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authorDenys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>2017-01-20 21:19:38 +0100
committerDenys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>2017-01-20 21:19:38 +0100
commit54b927d78bfdac54873513fb1dd992a7758d29c8 (patch)
tree52301746fefc809f05a76479d2d310fe2d15e402 /networking/tls.c
parent3916139ac4b9f60d7b958e5b2d88a277753dcc74 (diff)
tls: AES decrypt does one unnecessary memmove
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'networking/tls.c')
-rw-r--r--networking/tls.c25
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/networking/tls.c b/networking/tls.c
index 55ad2d83f..fb49b1523 100644
--- a/networking/tls.c
+++ b/networking/tls.c
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type)
xhdr->type = type;
xhdr->proto_maj = TLS_MAJ;
xhdr->proto_min = TLS_MIN;
- /* fake unencrypted record header len for MAC calculation */
+ /* fake unencrypted record len for MAC calculation */
xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8;
xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff;
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type)
// AES_128_CBC Block 16 16 16
// AES_256_CBC Block 32 16 16
- /* Build IV+content+MAC+padding in outbuf */
+ /* Fill IV and padding in outbuf */
tls_get_random(buf - AES_BLOCKSIZE, AES_BLOCKSIZE); /* IV */
dbg("before crypt: 5 hdr + %u data + %u hash bytes\n", size, SHA256_OUTSIZE);
// RFC is talking nonsense:
@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type)
// It's ok to have more than minimum padding, but we do minimum.
padding_length = (~size) & (AES_BLOCKSIZE - 1);
do {
- buf[size++] = padding_length; /* padding */
+ buf[size++] = padding_length; /* padding */
} while ((size & (AES_BLOCKSIZE - 1)) != 0);
/* Encrypt content+MAC+padding in place */
@@ -796,26 +796,23 @@ static int tls_xread_record(tls_state_t *tls)
) {
bb_error_msg_and_die("bad encrypted len:%u", sz);
}
- /* Decrypt content+MAC+padding in place */
+ /* Decrypt content+MAC+padding, moving it over IV in the process */
psAesInit(&ctx, p, /* IV */
tls->server_write_key, sizeof(tls->server_write_key)
);
+ sz -= AES_BLOCKSIZE; /* we will overwrite IV now */
psAesDecrypt(&ctx,
p + AES_BLOCKSIZE, /* ciphertext */
- p + AES_BLOCKSIZE, /* plaintext */
- sz - AES_BLOCKSIZE
+ p, /* plaintext */
+ sz
);
padding_len = p[sz - 1];
- dbg("encrypted size:%u type:0x%02x padding_length:0x%02x\n", sz, p[AES_BLOCKSIZE], padding_len);
+ dbg("encrypted size:%u type:0x%02x padding_length:0x%02x\n", sz, p[0], padding_len);
padding_len++;
- sz -= AES_BLOCKSIZE + SHA256_OUTSIZE + padding_len;
+ sz -= SHA256_OUTSIZE + padding_len; /* drop MAC and padding */
if (sz < 0) {
bb_error_msg_and_die("bad padding size:%u", padding_len);
}
- if (sz != 0) {
- /* Skip IV */
- memmove(tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN, tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN + AES_BLOCKSIZE, sz);
- }
} else {
/* if nonzero, then it's TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256: drop MAC */
/* else: no encryption yet on input, subtract zero = NOP */
@@ -828,8 +825,8 @@ static int tls_xread_record(tls_state_t *tls)
if (xhdr->type == RECORD_TYPE_ALERT && sz >= 2) {
uint8_t *p = tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN;
dbg("ALERT size:%d level:%d description:%d\n", sz, p[0], p[1]);
- if (p[0] == 1) { /*warning */
- if (p[1] == 0) { /* warning, close_notify: EOF */
+ if (p[0] == 1) { /* warning */
+ if (p[1] == 0) { /* "close_notify" warning: it's EOF */
dbg("EOF (TLS encoded) from peer\n");
sz = 0;
goto end;