// Copyright 2018 The gVisor Authors. // // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. // You may obtain a copy of the License at // // http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 // // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. package tcp import ( "crypto/sha1" "encoding/binary" "hash" "io" "time" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/rand" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sleep" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sync" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/buffer" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/header" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/seqnum" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/stack" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/waiter" ) const ( // tsLen is the length, in bits, of the timestamp in the SYN cookie. tsLen = 8 // tsMask is a mask for timestamp values (i.e., tsLen bits). tsMask = (1 << tsLen) - 1 // tsOffset is the offset, in bits, of the timestamp in the SYN cookie. tsOffset = 24 // hashMask is the mask for hash values (i.e., tsOffset bits). hashMask = (1 << tsOffset) - 1 // maxTSDiff is the maximum allowed difference between a received cookie // timestamp and the current timestamp. If the difference is greater // than maxTSDiff, the cookie is expired. maxTSDiff = 2 ) var ( // SynRcvdCountThreshold is the global maximum number of connections // that are allowed to be in SYN-RCVD state before TCP starts using SYN // cookies to accept connections. // // It is an exported variable only for testing, and should not otherwise // be used by importers of this package. SynRcvdCountThreshold uint64 = 1000 // mssTable is a slice containing the possible MSS values that we // encode in the SYN cookie with two bits. mssTable = []uint16{536, 1300, 1440, 1460} ) func encodeMSS(mss uint16) uint32 { for i := len(mssTable) - 1; i > 0; i-- { if mss >= mssTable[i] { return uint32(i) } } return 0 } // syncRcvdCount is the number of endpoints in the SYN-RCVD state. The value is // protected by a mutex so that we can increment only when it's guaranteed not // to go above a threshold. var synRcvdCount struct { sync.Mutex value uint64 pending sync.WaitGroup } // listenContext is used by a listening endpoint to store state used while // listening for connections. This struct is allocated by the listen goroutine // and must not be accessed or have its methods called concurrently as they // may mutate the stored objects. type listenContext struct { stack *stack.Stack rcvWnd seqnum.Size nonce [2][sha1.BlockSize]byte listenEP *endpoint hasherMu sync.Mutex hasher hash.Hash v6only bool netProto tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber // pendingMu protects pendingEndpoints. This should only be accessed // by the listening endpoint's worker goroutine. // // Lock Ordering: listenEP.workerMu -> pendingMu pendingMu sync.Mutex // pending is used to wait for all pendingEndpoints to finish when // a socket is closed. pending sync.WaitGroup // pendingEndpoints is a map of all endpoints for which a handshake is // in progress. pendingEndpoints map[stack.TransportEndpointID]*endpoint } // timeStamp returns an 8-bit timestamp with a granularity of 64 seconds. func timeStamp() uint32 { return uint32(time.Now().Unix()>>6) & tsMask } // incSynRcvdCount tries to increment the global number of endpoints in SYN-RCVD // state. It succeeds if the increment doesn't make the count go beyond the // threshold, and fails otherwise. func incSynRcvdCount() bool { synRcvdCount.Lock() if synRcvdCount.value >= SynRcvdCountThreshold { synRcvdCount.Unlock() return false } synRcvdCount.pending.Add(1) synRcvdCount.value++ synRcvdCount.Unlock() return true } // decSynRcvdCount atomically decrements the global number of endpoints in // SYN-RCVD state. It must only be called if a previous call to incSynRcvdCount // succeeded. func decSynRcvdCount() { synRcvdCount.Lock() synRcvdCount.value-- synRcvdCount.pending.Done() synRcvdCount.Unlock() } // synCookiesInUse() returns true if the synRcvdCount is greater than // SynRcvdCountThreshold. func synCookiesInUse() bool { synRcvdCount.Lock() v := synRcvdCount.value synRcvdCount.Unlock() return v >= SynRcvdCountThreshold } // newListenContext creates a new listen context. func newListenContext(stk *stack.Stack, listenEP *endpoint, rcvWnd seqnum.Size, v6only bool, netProto tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber) *listenContext { l := &listenContext{ stack: stk, rcvWnd: rcvWnd, hasher: sha1.New(), v6only: v6only, netProto: netProto, listenEP: listenEP, pendingEndpoints: make(map[stack.TransportEndpointID]*endpoint), } rand.Read(l.nonce[0][:]) rand.Read(l.nonce[1][:]) return l } // cookieHash calculates the cookieHash for the given id, timestamp and nonce // index. The hash is used to create and validate cookies. func (l *listenContext) cookieHash(id stack.TransportEndpointID, ts uint32, nonceIndex int) uint32 { // Initialize block with fixed-size data: local ports and v. var payload [8]byte binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(payload[0:], id.LocalPort) binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(payload[2:], id.RemotePort) binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(payload[4:], ts) // Feed everything to the hasher. l.hasherMu.Lock() l.hasher.Reset() l.hasher.Write(payload[:]) l.hasher.Write(l.nonce[nonceIndex][:]) io.WriteString(l.hasher, string(id.LocalAddress)) io.WriteString(l.hasher, string(id.RemoteAddress)) // Finalize the calculation of the hash and return the first 4 bytes. h := make([]byte, 0, sha1.Size) h = l.hasher.Sum(h) l.hasherMu.Unlock() return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(h[:]) } // createCookie creates a SYN cookie for the given id and incoming sequence // number. func (l *listenContext) createCookie(id stack.TransportEndpointID, seq seqnum.Value, data uint32) seqnum.Value { ts := timeStamp() v := l.cookieHash(id, 0, 0) + uint32(seq) + (ts << tsOffset) v += (l.cookieHash(id, ts, 1) + data) & hashMask return seqnum.Value(v) } // isCookieValid checks if the supplied cookie is valid for the given id and // sequence number. If it is, it also returns the data originally encoded in the // cookie when createCookie was called. func (l *listenContext) isCookieValid(id stack.TransportEndpointID, cookie seqnum.Value, seq seqnum.Value) (uint32, bool) { ts := timeStamp() v := uint32(cookie) - l.cookieHash(id, 0, 0) - uint32(seq) cookieTS := v >> tsOffset if ((ts - cookieTS) & tsMask) > maxTSDiff { return 0, false } return (v - l.cookieHash(id, cookieTS, 1)) & hashMask, true } // createConnectingEndpoint creates a new endpoint in a connecting state, with // the connection parameters given by the arguments. func (l *listenContext) createConnectingEndpoint(s *segment, iss seqnum.Value, irs seqnum.Value, rcvdSynOpts *header.TCPSynOptions, queue *waiter.Queue) (*endpoint, *tcpip.Error) { // Create a new endpoint. netProto := l.netProto if netProto == 0 { netProto = s.route.NetProto } n := newEndpoint(l.stack, netProto, queue) n.v6only = l.v6only n.ID = s.id n.boundNICID = s.route.NICID() n.route = s.route.Clone() n.effectiveNetProtos = []tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber{s.route.NetProto} n.rcvBufSize = int(l.rcvWnd) n.amss = mssForRoute(&n.route) n.maybeEnableTimestamp(rcvdSynOpts) n.maybeEnableSACKPermitted(rcvdSynOpts) n.initGSO() // Now inherit any socket options that should be inherited from the // listening endpoint. // In case of Forwarder listenEP will be nil and hence this check. if l.listenEP != nil { l.listenEP.propagateInheritableOptions(n) } // Register new endpoint so that packets are routed to it. if err := n.stack.RegisterTransportEndpoint(n.boundNICID, n.effectiveNetProtos, ProtocolNumber, n.ID, n, n.reusePort, n.boundBindToDevice); err != nil { n.Close() return nil, err } n.isRegistered = true // Create sender and receiver. // // The receiver at least temporarily has a zero receive window scale, // but the caller may change it (before starting the protocol loop). n.snd = newSender(n, iss, irs, s.window, rcvdSynOpts.MSS, rcvdSynOpts.WS) n.rcv = newReceiver(n, irs, seqnum.Size(n.initialReceiveWindow()), 0, seqnum.Size(n.receiveBufferSize())) // Bootstrap the auto tuning algorithm. Starting at zero will result in // a large step function on the first window adjustment causing the // window to grow to a really large value. n.rcvAutoParams.prevCopied = n.initialReceiveWindow() return n, nil } // createEndpointAndPerformHandshake creates a new endpoint in connected state // and then performs the TCP 3-way handshake. func (l *listenContext) createEndpointAndPerformHandshake(s *segment, opts *header.TCPSynOptions, queue *waiter.Queue) (*endpoint, *tcpip.Error) { // Create new endpoint. irs := s.sequenceNumber isn := generateSecureISN(s.id, l.stack.Seed()) ep, err := l.createConnectingEndpoint(s, isn, irs, opts, queue) if err != nil { return nil, err } // listenEP is nil when listenContext is used by tcp.Forwarder. deferAccept := time.Duration(0) if l.listenEP != nil { l.listenEP.mu.Lock() if l.listenEP.EndpointState() != StateListen { l.listenEP.mu.Unlock() return nil, tcpip.ErrConnectionAborted } l.addPendingEndpoint(ep) deferAccept = l.listenEP.deferAccept l.listenEP.mu.Unlock() } // Perform the 3-way handshake. h := newPassiveHandshake(ep, seqnum.Size(ep.initialReceiveWindow()), isn, irs, opts, deferAccept) if err := h.execute(); err != nil { ep.Close() // Wake up any waiters. This is strictly not required normally // as a socket that was never accepted can't really have any // registered waiters except when stack.Wait() is called which // waits for all registered endpoints to stop and expects an // EventHUp. ep.waiterQueue.Notify(waiter.EventHUp | waiter.EventErr | waiter.EventIn | waiter.EventOut) if l.listenEP != nil { l.removePendingEndpoint(ep) } return nil, err } ep.mu.Lock() ep.isConnectNotified = true ep.mu.Unlock() // Update the receive window scaling. We can't do it before the // handshake because it's possible that the peer doesn't support window // scaling. ep.rcv.rcvWndScale = h.effectiveRcvWndScale() return ep, nil } func (l *listenContext) addPendingEndpoint(n *endpoint) { l.pendingMu.Lock() l.pendingEndpoints[n.ID] = n l.pending.Add(1) l.pendingMu.Unlock() } func (l *listenContext) removePendingEndpoint(n *endpoint) { l.pendingMu.Lock() delete(l.pendingEndpoints, n.ID) l.pending.Done() l.pendingMu.Unlock() } func (l *listenContext) closeAllPendingEndpoints() { l.pendingMu.Lock() for _, n := range l.pendingEndpoints { n.notifyProtocolGoroutine(notifyClose) } l.pendingMu.Unlock() l.pending.Wait() } // deliverAccepted delivers the newly-accepted endpoint to the listener. If the // endpoint has transitioned out of the listen state, the new endpoint is closed // instead. func (e *endpoint) deliverAccepted(n *endpoint) { e.mu.Lock() state := e.EndpointState() e.pendingAccepted.Add(1) defer e.pendingAccepted.Done() acceptedChan := e.acceptedChan e.mu.Unlock() if state == StateListen { acceptedChan <- n e.waiterQueue.Notify(waiter.EventIn) } else { n.Close() } } // propagateInheritableOptions propagates any options set on the listening // endpoint to the newly created endpoint. func (e *endpoint) propagateInheritableOptions(n *endpoint) { e.mu.Lock() n.userTimeout = e.userTimeout e.mu.Unlock() } // handleSynSegment is called in its own goroutine once the listening endpoint // receives a SYN segment. It is responsible for completing the handshake and // queueing the new endpoint for acceptance. // // A limited number of these goroutines are allowed before TCP starts using SYN // cookies to accept connections. func (e *endpoint) handleSynSegment(ctx *listenContext, s *segment, opts *header.TCPSynOptions) { defer decSynRcvdCount() defer e.decSynRcvdCount() defer s.decRef() n, err := ctx.createEndpointAndPerformHandshake(s, opts, &waiter.Queue{}) if err != nil { e.stack.Stats().TCP.FailedConnectionAttempts.Increment() e.stats.FailedConnectionAttempts.Increment() return } ctx.removePendingEndpoint(n) n.startAcceptedLoop() e.stack.Stats().TCP.PassiveConnectionOpenings.Increment() e.deliverAccepted(n) } func (e *endpoint) incSynRcvdCount() bool { e.mu.Lock() if e.synRcvdCount >= cap(e.acceptedChan) { e.mu.Unlock() return false } e.synRcvdCount++ e.mu.Unlock() return true } func (e *endpoint) decSynRcvdCount() { e.mu.Lock() e.synRcvdCount-- e.mu.Unlock() } func (e *endpoint) acceptQueueIsFull() bool { e.mu.Lock() if l, c := len(e.acceptedChan)+e.synRcvdCount, cap(e.acceptedChan); l >= c { e.mu.Unlock() return true } e.mu.Unlock() return false } // handleListenSegment is called when a listening endpoint receives a segment // and needs to handle it. func (e *endpoint) handleListenSegment(ctx *listenContext, s *segment) { if s.flagsAreSet(header.TCPFlagSyn | header.TCPFlagAck) { // RFC 793 section 3.4 page 35 (figure 12) outlines that a RST // must be sent in response to a SYN-ACK while in the listen // state to prevent completing a handshake from an old SYN. e.sendTCP(&s.route, s.id, buffer.VectorisedView{}, e.ttl, e.sendTOS, header.TCPFlagRst, s.ackNumber, 0, 0, nil, nil) return } // TODO(b/143300739): Use the userMSS of the listening socket // for accepted sockets. switch { case s.flags == header.TCPFlagSyn: opts := parseSynSegmentOptions(s) if incSynRcvdCount() { // Only handle the syn if the following conditions hold // - accept queue is not full. // - number of connections in synRcvd state is less than the // backlog. if !e.acceptQueueIsFull() && e.incSynRcvdCount() { s.incRef() go e.handleSynSegment(ctx, s, &opts) // S/R-SAFE: synRcvdCount is the barrier. return } decSynRcvdCount() e.stack.Stats().TCP.ListenOverflowSynDrop.Increment() e.stats.ReceiveErrors.ListenOverflowSynDrop.Increment() e.stack.Stats().DroppedPackets.Increment() return } else { // If cookies are in use but the endpoint accept queue // is full then drop the syn. if e.acceptQueueIsFull() { e.stack.Stats().TCP.ListenOverflowSynDrop.Increment() e.stats.ReceiveErrors.ListenOverflowSynDrop.Increment() e.stack.Stats().DroppedPackets.Increment() return } cookie := ctx.createCookie(s.id, s.sequenceNumber, encodeMSS(opts.MSS)) // Send SYN without window scaling because we currently // dont't encode this information in the cookie. // // Enable Timestamp option if the original syn did have // the timestamp option specified. synOpts := header.TCPSynOptions{ WS: -1, TS: opts.TS, TSVal: tcpTimeStamp(timeStampOffset()), TSEcr: opts.TSVal, MSS: mssForRoute(&s.route), } e.sendSynTCP(&s.route, s.id, e.ttl, e.sendTOS, header.TCPFlagSyn|header.TCPFlagAck, cookie, s.sequenceNumber+1, ctx.rcvWnd, synOpts) e.stack.Stats().TCP.ListenOverflowSynCookieSent.Increment() } case (s.flags & header.TCPFlagAck) != 0: if e.acceptQueueIsFull() { // Silently drop the ack as the application can't accept // the connection at this point. The ack will be // retransmitted by the sender anyway and we can // complete the connection at the time of retransmit if // the backlog has space. e.stack.Stats().TCP.ListenOverflowAckDrop.Increment() e.stats.ReceiveErrors.ListenOverflowAckDrop.Increment() e.stack.Stats().DroppedPackets.Increment() return } if !synCookiesInUse() { // When not using SYN cookies, as per RFC 793, section 3.9, page 64: // Any acknowledgment is bad if it arrives on a connection still in // the LISTEN state. An acceptable reset segment should be formed // for any arriving ACK-bearing segment. The RST should be // formatted as follows: // // // // Send a reset as this is an ACK for which there is no // half open connections and we are not using cookies // yet. // // The only time we should reach here when a connection // was opened and closed really quickly and a delayed // ACK was received from the sender. replyWithReset(s) return } // Since SYN cookies are in use this is potentially an ACK to a // SYN-ACK we sent but don't have a half open connection state // as cookies are being used to protect against a potential SYN // flood. In such cases validate the cookie and if valid create // a fully connected endpoint and deliver to the accept queue. // // If not, silently drop the ACK to avoid leaking information // when under a potential syn flood attack. // // Validate the cookie. data, ok := ctx.isCookieValid(s.id, s.ackNumber-1, s.sequenceNumber-1) if !ok || int(data) >= len(mssTable) { e.stack.Stats().TCP.ListenOverflowInvalidSynCookieRcvd.Increment() e.stack.Stats().DroppedPackets.Increment() return } e.stack.Stats().TCP.ListenOverflowSynCookieRcvd.Increment() // Create newly accepted endpoint and deliver it. rcvdSynOptions := &header.TCPSynOptions{ MSS: mssTable[data], // Disable Window scaling as original SYN is // lost. WS: -1, } // When syn cookies are in use we enable timestamp only // if the ack specifies the timestamp option assuming // that the other end did in fact negotiate the // timestamp option in the original SYN. if s.parsedOptions.TS { rcvdSynOptions.TS = true rcvdSynOptions.TSVal = s.parsedOptions.TSVal rcvdSynOptions.TSEcr = s.parsedOptions.TSEcr } n, err := ctx.createConnectingEndpoint(s, s.ackNumber-1, s.sequenceNumber-1, rcvdSynOptions, &waiter.Queue{}) if err != nil { e.stack.Stats().TCP.FailedConnectionAttempts.Increment() e.stats.FailedConnectionAttempts.Increment() return } // clear the tsOffset for the newly created // endpoint as the Timestamp was already // randomly offset when the original SYN-ACK was // sent above. n.tsOffset = 0 // Switch state to connected. // We do not use transitionToStateEstablishedLocked here as there is // no handshake state available when doing a SYN cookie based accept. n.isConnectNotified = true n.setEndpointState(StateEstablished) // Do the delivery in a separate goroutine so // that we don't block the listen loop in case // the application is slow to accept or stops // accepting. // // NOTE: This won't result in an unbounded // number of goroutines as we do check before // entering here that there was at least some // space available in the backlog. // Start the protocol goroutine. n.startAcceptedLoop() e.stack.Stats().TCP.PassiveConnectionOpenings.Increment() go e.deliverAccepted(n) } } // protocolListenLoop is the main loop of a listening TCP endpoint. It runs in // its own goroutine and is responsible for handling connection requests. func (e *endpoint) protocolListenLoop(rcvWnd seqnum.Size) *tcpip.Error { e.mu.Lock() v6only := e.v6only e.mu.Unlock() ctx := newListenContext(e.stack, e, rcvWnd, v6only, e.NetProto) defer func() { // Mark endpoint as closed. This will prevent goroutines running // handleSynSegment() from attempting to queue new connections // to the endpoint. e.mu.Lock() e.setEndpointState(StateClose) // close any endpoints in SYN-RCVD state. ctx.closeAllPendingEndpoints() // Do cleanup if needed. e.completeWorkerLocked() if e.drainDone != nil { close(e.drainDone) } e.mu.Unlock() // Notify waiters that the endpoint is shutdown. e.waiterQueue.Notify(waiter.EventIn | waiter.EventOut | waiter.EventHUp | waiter.EventErr) }() s := sleep.Sleeper{} s.AddWaker(&e.notificationWaker, wakerForNotification) s.AddWaker(&e.newSegmentWaker, wakerForNewSegment) for { switch index, _ := s.Fetch(true); index { case wakerForNotification: n := e.fetchNotifications() if n¬ifyClose != 0 { return nil } if n¬ifyDrain != 0 { for !e.segmentQueue.empty() { s := e.segmentQueue.dequeue() e.handleListenSegment(ctx, s) s.decRef() } close(e.drainDone) <-e.undrain } case wakerForNewSegment: // Process at most maxSegmentsPerWake segments. mayRequeue := true for i := 0; i < maxSegmentsPerWake; i++ { s := e.segmentQueue.dequeue() if s == nil { mayRequeue = false break } e.handleListenSegment(ctx, s) s.decRef() } // If the queue is not empty, make sure we'll wake up // in the next iteration. if mayRequeue && !e.segmentQueue.empty() { e.newSegmentWaker.Assert() } } } }