/* Copyright 2015-2016 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. */ #include "noise.h" #include "device.h" #include "peer.h" #include "messages.h" #include "packets.h" #include "hashtables.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include /* This is RFC6479, a replay detection bitmap algorithm that avoids bitshifts */ static inline bool counter_validate(union noise_counter *counter, u64 their_counter) { bool ret = false; unsigned long index, index_current, top, i; spin_lock_bh(&counter->receive.lock); if (unlikely(counter->receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES + 1 || their_counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) goto out; ++their_counter; if (unlikely((COUNTER_WINDOW_SIZE + their_counter) < counter->receive.counter)) goto out; index = their_counter >> ilog2(COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS); if (likely(their_counter > counter->receive.counter)) { index_current = counter->receive.counter >> ilog2(COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS); top = min_t(unsigned long, index - index_current, COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG); for (i = 1; i <= top; ++i) counter->receive.backtrack[(i + index_current) & ((COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1)] = 0; counter->receive.counter = their_counter; } index &= (COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1; ret = !test_and_set_bit(their_counter & (COUNTER_REDUNDANT_BITS - 1), &counter->receive.backtrack[index]); out: spin_unlock_bh(&counter->receive.lock); return ret; } #include "selftest/counter.h" static inline size_t skb_padding(struct sk_buff *skb) { /* We do this modulo business with the MTU, just in case the networking layer * gives us a packet that's bigger than the MTU. Now that we support GSO, this * shouldn't be a real problem, and this can likely be removed. But, caution! */ size_t last_unit = skb->len % skb->dev->mtu; size_t padded_size = (last_unit + MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE - 1) & ~(MESSAGE_PADDING_MULTIPLE - 1); if (padded_size > skb->dev->mtu) padded_size = skb->dev->mtu; return padded_size - last_unit; } static inline void skb_reset(struct sk_buff *skb) { skb_scrub_packet(skb, false); memset(&skb->headers_start, 0, offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_end) - offsetof(struct sk_buff, headers_start)); skb->queue_mapping = 0; skb->nohdr = 0; skb->peeked = 0; skb->mac_len = 0; skb->dev = NULL; skb->hdr_len = skb_headroom(skb); skb->mac_header = (typeof(skb->mac_header))~0U; skb->transport_header = (typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U; skb_reset_network_header(skb); } static inline void skb_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct packet_data_encryption_ctx *ctx) { struct scatterlist sg[ctx->num_frags]; /* This should be bound to at most 128 by the caller. */ struct message_data *header; /* We have to remember to add the checksum to the innerpacket, in case the receiver forwards it. */ if (likely(!skb_checksum_setup(skb, true))) skb_checksum_help(skb); /* Only after checksumming can we safely add on the padding at the end and the header. */ header = (struct message_data *)skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct message_data)); header->header.type = MESSAGE_DATA; header->key_idx = ctx->keypair->remote_index; header->counter = cpu_to_le64(ctx->nonce); pskb_put(skb, ctx->trailer, ctx->trailer_len); /* Now we can encrypt the scattergather segments */ sg_init_table(sg, ctx->num_frags); skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct message_data), noise_encrypted_len(ctx->plaintext_len)); chacha20poly1305_encrypt_sg(sg, sg, ctx->plaintext_len, NULL, 0, ctx->nonce, ctx->keypair->sending.key); /* When we're done, we free the reference to the key pair */ noise_keypair_put(ctx->keypair); } static inline bool skb_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int num_frags, uint64_t nonce, struct noise_symmetric_key *key) { struct scatterlist sg[num_frags]; /* This should be bound to at most 128 by the caller. */ if (unlikely(!key)) return false; if (unlikely(!key->is_valid || time_is_before_eq_jiffies64(key->birthdate + REJECT_AFTER_TIME) || key->counter.receive.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { key->is_valid = false; return false; } sg_init_table(sg, num_frags); skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); if (!chacha20poly1305_decrypt_sg(sg, sg, skb->len, NULL, 0, nonce, key->key)) return false; return pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - noise_encrypted_len(0)) == 0; } static inline bool get_encryption_nonce(uint64_t *nonce, struct noise_symmetric_key *key) { if (unlikely(!key)) return false; if (unlikely(!key->is_valid || time_is_before_eq_jiffies64(key->birthdate + REJECT_AFTER_TIME))) { key->is_valid = false; return false; } *nonce = atomic64_inc_return(&key->counter.counter) - 1; if (*nonce >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES) { key->is_valid = false; return false; } return true; } #ifdef CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PARALLEL static void do_encryption(struct padata_priv *padata) { struct packet_data_encryption_ctx *ctx = container_of(padata, struct packet_data_encryption_ctx, padata); skb_encrypt(ctx->skb, ctx); skb_reset(ctx->skb); padata_do_serial(padata); } static void finish_encryption(struct padata_priv *padata) { struct packet_data_encryption_ctx *ctx = container_of(padata, struct packet_data_encryption_ctx, padata); ctx->callback(ctx->skb, ctx->peer); } static inline int start_encryption(struct padata_instance *padata, struct padata_priv *priv, int cb_cpu) { memset(priv, 0, sizeof(struct padata_priv)); priv->parallel = do_encryption; priv->serial = finish_encryption; return padata_do_parallel(padata, priv, cb_cpu); } static inline unsigned int choose_cpu(__le32 key) { unsigned int cpu_index, cpu, cb_cpu; /* This ensures that packets encrypted to the same key are sent in-order. */ cpu_index = ((__force unsigned int)key) % cpumask_weight(cpu_online_mask); cb_cpu = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask); for (cpu = 0; cpu < cpu_index; ++cpu) cb_cpu = cpumask_next(cb_cpu, cpu_online_mask); return cb_cpu; } #endif int packet_create_data(struct sk_buff *skb, struct wireguard_peer *peer, void(*callback)(struct sk_buff *, struct wireguard_peer *), bool parallel) { int ret = -ENOKEY; struct noise_keypair *keypair; struct packet_data_encryption_ctx *ctx = NULL; u64 nonce; struct sk_buff *trailer = NULL; size_t plaintext_len, padding_len, trailer_len; unsigned int num_frags; rcu_read_lock(); keypair = rcu_dereference(peer->keypairs.current_keypair); if (unlikely(!keypair)) goto err_rcu; kref_get(&keypair->refcount); rcu_read_unlock(); if (unlikely(!get_encryption_nonce(&nonce, &keypair->sending))) goto err; padding_len = skb_padding(skb); trailer_len = padding_len + noise_encrypted_len(0); plaintext_len = skb->len + padding_len; /* Expand data section to have room for padding and auth tag */ ret = skb_cow_data(skb, trailer_len, &trailer); if (unlikely(ret < 0)) goto err; num_frags = ret; ret = -ENOMEM; if (unlikely(num_frags > 128)) goto err; /* Set the padding to zeros, and make sure it and the auth tag are part of the skb */ memset(skb_tail_pointer(trailer), 0, padding_len); /* Expand head section to have room for our header and the network stack's headers, * plus our key and nonce in the head. */ ret = skb_cow_head(skb, DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM); if (unlikely(ret < 0)) goto err; ctx = (struct packet_data_encryption_ctx *)skb->head; ctx->skb = skb; ctx->callback = callback; ctx->peer = peer; ctx->num_frags = num_frags; ctx->trailer_len = trailer_len; ctx->trailer = trailer; ctx->plaintext_len = plaintext_len; ctx->nonce = nonce; ctx->keypair = keypair; #ifdef CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PARALLEL if ((parallel || padata_queue_len(peer->device->parallel_send) > 0) && cpumask_weight(cpu_online_mask) > 1) { unsigned int cpu = choose_cpu(keypair->remote_index); ret = start_encryption(peer->device->parallel_send, &ctx->padata, cpu); if (unlikely(ret < 0)) goto err; } else #endif { skb_encrypt(skb, ctx); skb_reset(skb); callback(skb, peer); } return 0; err: noise_keypair_put(keypair); return ret; err_rcu: rcu_read_unlock(); return ret; } struct packet_data_decryption_ctx { struct padata_priv padata; struct sk_buff *skb; void (*callback)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct wireguard_peer *, struct sockaddr_storage *, bool used_new_key, int err); struct noise_keypair *keypair; struct sockaddr_storage addr; uint64_t nonce; unsigned int num_frags; int ret; }; static void begin_decrypt_packet(struct packet_data_decryption_ctx *ctx) { if (unlikely(!skb_decrypt(ctx->skb, ctx->num_frags, ctx->nonce, &ctx->keypair->receiving))) goto err; skb_reset(ctx->skb); ctx->ret = 0; return; err: ctx->ret = -ENOKEY; peer_put(ctx->keypair->entry.peer); } static void finish_decrypt_packet(struct packet_data_decryption_ctx *ctx) { struct noise_keypairs *keypairs; bool used_new_key = false; int ret = ctx->ret; if (ret) goto err; keypairs = &ctx->keypair->entry.peer->keypairs; ret = counter_validate(&ctx->keypair->receiving.counter, ctx->nonce) ? 0 : -ERANGE; if (likely(!ret)) used_new_key = noise_received_with_keypair(&ctx->keypair->entry.peer->keypairs, ctx->keypair); else { net_dbg_ratelimited("Packet has invalid nonce %Lu (max %Lu)\n", ctx->nonce, ctx->keypair->receiving.counter.receive.counter); peer_put(ctx->keypair->entry.peer); goto err; } noise_keypair_put(ctx->keypair); ctx->callback(ctx->skb, ctx->keypair->entry.peer, &ctx->addr, used_new_key, 0); return; err: noise_keypair_put(ctx->keypair); ctx->callback(ctx->skb, NULL, NULL, false, ret); } #ifdef CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PARALLEL static void do_decryption(struct padata_priv *padata) { struct packet_data_decryption_ctx *ctx = container_of(padata, struct packet_data_decryption_ctx, padata); begin_decrypt_packet(ctx); padata_do_serial(padata); } static void finish_decryption(struct padata_priv *padata) { struct packet_data_decryption_ctx *ctx = container_of(padata, struct packet_data_decryption_ctx, padata); finish_decrypt_packet(ctx); kfree(ctx); } static inline int start_decryption(struct padata_instance *padata, struct padata_priv *priv, int cb_cpu) { priv->parallel = do_decryption; priv->serial = finish_decryption; return padata_do_parallel(padata, priv, cb_cpu); } #endif void packet_consume_data(struct sk_buff *skb, size_t offset, struct wireguard_device *wg, void(*callback)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct wireguard_peer *, struct sockaddr_storage *, bool used_new_key, int err)) { int ret; struct sockaddr_storage addr = { 0 }; unsigned int num_frags; struct sk_buff *trailer; struct message_data *header; struct noise_keypair *keypair; uint64_t nonce; __le32 idx; ret = socket_addr_from_skb(&addr, skb); if (unlikely(ret < 0)) goto err; ret = -ENOMEM; if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, offset + sizeof(struct message_data)))) goto err; header = (struct message_data *)(skb->data + offset); offset += sizeof(struct message_data); skb_pull(skb, offset); idx = header->key_idx; nonce = le64_to_cpu(header->counter); ret = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer); if (unlikely(ret < 0)) goto err; num_frags = ret; ret = -ENOMEM; if (unlikely(num_frags > 128)) goto err; ret = -EINVAL; rcu_read_lock(); keypair = (struct noise_keypair *)index_hashtable_lookup(&wg->index_hashtable, INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR, idx); if (unlikely(!keypair)) { rcu_read_unlock(); goto err; } kref_get(&keypair->refcount); rcu_read_unlock(); #ifdef CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PARALLEL if (cpumask_weight(cpu_online_mask) > 1) { struct packet_data_decryption_ctx *ctx; unsigned int cpu = choose_cpu(idx); ret = -ENOMEM; ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct packet_data_decryption_ctx), GFP_ATOMIC); if (unlikely(!ctx)) goto err_peer; ctx->skb = skb; ctx->keypair = keypair; ctx->callback = callback; ctx->nonce = nonce; ctx->num_frags = num_frags; ctx->addr = addr; ret = start_decryption(wg->parallel_receive, &ctx->padata, cpu); if (unlikely(ret)) { kfree(ctx); goto err_peer; } } else #endif { struct packet_data_decryption_ctx ctx = { .skb = skb, .keypair = keypair, .callback = callback, .nonce = nonce, .num_frags = num_frags, .addr = addr }; begin_decrypt_packet(&ctx); finish_decrypt_packet(&ctx); } return; #ifdef CONFIG_WIREGUARD_PARALLEL err_peer: peer_put(keypair->entry.peer); noise_keypair_put(keypair); #endif err: callback(skb, NULL, NULL, false, ret); }