diff options
author | Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@gmail.com> | 2017-05-26 23:24:08 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@gmail.com> | 2017-06-03 02:02:46 -0400 |
commit | 25e75f8ed7c1e4183981de020f80e86afc0f41f6 (patch) | |
tree | cc2999e9e3bc4c479b92e07641ca3c6be325b29b | |
parent | 7ed328301e50a1b168b4ffa0f1d27bb2519aeca7 (diff) |
fixed comment + consistency
-rw-r--r-- | paramiko/ed25519key.py | 46 |
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/paramiko/ed25519key.py b/paramiko/ed25519key.py index 22090044..d9c92aa2 100644 --- a/paramiko/ed25519key.py +++ b/paramiko/ed25519key.py @@ -32,15 +32,15 @@ OPENSSH_AUTH_MAGIC = b"openssh-key-v1\x00" def unpad(data): - # At the moment, this is only used for unpadding private keys on disk, and - # only unencrypted ones at that. In the future, if either of those changes, - # this really ought to be made constant time. + # At the moment, this is only used for unpadding private keys on disk. This + # really ought to be made constant time (possibly by upstreaming this logic + # into pyca/cryptography). padding_length = six.indexbytes(data, -1) if padding_length > 16: - raise SSHException('Invalid key') + raise SSHException("Invalid key") for i in range(1, padding_length + 1): if six.indexbytes(data, -i) != (padding_length - i + 1): - raise SSHException('Invalid key') + raise SSHException("Invalid key") return data[:-padding_length] @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ class Ed25519Key(PKey): msg = Message(data) if msg is not None: if msg.get_text() != "ssh-ed25519": - raise SSHException('Invalid key') + raise SSHException("Invalid key") verifying_key = nacl.signing.VerifyKey(msg.get_bytes(32)) elif filename is not None: with open(filename, "r") as f: @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ class Ed25519Key(PKey): # source for a full implementation. message = Message(data) if message.get_bytes(len(OPENSSH_AUTH_MAGIC)) != OPENSSH_AUTH_MAGIC: - raise SSHException('Invalid key') + raise SSHException("Invalid key") ciphername = message.get_text() kdfname = message.get_text() @@ -85,26 +85,26 @@ class Ed25519Key(PKey): # kdfname of "none" must have an empty kdfoptions, the ciphername # must be "none" if kdfoptions or ciphername != "none": - raise SSHException('Invalid key') + raise SSHException("Invalid key") elif kdfname == "bcrypt": if not password: raise PasswordRequiredException( - 'Private key file is encrypted' + "Private key file is encrypted" ) kdf = Message(kdfoptions) bcrypt_salt = kdf.get_binary() bcrypt_rounds = kdf.get_int() else: - raise SSHException('Invalid key') + raise SSHException("Invalid key") if ciphername != "none" and ciphername not in Transport._cipher_info: - raise SSHException('Invalid key') + raise SSHException("Invalid key") public_keys = [] for _ in range(num_keys): pubkey = Message(message.get_binary()) - if pubkey.get_text() != 'ssh-ed25519': - raise SSHException('Invalid key') + if pubkey.get_text() != "ssh-ed25519": + raise SSHException("Invalid key") public_keys.append(pubkey.get_binary()) private_ciphertext = message.get_binary() @@ -115,15 +115,15 @@ class Ed25519Key(PKey): key = bcrypt.kdf( password=password, salt=bcrypt_salt, - desired_key_bytes=cipher['key-size'] + cipher['block-size'], + desired_key_bytes=cipher["key-size"] + cipher["block-size"], rounds=bcrypt_rounds, # We can't control how many rounds are on disk, so no sense # warning about it. ignore_few_rounds=True, ) decryptor = Cipher( - cipher['class'](key[:cipher['key-size']]), - cipher['mode'](key[cipher['key-size']:]), + cipher["class"](key[:cipher["key-size"]]), + cipher["mode"](key[cipher["key-size"]:]), backend=default_backend() ).decryptor() private_data = ( @@ -132,12 +132,12 @@ class Ed25519Key(PKey): message = Message(unpad(private_data)) if message.get_int() != message.get_int(): - raise SSHException('Invalid key') + raise SSHException("Invalid key") signing_keys = [] for i in range(num_keys): - if message.get_text() != 'ssh-ed25519': - raise SSHException('Invalid key') + if message.get_text() != "ssh-ed25519": + raise SSHException("Invalid key") # A copy of the public key, again, ignore. public = message.get_binary() key_data = message.get_binary() @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ class Ed25519Key(PKey): message.get_binary() if len(signing_keys) != 1: - raise SSHException('Invalid key') + raise SSHException("Invalid key") return signing_keys[0] def asbytes(self): @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ class Ed25519Key(PKey): else: v = self._verifying_key m = Message() - m.add_string('ssh-ed25519') + m.add_string("ssh-ed25519") m.add_bytes(v.encode()) return m.asbytes() @@ -178,12 +178,12 @@ class Ed25519Key(PKey): def sign_ssh_data(self, data): m = Message() - m.add_string('ssh-ed25519') + m.add_string("ssh-ed25519") m.add_string(self._signing_key.sign(data).signature) return m def verify_ssh_sig(self, data, msg): - if msg.get_text() != 'ssh-ed25519': + if msg.get_text() != "ssh-ed25519": return False try: |