// Copyright 2018 Google Inc. // // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. // You may obtain a copy of the License at // // http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 // // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. // +build linux package ptrace import ( "fmt" "syscall" "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/abi/linux" "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/log" "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/seccomp" "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/arch" "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/platform/procid" ) const ( syscallEvent syscall.Signal = 0x80 seccompEvent syscall.Signal = 0x700 // 0x7 (PTRACE_SECCOMP_EVENT) << 8 _PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP = 0x80 // 1 << 0x7 (PTRACE_SECCOMP_EVENT) ) // probeSeccomp returns true iff seccomp is run after ptrace notifications, // which is generally the case for kernel version >= 4.8. This check is dynamic // because kernels have be backported behavior. // // See createStub for more information. // // Precondition: the runtime OS thread must be locked. func probeSeccomp() bool { // Create a completely new, destroyable process. t, err := attachedThread(0, uint32(linux.SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO)) if err != nil { panic(fmt.Sprintf("seccomp probe failed: %v", err)) } defer t.destroy() // Set registers to the yield system call. This call is not allowed // by the filters specified in the attachThread function. regs := createSyscallRegs(&t.initRegs, syscall.SYS_SCHED_YIELD) if err := t.setRegs(®s); err != nil { panic(fmt.Sprintf("ptrace set regs failed: %v", err)) } for { // Attempt an emulation. if _, _, errno := syscall.RawSyscall(syscall.SYS_PTRACE, syscall.PTRACE_SYSEMU, uintptr(t.tid), 0); errno != 0 { panic(fmt.Sprintf("ptrace syscall-enter failed: %v", errno)) } sig := t.wait(stopped) if sig == (syscallEvent | syscall.SIGTRAP) { // Did the seccomp errno hook already run? This would // indicate that seccomp is first in line and we're // less than 4.8. if err := t.getRegs(®s); err != nil { panic(fmt.Sprintf("ptrace get-regs failed: %v", err)) } if _, err := syscallReturnValue(®s); err == nil { // The seccomp errno mode ran first, and reset // the error in the registers. return false } // The seccomp hook did not run yet, and therefore it // is safe to use RET_KILL mode for dispatched calls. return true } } } // createStub creates a fresh stub processes. // // Precondition: the runtime OS thread must be locked. func createStub() (*thread, error) { // The exact interactions of ptrace and seccomp are complex, and // changed in recent kernel versions. Before commit 93e35efb8de45, the // seccomp check is done before the ptrace emulation check. This means // that any calls not matching this list will trigger the seccomp // default action instead of notifying ptrace. // // After commit 93e35efb8de45, the seccomp check is done after the // ptrace emulation check. This simplifies using SYSEMU, since seccomp // will never run for emulation. Seccomp will only run for injected // system calls, and thus we can use RET_KILL as our violation action. var defaultAction uint32 if probeSeccomp() { log.Infof("Latest seccomp behavior found (kernel >= 4.8 likely)") defaultAction = uint32(linux.SECCOMP_RET_KILL) } else { // We must rely on SYSEMU behavior; tracing with SYSEMU is broken. log.Infof("Legacy seccomp behavior found (kernel < 4.8 likely)") defaultAction = uint32(linux.SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) } // When creating the new child process, we specify SIGKILL as the // signal to deliver when the child exits. We never expect a subprocess // to exit; they are pooled and reused. This is done to ensure that if // a subprocess is OOM-killed, this process (and all other stubs, // transitively) will be killed as well. It's simply not possible to // safely handle a single stub getting killed: the exact state of // execution is unknown and not recoverable. return attachedThread(uintptr(syscall.SIGKILL)|syscall.CLONE_FILES, defaultAction) } // attachedThread returns a new attached thread. // // Precondition: the runtime OS thread must be locked. func attachedThread(flags uintptr, defaultAction uint32) (*thread, error) { // Create a BPF program that allows only the system calls needed by the // stub and all its children. This is used to create child stubs // (below), so we must include the ability to fork, but otherwise lock // down available calls only to what is needed. rules := []seccomp.RuleSet{ // Rules for trapping vsyscall access. seccomp.RuleSet{ Rules: seccomp.SyscallRules{ syscall.SYS_GETTIMEOFDAY: {}, syscall.SYS_TIME: {}, 309: {}, // SYS_GETCPU. }, Action: uint32(linux.SECCOMP_RET_TRACE), Vsyscall: true, }, } if defaultAction != uint32(linux.SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) { rules = append(rules, seccomp.RuleSet{ Rules: seccomp.SyscallRules{ syscall.SYS_CLONE: []seccomp.Rule{ // Allow creation of new subprocesses (used by the master). {seccomp.AllowValue(syscall.CLONE_FILES | syscall.SIGKILL)}, // Allow creation of new threads within a single address space (used by addresss spaces). {seccomp.AllowValue( syscall.CLONE_FILES | syscall.CLONE_FS | syscall.CLONE_SIGHAND | syscall.CLONE_THREAD | syscall.CLONE_PTRACE | syscall.CLONE_VM)}, }, // For the initial process creation. syscall.SYS_WAIT4: {}, syscall.SYS_ARCH_PRCTL: []seccomp.Rule{ {seccomp.AllowValue(linux.ARCH_SET_CPUID), seccomp.AllowValue(0)}, }, syscall.SYS_EXIT: {}, // For the stub prctl dance (all). syscall.SYS_PRCTL: []seccomp.Rule{ {seccomp.AllowValue(syscall.PR_SET_PDEATHSIG), seccomp.AllowValue(syscall.SIGKILL)}, }, syscall.SYS_GETPPID: {}, // For the stub to stop itself (all). syscall.SYS_GETPID: {}, syscall.SYS_KILL: []seccomp.Rule{ {seccomp.AllowAny{}, seccomp.AllowValue(syscall.SIGSTOP)}, }, // Injected to support the address space operations. syscall.SYS_MMAP: {}, syscall.SYS_MUNMAP: {}, }, Action: uint32(linux.SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), }) } instrs, err := seccomp.BuildProgram(rules, defaultAction) if err != nil { return nil, err } // Declare all variables up front in order to ensure that there's no // need for allocations between beforeFork & afterFork. var ( pid uintptr ppid uintptr errno syscall.Errno ) // Remember the current ppid for the pdeathsig race. ppid, _, _ = syscall.RawSyscall(syscall.SYS_GETPID, 0, 0, 0) // Among other things, beforeFork masks all signals. beforeFork() // Do the clone. pid, _, errno = syscall.RawSyscall6(syscall.SYS_CLONE, flags, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) if errno != 0 { afterFork() return nil, errno } // Is this the parent? if pid != 0 { // Among other things, restore signal mask. afterFork() // Initialize the first thread. t := &thread{ tgid: int32(pid), tid: int32(pid), cpu: ^uint32(0), } if sig := t.wait(stopped); sig != syscall.SIGSTOP { return nil, fmt.Errorf("wait failed: expected SIGSTOP, got %v", sig) } t.attach() return t, nil } // afterForkInChild resets all signals to their default dispositions // and restores the signal mask to its pre-fork state. afterForkInChild() // Explicitly unmask all signals to ensure that the tracer can see // them. errno = unmaskAllSignals() if errno != 0 { syscall.RawSyscall(syscall.SYS_EXIT, uintptr(errno), 0, 0) } // Set an aggressive BPF filter for the stub and all it's children. See // the description of the BPF program built above. if errno := seccomp.SetFilter(instrs); errno != 0 { syscall.RawSyscall(syscall.SYS_EXIT, uintptr(errno), 0, 0) } // Enable cpuid-faulting; this may fail on older kernels or hardware, // so we just disregard the result. Host CPUID will be enabled. syscall.RawSyscall(syscall.SYS_ARCH_PRCTL, linux.ARCH_SET_CPUID, 0, 0) // Call the stub; should not return. stubCall(stubStart, ppid) panic("unreachable") } // createStub creates a stub processes as a child of an existing subprocesses. // // Precondition: the runtime OS thread must be locked. func (s *subprocess) createStub() (*thread, error) { // There's no need to lock the runtime thread here, as this can only be // called from a context that is already locked. currentTID := int32(procid.Current()) t := s.syscallThreads.lookupOrCreate(currentTID, s.newThread) // Pass the expected PPID to the child via R15. regs := t.initRegs regs.R15 = uint64(t.tgid) // Call fork in a subprocess. // // The new child must set up PDEATHSIG to ensure it dies if this // process dies. Since this process could die at any time, this cannot // be done via instrumentation from here. // // Instead, we create the child untraced, which will do the PDEATHSIG // setup and then SIGSTOP itself for our attach below. // // See above re: SIGKILL. pid, err := t.syscallIgnoreInterrupt( ®s, syscall.SYS_CLONE, arch.SyscallArgument{Value: uintptr(syscall.SIGKILL | syscall.CLONE_FILES)}, arch.SyscallArgument{Value: 0}, arch.SyscallArgument{Value: 0}, arch.SyscallArgument{Value: 0}, arch.SyscallArgument{Value: 0}, arch.SyscallArgument{Value: 0}) if err != nil { return nil, err } // Wait for child to enter group-stop, so we don't stop its // bootstrapping work with t.attach below. // // We unfortunately don't have a handy part of memory to write the wait // status. If the wait succeeds, we'll assume that it was the SIGSTOP. // If the child actually exited, the attach below will fail. _, err = t.syscallIgnoreInterrupt( &t.initRegs, syscall.SYS_WAIT4, arch.SyscallArgument{Value: uintptr(pid)}, arch.SyscallArgument{Value: 0}, arch.SyscallArgument{Value: syscall.WALL | syscall.WUNTRACED}, arch.SyscallArgument{Value: 0}, arch.SyscallArgument{Value: 0}, arch.SyscallArgument{Value: 0}) if err != nil { return nil, err } childT := &thread{ tgid: int32(pid), tid: int32(pid), cpu: ^uint32(0), } childT.attach() return childT, nil }