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|
// Copyright 2018 The gVisor Authors.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
package stack
import (
"fmt"
"math/rand"
"reflect"
"sort"
"sync/atomic"
"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sync"
"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip"
"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/buffer"
"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/header"
)
var ipv4BroadcastAddr = tcpip.ProtocolAddress{
Protocol: header.IPv4ProtocolNumber,
AddressWithPrefix: tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{
Address: header.IPv4Broadcast,
PrefixLen: 8 * header.IPv4AddressSize,
},
}
// NIC represents a "network interface card" to which the networking stack is
// attached.
type NIC struct {
stack *Stack
id tcpip.NICID
name string
linkEP LinkEndpoint
context NICContext
stats NICStats
neigh *neighborCache
networkEndpoints map[tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber]NetworkEndpoint
mu struct {
sync.RWMutex
enabled bool
spoofing bool
promiscuous bool
primary map[tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber][]*referencedNetworkEndpoint
endpoints map[NetworkEndpointID]*referencedNetworkEndpoint
mcastJoins map[NetworkEndpointID]uint32
// packetEPs is protected by mu, but the contained PacketEndpoint
// values are not.
packetEPs map[tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber][]PacketEndpoint
ndp ndpState
}
}
// NICStats includes transmitted and received stats.
type NICStats struct {
Tx DirectionStats
Rx DirectionStats
DisabledRx DirectionStats
}
func makeNICStats() NICStats {
var s NICStats
tcpip.InitStatCounters(reflect.ValueOf(&s).Elem())
return s
}
// DirectionStats includes packet and byte counts.
type DirectionStats struct {
Packets *tcpip.StatCounter
Bytes *tcpip.StatCounter
}
// PrimaryEndpointBehavior is an enumeration of an endpoint's primacy behavior.
type PrimaryEndpointBehavior int
const (
// CanBePrimaryEndpoint indicates the endpoint can be used as a primary
// endpoint for new connections with no local address. This is the
// default when calling NIC.AddAddress.
CanBePrimaryEndpoint PrimaryEndpointBehavior = iota
// FirstPrimaryEndpoint indicates the endpoint should be the first
// primary endpoint considered. If there are multiple endpoints with
// this behavior, the most recently-added one will be first.
FirstPrimaryEndpoint
// NeverPrimaryEndpoint indicates the endpoint should never be a
// primary endpoint.
NeverPrimaryEndpoint
)
// newNIC returns a new NIC using the default NDP configurations from stack.
func newNIC(stack *Stack, id tcpip.NICID, name string, ep LinkEndpoint, ctx NICContext) *NIC {
// TODO(b/141011931): Validate a LinkEndpoint (ep) is valid. For
// example, make sure that the link address it provides is a valid
// unicast ethernet address.
// TODO(b/143357959): RFC 8200 section 5 requires that IPv6 endpoints
// observe an MTU of at least 1280 bytes. Ensure that this requirement
// of IPv6 is supported on this endpoint's LinkEndpoint.
nic := &NIC{
stack: stack,
id: id,
name: name,
linkEP: ep,
context: ctx,
stats: makeNICStats(),
networkEndpoints: make(map[tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber]NetworkEndpoint),
}
nic.mu.primary = make(map[tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber][]*referencedNetworkEndpoint)
nic.mu.endpoints = make(map[NetworkEndpointID]*referencedNetworkEndpoint)
nic.mu.mcastJoins = make(map[NetworkEndpointID]uint32)
nic.mu.packetEPs = make(map[tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber][]PacketEndpoint)
nic.mu.ndp = ndpState{
nic: nic,
configs: stack.ndpConfigs,
dad: make(map[tcpip.Address]dadState),
defaultRouters: make(map[tcpip.Address]defaultRouterState),
onLinkPrefixes: make(map[tcpip.Subnet]onLinkPrefixState),
slaacPrefixes: make(map[tcpip.Subnet]slaacPrefixState),
}
nic.mu.ndp.initializeTempAddrState()
// Register supported packet endpoint protocols.
for _, netProto := range header.Ethertypes {
nic.mu.packetEPs[netProto] = []PacketEndpoint{}
}
for _, netProto := range stack.networkProtocols {
netNum := netProto.Number()
nic.mu.packetEPs[netNum] = nil
nic.networkEndpoints[netNum] = netProto.NewEndpoint(id, stack, nic, ep, stack)
}
// Check for Neighbor Unreachability Detection support.
if ep.Capabilities()&CapabilityResolutionRequired != 0 && len(stack.linkAddrResolvers) != 0 {
rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(stack.clock.NowNanoseconds()))
nic.neigh = &neighborCache{
nic: nic,
state: NewNUDState(stack.nudConfigs, rng),
cache: make(map[tcpip.Address]*neighborEntry, neighborCacheSize),
}
}
nic.linkEP.Attach(nic)
return nic
}
// enabled returns true if n is enabled.
func (n *NIC) enabled() bool {
n.mu.RLock()
enabled := n.mu.enabled
n.mu.RUnlock()
return enabled
}
// disable disables n.
//
// It undoes the work done by enable.
func (n *NIC) disable() *tcpip.Error {
n.mu.RLock()
enabled := n.mu.enabled
n.mu.RUnlock()
if !enabled {
return nil
}
n.mu.Lock()
err := n.disableLocked()
n.mu.Unlock()
return err
}
// disableLocked disables n.
//
// It undoes the work done by enable.
//
// n MUST be locked.
func (n *NIC) disableLocked() *tcpip.Error {
if !n.mu.enabled {
return nil
}
// TODO(gvisor.dev/issue/1491): Should Routes that are currently bound to n be
// invalidated? Currently, Routes will continue to work when a NIC is enabled
// again, and applications may not know that the underlying NIC was ever
// disabled.
if _, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[header.IPv6ProtocolNumber]; ok {
n.mu.ndp.stopSolicitingRouters()
n.mu.ndp.cleanupState(false /* hostOnly */)
// Stop DAD for all the unicast IPv6 endpoints that are in the
// permanentTentative state.
for _, r := range n.mu.endpoints {
if addr := r.address(); r.getKind() == permanentTentative && header.IsV6UnicastAddress(addr) {
n.mu.ndp.stopDuplicateAddressDetection(addr)
}
}
// The NIC may have already left the multicast group.
if err := n.leaveGroupLocked(header.IPv6AllNodesMulticastAddress, false /* force */); err != nil && err != tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress {
return err
}
}
if _, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[header.IPv4ProtocolNumber]; ok {
// The NIC may have already left the multicast group.
if err := n.leaveGroupLocked(header.IPv4AllSystems, false /* force */); err != nil && err != tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress {
return err
}
// The address may have already been removed.
if err := n.removePermanentAddressLocked(ipv4BroadcastAddr.AddressWithPrefix.Address); err != nil && err != tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress {
return err
}
}
n.mu.enabled = false
return nil
}
// enable enables n.
//
// If the stack has IPv6 enabled, enable will join the IPv6 All-Nodes Multicast
// address (ff02::1), start DAD for permanent addresses, and start soliciting
// routers if the stack is not operating as a router. If the stack is also
// configured to auto-generate a link-local address, one will be generated.
func (n *NIC) enable() *tcpip.Error {
n.mu.RLock()
enabled := n.mu.enabled
n.mu.RUnlock()
if enabled {
return nil
}
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
if n.mu.enabled {
return nil
}
n.mu.enabled = true
// Create an endpoint to receive broadcast packets on this interface.
if _, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[header.IPv4ProtocolNumber]; ok {
if _, err := n.addAddressLocked(ipv4BroadcastAddr, NeverPrimaryEndpoint, permanent, static, false /* deprecated */); err != nil {
return err
}
// As per RFC 1122 section 3.3.7, all hosts should join the all-hosts
// multicast group. Note, the IANA calls the all-hosts multicast group the
// all-systems multicast group.
if err := n.joinGroupLocked(header.IPv4ProtocolNumber, header.IPv4AllSystems); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Join the IPv6 All-Nodes Multicast group if the stack is configured to
// use IPv6. This is required to ensure that this node properly receives
// and responds to the various NDP messages that are destined to the
// all-nodes multicast address. An example is the Neighbor Advertisement
// when we perform Duplicate Address Detection, or Router Advertisement
// when we do Router Discovery. See RFC 4862, section 5.4.2 and RFC 4861
// section 4.2 for more information.
//
// Also auto-generate an IPv6 link-local address based on the NIC's
// link address if it is configured to do so. Note, each interface is
// required to have IPv6 link-local unicast address, as per RFC 4291
// section 2.1.
_, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[header.IPv6ProtocolNumber]
if !ok {
return nil
}
// Join the All-Nodes multicast group before starting DAD as responses to DAD
// (NDP NS) messages may be sent to the All-Nodes multicast group if the
// source address of the NDP NS is the unspecified address, as per RFC 4861
// section 7.2.4.
if err := n.joinGroupLocked(header.IPv6ProtocolNumber, header.IPv6AllNodesMulticastAddress); err != nil {
return err
}
// Perform DAD on the all the unicast IPv6 endpoints that are in the permanent
// state.
//
// Addresses may have aleady completed DAD but in the time since the NIC was
// last enabled, other devices may have acquired the same addresses.
for _, r := range n.mu.endpoints {
addr := r.address()
if k := r.getKind(); (k != permanent && k != permanentTentative) || !header.IsV6UnicastAddress(addr) {
continue
}
r.setKind(permanentTentative)
if err := n.mu.ndp.startDuplicateAddressDetection(addr, r); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Do not auto-generate an IPv6 link-local address for loopback devices.
if n.stack.autoGenIPv6LinkLocal && !n.isLoopback() {
// The valid and preferred lifetime is infinite for the auto-generated
// link-local address.
n.mu.ndp.doSLAAC(header.IPv6LinkLocalPrefix.Subnet(), header.NDPInfiniteLifetime, header.NDPInfiniteLifetime)
}
// If we are operating as a router, then do not solicit routers since we
// won't process the RAs anyways.
//
// Routers do not process Router Advertisements (RA) the same way a host
// does. That is, routers do not learn from RAs (e.g. on-link prefixes
// and default routers). Therefore, soliciting RAs from other routers on
// a link is unnecessary for routers.
if !n.stack.Forwarding(header.IPv6ProtocolNumber) {
n.mu.ndp.startSolicitingRouters()
}
return nil
}
// remove detaches NIC from the link endpoint, and marks existing referenced
// network endpoints expired. This guarantees no packets between this NIC and
// the network stack.
func (n *NIC) remove() *tcpip.Error {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
n.disableLocked()
// TODO(b/151378115): come up with a better way to pick an error than the
// first one.
var err *tcpip.Error
// Forcefully leave multicast groups.
for nid := range n.mu.mcastJoins {
if tempErr := n.leaveGroupLocked(nid.LocalAddress, true /* force */); tempErr != nil && err == nil {
err = tempErr
}
}
// Remove permanent and permanentTentative addresses, so no packet goes out.
for nid, ref := range n.mu.endpoints {
switch ref.getKind() {
case permanentTentative, permanent:
if tempErr := n.removePermanentAddressLocked(nid.LocalAddress); tempErr != nil && err == nil {
err = tempErr
}
}
}
// Release any resources the network endpoint may hold.
for _, ep := range n.networkEndpoints {
ep.Close()
}
// Detach from link endpoint, so no packet comes in.
n.linkEP.Attach(nil)
return err
}
// becomeIPv6Router transitions n into an IPv6 router.
//
// When transitioning into an IPv6 router, host-only state (NDP discovered
// routers, discovered on-link prefixes, and auto-generated addresses) will
// be cleaned up/invalidated and NDP router solicitations will be stopped.
func (n *NIC) becomeIPv6Router() {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
n.mu.ndp.cleanupState(true /* hostOnly */)
n.mu.ndp.stopSolicitingRouters()
}
// becomeIPv6Host transitions n into an IPv6 host.
//
// When transitioning into an IPv6 host, NDP router solicitations will be
// started.
func (n *NIC) becomeIPv6Host() {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
n.mu.ndp.startSolicitingRouters()
}
// setPromiscuousMode enables or disables promiscuous mode.
func (n *NIC) setPromiscuousMode(enable bool) {
n.mu.Lock()
n.mu.promiscuous = enable
n.mu.Unlock()
}
func (n *NIC) isPromiscuousMode() bool {
n.mu.RLock()
rv := n.mu.promiscuous
n.mu.RUnlock()
return rv
}
func (n *NIC) isLoopback() bool {
return n.linkEP.Capabilities()&CapabilityLoopback != 0
}
// setSpoofing enables or disables address spoofing.
func (n *NIC) setSpoofing(enable bool) {
n.mu.Lock()
n.mu.spoofing = enable
n.mu.Unlock()
}
// primaryEndpoint will return the first non-deprecated endpoint if such an
// endpoint exists for the given protocol and remoteAddr. If no non-deprecated
// endpoint exists, the first deprecated endpoint will be returned.
//
// If an IPv6 primary endpoint is requested, Source Address Selection (as
// defined by RFC 6724 section 5) will be performed.
func (n *NIC) primaryEndpoint(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, remoteAddr tcpip.Address) *referencedNetworkEndpoint {
if protocol == header.IPv6ProtocolNumber && remoteAddr != "" {
return n.primaryIPv6Endpoint(remoteAddr)
}
n.mu.RLock()
defer n.mu.RUnlock()
var deprecatedEndpoint *referencedNetworkEndpoint
for _, r := range n.mu.primary[protocol] {
if !r.isValidForOutgoingRLocked() {
continue
}
if !r.deprecated {
if r.tryIncRef() {
// r is not deprecated, so return it immediately.
//
// If we kept track of a deprecated endpoint, decrement its reference
// count since it was incremented when we decided to keep track of it.
if deprecatedEndpoint != nil {
deprecatedEndpoint.decRefLocked()
deprecatedEndpoint = nil
}
return r
}
} else if deprecatedEndpoint == nil && r.tryIncRef() {
// We prefer an endpoint that is not deprecated, but we keep track of r in
// case n doesn't have any non-deprecated endpoints.
//
// If we end up finding a more preferred endpoint, r's reference count
// will be decremented when such an endpoint is found.
deprecatedEndpoint = r
}
}
// n doesn't have any valid non-deprecated endpoints, so return
// deprecatedEndpoint (which may be nil if n doesn't have any valid deprecated
// endpoints either).
return deprecatedEndpoint
}
// ipv6AddrCandidate is an IPv6 candidate for Source Address Selection (RFC
// 6724 section 5).
type ipv6AddrCandidate struct {
ref *referencedNetworkEndpoint
scope header.IPv6AddressScope
}
// primaryIPv6Endpoint returns an IPv6 endpoint following Source Address
// Selection (RFC 6724 section 5).
//
// Note, only rules 1-3 and 7 are followed.
//
// remoteAddr must be a valid IPv6 address.
func (n *NIC) primaryIPv6Endpoint(remoteAddr tcpip.Address) *referencedNetworkEndpoint {
n.mu.RLock()
ref := n.primaryIPv6EndpointRLocked(remoteAddr)
n.mu.RUnlock()
return ref
}
// primaryIPv6EndpointLocked returns an IPv6 endpoint following Source Address
// Selection (RFC 6724 section 5).
//
// Note, only rules 1-3 and 7 are followed.
//
// remoteAddr must be a valid IPv6 address.
//
// n.mu MUST be read locked.
func (n *NIC) primaryIPv6EndpointRLocked(remoteAddr tcpip.Address) *referencedNetworkEndpoint {
primaryAddrs := n.mu.primary[header.IPv6ProtocolNumber]
if len(primaryAddrs) == 0 {
return nil
}
// Create a candidate set of available addresses we can potentially use as a
// source address.
cs := make([]ipv6AddrCandidate, 0, len(primaryAddrs))
for _, r := range primaryAddrs {
// If r is not valid for outgoing connections, it is not a valid endpoint.
if !r.isValidForOutgoingRLocked() {
continue
}
addr := r.address()
scope, err := header.ScopeForIPv6Address(addr)
if err != nil {
// Should never happen as we got r from the primary IPv6 endpoint list and
// ScopeForIPv6Address only returns an error if addr is not an IPv6
// address.
panic(fmt.Sprintf("header.ScopeForIPv6Address(%s): %s", addr, err))
}
cs = append(cs, ipv6AddrCandidate{
ref: r,
scope: scope,
})
}
remoteScope, err := header.ScopeForIPv6Address(remoteAddr)
if err != nil {
// primaryIPv6Endpoint should never be called with an invalid IPv6 address.
panic(fmt.Sprintf("header.ScopeForIPv6Address(%s): %s", remoteAddr, err))
}
// Sort the addresses as per RFC 6724 section 5 rules 1-3.
//
// TODO(b/146021396): Implement rules 4-8 of RFC 6724 section 5.
sort.Slice(cs, func(i, j int) bool {
sa := cs[i]
sb := cs[j]
// Prefer same address as per RFC 6724 section 5 rule 1.
if sa.ref.address() == remoteAddr {
return true
}
if sb.ref.address() == remoteAddr {
return false
}
// Prefer appropriate scope as per RFC 6724 section 5 rule 2.
if sa.scope < sb.scope {
return sa.scope >= remoteScope
} else if sb.scope < sa.scope {
return sb.scope < remoteScope
}
// Avoid deprecated addresses as per RFC 6724 section 5 rule 3.
if saDep, sbDep := sa.ref.deprecated, sb.ref.deprecated; saDep != sbDep {
// If sa is not deprecated, it is preferred over sb.
return sbDep
}
// Prefer temporary addresses as per RFC 6724 section 5 rule 7.
if saTemp, sbTemp := sa.ref.configType == slaacTemp, sb.ref.configType == slaacTemp; saTemp != sbTemp {
return saTemp
}
// sa and sb are equal, return the endpoint that is closest to the front of
// the primary endpoint list.
return i < j
})
// Return the most preferred address that can have its reference count
// incremented.
for _, c := range cs {
if r := c.ref; r.tryIncRef() {
return r
}
}
return nil
}
// hasPermanentAddrLocked returns true if n has a permanent (including currently
// tentative) address, addr.
func (n *NIC) hasPermanentAddrLocked(addr tcpip.Address) bool {
ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[NetworkEndpointID{addr}]
if !ok {
return false
}
kind := ref.getKind()
return kind == permanent || kind == permanentTentative
}
type getRefBehaviour int
const (
// spoofing indicates that the NIC's spoofing flag should be observed when
// getting a NIC's referenced network endpoint.
spoofing getRefBehaviour = iota
// promiscuous indicates that the NIC's promiscuous flag should be observed
// when getting a NIC's referenced network endpoint.
promiscuous
)
func (n *NIC) getRef(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, dst tcpip.Address) *referencedNetworkEndpoint {
return n.getRefOrCreateTemp(protocol, dst, CanBePrimaryEndpoint, promiscuous)
}
// findEndpoint finds the endpoint, if any, with the given address.
func (n *NIC) findEndpoint(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, address tcpip.Address, peb PrimaryEndpointBehavior) *referencedNetworkEndpoint {
return n.getRefOrCreateTemp(protocol, address, peb, spoofing)
}
// getRefEpOrCreateTemp returns the referenced network endpoint for the given
// protocol and address.
//
// If none exists a temporary one may be created if we are in promiscuous mode
// or spoofing. Promiscuous mode will only be checked if promiscuous is true.
// Similarly, spoofing will only be checked if spoofing is true.
//
// If the address is the IPv4 broadcast address for an endpoint's network, that
// endpoint will be returned.
func (n *NIC) getRefOrCreateTemp(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, address tcpip.Address, peb PrimaryEndpointBehavior, tempRef getRefBehaviour) *referencedNetworkEndpoint {
n.mu.RLock()
var spoofingOrPromiscuous bool
switch tempRef {
case spoofing:
spoofingOrPromiscuous = n.mu.spoofing
case promiscuous:
spoofingOrPromiscuous = n.mu.promiscuous
}
if ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[NetworkEndpointID{address}]; ok {
// An endpoint with this id exists, check if it can be used and return it.
if !ref.isAssignedRLocked(spoofingOrPromiscuous) {
n.mu.RUnlock()
return nil
}
if ref.tryIncRef() {
n.mu.RUnlock()
return ref
}
}
// Check if address is a broadcast address for the endpoint's network.
//
// Only IPv4 has a notion of broadcast addresses.
if protocol == header.IPv4ProtocolNumber {
if ref := n.getRefForBroadcastRLocked(address); ref != nil {
n.mu.RUnlock()
return ref
}
}
// A usable reference was not found, create a temporary one if requested by
// the caller or if the address is found in the NIC's subnets.
createTempEP := spoofingOrPromiscuous
n.mu.RUnlock()
if !createTempEP {
return nil
}
// Try again with the lock in exclusive mode. If we still can't get the
// endpoint, create a new "temporary" endpoint. It will only exist while
// there's a route through it.
n.mu.Lock()
ref := n.getRefOrCreateTempLocked(protocol, address, peb)
n.mu.Unlock()
return ref
}
// getRefForBroadcastLocked returns an endpoint where address is the IPv4
// broadcast address for the endpoint's network.
//
// n.mu MUST be read locked.
func (n *NIC) getRefForBroadcastRLocked(address tcpip.Address) *referencedNetworkEndpoint {
for _, ref := range n.mu.endpoints {
// Only IPv4 has a notion of broadcast addresses.
if ref.protocol != header.IPv4ProtocolNumber {
continue
}
addr := ref.addrWithPrefix()
subnet := addr.Subnet()
if subnet.IsBroadcast(address) && ref.tryIncRef() {
return ref
}
}
return nil
}
/// getRefOrCreateTempLocked returns an existing endpoint for address or creates
/// and returns a temporary endpoint.
//
// If the address is the IPv4 broadcast address for an endpoint's network, that
// endpoint will be returned.
//
// n.mu must be write locked.
func (n *NIC) getRefOrCreateTempLocked(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, address tcpip.Address, peb PrimaryEndpointBehavior) *referencedNetworkEndpoint {
if ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[NetworkEndpointID{address}]; ok {
// No need to check the type as we are ok with expired endpoints at this
// point.
if ref.tryIncRef() {
return ref
}
// tryIncRef failing means the endpoint is scheduled to be removed once the
// lock is released. Remove it here so we can create a new (temporary) one.
// The removal logic waiting for the lock handles this case.
n.removeEndpointLocked(ref)
}
// Check if address is a broadcast address for an endpoint's network.
//
// Only IPv4 has a notion of broadcast addresses.
if protocol == header.IPv4ProtocolNumber {
if ref := n.getRefForBroadcastRLocked(address); ref != nil {
return ref
}
}
// Add a new temporary endpoint.
netProto, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[protocol]
if !ok {
return nil
}
ref, _ := n.addAddressLocked(tcpip.ProtocolAddress{
Protocol: protocol,
AddressWithPrefix: tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{
Address: address,
PrefixLen: netProto.DefaultPrefixLen(),
},
}, peb, temporary, static, false)
return ref
}
// addAddressLocked adds a new protocolAddress to n.
//
// If n already has the address in a non-permanent state, and the kind given is
// permanent, that address will be promoted in place and its properties set to
// the properties provided. Otherwise, it returns tcpip.ErrDuplicateAddress.
func (n *NIC) addAddressLocked(protocolAddress tcpip.ProtocolAddress, peb PrimaryEndpointBehavior, kind networkEndpointKind, configType networkEndpointConfigType, deprecated bool) (*referencedNetworkEndpoint, *tcpip.Error) {
// TODO(b/141022673): Validate IP addresses before adding them.
// Sanity check.
id := NetworkEndpointID{LocalAddress: protocolAddress.AddressWithPrefix.Address}
if ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[id]; ok {
// Endpoint already exists.
if kind != permanent {
return nil, tcpip.ErrDuplicateAddress
}
switch ref.getKind() {
case permanentTentative, permanent:
// The NIC already have a permanent endpoint with that address.
return nil, tcpip.ErrDuplicateAddress
case permanentExpired, temporary:
// Promote the endpoint to become permanent and respect the new peb,
// configType and deprecated status.
if ref.tryIncRef() {
// TODO(b/147748385): Perform Duplicate Address Detection when promoting
// an IPv6 endpoint to permanent.
ref.setKind(permanent)
ref.deprecated = deprecated
ref.configType = configType
refs := n.mu.primary[ref.protocol]
for i, r := range refs {
if r == ref {
switch peb {
case CanBePrimaryEndpoint:
return ref, nil
case FirstPrimaryEndpoint:
if i == 0 {
return ref, nil
}
n.mu.primary[r.protocol] = append(refs[:i], refs[i+1:]...)
case NeverPrimaryEndpoint:
n.mu.primary[r.protocol] = append(refs[:i], refs[i+1:]...)
return ref, nil
}
}
}
n.insertPrimaryEndpointLocked(ref, peb)
return ref, nil
}
// tryIncRef failing means the endpoint is scheduled to be removed once
// the lock is released. Remove it here so we can create a new
// (permanent) one. The removal logic waiting for the lock handles this
// case.
n.removeEndpointLocked(ref)
}
}
ep, ok := n.networkEndpoints[protocolAddress.Protocol]
if !ok {
return nil, tcpip.ErrUnknownProtocol
}
isIPv6Unicast := protocolAddress.Protocol == header.IPv6ProtocolNumber && header.IsV6UnicastAddress(protocolAddress.AddressWithPrefix.Address)
// If the address is an IPv6 address and it is a permanent address,
// mark it as tentative so it goes through the DAD process if the NIC is
// enabled. If the NIC is not enabled, DAD will be started when the NIC is
// enabled.
if isIPv6Unicast && kind == permanent {
kind = permanentTentative
}
ref := &referencedNetworkEndpoint{
refs: 1,
addr: protocolAddress.AddressWithPrefix,
ep: ep,
nic: n,
protocol: protocolAddress.Protocol,
kind: kind,
configType: configType,
deprecated: deprecated,
}
// Set up cache if link address resolution exists for this protocol.
if n.linkEP.Capabilities()&CapabilityResolutionRequired != 0 {
if _, ok := n.stack.linkAddrResolvers[protocolAddress.Protocol]; ok {
ref.linkCache = n.stack
}
}
// If we are adding an IPv6 unicast address, join the solicited-node
// multicast address.
if isIPv6Unicast {
snmc := header.SolicitedNodeAddr(protocolAddress.AddressWithPrefix.Address)
if err := n.joinGroupLocked(protocolAddress.Protocol, snmc); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
n.mu.endpoints[id] = ref
n.insertPrimaryEndpointLocked(ref, peb)
// If we are adding a tentative IPv6 address, start DAD if the NIC is enabled.
if isIPv6Unicast && kind == permanentTentative && n.mu.enabled {
if err := n.mu.ndp.startDuplicateAddressDetection(protocolAddress.AddressWithPrefix.Address, ref); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
return ref, nil
}
// AddAddress adds a new address to n, so that it starts accepting packets
// targeted at the given address (and network protocol).
func (n *NIC) AddAddress(protocolAddress tcpip.ProtocolAddress, peb PrimaryEndpointBehavior) *tcpip.Error {
// Add the endpoint.
n.mu.Lock()
_, err := n.addAddressLocked(protocolAddress, peb, permanent, static, false /* deprecated */)
n.mu.Unlock()
return err
}
// AllAddresses returns all addresses (primary and non-primary) associated with
// this NIC.
func (n *NIC) AllAddresses() []tcpip.ProtocolAddress {
n.mu.RLock()
defer n.mu.RUnlock()
addrs := make([]tcpip.ProtocolAddress, 0, len(n.mu.endpoints))
for _, ref := range n.mu.endpoints {
// Don't include tentative, expired or temporary endpoints to
// avoid confusion and prevent the caller from using those.
switch ref.getKind() {
case permanentExpired, temporary:
continue
}
addrs = append(addrs, tcpip.ProtocolAddress{
Protocol: ref.protocol,
AddressWithPrefix: ref.addrWithPrefix(),
})
}
return addrs
}
// PrimaryAddresses returns the primary addresses associated with this NIC.
func (n *NIC) PrimaryAddresses() []tcpip.ProtocolAddress {
n.mu.RLock()
defer n.mu.RUnlock()
var addrs []tcpip.ProtocolAddress
for proto, list := range n.mu.primary {
for _, ref := range list {
// Don't include tentative, expired or tempory endpoints
// to avoid confusion and prevent the caller from using
// those.
switch ref.getKind() {
case permanentTentative, permanentExpired, temporary:
continue
}
addrs = append(addrs, tcpip.ProtocolAddress{
Protocol: proto,
AddressWithPrefix: ref.addrWithPrefix(),
})
}
}
return addrs
}
// primaryAddress returns the primary address associated with this NIC.
//
// primaryAddress will return the first non-deprecated address if such an
// address exists. If no non-deprecated address exists, the first deprecated
// address will be returned.
func (n *NIC) primaryAddress(proto tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber) tcpip.AddressWithPrefix {
n.mu.RLock()
defer n.mu.RUnlock()
list, ok := n.mu.primary[proto]
if !ok {
return tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{}
}
var deprecatedEndpoint *referencedNetworkEndpoint
for _, ref := range list {
// Don't include tentative, expired or tempory endpoints to avoid confusion
// and prevent the caller from using those.
switch ref.getKind() {
case permanentTentative, permanentExpired, temporary:
continue
}
if !ref.deprecated {
return ref.addrWithPrefix()
}
if deprecatedEndpoint == nil {
deprecatedEndpoint = ref
}
}
if deprecatedEndpoint != nil {
return deprecatedEndpoint.addrWithPrefix()
}
return tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{}
}
// insertPrimaryEndpointLocked adds r to n's primary endpoint list as required
// by peb.
//
// n MUST be locked.
func (n *NIC) insertPrimaryEndpointLocked(r *referencedNetworkEndpoint, peb PrimaryEndpointBehavior) {
switch peb {
case CanBePrimaryEndpoint:
n.mu.primary[r.protocol] = append(n.mu.primary[r.protocol], r)
case FirstPrimaryEndpoint:
n.mu.primary[r.protocol] = append([]*referencedNetworkEndpoint{r}, n.mu.primary[r.protocol]...)
}
}
func (n *NIC) removeEndpointLocked(r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) {
id := NetworkEndpointID{LocalAddress: r.address()}
// Nothing to do if the reference has already been replaced with a different
// one. This happens in the case where 1) this endpoint's ref count hit zero
// and was waiting (on the lock) to be removed and 2) the same address was
// re-added in the meantime by removing this endpoint from the list and
// adding a new one.
if n.mu.endpoints[id] != r {
return
}
if r.getKind() == permanent {
panic("Reference count dropped to zero before being removed")
}
delete(n.mu.endpoints, id)
refs := n.mu.primary[r.protocol]
for i, ref := range refs {
if ref == r {
n.mu.primary[r.protocol] = append(refs[:i], refs[i+1:]...)
refs[len(refs)-1] = nil
break
}
}
}
func (n *NIC) removeEndpoint(r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) {
n.mu.Lock()
n.removeEndpointLocked(r)
n.mu.Unlock()
}
func (n *NIC) removePermanentAddressLocked(addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error {
r, ok := n.mu.endpoints[NetworkEndpointID{addr}]
if !ok {
return tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress
}
kind := r.getKind()
if kind != permanent && kind != permanentTentative {
return tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress
}
switch r.protocol {
case header.IPv6ProtocolNumber:
return n.removePermanentIPv6EndpointLocked(r, true /* allowSLAACInvalidation */)
default:
r.expireLocked()
return nil
}
}
func (n *NIC) removePermanentIPv6EndpointLocked(r *referencedNetworkEndpoint, allowSLAACInvalidation bool) *tcpip.Error {
addr := r.addrWithPrefix()
isIPv6Unicast := header.IsV6UnicastAddress(addr.Address)
if isIPv6Unicast {
n.mu.ndp.stopDuplicateAddressDetection(addr.Address)
// If we are removing an address generated via SLAAC, cleanup
// its SLAAC resources and notify the integrator.
switch r.configType {
case slaac:
n.mu.ndp.cleanupSLAACAddrResourcesAndNotify(addr, allowSLAACInvalidation)
case slaacTemp:
n.mu.ndp.cleanupTempSLAACAddrResourcesAndNotify(addr, allowSLAACInvalidation)
}
}
r.expireLocked()
// At this point the endpoint is deleted.
// If we are removing an IPv6 unicast address, leave the solicited-node
// multicast address.
//
// We ignore the tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress error because the solicited-node
// multicast group may be left by user action.
if isIPv6Unicast {
snmc := header.SolicitedNodeAddr(addr.Address)
if err := n.leaveGroupLocked(snmc, false /* force */); err != nil && err != tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// RemoveAddress removes an address from n.
func (n *NIC) RemoveAddress(addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
return n.removePermanentAddressLocked(addr)
}
// joinGroup adds a new endpoint for the given multicast address, if none
// exists yet. Otherwise it just increments its count.
func (n *NIC) joinGroup(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
return n.joinGroupLocked(protocol, addr)
}
// joinGroupLocked adds a new endpoint for the given multicast address, if none
// exists yet. Otherwise it just increments its count. n MUST be locked before
// joinGroupLocked is called.
func (n *NIC) joinGroupLocked(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error {
// TODO(b/143102137): When implementing MLD, make sure MLD packets are
// not sent unless a valid link-local address is available for use on n
// as an MLD packet's source address must be a link-local address as
// outlined in RFC 3810 section 5.
id := NetworkEndpointID{addr}
joins := n.mu.mcastJoins[id]
if joins == 0 {
netProto, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[protocol]
if !ok {
return tcpip.ErrUnknownProtocol
}
if _, err := n.addAddressLocked(tcpip.ProtocolAddress{
Protocol: protocol,
AddressWithPrefix: tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{
Address: addr,
PrefixLen: netProto.DefaultPrefixLen(),
},
}, NeverPrimaryEndpoint, permanent, static, false /* deprecated */); err != nil {
return err
}
}
n.mu.mcastJoins[id] = joins + 1
return nil
}
// leaveGroup decrements the count for the given multicast address, and when it
// reaches zero removes the endpoint for this address.
func (n *NIC) leaveGroup(addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
return n.leaveGroupLocked(addr, false /* force */)
}
// leaveGroupLocked decrements the count for the given multicast address, and
// when it reaches zero removes the endpoint for this address. n MUST be locked
// before leaveGroupLocked is called.
//
// If force is true, then the count for the multicast addres is ignored and the
// endpoint will be removed immediately.
func (n *NIC) leaveGroupLocked(addr tcpip.Address, force bool) *tcpip.Error {
id := NetworkEndpointID{addr}
joins, ok := n.mu.mcastJoins[id]
if !ok {
// There are no joins with this address on this NIC.
return tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress
}
joins--
if force || joins == 0 {
// There are no outstanding joins or we are forced to leave, clean up.
delete(n.mu.mcastJoins, id)
return n.removePermanentAddressLocked(addr)
}
n.mu.mcastJoins[id] = joins
return nil
}
// isInGroup returns true if n has joined the multicast group addr.
func (n *NIC) isInGroup(addr tcpip.Address) bool {
n.mu.RLock()
joins := n.mu.mcastJoins[NetworkEndpointID{addr}]
n.mu.RUnlock()
return joins != 0
}
func handlePacket(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, dst, src tcpip.Address, localLinkAddr, remotelinkAddr tcpip.LinkAddress, ref *referencedNetworkEndpoint, pkt *PacketBuffer) {
r := makeRoute(protocol, dst, src, localLinkAddr, ref, false /* handleLocal */, false /* multicastLoop */)
r.RemoteLinkAddress = remotelinkAddr
ref.ep.HandlePacket(&r, pkt)
ref.decRef()
}
// DeliverNetworkPacket finds the appropriate network protocol endpoint and
// hands the packet over for further processing. This function is called when
// the NIC receives a packet from the link endpoint.
// Note that the ownership of the slice backing vv is retained by the caller.
// This rule applies only to the slice itself, not to the items of the slice;
// the ownership of the items is not retained by the caller.
func (n *NIC) DeliverNetworkPacket(remote, local tcpip.LinkAddress, protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, pkt *PacketBuffer) {
n.mu.RLock()
enabled := n.mu.enabled
// If the NIC is not yet enabled, don't receive any packets.
if !enabled {
n.mu.RUnlock()
n.stats.DisabledRx.Packets.Increment()
n.stats.DisabledRx.Bytes.IncrementBy(uint64(pkt.Data.Size()))
return
}
n.stats.Rx.Packets.Increment()
n.stats.Rx.Bytes.IncrementBy(uint64(pkt.Data.Size()))
netProto, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[protocol]
if !ok {
n.mu.RUnlock()
n.stack.stats.UnknownProtocolRcvdPackets.Increment()
return
}
// If no local link layer address is provided, assume it was sent
// directly to this NIC.
if local == "" {
local = n.linkEP.LinkAddress()
}
// Are any packet sockets listening for this network protocol?
packetEPs := n.mu.packetEPs[protocol]
// Add any other packet sockets that maybe listening for all protocols.
packetEPs = append(packetEPs, n.mu.packetEPs[header.EthernetProtocolAll]...)
n.mu.RUnlock()
for _, ep := range packetEPs {
p := pkt.Clone()
p.PktType = tcpip.PacketHost
ep.HandlePacket(n.id, local, protocol, p)
}
if netProto.Number() == header.IPv4ProtocolNumber || netProto.Number() == header.IPv6ProtocolNumber {
n.stack.stats.IP.PacketsReceived.Increment()
}
// Parse headers.
transProtoNum, hasTransportHdr, ok := netProto.Parse(pkt)
if !ok {
// The packet is too small to contain a network header.
n.stack.stats.MalformedRcvdPackets.Increment()
return
}
if hasTransportHdr {
// Parse the transport header if present.
if state, ok := n.stack.transportProtocols[transProtoNum]; ok {
state.proto.Parse(pkt)
}
}
src, dst := netProto.ParseAddresses(pkt.NetworkHeader().View())
if n.stack.handleLocal && !n.isLoopback() && n.getRef(protocol, src) != nil {
// The source address is one of our own, so we never should have gotten a
// packet like this unless handleLocal is false. Loopback also calls this
// function even though the packets didn't come from the physical interface
// so don't drop those.
n.stack.stats.IP.InvalidSourceAddressesReceived.Increment()
return
}
// TODO(gvisor.dev/issue/170): Not supporting iptables for IPv6 yet.
// Loopback traffic skips the prerouting chain.
if protocol == header.IPv4ProtocolNumber && !n.isLoopback() {
// iptables filtering.
ipt := n.stack.IPTables()
address := n.primaryAddress(protocol)
if ok := ipt.Check(Prerouting, pkt, nil, nil, address.Address, ""); !ok {
// iptables is telling us to drop the packet.
return
}
}
if ref := n.getRef(protocol, dst); ref != nil {
handlePacket(protocol, dst, src, n.linkEP.LinkAddress(), remote, ref, pkt)
return
}
// This NIC doesn't care about the packet. Find a NIC that cares about the
// packet and forward it to the NIC.
//
// TODO: Should we be forwarding the packet even if promiscuous?
if n.stack.Forwarding(protocol) {
r, err := n.stack.FindRoute(0, "", dst, protocol, false /* multicastLoop */)
if err != nil {
n.stack.stats.IP.InvalidDestinationAddressesReceived.Increment()
return
}
// Found a NIC.
n := r.ref.nic
n.mu.RLock()
ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[NetworkEndpointID{dst}]
ok = ok && ref.isValidForOutgoingRLocked() && ref.tryIncRef()
n.mu.RUnlock()
if ok {
r.LocalLinkAddress = n.linkEP.LinkAddress()
r.RemoteLinkAddress = remote
r.RemoteAddress = src
// TODO(b/123449044): Update the source NIC as well.
ref.ep.HandlePacket(&r, pkt)
ref.decRef()
r.Release()
return
}
// n doesn't have a destination endpoint.
// Send the packet out of n.
// TODO(b/128629022): move this logic to route.WritePacket.
// TODO(gvisor.dev/issue/1085): According to the RFC, we must decrease the TTL field for ipv4/ipv6.
if ch, err := r.Resolve(nil); err != nil {
if err == tcpip.ErrWouldBlock {
n.stack.forwarder.enqueue(ch, n, &r, protocol, pkt)
// forwarder will release route.
return
}
n.stack.stats.IP.InvalidDestinationAddressesReceived.Increment()
r.Release()
return
}
// The link-address resolution finished immediately.
n.forwardPacket(&r, protocol, pkt)
r.Release()
return
}
// If a packet socket handled the packet, don't treat it as invalid.
if len(packetEPs) == 0 {
n.stack.stats.IP.InvalidDestinationAddressesReceived.Increment()
}
}
// DeliverOutboundPacket implements NetworkDispatcher.DeliverOutboundPacket.
func (n *NIC) DeliverOutboundPacket(remote, local tcpip.LinkAddress, protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, pkt *PacketBuffer) {
n.mu.RLock()
// We do not deliver to protocol specific packet endpoints as on Linux
// only ETH_P_ALL endpoints get outbound packets.
// Add any other packet sockets that maybe listening for all protocols.
packetEPs := n.mu.packetEPs[header.EthernetProtocolAll]
n.mu.RUnlock()
for _, ep := range packetEPs {
p := pkt.Clone()
p.PktType = tcpip.PacketOutgoing
// Add the link layer header as outgoing packets are intercepted
// before the link layer header is created.
n.linkEP.AddHeader(local, remote, protocol, p)
ep.HandlePacket(n.id, local, protocol, p)
}
}
func (n *NIC) forwardPacket(r *Route, protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, pkt *PacketBuffer) {
// TODO(b/143425874) Decrease the TTL field in forwarded packets.
// pkt may have set its header and may not have enough headroom for link-layer
// header for the other link to prepend. Here we create a new packet to
// forward.
fwdPkt := NewPacketBuffer(PacketBufferOptions{
ReserveHeaderBytes: int(n.linkEP.MaxHeaderLength()),
Data: buffer.NewVectorisedView(pkt.Size(), pkt.Views()),
})
// WritePacket takes ownership of fwdPkt, calculate numBytes first.
numBytes := fwdPkt.Size()
if err := n.linkEP.WritePacket(r, nil /* gso */, protocol, fwdPkt); err != nil {
r.Stats().IP.OutgoingPacketErrors.Increment()
return
}
n.stats.Tx.Packets.Increment()
n.stats.Tx.Bytes.IncrementBy(uint64(numBytes))
}
// DeliverTransportPacket delivers the packets to the appropriate transport
// protocol endpoint.
func (n *NIC) DeliverTransportPacket(r *Route, protocol tcpip.TransportProtocolNumber, pkt *PacketBuffer) {
state, ok := n.stack.transportProtocols[protocol]
if !ok {
n.stack.stats.UnknownProtocolRcvdPackets.Increment()
return
}
transProto := state.proto
// Raw socket packets are delivered based solely on the transport
// protocol number. We do not inspect the payload to ensure it's
// validly formed.
n.stack.demux.deliverRawPacket(r, protocol, pkt)
// TransportHeader is empty only when pkt is an ICMP packet or was reassembled
// from fragments.
if pkt.TransportHeader().View().IsEmpty() {
// TODO(gvisor.dev/issue/170): ICMP packets don't have their TransportHeader
// fields set yet, parse it here. See icmp/protocol.go:protocol.Parse for a
// full explanation.
if protocol == header.ICMPv4ProtocolNumber || protocol == header.ICMPv6ProtocolNumber {
// ICMP packets may be longer, but until icmp.Parse is implemented, here
// we parse it using the minimum size.
if _, ok := pkt.TransportHeader().Consume(transProto.MinimumPacketSize()); !ok {
n.stack.stats.MalformedRcvdPackets.Increment()
return
}
} else {
// This is either a bad packet or was re-assembled from fragments.
transProto.Parse(pkt)
}
}
if pkt.TransportHeader().View().Size() < transProto.MinimumPacketSize() {
n.stack.stats.MalformedRcvdPackets.Increment()
return
}
srcPort, dstPort, err := transProto.ParsePorts(pkt.TransportHeader().View())
if err != nil {
n.stack.stats.MalformedRcvdPackets.Increment()
return
}
id := TransportEndpointID{dstPort, r.LocalAddress, srcPort, r.RemoteAddress}
if n.stack.demux.deliverPacket(r, protocol, pkt, id) {
return
}
// Try to deliver to per-stack default handler.
if state.defaultHandler != nil {
if state.defaultHandler(r, id, pkt) {
return
}
}
// We could not find an appropriate destination for this packet, so
// deliver it to the global handler.
if !transProto.HandleUnknownDestinationPacket(r, id, pkt) {
n.stack.stats.MalformedRcvdPackets.Increment()
}
}
// DeliverTransportControlPacket delivers control packets to the appropriate
// transport protocol endpoint.
func (n *NIC) DeliverTransportControlPacket(local, remote tcpip.Address, net tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, trans tcpip.TransportProtocolNumber, typ ControlType, extra uint32, pkt *PacketBuffer) {
state, ok := n.stack.transportProtocols[trans]
if !ok {
return
}
transProto := state.proto
// ICMPv4 only guarantees that 8 bytes of the transport protocol will
// be present in the payload. We know that the ports are within the
// first 8 bytes for all known transport protocols.
transHeader, ok := pkt.Data.PullUp(8)
if !ok {
return
}
srcPort, dstPort, err := transProto.ParsePorts(transHeader)
if err != nil {
return
}
id := TransportEndpointID{srcPort, local, dstPort, remote}
if n.stack.demux.deliverControlPacket(n, net, trans, typ, extra, pkt, id) {
return
}
}
// ID returns the identifier of n.
func (n *NIC) ID() tcpip.NICID {
return n.id
}
// Name returns the name of n.
func (n *NIC) Name() string {
return n.name
}
// Stack returns the instance of the Stack that owns this NIC.
func (n *NIC) Stack() *Stack {
return n.stack
}
// LinkEndpoint returns the link endpoint of n.
func (n *NIC) LinkEndpoint() LinkEndpoint {
return n.linkEP
}
// isAddrTentative returns true if addr is tentative on n.
//
// Note that if addr is not associated with n, then this function will return
// false. It will only return true if the address is associated with the NIC
// AND it is tentative.
func (n *NIC) isAddrTentative(addr tcpip.Address) bool {
n.mu.RLock()
defer n.mu.RUnlock()
ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[NetworkEndpointID{addr}]
if !ok {
return false
}
return ref.getKind() == permanentTentative
}
// dupTentativeAddrDetected attempts to inform n that a tentative addr is a
// duplicate on a link.
//
// dupTentativeAddrDetected will remove the tentative address if it exists. If
// the address was generated via SLAAC, an attempt will be made to generate a
// new address.
func (n *NIC) dupTentativeAddrDetected(addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[NetworkEndpointID{addr}]
if !ok {
return tcpip.ErrBadAddress
}
if ref.getKind() != permanentTentative {
return tcpip.ErrInvalidEndpointState
}
// If the address is a SLAAC address, do not invalidate its SLAAC prefix as a
// new address will be generated for it.
if err := n.removePermanentIPv6EndpointLocked(ref, false /* allowSLAACInvalidation */); err != nil {
return err
}
prefix := ref.addrWithPrefix().Subnet()
switch ref.configType {
case slaac:
n.mu.ndp.regenerateSLAACAddr(prefix)
case slaacTemp:
// Do not reset the generation attempts counter for the prefix as the
// temporary address is being regenerated in response to a DAD conflict.
n.mu.ndp.regenerateTempSLAACAddr(prefix, false /* resetGenAttempts */)
}
return nil
}
// setNDPConfigs sets the NDP configurations for n.
//
// Note, if c contains invalid NDP configuration values, it will be fixed to
// use default values for the erroneous values.
func (n *NIC) setNDPConfigs(c NDPConfigurations) {
c.validate()
n.mu.Lock()
n.mu.ndp.configs = c
n.mu.Unlock()
}
// NUDConfigs gets the NUD configurations for n.
func (n *NIC) NUDConfigs() (NUDConfigurations, *tcpip.Error) {
if n.neigh == nil {
return NUDConfigurations{}, tcpip.ErrNotSupported
}
return n.neigh.config(), nil
}
// setNUDConfigs sets the NUD configurations for n.
//
// Note, if c contains invalid NUD configuration values, it will be fixed to
// use default values for the erroneous values.
func (n *NIC) setNUDConfigs(c NUDConfigurations) *tcpip.Error {
if n.neigh == nil {
return tcpip.ErrNotSupported
}
c.resetInvalidFields()
n.neigh.setConfig(c)
return nil
}
// handleNDPRA handles an NDP Router Advertisement message that arrived on n.
func (n *NIC) handleNDPRA(ip tcpip.Address, ra header.NDPRouterAdvert) {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
n.mu.ndp.handleRA(ip, ra)
}
type networkEndpointKind int32
const (
// A permanentTentative endpoint is a permanent address that is not yet
// considered to be fully bound to an interface in the traditional
// sense. That is, the address is associated with a NIC, but packets
// destined to the address MUST NOT be accepted and MUST be silently
// dropped, and the address MUST NOT be used as a source address for
// outgoing packets. For IPv6, addresses will be of this kind until
// NDP's Duplicate Address Detection has resolved, or be deleted if
// the process results in detecting a duplicate address.
permanentTentative networkEndpointKind = iota
// A permanent endpoint is created by adding a permanent address (vs. a
// temporary one) to the NIC. Its reference count is biased by 1 to avoid
// removal when no route holds a reference to it. It is removed by explicitly
// removing the permanent address from the NIC.
permanent
// An expired permanent endpoint is a permanent endpoint that had its address
// removed from the NIC, and it is waiting to be removed once no more routes
// hold a reference to it. This is achieved by decreasing its reference count
// by 1. If its address is re-added before the endpoint is removed, its type
// changes back to permanent and its reference count increases by 1 again.
permanentExpired
// A temporary endpoint is created for spoofing outgoing packets, or when in
// promiscuous mode and accepting incoming packets that don't match any
// permanent endpoint. Its reference count is not biased by 1 and the
// endpoint is removed immediately when no more route holds a reference to
// it. A temporary endpoint can be promoted to permanent if its address
// is added permanently.
temporary
)
func (n *NIC) registerPacketEndpoint(netProto tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, ep PacketEndpoint) *tcpip.Error {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
eps, ok := n.mu.packetEPs[netProto]
if !ok {
return tcpip.ErrNotSupported
}
n.mu.packetEPs[netProto] = append(eps, ep)
return nil
}
func (n *NIC) unregisterPacketEndpoint(netProto tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, ep PacketEndpoint) {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
eps, ok := n.mu.packetEPs[netProto]
if !ok {
return
}
for i, epOther := range eps {
if epOther == ep {
n.mu.packetEPs[netProto] = append(eps[:i], eps[i+1:]...)
return
}
}
}
type networkEndpointConfigType int32
const (
// A statically configured endpoint is an address that was added by
// some user-specified action (adding an explicit address, joining a
// multicast group).
static networkEndpointConfigType = iota
// A SLAAC configured endpoint is an IPv6 endpoint that was added by
// SLAAC as per RFC 4862 section 5.5.3.
slaac
// A temporary SLAAC configured endpoint is an IPv6 endpoint that was added by
// SLAAC as per RFC 4941. Temporary SLAAC addresses are short-lived and are
// not expected to be valid (or preferred) forever; hence the term temporary.
slaacTemp
)
type referencedNetworkEndpoint struct {
ep NetworkEndpoint
addr tcpip.AddressWithPrefix
nic *NIC
protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber
// linkCache is set if link address resolution is enabled for this
// protocol. Set to nil otherwise.
linkCache LinkAddressCache
// refs is counting references held for this endpoint. When refs hits zero it
// triggers the automatic removal of the endpoint from the NIC.
refs int32
// networkEndpointKind must only be accessed using {get,set}Kind().
kind networkEndpointKind
// configType is the method that was used to configure this endpoint.
// This must never change except during endpoint creation and promotion to
// permanent.
configType networkEndpointConfigType
// deprecated indicates whether or not the endpoint should be considered
// deprecated. That is, when deprecated is true, other endpoints that are not
// deprecated should be preferred.
deprecated bool
}
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) address() tcpip.Address {
return r.addr.Address
}
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) addrWithPrefix() tcpip.AddressWithPrefix {
return r.addr
}
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) getKind() networkEndpointKind {
return networkEndpointKind(atomic.LoadInt32((*int32)(&r.kind)))
}
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) setKind(kind networkEndpointKind) {
atomic.StoreInt32((*int32)(&r.kind), int32(kind))
}
// isValidForOutgoing returns true if the endpoint can be used to send out a
// packet. It requires the endpoint to not be marked expired (i.e., its address)
// has been removed) unless the NIC is in spoofing mode, or temporary.
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) isValidForOutgoing() bool {
r.nic.mu.RLock()
defer r.nic.mu.RUnlock()
return r.isValidForOutgoingRLocked()
}
// isValidForOutgoingRLocked is the same as isValidForOutgoing but requires
// r.nic.mu to be read locked.
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) isValidForOutgoingRLocked() bool {
if !r.nic.mu.enabled {
return false
}
return r.isAssignedRLocked(r.nic.mu.spoofing)
}
// isAssignedRLocked returns true if r is considered to be assigned to the NIC.
//
// r.nic.mu must be read locked.
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) isAssignedRLocked(spoofingOrPromiscuous bool) bool {
switch r.getKind() {
case permanentTentative:
return false
case permanentExpired:
return spoofingOrPromiscuous
default:
return true
}
}
// expireLocked decrements the reference count and marks the permanent endpoint
// as expired.
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) expireLocked() {
r.setKind(permanentExpired)
r.decRefLocked()
}
// decRef decrements the ref count and cleans up the endpoint once it reaches
// zero.
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) decRef() {
if atomic.AddInt32(&r.refs, -1) == 0 {
r.nic.removeEndpoint(r)
}
}
// decRefLocked is the same as decRef but assumes that the NIC.mu mutex is
// locked.
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) decRefLocked() {
if atomic.AddInt32(&r.refs, -1) == 0 {
r.nic.removeEndpointLocked(r)
}
}
// incRef increments the ref count. It must only be called when the caller is
// known to be holding a reference to the endpoint, otherwise tryIncRef should
// be used.
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) incRef() {
atomic.AddInt32(&r.refs, 1)
}
// tryIncRef attempts to increment the ref count from n to n+1, but only if n is
// not zero. That is, it will increment the count if the endpoint is still
// alive, and do nothing if it has already been clean up.
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) tryIncRef() bool {
for {
v := atomic.LoadInt32(&r.refs)
if v == 0 {
return false
}
if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&r.refs, v, v+1) {
return true
}
}
}
// stack returns the Stack instance that owns the underlying endpoint.
func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) stack() *Stack {
return r.nic.stack
}
|