diff options
author | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> | 2013-11-14 22:05:47 +0800 |
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committer | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> | 2013-11-14 22:05:47 +0800 |
commit | cbe63bbabe5628e29fde8f30702d90e975fc75fb (patch) | |
tree | 031dc6a493f7f3813b81ec3d44819f8307c25964 /random.c | |
parent | de1deaf0bde9c0e67932420117caeb390f8ead98 (diff) |
rename random.h to dbrandom.h since some OSes have a system random.h
--HG--
rename : random.c => dbrandom.c
rename : random.h => dbrandom.h
Diffstat (limited to 'random.c')
-rw-r--r-- | random.c | 312 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 312 deletions
diff --git a/random.c b/random.c deleted file mode 100644 index cc448ec..0000000 --- a/random.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,312 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Dropbear - a SSH2 server - * - * Copyright (c) 2002,2003 Matt Johnston - * All rights reserved. - * - * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy - * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal - * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights - * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell - * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is - * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: - * - * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in - * all copies or substantial portions of the Software. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, - * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE - * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, - * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE - * SOFTWARE. */ - -#include "includes.h" -#include "buffer.h" -#include "dbutil.h" -#include "bignum.h" -#include "random.h" - - -/* this is used to generate unique output from the same hashpool */ -static uint32_t counter = 0; -/* the max value for the counter, so it won't integer overflow */ -#define MAX_COUNTER 1<<30 - -static unsigned char hashpool[SHA1_HASH_SIZE] = {0}; -static int donerandinit = 0; - -#define INIT_SEED_SIZE 32 /* 256 bits */ - -/* The basic setup is we read some data from /dev/(u)random or prngd and hash it - * into hashpool. To read data, we hash together current hashpool contents, - * and a counter. We feed more data in by hashing the current pool and new - * data into the pool. - * - * It is important to ensure that counter doesn't wrap around before we - * feed in new entropy. - * - */ - -/* Pass len=0 to hash an entire file */ -static int -process_file(hash_state *hs, const char *filename, - unsigned int len, int prngd) -{ - static int already_blocked = 0; - int readfd; - unsigned int readcount; - int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE; - -#ifdef DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET - if (prngd) - { - readfd = connect_unix(filename); - } - else -#endif - { - readfd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); - } - - if (readfd < 0) { - goto out; - } - - readcount = 0; - while (len == 0 || readcount < len) - { - int readlen, wantread; - unsigned char readbuf[4096]; - if (!already_blocked && !prngd) - { - int res; - struct timeval timeout; - fd_set read_fds; - - timeout.tv_sec = 2; - timeout.tv_usec = 0; - - FD_ZERO(&read_fds); - FD_SET(readfd, &read_fds); - res = select(readfd + 1, &read_fds, NULL, NULL, &timeout); - if (res == 0) - { - dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Reading the randomness source '%s' seems to have blocked.\nYou may need to find a better entropy source.", filename); - already_blocked = 1; - } - } - - if (len == 0) - { - wantread = sizeof(readbuf); - } - else - { - wantread = MIN(sizeof(readbuf), len-readcount); - } - -#ifdef DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET - if (prngd) - { - char egdcmd[2]; - egdcmd[0] = 0x02; /* blocking read */ - egdcmd[1] = (unsigned char)wantread; - if (write(readfd, egdcmd, 2) < 0) - { - dropbear_exit("Can't send command to egd"); - } - } -#endif - - readlen = read(readfd, readbuf, wantread); - if (readlen <= 0) { - if (readlen < 0 && errno == EINTR) { - continue; - } - if (readlen == 0 && len == 0) - { - /* whole file was read as requested */ - break; - } - goto out; - } - sha1_process(hs, readbuf, readlen); - readcount += readlen; - } - ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS; -out: - close(readfd); - return ret; -} - -void addrandom(char * buf, unsigned int len) -{ - hash_state hs; - - /* hash in the new seed data */ - sha1_init(&hs); - /* existing state (zeroes on startup) */ - sha1_process(&hs, (void*)hashpool, sizeof(hashpool)); - - /* new */ - sha1_process(&hs, buf, len); - sha1_done(&hs, hashpool); -} - -static void write_urandom() -{ -#ifndef DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET - /* This is opportunistic, don't worry about failure */ - unsigned char buf[INIT_SEED_SIZE]; - FILE *f = fopen(DROPBEAR_URANDOM_DEV, "w"); - if (!f) { - return; - } - genrandom(buf, sizeof(buf)); - fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, f); - fclose(f); -#endif -} - -/* Initialise the prng from /dev/urandom or prngd. This function can - * be called multiple times */ -void seedrandom() { - - hash_state hs; - - pid_t pid; - struct timeval tv; - clock_t clockval; - - /* hash in the new seed data */ - sha1_init(&hs); - /* existing state */ - sha1_process(&hs, (void*)hashpool, sizeof(hashpool)); - -#ifdef DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET - if (process_file(&hs, DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET, INIT_SEED_SIZE, 1) - != DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { - dropbear_exit("Failure reading random device %s", - DROPBEAR_PRNGD_SOCKET); - } -#else - /* non-blocking random source (probably /dev/urandom) */ - if (process_file(&hs, DROPBEAR_URANDOM_DEV, INIT_SEED_SIZE, 0) - != DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { - dropbear_exit("Failure reading random device %s", - DROPBEAR_URANDOM_DEV); - } -#endif - - /* A few other sources to fall back on. - * Add more here for other platforms */ -#ifdef __linux__ - /* Seems to be a reasonable source of entropy from timers. Possibly hard - * for even local attackers to reproduce */ - process_file(&hs, "/proc/timer_list", 0, 0); - /* Might help on systems with wireless */ - process_file(&hs, "/proc/interrupts", 0, 0); - - process_file(&hs, "/proc/loadavg", 0, 0); - process_file(&hs, "/proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail", 0, 0); - - /* Mostly network visible but useful in some situations. - * Limit size to avoid slowdowns on systems with lots of routes */ - process_file(&hs, "/proc/net/netstat", 4096, 0); - process_file(&hs, "/proc/net/dev", 4096, 0); - process_file(&hs, "/proc/net/tcp", 4096, 0); - /* Also includes interface lo */ - process_file(&hs, "/proc/net/rt_cache", 4096, 0); - process_file(&hs, "/proc/vmstat", 0, 0); -#endif - - pid = getpid(); - sha1_process(&hs, (void*)&pid, sizeof(pid)); - - /* gettimeofday() doesn't completely fill out struct timeval on - OS X (10.8.3), avoid valgrind warnings by clearing it first */ - memset(&tv, 0x0, sizeof(tv)); - gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); - sha1_process(&hs, (void*)&tv, sizeof(tv)); - - clockval = clock(); - sha1_process(&hs, (void*)&clockval, sizeof(clockval)); - - /* When a private key is read by the client or server it will - * be added to the hashpool - see runopts.c */ - - sha1_done(&hs, hashpool); - - counter = 0; - donerandinit = 1; - - /* Feed it all back into /dev/urandom - this might help if Dropbear - * is running from inetd and gets new state each time */ - write_urandom(); -} - -/* return len bytes of pseudo-random data */ -void genrandom(unsigned char* buf, unsigned int len) { - - hash_state hs; - unsigned char hash[SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; - unsigned int copylen; - - if (!donerandinit) { - dropbear_exit("seedrandom not done"); - } - - while (len > 0) { - sha1_init(&hs); - sha1_process(&hs, (void*)hashpool, sizeof(hashpool)); - sha1_process(&hs, (void*)&counter, sizeof(counter)); - sha1_done(&hs, hash); - - counter++; - if (counter > MAX_COUNTER) { - seedrandom(); - } - - copylen = MIN(len, SHA1_HASH_SIZE); - memcpy(buf, hash, copylen); - len -= copylen; - buf += copylen; - } - m_burn(hash, sizeof(hash)); -} - -/* Generates a random mp_int. - * max is a *mp_int specifying an upper bound. - * rand must be an initialised *mp_int for the result. - * the result rand satisfies: 0 < rand < max - * */ -void gen_random_mpint(mp_int *max, mp_int *rand) { - - unsigned char *randbuf = NULL; - unsigned int len = 0; - const unsigned char masks[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f}; - - const int size_bits = mp_count_bits(max); - - len = size_bits / 8; - if ((size_bits % 8) != 0) { - len += 1; - } - - randbuf = (unsigned char*)m_malloc(len); - do { - genrandom(randbuf, len); - /* Mask out the unrequired bits - mp_read_unsigned_bin expects - * MSB first.*/ - randbuf[0] &= masks[size_bits % 8]; - - bytes_to_mp(rand, randbuf, len); - - /* keep regenerating until we get one satisfying - * 0 < rand < max */ - } while (mp_cmp(rand, max) != MP_LT); - m_burn(randbuf, len); - m_free(randbuf); -} |