| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Reported-by: Christian Weiss <cwei@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Contributed-by: Martin Hauke <mardnh@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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This is a follow up to 2d4fa2a6e7903ec3340f1b075456cbd84ba6a744.
Upstream commit 2c64605b590edadb3fb46d1ec6badb49e940b479 has been backported
to 5.4.29 and 5.5.14.
Signed-off-by: Christian Hesse <mail@eworm.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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This backports upstream commit 2c64605b590edadb3fb46d1ec6badb49e940b479.
It makes no difference for us, but it's nice to keep this code in sync
with upstream as much as possible.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Slightly more meh, but upstream likes it better, and I'd rather minimize
the delta between trees.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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We precompute the static-static ECDH during configuration time, in order
to save an expensive computation later when receiving network packets.
However, not all ECDH computations yield a contributory result. Prior,
we were just not letting those peers be added to the interface. However,
this creates a strange inconsistency, since it was still possible to add
other weird points, like a valid public key plus a low-order point, and,
like points that result in zeros, a handshake would not complete. In
order to make the behavior more uniform and less surprising, simply
allow all peers to be added. Then, we'll error out later when doing the
crypto if there's an issue. This also adds more separation between the
crypto layer and the configuration layer.
Discussed-with: Mathias Hall-Andersen <mathias@hall-andersen.dk>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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The situation in which we wind up hitting the default case here
indicates a major bug in earlier parsing code. It is not a usual thing
that should ever happen, which means a "friendly" message for it doesn't
make sense. Rather, replace this with a WARN_ON, just like we do earlier
in the file for a similar situation, so that somebody sends us a bug
report and we can fix it.
Reported-by: Fabian Freyer <fabianfreyer@radicallyopensecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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We carry out checks to the effect of:
if (skb->protocol != wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb))
goto err;
By having wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr return 0 on failure, this
means that the check above still passes in the case where skb->protocol
is zero, which is possible to hit with AF_PACKET:
struct sockaddr_pkt saddr = { .spkt_device = "wg0" };
unsigned char buffer[5] = { 0 };
sendto(socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, /* skb->protocol = */ 0),
buffer, sizeof(buffer), 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&saddr, sizeof(saddr));
Additional checks mean that this isn't actually a problem in the code
base, but I could imagine it becoming a problem later if the function is
used more liberally.
I would prefer to fix this by having wg_examine_packet_protocol return a
32-bit ~0 value on failure, which will never match any value of
skb->protocol, which would simply change the generated code from a mov
to a movzx. However, sparse complains, and adding __force casts doesn't
seem like a good idea, so instead we just add a simple helper function
to check for the zero return value. Since wg_examine_packet_protocol
itself gets inlined, this winds up not adding an additional branch to
the generated code, since the 0 return value already happens in a
mergable branch.
Reported-by: Fabian Freyer <fabianfreyer@radicallyopensecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Reported-by: Vladimir Benes <vbenes@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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This causes problems with RAP and KERNEXEC for PaX, as r12 is a
reserved register.
It also leads to a more compact instruction encoding, saving about 100
cycles.
Suggested-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Reported-by: chotaire <chotaire@chotaire.net>
Signed-off-by: Luis Ressel <aranea@aixah.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Utter non-sense from way back when.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Fixes: 8906775b ("socket: synchronize net on socket tear down")
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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It turns out there's an easy way to get packets queued up while still
having an MTU of zero, and that's via persistent keep alive. This commit
makes sure that in whatever condition, we don't wind up dividing by
zero. Note that an MTU of zero for a wireguard interface is something
quasi-valid, so I don't think the correct fix is to limit it via
min_mtu. This can be reproduced easily with:
ip link add wg0 type wireguard
ip link add wg1 type wireguard
ip link set wg0 up mtu 0
ip link set wg1 up
wg set wg0 private-key <(wg genkey)
wg set wg1 listen-port 1 private-key <(wg genkey) peer $(wg show wg0 public-key)
wg set wg0 peer $(wg show wg1 public-key) persistent-keepalive 1 endpoint 127.0.0.1:1
However, while min_mtu=0 seems fine, it makes sense to restrict the
max_mtu. This commit also restricts the maximum MTU to the greatest
number for which rounding up to the padding multiple won't overflow a
signed integer. Packets this large were always rejected anyway
eventually, due to checks deeper in, but it seems more sound not to even
let the administrator configure something that won't work anyway.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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This is a small optimization that prevents more expensive comparisons
from happening when they are no longer necessary, by clearing the
last_under_load variable whenever we wind up in a state where we were
under load but we no longer are.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Suggested-by: Matt Dunwoodie <ncon@noconroy.net>
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This is a small test to ensure that icmp_ndo_send is actually doing the
right with with regards to the source address. It tests this by
ensuring that the error comes back along the right path.
Also, backport the new ndo function for this.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Ensure that peers with low order points are ignored, both in the case
where we already have a device private key and in the case where we do
not. This adds points that naturally give a zero output.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Without this, we wind up proceeding too early sometimes when the
previous process has just used the same listening port. So, we tie the
listening socket query to the specific pid we're interested in.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Our static-static calculation returns a failure if the public key is of
low order. We check for this when peers are added, and don't allow them
to be added if they're low order, except in the case where we haven't
yet been given a private key. In that case, we would defer the removal
of the peer until we're given a private key, since at that point we're
doing new static-static calculations which incur failures we can act on.
This meant, however, that we wound up removing peers rather late in the
configuration flow.
Syzkaller points out that peer_remove calls flush_workqueue, which in
turn might then wait for sending a handshake initiation to complete.
Since handshake initiation needs the static identity lock, holding the
static identity lock while calling peer_remove can result in a rare
deadlock. We have precisely this case in this situation of late-stage
peer removal based on an invalid public key. We can't drop the lock when
removing, because then incoming handshakes might interact with a bogus
static-static calculation.
While the band-aid patch for this would involve breaking up the peer
removal into two steps like wg_peer_remove_all does, in order to solve
the locking issue, there's actually a much more elegant way of fixing
this:
If the static-static calculation succeeds with one private key, it
*must* succeed with all others, because all 32-byte strings map to valid
private keys, thanks to clamping. That means we can get rid of this
silly dance and locking headaches of removing peers late in the
configuration flow, and instead just reject them early on, regardless of
whether the device has yet been assigned a private key. For the case
where the device doesn't yet have a private key, we safely use zeros
just for the purposes of checking for low order points by way of
checking the output of the calculation.
The following PoC will trigger the deadlock:
ip link add wg0 type wireguard
ip addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev wg0
ip link set wg0 up
ping -f 10.0.0.2 &
while true; do
wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null peer AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= allowed-ips 10.0.0.0/24 endpoint 10.0.0.3:1234
wg set wg0 private-key <(echo AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=)
done
[ 0.949105] ======================================================
[ 0.949550] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 0.950143] 5.5.0-debug+ #18 Not tainted
[ 0.950431] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 0.950959] wg/89 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 0.951252] ffff8880333e2128 ((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0
[ 0.951865]
[ 0.951865] but task is already holding lock:
[ 0.952280] ffff888032819bc0 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}, at: wg_set_device+0x95d/0xcc0
[ 0.953011]
[ 0.953011] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 0.953011]
[ 0.953651]
[ 0.953651] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 0.954292]
[ 0.954292] -> #2 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}:
[ 0.954804] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350
[ 0.955133] down_read+0x83/0x410
[ 0.955428] wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation+0x97/0x700
[ 0.955885] wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x13a/0x280
[ 0.956401] wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x10/0x20
[ 0.956841] process_one_work+0x806/0x1500
[ 0.957167] worker_thread+0x8c/0xcb0
[ 0.957549] kthread+0x2ee/0x3b0
[ 0.957792] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[ 0.958234]
[ 0.958234] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work)){+.+.}:
[ 0.958808] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350
[ 0.959075] process_one_work+0x7ab/0x1500
[ 0.959369] worker_thread+0x8c/0xcb0
[ 0.959639] kthread+0x2ee/0x3b0
[ 0.959896] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[ 0.960346]
[ 0.960346] -> #0 ((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0){+.+.}:
[ 0.960945] check_prev_add+0x167/0x1e20
[ 0.961351] __lock_acquire+0x2012/0x3170
[ 0.961725] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350
[ 0.961990] flush_workqueue+0x106/0x12f0
[ 0.962280] peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220
[ 0.962600] wg_set_device+0xa24/0xcc0
[ 0.962994] genl_rcv_msg+0x52f/0xe90
[ 0.963298] netlink_rcv_skb+0x111/0x320
[ 0.963618] genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30
[ 0.963853] netlink_unicast+0x3f6/0x610
[ 0.964245] netlink_sendmsg+0x700/0xb80
[ 0.964586] __sys_sendto+0x1dd/0x2c0
[ 0.964854] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0
[ 0.965141] do_syscall_64+0x90/0xd9a
[ 0.965408] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 0.965769]
[ 0.965769] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 0.965769]
[ 0.966337] Chain exists of:
[ 0.966337] (wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0 --> (work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work) --> &wg->static_identity.lock
[ 0.966337]
[ 0.967417] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 0.967417]
[ 0.967836] CPU0 CPU1
[ 0.968155] ---- ----
[ 0.968497] lock(&wg->static_identity.lock);
[ 0.968779] lock((work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work));
[ 0.969345] lock(&wg->static_identity.lock);
[ 0.969809] lock((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0);
[ 0.970146]
[ 0.970146] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 0.970146]
[ 0.970531] 5 locks held by wg/89:
[ 0.970908] #0: ffffffff827433c8 (cb_lock){++++}, at: genl_rcv+0x10/0x30
[ 0.971400] #1: ffffffff82743480 (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: genl_rcv_msg+0x642/0xe90
[ 0.971924] #2: ffffffff827160c0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: wg_set_device+0x9f/0xcc0
[ 0.972488] #3: ffff888032819de0 (&wg->device_update_lock){+.+.}, at: wg_set_device+0xb0/0xcc0
[ 0.973095] #4: ffff888032819bc0 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}, at: wg_set_device+0x95d/0xcc0
[ 0.973653]
[ 0.973653] stack backtrace:
[ 0.973932] CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: wg Not tainted 5.5.0-debug+ #18
[ 0.974476] Call Trace:
[ 0.974638] dump_stack+0x97/0xe0
[ 0.974869] check_noncircular+0x312/0x3e0
[ 0.975132] ? print_circular_bug+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 0.975410] ? __kernel_text_address+0x9/0x30
[ 0.975727] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x51/0x90
[ 0.976024] check_prev_add+0x167/0x1e20
[ 0.976367] ? graph_lock+0x70/0x160
[ 0.976682] __lock_acquire+0x2012/0x3170
[ 0.976998] ? register_lock_class+0x1140/0x1140
[ 0.977323] lock_acquire+0x127/0x350
[ 0.977627] ? flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0
[ 0.977890] flush_workqueue+0x106/0x12f0
[ 0.978147] ? flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0
[ 0.978410] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110
[ 0.978662] ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
[ 0.978919] ? queue_rcu_work+0x60/0x60
[ 0.979166] ? netif_napi_del+0x151/0x3b0
[ 0.979501] ? peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220
[ 0.979871] peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220
[ 0.980232] wg_set_device+0xa24/0xcc0
[ 0.980516] ? deref_stack_reg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 0.980801] ? set_peer+0xe10/0xe10
[ 0.981040] ? __ww_mutex_check_waiters+0x150/0x150
[ 0.981430] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x163/0x270
[ 0.981719] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x13f/0x310
[ 0.982078] genl_rcv_msg+0x52f/0xe90
[ 0.982348] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x310/0x310
[ 0.982690] ? register_lock_class+0x1140/0x1140
[ 0.983049] netlink_rcv_skb+0x111/0x320
[ 0.983298] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x310/0x310
[ 0.983645] ? netlink_ack+0x880/0x880
[ 0.983888] genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30
[ 0.984168] netlink_unicast+0x3f6/0x610
[ 0.984443] ? netlink_detachskb+0x60/0x60
[ 0.984729] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110
[ 0.984976] netlink_sendmsg+0x700/0xb80
[ 0.985220] ? netlink_broadcast_filtered+0xa60/0xa60
[ 0.985533] __sys_sendto+0x1dd/0x2c0
[ 0.985763] ? __x64_sys_getpeername+0xb0/0xb0
[ 0.986039] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x17/0x160
[ 0.986397] ? __sys_recvmsg+0x8c/0xf0
[ 0.986711] ? __sys_recvmsg_sock+0xd0/0xd0
[ 0.987018] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0
[ 0.987283] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x39b/0x5a0
[ 0.987666] do_syscall_64+0x90/0xd9a
[ 0.987903] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 0.988223] RIP: 0033:0x7fe77c12003e
[ 0.988508] Code: c3 8b 07 85 c0 75 24 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 4
[ 0.989666] RSP: 002b:00007fffada2ed58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 0.990137] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe77c159d48 RCX: 00007fe77c12003e
[ 0.990583] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055fd1d38e020 RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 0.991091] RBP: 000055fd1d38e020 R08: 000055fd1cb63358 R09: 000000000000000c
[ 0.991568] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000002c
[ 0.992014] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 000055fd1d38e020 R15: 0000000000000001
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
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In the unlikely case a new node could not be allocated, we need to
remove @newnode from @peer->allowedips_list before freeing it.
syzbot reported:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0xdc/0xf5 lib/list_debug.c:54
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88809881a538 by task syz-executor.4/30133
CPU: 0 PID: 30133 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x32 mm/kasan/report.c:506
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135
__list_del_entry_valid+0xdc/0xf5 lib/list_debug.c:54
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:132 [inline]
list_del include/linux/list.h:146 [inline]
root_remove_peer_lists+0x24f/0x4b0 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:65
wg_allowedips_free+0x232/0x390 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:300
wg_peer_remove_all+0xd5/0x620 drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c:187
wg_set_device+0xd01/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:542
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734
netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343
___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397
__sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x45b399
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f99a9bcdc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f99a9bce6d4 RCX: 000000000045b399
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020001340 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 00000000000009ba R14: 00000000004cb2b8 R15: 0000000000000009
Allocated by task 30103:
save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486
kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:527
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x158/0x790 mm/slab.c:3551
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:556 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:670 [inline]
add+0x70a/0x1970 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:236
wg_allowedips_insert_v4+0xf6/0x160 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:320
set_allowedip drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:343 [inline]
set_peer+0xfb9/0x1150 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:468
wg_set_device+0xbd4/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:591
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734
netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343
___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397
__sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 30103:
save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
kfree+0x10a/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3757
add+0x12d2/0x1970 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:266
wg_allowedips_insert_v4+0xf6/0x160 drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c:320
set_allowedip drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:343 [inline]
set_peer+0xfb9/0x1150 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:468
wg_set_device+0xbd4/0x1350 drivers/net/wireguard/netlink.c:591
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline]
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x67d/0xea0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734
netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343
___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397
__sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88809881a500
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of
64-byte region [ffff88809881a500, ffff88809881a540)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002620680 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400380 index:0x0
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea000250b748 ffffea000254bac8 ffff8880aa400380
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88809881a000 0000000100000020 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88809881a400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88809881a480: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88809881a500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88809881a580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88809881a600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: wireguard@lists.zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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We only support the latest RHEL-7 and RHEL-8.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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RedHat backported some more changes, now released as kernel 4.18.0-168.el8.
To maintain compatibility with kernel -147, a new macro is introduced: ISRHEL82.
Compile-tested with the -168 and -147 kernels.
Signed-off-by: Ilie Halip <ilie.halip@gmail.com>
[zx2c4: we normally only support the latest RHEL, but having some beta
support for the time being sounds like a good plan, given that there
may be interest from RedHat in actually merging this into their
kernels.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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This comes from INRIA's HACL*/Vale. It implements the same algorithm and
implementation strategy as the code it replaces, only this code has been
formally verified, sans the base point multiplication, which uses code
similar to prior, only it uses the formally verified field arithmetic
alongside reproducable ladder generation steps. This doesn't have a
pure-bmi2 version, which means haswell no longer benefits, but the
increased (doubled) code complexity is not worth it for a single
generation of chips that's already old.
Performance-wise, this is around 1% slower on older microarchitectures,
and slightly faster on newer microarchitectures, mainly 10nm ones or
backports of 10nm to 14nm. This implementation is "everest" below:
Xeon E5-2680 v4 (Broadwell)
armfazh: 133340 cycles per call
everest: 133436 cycles per call
Xeon Gold 5120 (Sky Lake Server)
armfazh: 112636 cycles per call
everest: 113906 cycles per call
Core i5-6300U (Sky Lake Client)
armfazh: 116810 cycles per call
everest: 117916 cycles per call
Core i7-7600U (Kaby Lake)
armfazh: 119523 cycles per call
everest: 119040 cycles per call
Core i7-8750H (Coffee Lake)
armfazh: 113914 cycles per call
everest: 113650 cycles per call
Core i9-9880H (Coffee Lake Refresh)
armfazh: 112616 cycles per call
everest: 114082 cycles per call
Core i3-8121U (Cannon Lake)
armfazh: 113202 cycles per call
everest: 111382 cycles per call
Core i7-8265U (Whiskey Lake)
armfazh: 127307 cycles per call
everest: 127697 cycles per call
Core i7-8550U (Kaby Lake Refresh)
armfazh: 127522 cycles per call
everest: 127083 cycles per call
Xeon Platinum 8275CL (Cascade Lake)
armfazh: 114380 cycles per call
everest: 114656 cycles per call
Achieving these kind of results with formally verified code is quite
remarkable, especialy considering that performance is favorable for
newer chips.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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This won't be ported to 5.6, of course, but it's still cleaner to get
this out of the way.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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We also no longer do anything dynamic with dkms.conf, and we don't
rewrite any files at all, but rather pass this through as a cflag to the
compiler optionally.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reported-by: Egbert Verhage <egbert@eggiecode.org>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Certain drivers will pass gro skbs to udp, at which point the udp driver
simply iterates through them and passes them off to encap_rcv, which is
where we pick up. At the moment, we're not attempting to coalesce these
into bundles, but we also don't want to wind up having cascaded lists of
skbs treated separately. The right behavior here, then, is to just mark
each incoming one as not on a list. This can be seen in practice, for
example, with Qualcomm's rmnet_perf driver.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Tested-by: Yaroslav Furman <yaro330@gmail.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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