// Copyright 2018 The gVisor Authors. // // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. // You may obtain a copy of the License at // // http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 // // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. package stack import ( "log" "reflect" "sort" "strings" "sync/atomic" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sync" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/buffer" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/header" ) var ipv4BroadcastAddr = tcpip.ProtocolAddress{ Protocol: header.IPv4ProtocolNumber, AddressWithPrefix: tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{ Address: header.IPv4Broadcast, PrefixLen: 8 * header.IPv4AddressSize, }, } // NIC represents a "network interface card" to which the networking stack is // attached. type NIC struct { stack *Stack id tcpip.NICID name string linkEP LinkEndpoint context NICContext stats NICStats mu struct { sync.RWMutex enabled bool spoofing bool promiscuous bool primary map[tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber][]*referencedNetworkEndpoint endpoints map[NetworkEndpointID]*referencedNetworkEndpoint addressRanges []tcpip.Subnet mcastJoins map[NetworkEndpointID]int32 // packetEPs is protected by mu, but the contained PacketEndpoint // values are not. packetEPs map[tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber][]PacketEndpoint ndp ndpState } } // NICStats includes transmitted and received stats. type NICStats struct { Tx DirectionStats Rx DirectionStats DisabledRx DirectionStats } func makeNICStats() NICStats { var s NICStats tcpip.InitStatCounters(reflect.ValueOf(&s).Elem()) return s } // DirectionStats includes packet and byte counts. type DirectionStats struct { Packets *tcpip.StatCounter Bytes *tcpip.StatCounter } // PrimaryEndpointBehavior is an enumeration of an endpoint's primacy behavior. type PrimaryEndpointBehavior int const ( // CanBePrimaryEndpoint indicates the endpoint can be used as a primary // endpoint for new connections with no local address. This is the // default when calling NIC.AddAddress. CanBePrimaryEndpoint PrimaryEndpointBehavior = iota // FirstPrimaryEndpoint indicates the endpoint should be the first // primary endpoint considered. If there are multiple endpoints with // this behavior, the most recently-added one will be first. FirstPrimaryEndpoint // NeverPrimaryEndpoint indicates the endpoint should never be a // primary endpoint. NeverPrimaryEndpoint ) // newNIC returns a new NIC using the default NDP configurations from stack. func newNIC(stack *Stack, id tcpip.NICID, name string, ep LinkEndpoint, ctx NICContext) *NIC { // TODO(b/141011931): Validate a LinkEndpoint (ep) is valid. For // example, make sure that the link address it provides is a valid // unicast ethernet address. // TODO(b/143357959): RFC 8200 section 5 requires that IPv6 endpoints // observe an MTU of at least 1280 bytes. Ensure that this requirement // of IPv6 is supported on this endpoint's LinkEndpoint. nic := &NIC{ stack: stack, id: id, name: name, linkEP: ep, context: ctx, stats: makeNICStats(), } nic.mu.primary = make(map[tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber][]*referencedNetworkEndpoint) nic.mu.endpoints = make(map[NetworkEndpointID]*referencedNetworkEndpoint) nic.mu.mcastJoins = make(map[NetworkEndpointID]int32) nic.mu.packetEPs = make(map[tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber][]PacketEndpoint) nic.mu.ndp = ndpState{ nic: nic, configs: stack.ndpConfigs, dad: make(map[tcpip.Address]dadState), defaultRouters: make(map[tcpip.Address]defaultRouterState), onLinkPrefixes: make(map[tcpip.Subnet]onLinkPrefixState), autoGenAddresses: make(map[tcpip.Address]autoGenAddressState), } // Register supported packet endpoint protocols. for _, netProto := range header.Ethertypes { nic.mu.packetEPs[netProto] = []PacketEndpoint{} } for _, netProto := range stack.networkProtocols { nic.mu.packetEPs[netProto.Number()] = []PacketEndpoint{} } nic.linkEP.Attach(nic) return nic } // enabled returns true if n is enabled. func (n *NIC) enabled() bool { n.mu.RLock() enabled := n.mu.enabled n.mu.RUnlock() return enabled } // disable disables n. // // It undoes the work done by enable. func (n *NIC) disable() *tcpip.Error { n.mu.RLock() enabled := n.mu.enabled n.mu.RUnlock() if !enabled { return nil } n.mu.Lock() defer n.mu.Unlock() if !n.mu.enabled { return nil } // TODO(b/147015577): Should Routes that are currently bound to n be // invalidated? Currently, Routes will continue to work when a NIC is enabled // again, and applications may not know that the underlying NIC was ever // disabled. if _, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[header.IPv6ProtocolNumber]; ok { n.mu.ndp.stopSolicitingRouters() n.mu.ndp.cleanupState(false /* hostOnly */) // Stop DAD for all the unicast IPv6 endpoints that are in the // permanentTentative state. for _, r := range n.mu.endpoints { if addr := r.ep.ID().LocalAddress; r.getKind() == permanentTentative && header.IsV6UnicastAddress(addr) { n.mu.ndp.stopDuplicateAddressDetection(addr) } } // The NIC may have already left the multicast group. if err := n.leaveGroupLocked(header.IPv6AllNodesMulticastAddress); err != nil && err != tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress { return err } } if _, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[header.IPv4ProtocolNumber]; ok { // The address may have already been removed. if err := n.removePermanentAddressLocked(ipv4BroadcastAddr.AddressWithPrefix.Address); err != nil && err != tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress { return err } } n.mu.enabled = false return nil } // enable enables n. // // If the stack has IPv6 enabled, enable will join the IPv6 All-Nodes Multicast // address (ff02::1), start DAD for permanent addresses, and start soliciting // routers if the stack is not operating as a router. If the stack is also // configured to auto-generate a link-local address, one will be generated. func (n *NIC) enable() *tcpip.Error { n.mu.RLock() enabled := n.mu.enabled n.mu.RUnlock() if enabled { return nil } n.mu.Lock() defer n.mu.Unlock() if n.mu.enabled { return nil } n.mu.enabled = true // Create an endpoint to receive broadcast packets on this interface. if _, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[header.IPv4ProtocolNumber]; ok { if _, err := n.addAddressLocked(ipv4BroadcastAddr, NeverPrimaryEndpoint, permanent, static, false /* deprecated */); err != nil { return err } } // Join the IPv6 All-Nodes Multicast group if the stack is configured to // use IPv6. This is required to ensure that this node properly receives // and responds to the various NDP messages that are destined to the // all-nodes multicast address. An example is the Neighbor Advertisement // when we perform Duplicate Address Detection, or Router Advertisement // when we do Router Discovery. See RFC 4862, section 5.4.2 and RFC 4861 // section 4.2 for more information. // // Also auto-generate an IPv6 link-local address based on the NIC's // link address if it is configured to do so. Note, each interface is // required to have IPv6 link-local unicast address, as per RFC 4291 // section 2.1. _, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[header.IPv6ProtocolNumber] if !ok { return nil } // Join the All-Nodes multicast group before starting DAD as responses to DAD // (NDP NS) messages may be sent to the All-Nodes multicast group if the // source address of the NDP NS is the unspecified address, as per RFC 4861 // section 7.2.4. if err := n.joinGroupLocked(header.IPv6ProtocolNumber, header.IPv6AllNodesMulticastAddress); err != nil { return err } // Perform DAD on the all the unicast IPv6 endpoints that are in the permanent // state. // // Addresses may have aleady completed DAD but in the time since the NIC was // last enabled, other devices may have acquired the same addresses. for _, r := range n.mu.endpoints { addr := r.ep.ID().LocalAddress if k := r.getKind(); (k != permanent && k != permanentTentative) || !header.IsV6UnicastAddress(addr) { continue } r.setKind(permanentTentative) if err := n.mu.ndp.startDuplicateAddressDetection(addr, r); err != nil { return err } } // Do not auto-generate an IPv6 link-local address for loopback devices. if n.stack.autoGenIPv6LinkLocal && !n.isLoopback() { // The valid and preferred lifetime is infinite for the auto-generated // link-local address. n.mu.ndp.doSLAAC(header.IPv6LinkLocalPrefix.Subnet(), header.NDPInfiniteLifetime, header.NDPInfiniteLifetime) } // If we are operating as a router, then do not solicit routers since we // won't process the RAs anyways. // // Routers do not process Router Advertisements (RA) the same way a host // does. That is, routers do not learn from RAs (e.g. on-link prefixes // and default routers). Therefore, soliciting RAs from other routers on // a link is unnecessary for routers. if !n.stack.forwarding { n.mu.ndp.startSolicitingRouters() } return nil } // remove detaches NIC from the link endpoint, and marks existing referenced // network endpoints expired. This guarantees no packets between this NIC and // the network stack. func (n *NIC) remove() *tcpip.Error { n.mu.Lock() defer n.mu.Unlock() // Detach from link endpoint, so no packet comes in. n.linkEP.Attach(nil) // Remove permanent and permanentTentative addresses, so no packet goes out. var errs []*tcpip.Error for nid, ref := range n.mu.endpoints { switch ref.getKind() { case permanentTentative, permanent: if err := n.removePermanentAddressLocked(nid.LocalAddress); err != nil { errs = append(errs, err) } } } if len(errs) > 0 { return errs[0] } return nil } // becomeIPv6Router transitions n into an IPv6 router. // // When transitioning into an IPv6 router, host-only state (NDP discovered // routers, discovered on-link prefixes, and auto-generated addresses) will // be cleaned up/invalidated and NDP router solicitations will be stopped. func (n *NIC) becomeIPv6Router() { n.mu.Lock() defer n.mu.Unlock() n.mu.ndp.cleanupState(true /* hostOnly */) n.mu.ndp.stopSolicitingRouters() } // becomeIPv6Host transitions n into an IPv6 host. // // When transitioning into an IPv6 host, NDP router solicitations will be // started. func (n *NIC) becomeIPv6Host() { n.mu.Lock() defer n.mu.Unlock() n.mu.ndp.startSolicitingRouters() } // setPromiscuousMode enables or disables promiscuous mode. func (n *NIC) setPromiscuousMode(enable bool) { n.mu.Lock() n.mu.promiscuous = enable n.mu.Unlock() } func (n *NIC) isPromiscuousMode() bool { n.mu.RLock() rv := n.mu.promiscuous n.mu.RUnlock() return rv } func (n *NIC) isLoopback() bool { return n.linkEP.Capabilities()&CapabilityLoopback != 0 } // setSpoofing enables or disables address spoofing. func (n *NIC) setSpoofing(enable bool) { n.mu.Lock() n.mu.spoofing = enable n.mu.Unlock() } // primaryEndpoint will return the first non-deprecated endpoint if such an // endpoint exists for the given protocol and remoteAddr. If no non-deprecated // endpoint exists, the first deprecated endpoint will be returned. // // If an IPv6 primary endpoint is requested, Source Address Selection (as // defined by RFC 6724 section 5) will be performed. func (n *NIC) primaryEndpoint(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, remoteAddr tcpip.Address) *referencedNetworkEndpoint { if protocol == header.IPv6ProtocolNumber && remoteAddr != "" { return n.primaryIPv6Endpoint(remoteAddr) } n.mu.RLock() defer n.mu.RUnlock() var deprecatedEndpoint *referencedNetworkEndpoint for _, r := range n.mu.primary[protocol] { if !r.isValidForOutgoingRLocked() { continue } if !r.deprecated { if r.tryIncRef() { // r is not deprecated, so return it immediately. // // If we kept track of a deprecated endpoint, decrement its reference // count since it was incremented when we decided to keep track of it. if deprecatedEndpoint != nil { deprecatedEndpoint.decRefLocked() deprecatedEndpoint = nil } return r } } else if deprecatedEndpoint == nil && r.tryIncRef() { // We prefer an endpoint that is not deprecated, but we keep track of r in // case n doesn't have any non-deprecated endpoints. // // If we end up finding a more preferred endpoint, r's reference count // will be decremented when such an endpoint is found. deprecatedEndpoint = r } } // n doesn't have any valid non-deprecated endpoints, so return // deprecatedEndpoint (which may be nil if n doesn't have any valid deprecated // endpoints either). return deprecatedEndpoint } // ipv6AddrCandidate is an IPv6 candidate for Source Address Selection (RFC // 6724 section 5). type ipv6AddrCandidate struct { ref *referencedNetworkEndpoint scope header.IPv6AddressScope } // primaryIPv6Endpoint returns an IPv6 endpoint following Source Address // Selection (RFC 6724 section 5). // // Note, only rules 1-3 are followed. // // remoteAddr must be a valid IPv6 address. func (n *NIC) primaryIPv6Endpoint(remoteAddr tcpip.Address) *referencedNetworkEndpoint { n.mu.RLock() defer n.mu.RUnlock() primaryAddrs := n.mu.primary[header.IPv6ProtocolNumber] if len(primaryAddrs) == 0 { return nil } // Create a candidate set of available addresses we can potentially use as a // source address. cs := make([]ipv6AddrCandidate, 0, len(primaryAddrs)) for _, r := range primaryAddrs { // If r is not valid for outgoing connections, it is not a valid endpoint. if !r.isValidForOutgoingRLocked() { continue } addr := r.ep.ID().LocalAddress scope, err := header.ScopeForIPv6Address(addr) if err != nil { // Should never happen as we got r from the primary IPv6 endpoint list and // ScopeForIPv6Address only returns an error if addr is not an IPv6 // address. log.Fatalf("header.ScopeForIPv6Address(%s): %s", addr, err) } cs = append(cs, ipv6AddrCandidate{ ref: r, scope: scope, }) } remoteScope, err := header.ScopeForIPv6Address(remoteAddr) if err != nil { // primaryIPv6Endpoint should never be called with an invalid IPv6 address. log.Fatalf("header.ScopeForIPv6Address(%s): %s", remoteAddr, err) } // Sort the addresses as per RFC 6724 section 5 rules 1-3. // // TODO(b/146021396): Implement rules 4-8 of RFC 6724 section 5. sort.Slice(cs, func(i, j int) bool { sa := cs[i] sb := cs[j] // Prefer same address as per RFC 6724 section 5 rule 1. if sa.ref.ep.ID().LocalAddress == remoteAddr { return true } if sb.ref.ep.ID().LocalAddress == remoteAddr { return false } // Prefer appropriate scope as per RFC 6724 section 5 rule 2. if sa.scope < sb.scope { return sa.scope >= remoteScope } else if sb.scope < sa.scope { return sb.scope < remoteScope } // Avoid deprecated addresses as per RFC 6724 section 5 rule 3. if saDep, sbDep := sa.ref.deprecated, sb.ref.deprecated; saDep != sbDep { // If sa is not deprecated, it is preferred over sb. return sbDep } // sa and sb are equal, return the endpoint that is closest to the front of // the primary endpoint list. return i < j }) // Return the most preferred address that can have its reference count // incremented. for _, c := range cs { if r := c.ref; r.tryIncRef() { return r } } return nil } // hasPermanentAddrLocked returns true if n has a permanent (including currently // tentative) address, addr. func (n *NIC) hasPermanentAddrLocked(addr tcpip.Address) bool { ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[NetworkEndpointID{addr}] if !ok { return false } kind := ref.getKind() return kind == permanent || kind == permanentTentative } type getRefBehaviour int const ( // spoofing indicates that the NIC's spoofing flag should be observed when // getting a NIC's referenced network endpoint. spoofing getRefBehaviour = iota // promiscuous indicates that the NIC's promiscuous flag should be observed // when getting a NIC's referenced network endpoint. promiscuous // forceSpoofing indicates that the NIC should be assumed to be spoofing, // regardless of what the NIC's spoofing flag is when getting a NIC's // referenced network endpoint. forceSpoofing ) func (n *NIC) getRef(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, dst tcpip.Address) *referencedNetworkEndpoint { return n.getRefOrCreateTemp(protocol, dst, CanBePrimaryEndpoint, promiscuous) } // findEndpoint finds the endpoint, if any, with the given address. func (n *NIC) findEndpoint(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, address tcpip.Address, peb PrimaryEndpointBehavior) *referencedNetworkEndpoint { return n.getRefOrCreateTemp(protocol, address, peb, spoofing) } // getRefEpOrCreateTemp returns the referenced network endpoint for the given // protocol and address. // // If none exists a temporary one may be created if we are in promiscuous mode // or spoofing. Promiscuous mode will only be checked if promiscuous is true. // Similarly, spoofing will only be checked if spoofing is true. func (n *NIC) getRefOrCreateTemp(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, address tcpip.Address, peb PrimaryEndpointBehavior, tempRef getRefBehaviour) *referencedNetworkEndpoint { id := NetworkEndpointID{address} n.mu.RLock() var spoofingOrPromiscuous bool switch tempRef { case spoofing: spoofingOrPromiscuous = n.mu.spoofing case promiscuous: spoofingOrPromiscuous = n.mu.promiscuous case forceSpoofing: spoofingOrPromiscuous = true } if ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[id]; ok { // An endpoint with this id exists, check if it can be used and return it. switch ref.getKind() { case permanentExpired: if !spoofingOrPromiscuous { n.mu.RUnlock() return nil } fallthrough case temporary, permanent: if ref.tryIncRef() { n.mu.RUnlock() return ref } } } // A usable reference was not found, create a temporary one if requested by // the caller or if the address is found in the NIC's subnets. createTempEP := spoofingOrPromiscuous if !createTempEP { for _, sn := range n.mu.addressRanges { // Skip the subnet address. if address == sn.ID() { continue } // For now just skip the broadcast address, until we support it. // FIXME(b/137608825): Add support for sending/receiving directed // (subnet) broadcast. if address == sn.Broadcast() { continue } if sn.Contains(address) { createTempEP = true break } } } n.mu.RUnlock() if !createTempEP { return nil } // Try again with the lock in exclusive mode. If we still can't get the // endpoint, create a new "temporary" endpoint. It will only exist while // there's a route through it. n.mu.Lock() if ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[id]; ok { // No need to check the type as we are ok with expired endpoints at this // point. if ref.tryIncRef() { n.mu.Unlock() return ref } // tryIncRef failing means the endpoint is scheduled to be removed once the // lock is released. Remove it here so we can create a new (temporary) one. // The removal logic waiting for the lock handles this case. n.removeEndpointLocked(ref) } // Add a new temporary endpoint. netProto, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[protocol] if !ok { n.mu.Unlock() return nil } ref, _ := n.addAddressLocked(tcpip.ProtocolAddress{ Protocol: protocol, AddressWithPrefix: tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{ Address: address, PrefixLen: netProto.DefaultPrefixLen(), }, }, peb, temporary, static, false) n.mu.Unlock() return ref } // addAddressLocked adds a new protocolAddress to n. // // If n already has the address in a non-permanent state, and the kind given is // permanent, that address will be promoted in place and its properties set to // the properties provided. Otherwise, it returns tcpip.ErrDuplicateAddress. func (n *NIC) addAddressLocked(protocolAddress tcpip.ProtocolAddress, peb PrimaryEndpointBehavior, kind networkEndpointKind, configType networkEndpointConfigType, deprecated bool) (*referencedNetworkEndpoint, *tcpip.Error) { // TODO(b/141022673): Validate IP addresses before adding them. // Sanity check. id := NetworkEndpointID{LocalAddress: protocolAddress.AddressWithPrefix.Address} if ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[id]; ok { // Endpoint already exists. if kind != permanent { return nil, tcpip.ErrDuplicateAddress } switch ref.getKind() { case permanentTentative, permanent: // The NIC already have a permanent endpoint with that address. return nil, tcpip.ErrDuplicateAddress case permanentExpired, temporary: // Promote the endpoint to become permanent and respect the new peb, // configType and deprecated status. if ref.tryIncRef() { // TODO(b/147748385): Perform Duplicate Address Detection when promoting // an IPv6 endpoint to permanent. ref.setKind(permanent) ref.deprecated = deprecated ref.configType = configType refs := n.mu.primary[ref.protocol] for i, r := range refs { if r == ref { switch peb { case CanBePrimaryEndpoint: return ref, nil case FirstPrimaryEndpoint: if i == 0 { return ref, nil } n.mu.primary[r.protocol] = append(refs[:i], refs[i+1:]...) case NeverPrimaryEndpoint: n.mu.primary[r.protocol] = append(refs[:i], refs[i+1:]...) return ref, nil } } } n.insertPrimaryEndpointLocked(ref, peb) return ref, nil } // tryIncRef failing means the endpoint is scheduled to be removed once // the lock is released. Remove it here so we can create a new // (permanent) one. The removal logic waiting for the lock handles this // case. n.removeEndpointLocked(ref) } } netProto, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[protocolAddress.Protocol] if !ok { return nil, tcpip.ErrUnknownProtocol } // Create the new network endpoint. ep, err := netProto.NewEndpoint(n.id, protocolAddress.AddressWithPrefix, n.stack, n, n.linkEP, n.stack) if err != nil { return nil, err } isIPv6Unicast := protocolAddress.Protocol == header.IPv6ProtocolNumber && header.IsV6UnicastAddress(protocolAddress.AddressWithPrefix.Address) // If the address is an IPv6 address and it is a permanent address, // mark it as tentative so it goes through the DAD process if the NIC is // enabled. If the NIC is not enabled, DAD will be started when the NIC is // enabled. if isIPv6Unicast && kind == permanent { kind = permanentTentative } ref := &referencedNetworkEndpoint{ refs: 1, ep: ep, nic: n, protocol: protocolAddress.Protocol, kind: kind, configType: configType, deprecated: deprecated, } // Set up cache if link address resolution exists for this protocol. if n.linkEP.Capabilities()&CapabilityResolutionRequired != 0 { if _, ok := n.stack.linkAddrResolvers[protocolAddress.Protocol]; ok { ref.linkCache = n.stack } } // If we are adding an IPv6 unicast address, join the solicited-node // multicast address. if isIPv6Unicast { snmc := header.SolicitedNodeAddr(protocolAddress.AddressWithPrefix.Address) if err := n.joinGroupLocked(protocolAddress.Protocol, snmc); err != nil { return nil, err } } n.mu.endpoints[id] = ref n.insertPrimaryEndpointLocked(ref, peb) // If we are adding a tentative IPv6 address, start DAD if the NIC is enabled. if isIPv6Unicast && kind == permanentTentative && n.mu.enabled { if err := n.mu.ndp.startDuplicateAddressDetection(protocolAddress.AddressWithPrefix.Address, ref); err != nil { return nil, err } } return ref, nil } // AddAddress adds a new address to n, so that it starts accepting packets // targeted at the given address (and network protocol). func (n *NIC) AddAddress(protocolAddress tcpip.ProtocolAddress, peb PrimaryEndpointBehavior) *tcpip.Error { // Add the endpoint. n.mu.Lock() _, err := n.addAddressLocked(protocolAddress, peb, permanent, static, false /* deprecated */) n.mu.Unlock() return err } // AllAddresses returns all addresses (primary and non-primary) associated with // this NIC. func (n *NIC) AllAddresses() []tcpip.ProtocolAddress { n.mu.RLock() defer n.mu.RUnlock() addrs := make([]tcpip.ProtocolAddress, 0, len(n.mu.endpoints)) for nid, ref := range n.mu.endpoints { // Don't include tentative, expired or temporary endpoints to // avoid confusion and prevent the caller from using those. switch ref.getKind() { case permanentExpired, temporary: continue } addrs = append(addrs, tcpip.ProtocolAddress{ Protocol: ref.protocol, AddressWithPrefix: tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{ Address: nid.LocalAddress, PrefixLen: ref.ep.PrefixLen(), }, }) } return addrs } // PrimaryAddresses returns the primary addresses associated with this NIC. func (n *NIC) PrimaryAddresses() []tcpip.ProtocolAddress { n.mu.RLock() defer n.mu.RUnlock() var addrs []tcpip.ProtocolAddress for proto, list := range n.mu.primary { for _, ref := range list { // Don't include tentative, expired or tempory endpoints // to avoid confusion and prevent the caller from using // those. switch ref.getKind() { case permanentTentative, permanentExpired, temporary: continue } addrs = append(addrs, tcpip.ProtocolAddress{ Protocol: proto, AddressWithPrefix: tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{ Address: ref.ep.ID().LocalAddress, PrefixLen: ref.ep.PrefixLen(), }, }) } } return addrs } // primaryAddress returns the primary address associated with this NIC. // // primaryAddress will return the first non-deprecated address if such an // address exists. If no non-deprecated address exists, the first deprecated // address will be returned. func (n *NIC) primaryAddress(proto tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber) tcpip.AddressWithPrefix { n.mu.RLock() defer n.mu.RUnlock() list, ok := n.mu.primary[proto] if !ok { return tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{} } var deprecatedEndpoint *referencedNetworkEndpoint for _, ref := range list { // Don't include tentative, expired or tempory endpoints to avoid confusion // and prevent the caller from using those. switch ref.getKind() { case permanentTentative, permanentExpired, temporary: continue } if !ref.deprecated { return tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{ Address: ref.ep.ID().LocalAddress, PrefixLen: ref.ep.PrefixLen(), } } if deprecatedEndpoint == nil { deprecatedEndpoint = ref } } if deprecatedEndpoint != nil { return tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{ Address: deprecatedEndpoint.ep.ID().LocalAddress, PrefixLen: deprecatedEndpoint.ep.PrefixLen(), } } return tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{} } // AddAddressRange adds a range of addresses to n, so that it starts accepting // packets targeted at the given addresses and network protocol. The range is // given by a subnet address, and all addresses contained in the subnet are // used except for the subnet address itself and the subnet's broadcast // address. func (n *NIC) AddAddressRange(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, subnet tcpip.Subnet) { n.mu.Lock() n.mu.addressRanges = append(n.mu.addressRanges, subnet) n.mu.Unlock() } // RemoveAddressRange removes the given address range from n. func (n *NIC) RemoveAddressRange(subnet tcpip.Subnet) { n.mu.Lock() // Use the same underlying array. tmp := n.mu.addressRanges[:0] for _, sub := range n.mu.addressRanges { if sub != subnet { tmp = append(tmp, sub) } } n.mu.addressRanges = tmp n.mu.Unlock() } // AddressRanges returns the Subnets associated with this NIC. func (n *NIC) AddressRanges() []tcpip.Subnet { n.mu.RLock() defer n.mu.RUnlock() sns := make([]tcpip.Subnet, 0, len(n.mu.addressRanges)+len(n.mu.endpoints)) for nid := range n.mu.endpoints { sn, err := tcpip.NewSubnet(nid.LocalAddress, tcpip.AddressMask(strings.Repeat("\xff", len(nid.LocalAddress)))) if err != nil { // This should never happen as the mask has been carefully crafted to // match the address. panic("Invalid endpoint subnet: " + err.Error()) } sns = append(sns, sn) } return append(sns, n.mu.addressRanges...) } // insertPrimaryEndpointLocked adds r to n's primary endpoint list as required // by peb. // // n MUST be locked. func (n *NIC) insertPrimaryEndpointLocked(r *referencedNetworkEndpoint, peb PrimaryEndpointBehavior) { switch peb { case CanBePrimaryEndpoint: n.mu.primary[r.protocol] = append(n.mu.primary[r.protocol], r) case FirstPrimaryEndpoint: n.mu.primary[r.protocol] = append([]*referencedNetworkEndpoint{r}, n.mu.primary[r.protocol]...) } } func (n *NIC) removeEndpointLocked(r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) { id := *r.ep.ID() // Nothing to do if the reference has already been replaced with a different // one. This happens in the case where 1) this endpoint's ref count hit zero // and was waiting (on the lock) to be removed and 2) the same address was // re-added in the meantime by removing this endpoint from the list and // adding a new one. if n.mu.endpoints[id] != r { return } if r.getKind() == permanent { panic("Reference count dropped to zero before being removed") } delete(n.mu.endpoints, id) refs := n.mu.primary[r.protocol] for i, ref := range refs { if ref == r { n.mu.primary[r.protocol] = append(refs[:i], refs[i+1:]...) break } } r.ep.Close() } func (n *NIC) removeEndpoint(r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) { n.mu.Lock() n.removeEndpointLocked(r) n.mu.Unlock() } func (n *NIC) removePermanentAddressLocked(addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error { r, ok := n.mu.endpoints[NetworkEndpointID{addr}] if !ok { return tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress } kind := r.getKind() if kind != permanent && kind != permanentTentative { return tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress } isIPv6Unicast := r.protocol == header.IPv6ProtocolNumber && header.IsV6UnicastAddress(addr) if isIPv6Unicast { // If we are removing a tentative IPv6 unicast address, stop // DAD. if kind == permanentTentative { n.mu.ndp.stopDuplicateAddressDetection(addr) } // If we are removing an address generated via SLAAC, cleanup // its SLAAC resources and notify the integrator. if r.configType == slaac { n.mu.ndp.cleanupAutoGenAddrResourcesAndNotify(addr) } } r.setKind(permanentExpired) if !r.decRefLocked() { // The endpoint still has references to it. return nil } // At this point the endpoint is deleted. // If we are removing an IPv6 unicast address, leave the solicited-node // multicast address. if isIPv6Unicast { snmc := header.SolicitedNodeAddr(addr) if err := n.leaveGroupLocked(snmc); err != nil { return err } } return nil } // RemoveAddress removes an address from n. func (n *NIC) RemoveAddress(addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error { n.mu.Lock() defer n.mu.Unlock() return n.removePermanentAddressLocked(addr) } // joinGroup adds a new endpoint for the given multicast address, if none // exists yet. Otherwise it just increments its count. func (n *NIC) joinGroup(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error { n.mu.Lock() defer n.mu.Unlock() return n.joinGroupLocked(protocol, addr) } // joinGroupLocked adds a new endpoint for the given multicast address, if none // exists yet. Otherwise it just increments its count. n MUST be locked before // joinGroupLocked is called. func (n *NIC) joinGroupLocked(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error { // TODO(b/143102137): When implementing MLD, make sure MLD packets are // not sent unless a valid link-local address is available for use on n // as an MLD packet's source address must be a link-local address as // outlined in RFC 3810 section 5. id := NetworkEndpointID{addr} joins := n.mu.mcastJoins[id] if joins == 0 { netProto, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[protocol] if !ok { return tcpip.ErrUnknownProtocol } if _, err := n.addAddressLocked(tcpip.ProtocolAddress{ Protocol: protocol, AddressWithPrefix: tcpip.AddressWithPrefix{ Address: addr, PrefixLen: netProto.DefaultPrefixLen(), }, }, NeverPrimaryEndpoint, permanent, static, false /* deprecated */); err != nil { return err } } n.mu.mcastJoins[id] = joins + 1 return nil } // leaveGroup decrements the count for the given multicast address, and when it // reaches zero removes the endpoint for this address. func (n *NIC) leaveGroup(addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error { n.mu.Lock() defer n.mu.Unlock() return n.leaveGroupLocked(addr) } // leaveGroupLocked decrements the count for the given multicast address, and // when it reaches zero removes the endpoint for this address. n MUST be locked // before leaveGroupLocked is called. func (n *NIC) leaveGroupLocked(addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error { id := NetworkEndpointID{addr} joins := n.mu.mcastJoins[id] switch joins { case 0: // There are no joins with this address on this NIC. return tcpip.ErrBadLocalAddress case 1: // This is the last one, clean up. if err := n.removePermanentAddressLocked(addr); err != nil { return err } } n.mu.mcastJoins[id] = joins - 1 return nil } // isInGroup returns true if n has joined the multicast group addr. func (n *NIC) isInGroup(addr tcpip.Address) bool { n.mu.RLock() joins := n.mu.mcastJoins[NetworkEndpointID{addr}] n.mu.RUnlock() return joins != 0 } func handlePacket(protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, dst, src tcpip.Address, localLinkAddr, remotelinkAddr tcpip.LinkAddress, ref *referencedNetworkEndpoint, pkt tcpip.PacketBuffer) { r := makeRoute(protocol, dst, src, localLinkAddr, ref, false /* handleLocal */, false /* multicastLoop */) r.RemoteLinkAddress = remotelinkAddr ref.ep.HandlePacket(&r, pkt) ref.decRef() } // DeliverNetworkPacket finds the appropriate network protocol endpoint and // hands the packet over for further processing. This function is called when // the NIC receives a packet from the link endpoint. // Note that the ownership of the slice backing vv is retained by the caller. // This rule applies only to the slice itself, not to the items of the slice; // the ownership of the items is not retained by the caller. func (n *NIC) DeliverNetworkPacket(linkEP LinkEndpoint, remote, local tcpip.LinkAddress, protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, pkt tcpip.PacketBuffer) { n.mu.RLock() enabled := n.mu.enabled // If the NIC is not yet enabled, don't receive any packets. if !enabled { n.mu.RUnlock() n.stats.DisabledRx.Packets.Increment() n.stats.DisabledRx.Bytes.IncrementBy(uint64(pkt.Data.Size())) return } n.stats.Rx.Packets.Increment() n.stats.Rx.Bytes.IncrementBy(uint64(pkt.Data.Size())) netProto, ok := n.stack.networkProtocols[protocol] if !ok { n.mu.RUnlock() n.stack.stats.UnknownProtocolRcvdPackets.Increment() return } // If no local link layer address is provided, assume it was sent // directly to this NIC. if local == "" { local = n.linkEP.LinkAddress() } // Are any packet sockets listening for this network protocol? packetEPs := n.mu.packetEPs[protocol] // Check whether there are packet sockets listening for every protocol. // If we received a packet with protocol EthernetProtocolAll, then the // previous for loop will have handled it. if protocol != header.EthernetProtocolAll { packetEPs = append(packetEPs, n.mu.packetEPs[header.EthernetProtocolAll]...) } n.mu.RUnlock() for _, ep := range packetEPs { ep.HandlePacket(n.id, local, protocol, pkt.Clone()) } if netProto.Number() == header.IPv4ProtocolNumber || netProto.Number() == header.IPv6ProtocolNumber { n.stack.stats.IP.PacketsReceived.Increment() } if len(pkt.Data.First()) < netProto.MinimumPacketSize() { n.stack.stats.MalformedRcvdPackets.Increment() return } src, dst := netProto.ParseAddresses(pkt.Data.First()) if n.stack.handleLocal && !n.isLoopback() && n.getRef(protocol, src) != nil { // The source address is one of our own, so we never should have gotten a // packet like this unless handleLocal is false. Loopback also calls this // function even though the packets didn't come from the physical interface // so don't drop those. n.stack.stats.IP.InvalidSourceAddressesReceived.Increment() return } if ref := n.getRef(protocol, dst); ref != nil { handlePacket(protocol, dst, src, linkEP.LinkAddress(), remote, ref, pkt) return } // This NIC doesn't care about the packet. Find a NIC that cares about the // packet and forward it to the NIC. // // TODO: Should we be forwarding the packet even if promiscuous? if n.stack.Forwarding() { r, err := n.stack.FindRoute(0, "", dst, protocol, false /* multicastLoop */) if err != nil { n.stack.stats.IP.InvalidDestinationAddressesReceived.Increment() return } // Found a NIC. n := r.ref.nic n.mu.RLock() ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[NetworkEndpointID{dst}] ok = ok && ref.isValidForOutgoingRLocked() && ref.tryIncRef() n.mu.RUnlock() if ok { r.LocalLinkAddress = n.linkEP.LinkAddress() r.RemoteLinkAddress = remote r.RemoteAddress = src // TODO(b/123449044): Update the source NIC as well. ref.ep.HandlePacket(&r, pkt) ref.decRef() r.Release() return } // n doesn't have a destination endpoint. // Send the packet out of n. // TODO(b/128629022): move this logic to route.WritePacket. if ch, err := r.Resolve(nil); err != nil { if err == tcpip.ErrWouldBlock { n.stack.forwarder.enqueue(ch, n, &r, protocol, pkt) // forwarder will release route. return } n.stack.stats.IP.InvalidDestinationAddressesReceived.Increment() r.Release() return } // The link-address resolution finished immediately. n.forwardPacket(&r, protocol, pkt) r.Release() return } // If a packet socket handled the packet, don't treat it as invalid. if len(packetEPs) == 0 { n.stack.stats.IP.InvalidDestinationAddressesReceived.Increment() } } func (n *NIC) forwardPacket(r *Route, protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, pkt tcpip.PacketBuffer) { // TODO(b/143425874) Decrease the TTL field in forwarded packets. pkt.Header = buffer.NewPrependableFromView(pkt.Data.First()) pkt.Data.RemoveFirst() if err := n.linkEP.WritePacket(r, nil /* gso */, protocol, pkt); err != nil { r.Stats().IP.OutgoingPacketErrors.Increment() return } n.stats.Tx.Packets.Increment() n.stats.Tx.Bytes.IncrementBy(uint64(pkt.Header.UsedLength() + pkt.Data.Size())) } // DeliverTransportPacket delivers the packets to the appropriate transport // protocol endpoint. func (n *NIC) DeliverTransportPacket(r *Route, protocol tcpip.TransportProtocolNumber, pkt tcpip.PacketBuffer) { state, ok := n.stack.transportProtocols[protocol] if !ok { n.stack.stats.UnknownProtocolRcvdPackets.Increment() return } transProto := state.proto // Raw socket packets are delivered based solely on the transport // protocol number. We do not inspect the payload to ensure it's // validly formed. n.stack.demux.deliverRawPacket(r, protocol, pkt) if len(pkt.Data.First()) < transProto.MinimumPacketSize() { n.stack.stats.MalformedRcvdPackets.Increment() return } srcPort, dstPort, err := transProto.ParsePorts(pkt.Data.First()) if err != nil { n.stack.stats.MalformedRcvdPackets.Increment() return } id := TransportEndpointID{dstPort, r.LocalAddress, srcPort, r.RemoteAddress} if n.stack.demux.deliverPacket(r, protocol, pkt, id) { return } // Try to deliver to per-stack default handler. if state.defaultHandler != nil { if state.defaultHandler(r, id, pkt) { return } } // We could not find an appropriate destination for this packet, so // deliver it to the global handler. if !transProto.HandleUnknownDestinationPacket(r, id, pkt) { n.stack.stats.MalformedRcvdPackets.Increment() } } // DeliverTransportControlPacket delivers control packets to the appropriate // transport protocol endpoint. func (n *NIC) DeliverTransportControlPacket(local, remote tcpip.Address, net tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, trans tcpip.TransportProtocolNumber, typ ControlType, extra uint32, pkt tcpip.PacketBuffer) { state, ok := n.stack.transportProtocols[trans] if !ok { return } transProto := state.proto // ICMPv4 only guarantees that 8 bytes of the transport protocol will // be present in the payload. We know that the ports are within the // first 8 bytes for all known transport protocols. if len(pkt.Data.First()) < 8 { return } srcPort, dstPort, err := transProto.ParsePorts(pkt.Data.First()) if err != nil { return } id := TransportEndpointID{srcPort, local, dstPort, remote} if n.stack.demux.deliverControlPacket(n, net, trans, typ, extra, pkt, id) { return } } // ID returns the identifier of n. func (n *NIC) ID() tcpip.NICID { return n.id } // Name returns the name of n. func (n *NIC) Name() string { return n.name } // Stack returns the instance of the Stack that owns this NIC. func (n *NIC) Stack() *Stack { return n.stack } // LinkEndpoint returns the link endpoint of n. func (n *NIC) LinkEndpoint() LinkEndpoint { return n.linkEP } // isAddrTentative returns true if addr is tentative on n. // // Note that if addr is not associated with n, then this function will return // false. It will only return true if the address is associated with the NIC // AND it is tentative. func (n *NIC) isAddrTentative(addr tcpip.Address) bool { n.mu.RLock() defer n.mu.RUnlock() ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[NetworkEndpointID{addr}] if !ok { return false } return ref.getKind() == permanentTentative } // dupTentativeAddrDetected attempts to inform n that a tentative addr // is a duplicate on a link. // // dupTentativeAddrDetected will delete the tentative address if it exists. func (n *NIC) dupTentativeAddrDetected(addr tcpip.Address) *tcpip.Error { n.mu.Lock() defer n.mu.Unlock() ref, ok := n.mu.endpoints[NetworkEndpointID{addr}] if !ok { return tcpip.ErrBadAddress } if ref.getKind() != permanentTentative { return tcpip.ErrInvalidEndpointState } return n.removePermanentAddressLocked(addr) } // setNDPConfigs sets the NDP configurations for n. // // Note, if c contains invalid NDP configuration values, it will be fixed to // use default values for the erroneous values. func (n *NIC) setNDPConfigs(c NDPConfigurations) { c.validate() n.mu.Lock() n.mu.ndp.configs = c n.mu.Unlock() } // handleNDPRA handles an NDP Router Advertisement message that arrived on n. func (n *NIC) handleNDPRA(ip tcpip.Address, ra header.NDPRouterAdvert) { n.mu.Lock() defer n.mu.Unlock() n.mu.ndp.handleRA(ip, ra) } type networkEndpointKind int32 const ( // A permanentTentative endpoint is a permanent address that is not yet // considered to be fully bound to an interface in the traditional // sense. That is, the address is associated with a NIC, but packets // destined to the address MUST NOT be accepted and MUST be silently // dropped, and the address MUST NOT be used as a source address for // outgoing packets. For IPv6, addresses will be of this kind until // NDP's Duplicate Address Detection has resolved, or be deleted if // the process results in detecting a duplicate address. permanentTentative networkEndpointKind = iota // A permanent endpoint is created by adding a permanent address (vs. a // temporary one) to the NIC. Its reference count is biased by 1 to avoid // removal when no route holds a reference to it. It is removed by explicitly // removing the permanent address from the NIC. permanent // An expired permanent endpoint is a permanent endpoint that had its address // removed from the NIC, and it is waiting to be removed once no more routes // hold a reference to it. This is achieved by decreasing its reference count // by 1. If its address is re-added before the endpoint is removed, its type // changes back to permanent and its reference count increases by 1 again. permanentExpired // A temporary endpoint is created for spoofing outgoing packets, or when in // promiscuous mode and accepting incoming packets that don't match any // permanent endpoint. Its reference count is not biased by 1 and the // endpoint is removed immediately when no more route holds a reference to // it. A temporary endpoint can be promoted to permanent if its address // is added permanently. temporary ) func (n *NIC) registerPacketEndpoint(netProto tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, ep PacketEndpoint) *tcpip.Error { n.mu.Lock() defer n.mu.Unlock() eps, ok := n.mu.packetEPs[netProto] if !ok { return tcpip.ErrNotSupported } n.mu.packetEPs[netProto] = append(eps, ep) return nil } func (n *NIC) unregisterPacketEndpoint(netProto tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber, ep PacketEndpoint) { n.mu.Lock() defer n.mu.Unlock() eps, ok := n.mu.packetEPs[netProto] if !ok { return } for i, epOther := range eps { if epOther == ep { n.mu.packetEPs[netProto] = append(eps[:i], eps[i+1:]...) return } } } type networkEndpointConfigType int32 const ( // A statically configured endpoint is an address that was added by // some user-specified action (adding an explicit address, joining a // multicast group). static networkEndpointConfigType = iota // A slaac configured endpoint is an IPv6 endpoint that was // added by SLAAC as per RFC 4862 section 5.5.3. slaac ) type referencedNetworkEndpoint struct { ep NetworkEndpoint nic *NIC protocol tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber // linkCache is set if link address resolution is enabled for this // protocol. Set to nil otherwise. linkCache LinkAddressCache // refs is counting references held for this endpoint. When refs hits zero it // triggers the automatic removal of the endpoint from the NIC. refs int32 // networkEndpointKind must only be accessed using {get,set}Kind(). kind networkEndpointKind // configType is the method that was used to configure this endpoint. // This must never change except during endpoint creation and promotion to // permanent. configType networkEndpointConfigType // deprecated indicates whether or not the endpoint should be considered // deprecated. That is, when deprecated is true, other endpoints that are not // deprecated should be preferred. deprecated bool } func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) getKind() networkEndpointKind { return networkEndpointKind(atomic.LoadInt32((*int32)(&r.kind))) } func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) setKind(kind networkEndpointKind) { atomic.StoreInt32((*int32)(&r.kind), int32(kind)) } // isValidForOutgoing returns true if the endpoint can be used to send out a // packet. It requires the endpoint to not be marked expired (i.e., its address // has been removed), or the NIC to be in spoofing mode. func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) isValidForOutgoing() bool { r.nic.mu.RLock() defer r.nic.mu.RUnlock() return r.isValidForOutgoingRLocked() } // isValidForOutgoingRLocked returns true if the endpoint can be used to send // out a packet. It requires the endpoint to not be marked expired (i.e., its // address has been removed), or the NIC to be in spoofing mode. // // r's NIC must be read locked. func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) isValidForOutgoingRLocked() bool { return r.nic.mu.enabled && (r.getKind() != permanentExpired || r.nic.mu.spoofing) } // decRef decrements the ref count and cleans up the endpoint once it reaches // zero. func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) decRef() { if atomic.AddInt32(&r.refs, -1) == 0 { r.nic.removeEndpoint(r) } } // decRefLocked is the same as decRef but assumes that the NIC.mu mutex is // locked. Returns true if the endpoint was removed. func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) decRefLocked() bool { if atomic.AddInt32(&r.refs, -1) == 0 { r.nic.removeEndpointLocked(r) return true } return false } // incRef increments the ref count. It must only be called when the caller is // known to be holding a reference to the endpoint, otherwise tryIncRef should // be used. func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) incRef() { atomic.AddInt32(&r.refs, 1) } // tryIncRef attempts to increment the ref count from n to n+1, but only if n is // not zero. That is, it will increment the count if the endpoint is still // alive, and do nothing if it has already been clean up. func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) tryIncRef() bool { for { v := atomic.LoadInt32(&r.refs) if v == 0 { return false } if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&r.refs, v, v+1) { return true } } } // stack returns the Stack instance that owns the underlying endpoint. func (r *referencedNetworkEndpoint) stack() *Stack { return r.nic.stack }