+
+ return alignSlice(buf, align)
+}
+
+// Credentials implements SCMCredentials.Credentials.
+func (c *scmCredentials) Credentials(t *kernel.Task) (kernel.ThreadID, auth.UID, auth.GID) {
+ // "When a process's user and group IDs are passed over a UNIX domain
+ // socket to a process in a different user namespace (see the description
+ // of SCM_CREDENTIALS in unix(7)), they are translated into the
+ // corresponding values as per the receiving process's user and group ID
+ // mappings." - user_namespaces(7)
+ pid := t.PIDNamespace().IDOfTask(c.t)
+ uid := c.kuid.In(t.UserNamespace()).OrOverflow()
+ gid := c.kgid.In(t.UserNamespace()).OrOverflow()
+
+ return pid, uid, gid
+}
+
+// PackCredentials packs the credentials in the control message (or default
+// credentials if none) into a buffer.
+func PackCredentials(t *kernel.Task, creds SCMCredentials, buf []byte, flags int) ([]byte, int) {
+ align := t.Arch().Width()
+
+ // Default credentials if none are available.
+ pid := kernel.ThreadID(0)
+ uid := auth.UID(auth.NobodyKUID)
+ gid := auth.GID(auth.NobodyKGID)
+
+ if creds != nil {
+ pid, uid, gid = creds.Credentials(t)
+ }
+ c := []int32{int32(pid), int32(uid), int32(gid)}
+ return putCmsg(buf, flags, linux.SCM_CREDENTIALS, align, c)
+}
+
+// AlignUp rounds a length up to an alignment. align must be a power of 2.
+func AlignUp(length int, align uint) int {
+ return (length + int(align) - 1) & ^(int(align) - 1)
+}
+
+// AlignDown rounds a down to an alignment. align must be a power of 2.
+func AlignDown(length int, align uint) int {
+ return length & ^(int(align) - 1)
+}
+
+// alignSlice extends a slice's length (up to the capacity) to align it.
+func alignSlice(buf []byte, align uint) []byte {
+ aligned := AlignUp(len(buf), align)
+ if aligned > cap(buf) {
+ // Linux allows unaligned data if there isn't room for alignment.
+ // Since there isn't room for alignment, there isn't room for any
+ // additional messages either.
+ return buf
+ }
+ return buf[:aligned]
+}
+
+// PackTimestamp packs a SO_TIMESTAMP socket control message.
+func PackTimestamp(t *kernel.Task, timestamp int64, buf []byte) []byte {
+ return putCmsgStruct(
+ buf,
+ linux.SO_TIMESTAMP,
+ t.Arch().Width(),
+ linux.NsecToTimeval(timestamp),
+ )
+}
+
+// Parse parses a raw socket control message into portable objects.
+func Parse(t *kernel.Task, socketOrEndpoint interface{}, buf []byte) (transport.ControlMessages, error) {
+ var (
+ fds linux.ControlMessageRights
+
+ haveCreds bool
+ creds linux.ControlMessageCredentials
+ )
+
+ for i := 0; i < len(buf); {
+ if i+linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader > len(buf) {
+ return transport.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+
+ var h linux.ControlMessageHeader
+ binary.Unmarshal(buf[i:i+linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader], usermem.ByteOrder, &h)
+
+ if h.Length < uint64(linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader) {
+ return transport.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+ if h.Length > uint64(len(buf)-i) {
+ return transport.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+ if h.Level != linux.SOL_SOCKET {
+ return transport.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+
+ i += linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader
+ length := int(h.Length) - linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader
+
+ // The use of t.Arch().Width() is analogous to Linux's use of
+ // sizeof(long) in CMSG_ALIGN.
+ width := t.Arch().Width()
+
+ switch h.Type {
+ case linux.SCM_RIGHTS:
+ rightsSize := AlignDown(length, linux.SizeOfControlMessageRight)
+ numRights := rightsSize / linux.SizeOfControlMessageRight
+
+ if len(fds)+numRights > linux.SCM_MAX_FD {
+ return transport.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+
+ for j := i; j < i+rightsSize; j += linux.SizeOfControlMessageRight {
+ fds = append(fds, int32(usermem.ByteOrder.Uint32(buf[j:j+linux.SizeOfControlMessageRight])))
+ }
+
+ i += AlignUp(length, width)
+
+ case linux.SCM_CREDENTIALS:
+ if length < linux.SizeOfControlMessageCredentials {
+ return transport.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+
+ binary.Unmarshal(buf[i:i+linux.SizeOfControlMessageCredentials], usermem.ByteOrder, &creds)
+ haveCreds = true
+ i += AlignUp(length, width)
+
+ default:
+ // Unknown message type.
+ return transport.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+ }
+
+ var credentials SCMCredentials
+ if haveCreds {
+ var err error
+ if credentials, err = NewSCMCredentials(t, creds); err != nil {
+ return transport.ControlMessages{}, err
+ }
+ } else {
+ credentials = makeCreds(t, socketOrEndpoint)
+ }
+
+ var rights SCMRights
+ if len(fds) > 0 {
+ var err error
+ if rights, err = NewSCMRights(t, fds); err != nil {
+ return transport.ControlMessages{}, err
+ }
+ }
+
+ if credentials == nil && rights == nil {
+ return transport.ControlMessages{}, nil
+ }
+
+ return transport.ControlMessages{Credentials: credentials, Rights: rights}, nil
+}
+
+func makeCreds(t *kernel.Task, socketOrEndpoint interface{}) SCMCredentials {
+ if t == nil || socketOrEndpoint == nil {
+ return nil
+ }
+ if cr, ok := socketOrEndpoint.(transport.Credentialer); ok && (cr.Passcred() || cr.ConnectedPasscred()) {
+ tcred := t.Credentials()
+ return &scmCredentials{t, tcred.EffectiveKUID, tcred.EffectiveKGID}
+ }
+ return nil
+}
+
+// New creates default control messages if needed.
+func New(t *kernel.Task, socketOrEndpoint interface{}, rights SCMRights) transport.ControlMessages {
+ return transport.ControlMessages{
+ Credentials: makeCreds(t, socketOrEndpoint),
+ Rights: rights,
+ }
+}