Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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All locks are potentially between user context and softirq,
which means we need to take the _bh variant.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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If it's time to rekey, and the responder sends a message, the initator
will begin the rekeying when sending his response message. In the worst
case, this response message will actually just be the keepalive. This
generally works well, with the one edge case of the message arriving
less than 10 seconds before key expiration, in which the keepalive is
not sufficient. In this case, we simply rehandshake immediately.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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With the prior behavior, when sending a packet, we checked to see if it
was about time to start a new handshake, and if we were past a certain
time, we started it. For the responder, we made that time a bit further
in the future than for the initiator, to prevent the thundering herd
problem of them both starting at the same time. However, this was
flawed.
If both parties stopped communicating after 2.2 minutes, and then one
party decided to initiate a TCP connection before the 3 minute mark, the
currently open session would be used. However, because it was after the
2.2 minute mark, both peers would try to initiate a handshake upon
sending their first packet. The errant flow was as follows:
1. Peer A sends SYN.
2. Peer A sees that his key is getting old and initiates new handshake.
3. Peer B receives SYN and sends ACK.
4. Peer B sees that his key is getting old and initiates new handshake.
Since these events happened after the 2.2 minute mark, there's no delay
between handshake initiations, and problems begin. The new behavior is
changed to:
1. Peer A sends SYN.
2. Peer A sees that his key is getting old and initiates new handshake.
3. Peer B receives SYN and sends ACK.
4. Peer B sees that his key is getting old and schedules a delayed
handshake for 12.5 seconds in the future.
5. Peer B receives handshake initiation and cancels scheduled handshake.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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We're not leaking the DSCP, but we do deal with ECN.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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It should never be the case that skb->head + skb->transport_header -
skb->data is greater than 2^16, but in case the kernel network stack
borks this at some point in the future, we don't want this to slyly
introduce a vulnerability into WireGuard.
Further, really smart compilers might be able to make deductions about
data_offset, and optimize accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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