diff options
author | Ladislav Michl <Ladislav.Michl@seznam.cz> | 2010-06-27 03:23:31 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> | 2010-06-27 03:23:31 +0200 |
commit | a73b87e9343df2a6f14e328a977e7b70eb3ed707 (patch) | |
tree | 564869bde93c870b20f6d4d8a3da71e42b629f2e /loginutils | |
parent | 1b14cdb27ca5e8104a824424731be430c8592dd6 (diff) |
*: s/"/bin/sh"/DEFAULT_SHELL, run_shell() API fix, remove unneeded strdup
function old new delta
run_shell 157 166 +9
su_main 477 470 -7
sulogin_main 515 503 -12
Signed-off-by: Ladislav Michl <Ladislav.Michl@seznam.cz>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'loginutils')
-rw-r--r-- | loginutils/login.c | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | loginutils/su.c | 57 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | loginutils/sulogin.c | 8 |
3 files changed, 40 insertions, 37 deletions
diff --git a/loginutils/login.c b/loginutils/login.c index 078cd68ed..88ed0af78 100644 --- a/loginutils/login.c +++ b/loginutils/login.c @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ int login_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) }; char *fromhost; char username[USERNAME_SIZE]; - const char *tmp; + const char *shell; int run_by_root; unsigned opt; int count = 0; @@ -389,10 +389,10 @@ int login_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) run_login_script(pw, full_tty); change_identity(pw); - tmp = pw->pw_shell; - if (!tmp || !*tmp) - tmp = DEFAULT_SHELL; - setup_environment(tmp, + shell = pw->pw_shell; + if (!shell || !shell[0]) + shell = DEFAULT_SHELL; + setup_environment(shell, (!(opt & LOGIN_OPT_p) * SETUP_ENV_CLEARENV) + SETUP_ENV_CHANGEENV, pw); @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ int login_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); /* Exec login shell with no additional parameters */ - run_shell(tmp, 1, NULL, NULL); + run_shell(shell, 1, NULL, NULL); /* return EXIT_FAILURE; - not reached */ } diff --git a/loginutils/su.c b/loginutils/su.c index af25655fd..9bae37551 100644 --- a/loginutils/su.c +++ b/loginutils/su.c @@ -10,23 +10,27 @@ #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_CHECKS_SHELLS /* Return 1 if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by - getusershell), else 0, meaning it is a standard shell. */ + * getusershell), else 0, meaning it is a standard shell. */ static int restricted_shell(const char *shell) { char *line; + int result = 1; /*setusershell(); - getusershell does it itself*/ while ((line = getusershell()) != NULL) { - if (/* *line != '#' && */ strcmp(line, shell) == 0) - return 0; + if (/* *line != '#' && */ strcmp(line, shell) == 0) { + result = 0; + break; + } } - endusershell(); - return 1; + if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP) + endusershell(); + return result; } #endif #define SU_OPT_mp (3) -#define SU_OPT_l (4) +#define SU_OPT_l (4) int su_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE; int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) @@ -38,7 +42,8 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) struct passwd *pw; uid_t cur_uid = getuid(); const char *tty; - char *old_user; + char user_buf[64]; + const char *old_user; flags = getopt32(argv, "mplc:s:", &opt_command, &opt_shell); //argc -= optind; @@ -56,21 +61,18 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) } if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) { - /* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to identify - * the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell. + /* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to + * identify the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell. * But getlogin can fail -- usually due to lack of utmp entry. * in this case resort to getpwuid. */ - const char *user; #if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP - char user_buf[64]; - user = user_buf; + old_user = user_buf; if (getlogin_r(user_buf, sizeof(user_buf)) != 0) #endif { pw = getpwuid(cur_uid); - user = pw ? pw->pw_name : ""; + old_user = pw ? xstrdup(pw->pw_name) : ""; } - old_user = xstrdup(user); tty = xmalloc_ttyname(2); if (!tty) { tty = "none"; @@ -80,13 +82,7 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) pw = xgetpwnam(opt_username); - /* Make sure pw->pw_shell is non-NULL. It may be NULL when NEW_USER - is a username that is retrieved via NIS (YP), but that doesn't have - a default shell listed. */ - if (!pw->pw_shell || !pw->pw_shell[0]) - pw->pw_shell = (char *)DEFAULT_SHELL; - - if ((cur_uid == 0) || correct_password(pw)) { + if (cur_uid == 0 || correct_password(pw)) { if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s", '+', tty, old_user, opt_username); @@ -99,21 +95,30 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) { closelog(); - free(old_user); } - if (!opt_shell && (flags & SU_OPT_mp)) + if (!opt_shell && (flags & SU_OPT_mp)) { + /* -s SHELL is not given, but "preserve env" opt is */ opt_shell = getenv("SHELL"); + } + + /* Make sure pw->pw_shell is non-NULL. It may be NULL when NEW_USER + * is a username that is retrieved via NIS (YP), that doesn't have + * a default shell listed. */ + if (!pw->pw_shell || !pw->pw_shell[0]) + pw->pw_shell = (char *)DEFAULT_SHELL; #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_CHECKS_SHELLS if (opt_shell && cur_uid != 0 && restricted_shell(pw->pw_shell)) { /* The user being su'd to has a nonstandard shell, and so is - probably a uucp account or has restricted access. Don't - compromise the account by allowing access with a standard - shell. */ + * probably a uucp account or has restricted access. Don't + * compromise the account by allowing access with a standard + * shell. */ bb_error_msg("using restricted shell"); opt_shell = NULL; } + /* else: user can run whatever he wants via "su -s PROG USER". + * This is safe since PROG is run under user's uid/gid. */ #endif if (!opt_shell) opt_shell = pw->pw_shell; diff --git a/loginutils/sulogin.c b/loginutils/sulogin.c index 6e3d3b019..3516013f1 100644 --- a/loginutils/sulogin.c +++ b/loginutils/sulogin.c @@ -101,11 +101,9 @@ int sulogin_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) shell = getenv("SUSHELL"); if (!shell) shell = getenv("sushell"); - if (!shell) { - shell = "/bin/sh"; - if (pwd->pw_shell[0]) - shell = pwd->pw_shell; - } + if (!shell) + shell = pwd->pw_shell; + /* Exec login shell with no additional parameters. Never returns. */ run_shell(shell, 1, NULL, NULL); |