// Copyright 2018 Google LLC
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.

// Package shm implements sysv shared memory segments.
//
// Known missing features:
//
// - SHM_LOCK/SHM_UNLOCK are no-ops. The sentry currently doesn't implement
//   memory locking in general.
//
// - SHM_HUGETLB and related flags for shmget(2) are ignored. There's no easy
//   way to implement hugetlb support on a per-map basis, and it has no impact
//   on correctness.
//
// - SHM_NORESERVE for shmget(2) is ignored, the sentry doesn't implement swap
//   so it's meaningless to reserve space for swap.
//
// - No per-process segment size enforcement. This feature probably isn't used
//   much anyways, since Linux sets the per-process limits to the system-wide
//   limits by default.
//
// Lock ordering: mm.mappingMu -> shm registry lock -> shm lock
package shm

import (
	"fmt"
	"sync"

	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/abi/linux"
	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/log"
	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/refs"
	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/context"
	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/fs"
	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/auth"
	ktime "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/time"
	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/memmap"
	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/platform"
	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/usage"
	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/usermem"
	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/syserror"
)

// Registry tracks all shared memory segments in an IPC namespace. The registry
// provides the mechanisms for creating and finding segments, and reporting
// global shm parameters.
//
// +stateify savable
type Registry struct {
	// userNS owns the IPC namespace this registry belong to. Immutable.
	userNS *auth.UserNamespace

	mu sync.Mutex `state:"nosave"`

	// shms maps segment ids to segments. Protected by mu.
	shms map[int32]*Shm

	// Sum of the sizes of all existing segments rounded up to page size, in
	// units of page size. Protected by mu.
	totalPages uint64

	// lastIDUsed is protected by mu.
	lastIDUsed int32
}

// NewRegistry creates a new shm registry.
func NewRegistry(userNS *auth.UserNamespace) *Registry {
	return &Registry{
		userNS: userNS,
		shms:   make(map[int32]*Shm),
	}
}

// FindByID looks up a segment given an ID.
func (r *Registry) FindByID(id int32) *Shm {
	r.mu.Lock()
	defer r.mu.Unlock()
	return r.shms[id]
}

// Precondition: Caller must hold r.mu.
func (r *Registry) findByKey(key int32) *Shm {
	for _, v := range r.shms {
		if v.key == key {
			return v
		}
	}
	return nil
}

// FindOrCreate looks up or creates a segment in the registry. It's functionally
// analogous to open(2).
func (r *Registry) FindOrCreate(ctx context.Context, pid, key int32, size uint64, mode linux.FileMode, private, create, exclusive bool) (*Shm, error) {
	if (create || private) && (size < linux.SHMMIN || size > linux.SHMMAX) {
		// "A new segment was to be created and size is less than SHMMIN or
		// greater than SHMMAX." - man shmget(2)
		//
		// Note that 'private' always implies the creation of a new segment
		// whether IPC_CREAT is specified or not.
		return nil, syserror.EINVAL
	}

	r.mu.Lock()
	defer r.mu.Unlock()

	if len(r.shms) >= linux.SHMMNI {
		// "All possible shared memory IDs have been taken (SHMMNI) ..."
		//   - man shmget(2)
		return nil, syserror.ENOSPC
	}

	if !private {
		// Look up an existing segment.
		if shm := r.findByKey(key); shm != nil {
			shm.mu.Lock()
			defer shm.mu.Unlock()

			// Check that caller can access the segment.
			if !shm.checkPermissions(ctx, fs.PermsFromMode(mode)) {
				// "The user does not have permission to access the shared
				// memory segment, and does not have the CAP_IPC_OWNER
				// capability in the user namespace that governs its IPC
				// namespace." - man shmget(2)
				return nil, syserror.EACCES
			}

			if size > shm.size {
				// "A segment for the given key exists, but size is greater than
				// the size of that segment." - man shmget(2)
				return nil, syserror.EINVAL
			}

			if create && exclusive {
				// "IPC_CREAT and IPC_EXCL were specified in shmflg, but a
				// shared memory segment already exists for key."
				//  - man shmget(2)
				return nil, syserror.EEXIST
			}

			return shm, nil
		}

		if !create {
			// "No segment exists for the given key, and IPC_CREAT was not
			// specified." - man shmget(2)
			return nil, syserror.ENOENT
		}
	}

	var sizeAligned uint64
	if val, ok := usermem.Addr(size).RoundUp(); ok {
		sizeAligned = uint64(val)
	} else {
		return nil, syserror.EINVAL
	}

	if numPages := sizeAligned / usermem.PageSize; r.totalPages+numPages > linux.SHMALL {
		// "... allocating a segment of the requested size would cause the
		// system to exceed the system-wide limit on shared memory (SHMALL)."
		//   - man shmget(2)
		return nil, syserror.ENOSPC
	}

	// Need to create a new segment.
	creator := fs.FileOwnerFromContext(ctx)
	perms := fs.FilePermsFromMode(mode)
	return r.newShm(ctx, pid, key, creator, perms, size)
}

// newShm creates a new segment in the registry.
func (r *Registry) newShm(ctx context.Context, pid, key int32, creator fs.FileOwner, perms fs.FilePermissions, size uint64) (*Shm, error) {
	p := platform.FromContext(ctx)
	if p == nil {
		panic(fmt.Sprintf("context.Context %T lacks non-nil value for key %T", ctx, platform.CtxPlatform))
	}

	effectiveSize := uint64(usermem.Addr(size).MustRoundUp())
	fr, err := p.Memory().Allocate(effectiveSize, usage.Anonymous)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	shm := &Shm{
		p:             p,
		registry:      r,
		creator:       creator,
		size:          size,
		effectiveSize: effectiveSize,
		fr:            fr,
		key:           key,
		perms:         perms,
		owner:         creator,
		creatorPID:    pid,
		changeTime:    ktime.NowFromContext(ctx),
	}

	// Find the next available ID.
	for id := r.lastIDUsed + 1; id != r.lastIDUsed; id++ {
		// Handle wrap around.
		if id < 0 {
			id = 0
			continue
		}
		if r.shms[id] == nil {
			r.lastIDUsed = id
			r.shms[id] = shm
			shm.ID = id

			r.totalPages += effectiveSize / usermem.PageSize

			return shm, nil
		}
	}

	log.Warningf("Shm ids exhuasted, they may be leaking")
	return nil, syserror.ENOSPC
}

// IPCInfo reports global parameters for sysv shared memory segments on this
// system. See shmctl(IPC_INFO).
func (r *Registry) IPCInfo() *linux.ShmParams {
	return &linux.ShmParams{
		ShmMax: linux.SHMMAX,
		ShmMin: linux.SHMMIN,
		ShmMni: linux.SHMMNI,
		ShmSeg: linux.SHMSEG,
		ShmAll: linux.SHMALL,
	}
}

// ShmInfo reports linux-specific global parameters for sysv shared memory
// segments on this system. See shmctl(SHM_INFO).
func (r *Registry) ShmInfo() *linux.ShmInfo {
	r.mu.Lock()
	defer r.mu.Unlock()

	return &linux.ShmInfo{
		UsedIDs: int32(r.lastIDUsed),
		ShmTot:  r.totalPages,
		ShmRss:  r.totalPages, // We could probably get a better estimate from memory accounting.
		ShmSwp:  0,            // No reclaim at the moment.
	}
}

// remove unregisters a segment from this registry, preventing it from being
// discovered in the future. Caller is responsible for ensuring s is destroyed.
//
// Precondition: To preserve lock ordering, caller must not hold s.mu.
func (r *Registry) remove(s *Shm) {
	r.mu.Lock()
	defer r.mu.Unlock()
	delete(r.shms, s.ID)
	r.totalPages -= s.effectiveSize / usermem.PageSize
}

// Shm represents a single shared memory segment.
//
// Shm segment are backed directly by an allocation from platform
// memory. Segments are always mapped as a whole, greatly simplifying how
// mappings are tracked. However note that mremap and munmap calls may cause the
// vma for a segment to become fragmented; which requires special care when
// unmapping a segment. See mm/shm.go.
//
// Segments persist until they are explicitly marked for destruction via
// shmctl(SHM_RMID).
//
// Shm implements memmap.Mappable and memmap.MappingIdentity.
//
// +stateify savable
type Shm struct {
	// AtomicRefCount tracks the number of references to this segment from
	// maps. A segment always holds a reference to itself, until it's marked for
	// destruction.
	refs.AtomicRefCount

	p platform.Platform

	// registry points to the shm registry containing this segment. Immutable.
	registry *Registry

	// ID is the kernel identifier for this segment. Immutable.
	ID int32

	// creator is the user that created the segment. Immutable.
	creator fs.FileOwner

	// size is the requested size of the segment at creation, in
	// bytes. Immutable.
	size uint64

	// effectiveSize of the segment, rounding up to the next page
	// boundary. Immutable.
	//
	// Invariant: effectiveSize must be a multiple of usermem.PageSize.
	effectiveSize uint64

	// fr is the offset into platform.Memory() that backs this contents of this
	// segment. Immutable.
	fr platform.FileRange

	// key is the public identifier for this segment.
	key int32

	// mu protects all fields below.
	mu sync.Mutex `state:"nosave"`

	// perms is the access permissions for the segment.
	perms fs.FilePermissions

	// owner of this segment.
	owner fs.FileOwner
	// attachTime is updated on every successful shmat.
	attachTime ktime.Time
	// detachTime is updated on every successful shmdt.
	detachTime ktime.Time
	// changeTime is updated on every successful changes to the segment via
	// shmctl(IPC_SET).
	changeTime ktime.Time

	// creatorPID is the PID of the process that created the segment.
	creatorPID int32
	// lastAttachDetachPID is the pid of the process that issued the last shmat
	// or shmdt syscall.
	lastAttachDetachPID int32

	// pendingDestruction indicates the segment was marked as destroyed through
	// shmctl(IPC_RMID). When marked as destroyed, the segment will not be found
	// in the registry and can no longer be attached. When the last user
	// detaches from the segment, it is destroyed. Protected by mu.
	pendingDestruction bool
}

// MappedName implements memmap.MappingIdentity.MappedName.
func (s *Shm) MappedName(ctx context.Context) string {
	return fmt.Sprintf("SYSV%08d", s.key)
}

// DeviceID implements memmap.MappingIdentity.DeviceID.
func (s *Shm) DeviceID() uint64 {
	return shmDevice.DeviceID()
}

// InodeID implements memmap.MappingIdentity.InodeID.
func (s *Shm) InodeID() uint64 {
	// "shmid gets reported as "inode#" in /proc/pid/maps. proc-ps tools use
	// this. Changing this will break them." -- Linux, ipc/shm.c:newseg()
	return uint64(s.ID)
}

// DecRef overrides refs.RefCount.DecRef with a destructor.
func (s *Shm) DecRef() {
	s.DecRefWithDestructor(s.destroy)
}

// Msync implements memmap.MappingIdentity.Msync. Msync is a no-op for shm
// segments.
func (s *Shm) Msync(context.Context, memmap.MappableRange) error {
	return nil
}

// AddMapping implements memmap.Mappable.AddMapping.
func (s *Shm) AddMapping(ctx context.Context, ms memmap.MappingSpace, ar usermem.AddrRange, offset uint64) error {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	s.attachTime = ktime.NowFromContext(ctx)
	if pid, ok := context.ThreadGroupIDFromContext(ctx); ok {
		s.lastAttachDetachPID = pid
	} else {
		// AddMapping is called during a syscall, so ctx should always be a task
		// context.
		log.Warningf("Adding mapping to shm %+v but couldn't get the current pid; not updating the last attach pid", s)
	}
	return nil
}

// RemoveMapping implements memmap.Mappable.RemoveMapping.
func (s *Shm) RemoveMapping(ctx context.Context, ms memmap.MappingSpace, ar usermem.AddrRange, offset uint64) {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	// TODO: RemoveMapping may be called during task exit, when ctx
	// is context.Background. Gracefully handle missing clocks. Failing to
	// update the detach time in these cases is ok, since no one can observe the
	// omission.
	if clock := ktime.RealtimeClockFromContext(ctx); clock != nil {
		s.detachTime = clock.Now()
	}

	// If called from a non-task context we also won't have a threadgroup
	// id. Silently skip updating the lastAttachDetachPid in that case.
	if pid, ok := context.ThreadGroupIDFromContext(ctx); ok {
		s.lastAttachDetachPID = pid
	} else {
		log.Debugf("Couldn't obtain pid when removing mapping to shm %+v, not updating the last detach pid.", s)
	}
}

// CopyMapping implements memmap.Mappable.CopyMapping.
func (s *Shm) CopyMapping(ctx context.Context, ms memmap.MappingSpace, srcAR, dstAR usermem.AddrRange, offset uint64) error {
	return nil
}

// Translate implements memmap.Mappable.Translate.
func (s *Shm) Translate(ctx context.Context, required, optional memmap.MappableRange, at usermem.AccessType) ([]memmap.Translation, error) {
	var err error
	if required.End > s.fr.Length() {
		err = &memmap.BusError{syserror.EFAULT}
	}
	if source := optional.Intersect(memmap.MappableRange{0, s.fr.Length()}); source.Length() != 0 {
		return []memmap.Translation{
			{
				Source: source,
				File:   s.p.Memory(),
				Offset: s.fr.Start + source.Start,
			},
		}, err
	}
	return nil, err
}

// InvalidateUnsavable implements memmap.Mappable.InvalidateUnsavable.
func (s *Shm) InvalidateUnsavable(ctx context.Context) error {
	return nil
}

// AttachOpts describes various flags passed to shmat(2).
type AttachOpts struct {
	Execute  bool
	Readonly bool
	Remap    bool
}

// ConfigureAttach creates an mmap configuration for the segment with the
// requested attach options.
//
// ConfigureAttach returns with a ref on s on success. The caller should drop
// this once the map is installed. This reference prevents s from being
// destroyed before the returned configuration is used.
func (s *Shm) ConfigureAttach(ctx context.Context, addr usermem.Addr, opts AttachOpts) (memmap.MMapOpts, error) {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	if s.pendingDestruction && s.ReadRefs() == 0 {
		return memmap.MMapOpts{}, syserror.EIDRM
	}

	if !s.checkPermissions(ctx, fs.PermMask{
		Read:    true,
		Write:   !opts.Readonly,
		Execute: opts.Execute,
	}) {
		// "The calling process does not have the required permissions for the
		// requested attach type, and does not have the CAP_IPC_OWNER capability
		// in the user namespace that governs its IPC namespace." - man shmat(2)
		return memmap.MMapOpts{}, syserror.EACCES
	}
	s.IncRef()
	return memmap.MMapOpts{
		Length: s.size,
		Offset: 0,
		Addr:   addr,
		Fixed:  opts.Remap,
		Perms: usermem.AccessType{
			Read:    true,
			Write:   !opts.Readonly,
			Execute: opts.Execute,
		},
		MaxPerms:        usermem.AnyAccess,
		Mappable:        s,
		MappingIdentity: s,
	}, nil
}

// EffectiveSize returns the size of the underlying shared memory segment. This
// may be larger than the requested size at creation, due to rounding to page
// boundaries.
func (s *Shm) EffectiveSize() uint64 {
	return s.effectiveSize
}

// IPCStat returns information about a shm. See shmctl(IPC_STAT).
func (s *Shm) IPCStat(ctx context.Context) (*linux.ShmidDS, error) {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()

	// "The caller must have read permission on the shared memory segment."
	//   - man shmctl(2)
	if !s.checkPermissions(ctx, fs.PermMask{Read: true}) {
		// "IPC_STAT or SHM_STAT is requested and shm_perm.mode does not allow
		// read access for shmid, and the calling process does not have the
		// CAP_IPC_OWNER capability in the user namespace that governs its IPC
		// namespace." - man shmctl(2)
		return nil, syserror.EACCES
	}

	var mode uint16
	if s.pendingDestruction {
		mode |= linux.SHM_DEST
	}
	creds := auth.CredentialsFromContext(ctx)

	nattach := uint64(s.ReadRefs())
	// Don't report the self-reference we keep prior to being marked for
	// destruction. However, also don't report a count of -1 for segments marked
	// as destroyed, with no mappings.
	if !s.pendingDestruction {
		nattach--
	}

	ds := &linux.ShmidDS{
		ShmPerm: linux.IPCPerm{
			Key:  uint32(s.key),
			UID:  uint32(creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKUID(s.owner.UID)),
			GID:  uint32(creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKGID(s.owner.GID)),
			CUID: uint32(creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKUID(s.creator.UID)),
			CGID: uint32(creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKGID(s.creator.GID)),
			Mode: mode | uint16(s.perms.LinuxMode()),
			Seq:  0, // IPC sequences not supported.
		},
		ShmSegsz:   s.size,
		ShmAtime:   s.attachTime.TimeT(),
		ShmDtime:   s.detachTime.TimeT(),
		ShmCtime:   s.changeTime.TimeT(),
		ShmCpid:    s.creatorPID,
		ShmLpid:    s.lastAttachDetachPID,
		ShmNattach: nattach,
	}

	return ds, nil
}

// Set modifies attributes for a segment. See shmctl(IPC_SET).
func (s *Shm) Set(ctx context.Context, ds *linux.ShmidDS) error {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()

	if !s.checkOwnership(ctx) {
		return syserror.EPERM
	}

	creds := auth.CredentialsFromContext(ctx)
	uid := creds.UserNamespace.MapToKUID(auth.UID(ds.ShmPerm.UID))
	gid := creds.UserNamespace.MapToKGID(auth.GID(ds.ShmPerm.GID))
	if !uid.Ok() || !gid.Ok() {
		return syserror.EINVAL
	}

	// User may only modify the lower 9 bits of the mode. All the other bits are
	// always 0 for the underlying inode.
	mode := linux.FileMode(ds.ShmPerm.Mode & 0x1ff)
	s.perms = fs.FilePermsFromMode(mode)

	s.owner.UID = uid
	s.owner.GID = gid

	s.changeTime = ktime.NowFromContext(ctx)
	return nil
}

func (s *Shm) destroy() {
	s.registry.remove(s)
	s.p.Memory().DecRef(s.fr)
}

// MarkDestroyed marks a shm for destruction. The shm is actually destroyed once
// it has no references. See shmctl(IPC_RMID).
func (s *Shm) MarkDestroyed() {
	s.mu.Lock()
	defer s.mu.Unlock()
	// Prevent the segment from being found in the registry.
	s.key = linux.IPC_PRIVATE
	s.pendingDestruction = true
	s.DecRef()
}

// checkOwnership verifies whether a segment may be accessed by ctx as an
// owner. See ipc/util.c:ipcctl_pre_down_nolock() in Linux.
//
// Precondition: Caller must hold s.mu.
func (s *Shm) checkOwnership(ctx context.Context) bool {
	creds := auth.CredentialsFromContext(ctx)
	if s.owner.UID == creds.EffectiveKUID || s.creator.UID == creds.EffectiveKUID {
		return true
	}

	// Tasks with CAP_SYS_ADMIN may bypass ownership checks. Strangely, Linux
	// doesn't use CAP_IPC_OWNER for this despite CAP_IPC_OWNER being documented
	// for use to "override IPC ownership checks".
	return creds.HasCapabilityIn(linux.CAP_SYS_ADMIN, s.registry.userNS)
}

// checkPermissions verifies whether a segment is accessible by ctx for access
// described by req. See ipc/util.c:ipcperms() in Linux.
//
// Precondition: Caller must hold s.mu.
func (s *Shm) checkPermissions(ctx context.Context, req fs.PermMask) bool {
	creds := auth.CredentialsFromContext(ctx)

	p := s.perms.Other
	if s.owner.UID == creds.EffectiveKUID {
		p = s.perms.User
	} else if creds.InGroup(s.owner.GID) {
		p = s.perms.Group
	}
	if p.SupersetOf(req) {
		return true
	}

	// Tasks with CAP_IPC_OWNER may bypass permission checks.
	return creds.HasCapabilityIn(linux.CAP_IPC_OWNER, s.registry.userNS)
}