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authorMatt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>2013-11-14 22:05:47 +0800
committerMatt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>2013-11-14 22:05:47 +0800
commitcbe63bbabe5628e29fde8f30702d90e975fc75fb (patch)
tree031dc6a493f7f3813b81ec3d44819f8307c25964 /random.c
parentde1deaf0bde9c0e67932420117caeb390f8ead98 (diff)
rename random.h to dbrandom.h since some OSes have a system random.h
--HG-- rename : random.c => dbrandom.c rename : random.h => dbrandom.h
Diffstat (limited to 'random.c')
-rw-r--r--random.c312
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 312 deletions
diff --git a/random.c b/random.c
deleted file mode 100644
index cc448ec..0000000
--- a/random.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,312 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Dropbear - a SSH2 server
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2002,2003 Matt Johnston
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
- * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
- * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
- * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
- * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
- * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
- *
- * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
- * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
- * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
- * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
- * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
- * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
- * SOFTWARE. */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "dbutil.h"
-#include "bignum.h"
-#include "random.h"
-
-
-/* this is used to generate unique output from the same hashpool */
-static uint32_t counter = 0;
-/* the max value for the counter, so it won't integer overflow */
-#define MAX_COUNTER 1<<30
-
-static unsigned char hashpool[SHA1_HASH_SIZE] = {0};
-static int donerandinit = 0;
-
-#define INIT_SEED_SIZE 32 /* 256 bits */
-
-/* The basic setup is we read some data from /dev/(u)random or prngd and hash it
- * into hashpool. To read data, we hash together current hashpool contents,
- * and a counter. We feed more data in by hashing the current pool and new
- * data into the pool.
- *
- * It is important to ensure that counter doesn't wrap around before we
- * feed in new entropy.
- *
- */
-
-/* Pass len=0 to hash an entire file */
-static int
-process_file(hash_state *hs, const char *filename,
- unsigned int len, int prngd)
-{
- static int already_blocked = 0;
- int readfd;
- unsigned int readcount;
- int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
-
-#ifdef DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET
- if (prngd)
- {
- readfd = connect_unix(filename);
- }
- else
-#endif
- {
- readfd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
- }
-
- if (readfd < 0) {
- goto out;
- }
-
- readcount = 0;
- while (len == 0 || readcount < len)
- {
- int readlen, wantread;
- unsigned char readbuf[4096];
- if (!already_blocked && !prngd)
- {
- int res;
- struct timeval timeout;
- fd_set read_fds;
-
- timeout.tv_sec = 2;
- timeout.tv_usec = 0;
-
- FD_ZERO(&read_fds);
- FD_SET(readfd, &read_fds);
- res = select(readfd + 1, &read_fds, NULL, NULL, &timeout);
- if (res == 0)
- {
- dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Reading the randomness source '%s' seems to have blocked.\nYou may need to find a better entropy source.", filename);
- already_blocked = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (len == 0)
- {
- wantread = sizeof(readbuf);
- }
- else
- {
- wantread = MIN(sizeof(readbuf), len-readcount);
- }
-
-#ifdef DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET
- if (prngd)
- {
- char egdcmd[2];
- egdcmd[0] = 0x02; /* blocking read */
- egdcmd[1] = (unsigned char)wantread;
- if (write(readfd, egdcmd, 2) < 0)
- {
- dropbear_exit("Can't send command to egd");
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- readlen = read(readfd, readbuf, wantread);
- if (readlen <= 0) {
- if (readlen < 0 && errno == EINTR) {
- continue;
- }
- if (readlen == 0 && len == 0)
- {
- /* whole file was read as requested */
- break;
- }
- goto out;
- }
- sha1_process(hs, readbuf, readlen);
- readcount += readlen;
- }
- ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
-out:
- close(readfd);
- return ret;
-}
-
-void addrandom(char * buf, unsigned int len)
-{
- hash_state hs;
-
- /* hash in the new seed data */
- sha1_init(&hs);
- /* existing state (zeroes on startup) */
- sha1_process(&hs, (void*)hashpool, sizeof(hashpool));
-
- /* new */
- sha1_process(&hs, buf, len);
- sha1_done(&hs, hashpool);
-}
-
-static void write_urandom()
-{
-#ifndef DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET
- /* This is opportunistic, don't worry about failure */
- unsigned char buf[INIT_SEED_SIZE];
- FILE *f = fopen(DROPBEAR_URANDOM_DEV, "w");
- if (!f) {
- return;
- }
- genrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
- fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, f);
- fclose(f);
-#endif
-}
-
-/* Initialise the prng from /dev/urandom or prngd. This function can
- * be called multiple times */
-void seedrandom() {
-
- hash_state hs;
-
- pid_t pid;
- struct timeval tv;
- clock_t clockval;
-
- /* hash in the new seed data */
- sha1_init(&hs);
- /* existing state */
- sha1_process(&hs, (void*)hashpool, sizeof(hashpool));
-
-#ifdef DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET
- if (process_file(&hs, DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET, INIT_SEED_SIZE, 1)
- != DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
- dropbear_exit("Failure reading random device %s",
- DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET);
- }
-#else
- /* non-blocking random source (probably /dev/urandom) */
- if (process_file(&hs, DROPBEAR_URANDOM_DEV, INIT_SEED_SIZE, 0)
- != DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
- dropbear_exit("Failure reading random device %s",
- DROPBEAR_URANDOM_DEV);
- }
-#endif
-
- /* A few other sources to fall back on.
- * Add more here for other platforms */
-#ifdef __linux__
- /* Seems to be a reasonable source of entropy from timers. Possibly hard
- * for even local attackers to reproduce */
- process_file(&hs, "/proc/timer_list", 0, 0);
- /* Might help on systems with wireless */
- process_file(&hs, "/proc/interrupts", 0, 0);
-
- process_file(&hs, "/proc/loadavg", 0, 0);
- process_file(&hs, "/proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail", 0, 0);
-
- /* Mostly network visible but useful in some situations.
- * Limit size to avoid slowdowns on systems with lots of routes */
- process_file(&hs, "/proc/net/netstat", 4096, 0);
- process_file(&hs, "/proc/net/dev", 4096, 0);
- process_file(&hs, "/proc/net/tcp", 4096, 0);
- /* Also includes interface lo */
- process_file(&hs, "/proc/net/rt_cache", 4096, 0);
- process_file(&hs, "/proc/vmstat", 0, 0);
-#endif
-
- pid = getpid();
- sha1_process(&hs, (void*)&pid, sizeof(pid));
-
- /* gettimeofday() doesn't completely fill out struct timeval on
- OS X (10.8.3), avoid valgrind warnings by clearing it first */
- memset(&tv, 0x0, sizeof(tv));
- gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
- sha1_process(&hs, (void*)&tv, sizeof(tv));
-
- clockval = clock();
- sha1_process(&hs, (void*)&clockval, sizeof(clockval));
-
- /* When a private key is read by the client or server it will
- * be added to the hashpool - see runopts.c */
-
- sha1_done(&hs, hashpool);
-
- counter = 0;
- donerandinit = 1;
-
- /* Feed it all back into /dev/urandom - this might help if Dropbear
- * is running from inetd and gets new state each time */
- write_urandom();
-}
-
-/* return len bytes of pseudo-random data */
-void genrandom(unsigned char* buf, unsigned int len) {
-
- hash_state hs;
- unsigned char hash[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
- unsigned int copylen;
-
- if (!donerandinit) {
- dropbear_exit("seedrandom not done");
- }
-
- while (len > 0) {
- sha1_init(&hs);
- sha1_process(&hs, (void*)hashpool, sizeof(hashpool));
- sha1_process(&hs, (void*)&counter, sizeof(counter));
- sha1_done(&hs, hash);
-
- counter++;
- if (counter > MAX_COUNTER) {
- seedrandom();
- }
-
- copylen = MIN(len, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
- memcpy(buf, hash, copylen);
- len -= copylen;
- buf += copylen;
- }
- m_burn(hash, sizeof(hash));
-}
-
-/* Generates a random mp_int.
- * max is a *mp_int specifying an upper bound.
- * rand must be an initialised *mp_int for the result.
- * the result rand satisfies: 0 < rand < max
- * */
-void gen_random_mpint(mp_int *max, mp_int *rand) {
-
- unsigned char *randbuf = NULL;
- unsigned int len = 0;
- const unsigned char masks[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
-
- const int size_bits = mp_count_bits(max);
-
- len = size_bits / 8;
- if ((size_bits % 8) != 0) {
- len += 1;
- }
-
- randbuf = (unsigned char*)m_malloc(len);
- do {
- genrandom(randbuf, len);
- /* Mask out the unrequired bits - mp_read_unsigned_bin expects
- * MSB first.*/
- randbuf[0] &= masks[size_bits % 8];
-
- bytes_to_mp(rand, randbuf, len);
-
- /* keep regenerating until we get one satisfying
- * 0 < rand < max */
- } while (mp_cmp(rand, max) != MP_LT);
- m_burn(randbuf, len);
- m_free(randbuf);
-}