1 files changed, 476 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/libs/nixio/axTLS/ssl/tls1_svr.c b/libs/nixio/axTLS/ssl/tls1_svr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45b9bec6a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libs/nixio/axTLS/ssl/tls1_svr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,476 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2007, Cameron Rich
+ * 
+ * All rights reserved.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, 
+ *   this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, 
+ *   this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation 
+ *   and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * * Neither the name of the axTLS project nor the names of its contributors 
+ *   may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software 
+ *   without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR
+ * CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
+ * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
+ * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "ssl.h"
+
+static const uint8_t g_hello_done[] = { HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, 0, 0, 0 };
+
+static int process_client_hello(SSL *ssl);
+static int send_server_hello_sequence(SSL *ssl);
+static int send_server_hello(SSL *ssl);
+static int send_server_hello_done(SSL *ssl);
+static int process_client_key_xchg(SSL *ssl);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
+static int send_certificate_request(SSL *ssl);
+static int process_cert_verify(SSL *ssl);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Establish a new SSL connection to an SSL client.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC SSL * STDCALL ssl_server_new(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, int client_fd)
+{
+    SSL *ssl;
+
+    ssl = ssl_new(ssl_ctx, client_fd);
+    ssl->next_state = HS_CLIENT_HELLO;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE
+    if (ssl_ctx->chain_length == 0)
+        printf("Warning - no server certificate defined\n"); TTY_FLUSH();
+#endif
+
+    return ssl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process the handshake record.
+ */
+int do_svr_handshake(SSL *ssl, int handshake_type, uint8_t *buf, int hs_len)
+{
+    int ret = SSL_OK;
+    ssl->hs_status = SSL_NOT_OK;            /* not connected */
+
+    /* To get here the state must be valid */
+    switch (handshake_type)
+    {
+        case HS_CLIENT_HELLO:
+            if ((ret = process_client_hello(ssl)) == SSL_OK)
+                ret = send_server_hello_sequence(ssl);
+            break;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
+        case HS_CERTIFICATE:/* the client sends its cert */
+            ret = process_certificate(ssl, &ssl->x509_ctx);
+
+            if (ret == SSL_OK)    /* verify the cert */
+            { 
+                int cert_res;
+                cert_res = x509_verify(
+                        ssl->ssl_ctx->ca_cert_ctx, ssl->x509_ctx);
+                ret = (cert_res == 0) ? SSL_OK : SSL_X509_ERROR(cert_res);
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case HS_CERT_VERIFY:    
+            ret = process_cert_verify(ssl);
+            add_packet(ssl, buf, hs_len);   /* needs to be done after */
+            break;
+#endif
+        case HS_CLIENT_KEY_XCHG:
+            ret = process_client_key_xchg(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case HS_FINISHED:
+            ret = process_finished(ssl, hs_len);
+            disposable_free(ssl);   /* free up some memory */
+            break;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Process a client hello message.
+ */
+static int process_client_hello(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    uint8_t *buf = ssl->bm_data;
+    uint8_t *record_buf = ssl->hmac_header;
+    int pkt_size = ssl->bm_index;
+    int i, j, cs_len, id_len, offset = 6 + SSL_RANDOM_SIZE;
+    int version = (record_buf[1] << 4) + record_buf[2];
+    int ret = SSL_OK;
+    
+    /* should be v3.1 (TLSv1) or better - we'll send in v3.1 mode anyway */
+    if (version < 0x31) 
+    {
+        ret = SSL_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION;
+        ssl_display_error(ret);
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(ssl->dc->client_random, &buf[6], SSL_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+    /* process the session id */
+    id_len = buf[offset++];
+    if (id_len > SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE)
+    {
+        return SSL_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION;
+    }
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+    ssl->session = ssl_session_update(ssl->ssl_ctx->num_sessions,
+            ssl->ssl_ctx->ssl_sessions, ssl, id_len ? &buf[offset] : NULL);
+#endif
+
+    offset += id_len;
+    cs_len = (buf[offset]<<8) + buf[offset+1];
+    offset += 3;        /* add 1 due to all cipher suites being 8 bit */
+
+    PARANOIA_CHECK(pkt_size, offset);
+
+    /* work out what cipher suite we are going to use */
+    for (j = 0; j < NUM_PROTOCOLS; j++)
+    {
+        for (i = 0; i < cs_len; i += 2)
+        {
+            if (ssl_prot_prefs[j] == buf[offset+i])   /* got a match? */
+            {
+                ssl->cipher = ssl_prot_prefs[j];
+                goto do_state;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* ouch! protocol is not supported */
+    ret = SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHER;
+
+do_state:
+error:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_ENABLE_V23_HANDSHAKE
+/*
+ * Some browsers use a hybrid SSLv2 "client hello" 
+ */
+int process_sslv23_client_hello(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    uint8_t *buf = ssl->bm_data;
+    int bytes_needed = ((buf[0] & 0x7f) << 8) + buf[1];
+    int version = (buf[3] << 4) + buf[4];
+    int ret = SSL_OK;
+
+    /* we have already read 3 extra bytes so far */
+    int read_len = SOCKET_READ(ssl->client_fd, buf, bytes_needed-3);
+    int cs_len = buf[1];
+    int id_len = buf[3];
+    int ch_len = buf[5];
+    int i, j, offset = 8;   /* start at first cipher */
+    int random_offset = 0;
+
+    DISPLAY_BYTES(ssl, "received %d bytes", buf, read_len, read_len);
+    
+    /* should be v3.1 (TLSv1) or better - we'll send in v3.1 mode anyway */
+    if (version < 0x31)
+    {
+        return SSL_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION;
+    }
+
+    add_packet(ssl, buf, read_len);
+
+    /* connection has gone, so die */
+    if (bytes_needed < 0)
+    {
+        return SSL_ERROR_CONN_LOST;
+    }
+
+    /* now work out what cipher suite we are going to use */
+    for (j = 0; j < NUM_PROTOCOLS; j++)
+    {
+        for (i = 0; i < cs_len; i += 3)
+        {
+            if (ssl_prot_prefs[j] == buf[offset+i])
+            {
+                ssl->cipher = ssl_prot_prefs[j];
+                goto server_hello;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* ouch! protocol is not supported */
+    ret = SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHER;
+    goto error;
+
+server_hello:
+    /* get the session id */
+    offset += cs_len - 2;   /* we've gone 2 bytes past the end */
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+    ssl->session = ssl_session_update(ssl->ssl_ctx->num_sessions,
+            ssl->ssl_ctx->ssl_sessions, ssl, id_len ? &buf[offset] : NULL);
+#endif
+
+    /* get the client random data */
+    offset += id_len;
+
+    /* random can be anywhere between 16 and 32 bytes long - so it is padded
+     * with 0's to the left */
+    if (ch_len == 0x10)
+    {
+        random_offset += 0x10;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(&ssl->dc->client_random[random_offset], &buf[offset], ch_len);
+    ret = send_server_hello_sequence(ssl);
+
+error:
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Send the entire server hello sequence
+ */
+static int send_server_hello_sequence(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if ((ret = send_server_hello(ssl)) == SSL_OK)
+    {
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+        /* resume handshake? */
+        if (IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_SESSION_RESUME))
+        {
+            if ((ret = send_change_cipher_spec(ssl)) == SSL_OK)
+            {
+                ret = send_finished(ssl);
+                ssl->next_state = HS_FINISHED;
+            }
+        }
+        else 
+#endif
+        if ((ret = send_certificate(ssl)) == SSL_OK)
+        {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
+            /* ask the client for its certificate */
+            if (IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_CLIENT_AUTHENTICATION))
+            {
+                if ((ret = send_certificate_request(ssl)) == SSL_OK)
+                {
+                    ret = send_server_hello_done(ssl);
+                    ssl->next_state = HS_CERTIFICATE;
+                }
+            }
+            else
+#endif
+            {
+                ret = send_server_hello_done(ssl);
+                ssl->next_state = HS_CLIENT_KEY_XCHG;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send a server hello message.
+ */
+static int send_server_hello(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    uint8_t *buf = ssl->bm_data;
+    int offset = 0;
+
+    buf[0] = HS_SERVER_HELLO;
+    buf[1] = 0;
+    buf[2] = 0;
+    /* byte 3 is calculated later */
+    buf[4] = 0x03;
+    buf[5] = 0x01;
+
+    /* server random value */
+    get_random(SSL_RANDOM_SIZE, &buf[6]);
+    memcpy(ssl->dc->server_random, &buf[6], SSL_RANDOM_SIZE);
+    offset = 6 + SSL_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+    if (IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_SESSION_RESUME))
+    {
+        /* retrieve id from session cache */
+        buf[offset++] = SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE;
+        memcpy(&buf[offset], ssl->session->session_id, SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE);
+        memcpy(ssl->session_id, ssl->session->session_id, SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE);
+        ssl->sess_id_size = SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE;
+        offset += SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE;
+    }
+    else    /* generate our own session id */
+#endif
+    {
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+        buf[offset++] = SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE;
+        get_random(SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE, &buf[offset]);
+        memcpy(ssl->session_id, &buf[offset], SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE);
+        ssl->sess_id_size = SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE;
+
+        /* store id in session cache */
+        if (ssl->ssl_ctx->num_sessions)
+        {
+            memcpy(ssl->session->session_id, 
+                    ssl->session_id, SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE);
+        }
+
+        offset += SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE;
+#else
+        buf[offset++] = 0;  /* don't bother with session id in skelton mode */
+#endif
+    }
+
+    buf[offset++] = 0;      /* cipher we are using */
+    buf[offset++] = ssl->cipher;
+    buf[offset++] = 0;      /* no compression */
+    buf[3] = offset - 4;    /* handshake size */
+    return send_packet(ssl, PT_HANDSHAKE_PROTOCOL, NULL, offset);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send the server hello done message.
+ */
+static int send_server_hello_done(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    return send_packet(ssl, PT_HANDSHAKE_PROTOCOL, 
+                            g_hello_done, sizeof(g_hello_done));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pull apart a client key exchange message. Decrypt the pre-master key (using
+ * our RSA private key) and then work out the master key. Initialise the
+ * ciphers.
+ */
+static int process_client_key_xchg(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    uint8_t *buf = &ssl->bm_data[ssl->dc->bm_proc_index];
+    int pkt_size = ssl->bm_index;
+    int premaster_size, secret_length = (buf[2] << 8) + buf[3];
+    uint8_t premaster_secret[MAX_KEY_BYTE_SIZE];
+    RSA_CTX *rsa_ctx = ssl->ssl_ctx->rsa_ctx;
+    int offset = 4;
+    int ret = SSL_OK;
+    
+    if (rsa_ctx == NULL)
+    {
+        ret = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERT_DEFINED;
+        goto error;
+    }
+
+    /* is there an extra size field? */
+    if ((secret_length - 2) == rsa_ctx->num_octets)
+        offset += 2;
+
+    PARANOIA_CHECK(pkt_size, rsa_ctx->num_octets+offset);
+
+    /* rsa_ctx->bi_ctx is not thread-safe */
+    SSL_CTX_LOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
+    premaster_size = RSA_decrypt(rsa_ctx, &buf[offset], premaster_secret, 1);
+    SSL_CTX_UNLOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
+
+    if (premaster_size != SSL_SECRET_SIZE || 
+            premaster_secret[0] != 0x03 ||  /* check version is 3.1 (TLS) */
+            premaster_secret[1] != 0x01)
+    {
+        /* guard against a Bleichenbacher attack */
+        memset(premaster_secret, 0, SSL_SECRET_SIZE);
+        /* and continue - will die eventually when checking the mac */
+    }
+
+#if 0
+    print_blob("pre-master", premaster_secret, SSL_SECRET_SIZE);
+#endif
+
+    generate_master_secret(ssl, premaster_secret);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
+    ssl->next_state = IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_CLIENT_AUTHENTICATION) ?  
+                                            HS_CERT_VERIFY : HS_FINISHED;
+#else
+    ssl->next_state = HS_FINISHED; 
+#endif
+error:
+    ssl->dc->bm_proc_index += rsa_ctx->num_octets+offset;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
+static const uint8_t g_cert_request[] = { HS_CERT_REQ, 0, 0, 4, 1, 0, 0, 0 };
+
+/*
+ * Send the certificate request message.
+ */
+static int send_certificate_request(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    return send_packet(ssl, PT_HANDSHAKE_PROTOCOL, 
+            g_cert_request, sizeof(g_cert_request));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ensure the client has the private key by first decrypting the packet and
+ * then checking the packet digests.
+ */
+static int process_cert_verify(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    uint8_t *buf = &ssl->bm_data[ssl->dc->bm_proc_index];
+    int pkt_size = ssl->bm_index;
+    uint8_t dgst_buf[MAX_KEY_BYTE_SIZE];
+    uint8_t dgst[MD5_SIZE+SHA1_SIZE];
+    X509_CTX *x509_ctx = ssl->x509_ctx;
+    int ret = SSL_OK;
+    int n;
+
+    PARANOIA_CHECK(pkt_size, x509_ctx->rsa_ctx->num_octets+6);
+    DISPLAY_RSA(ssl, x509_ctx->rsa_ctx);
+
+    /* rsa_ctx->bi_ctx is not thread-safe */
+    SSL_CTX_LOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
+    n = RSA_decrypt(x509_ctx->rsa_ctx, &buf[6], dgst_buf, 0);
+    SSL_CTX_UNLOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
+
+    if (n != SHA1_SIZE + MD5_SIZE)
+    {
+        ret = SSL_ERROR_INVALID_KEY;
+        goto end_cert_vfy;
+    }
+
+    finished_digest(ssl, NULL, dgst);       /* calculate the digest */
+    if (memcmp(dgst_buf, dgst, MD5_SIZE + SHA1_SIZE))
+    {
+        ret = SSL_ERROR_INVALID_KEY;
+    }
+
+end_cert_vfy:
+    ssl->next_state = HS_FINISHED;
+error:
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif