Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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This CL:
1) Fix `runsc wait`, it now also works after the container exits;
2) Generate correct container state in Load;
2) Make sure `Destory` cleanup everything before successfully return.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212900107
Change-Id: Ie129cbb9d74f8151a18364f1fc0b2603eac4109a
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This is different from the existing -pid-file flag, which saves a host pid.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212713968
Change-Id: I2c486de8dd5cfd9b923fb0970165ef7c5fc597f0
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It was only used by whitelistfs, which was removed in
bc81f3fe4a042a15343d2eab44da32d818ac1ade.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212666374
Change-Id: Ia35e6dc9d68c1a3b015d5b5f71ea3e68e46c5bed
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 212557844
Change-Id: I414de848e75d57ecee2c05e851d05b607db4aa57
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We were previously openining the platform device (i.e. /dev/kvm) inside the
platfrom constructor (i.e. kvm.New). This requires that we have RW access to
the platform device when constructing the platform.
However, now that the runsc sandbox process runs as user "nobody", it is not
able to open the platform device.
This CL changes the kvm constructor to take the platform device FD, rather than
opening the device file itself. The device file is opened outside of the
sandbox and passed to the sandbox process.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212505804
Change-Id: I427e1d9de5eb84c84f19d513356e1bb148a52910
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 212483372
Change-Id: If95f32a8e41126cf3dc8bd6c8b2fb0fcfefedc6d
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Inside the chroot, we run as user nobody, so all mounted files and directories
must be accessible to all users.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212284805
Change-Id: I705e0dbbf15e01e04e0c7f378a99daffe6866807
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 212069131
Change-Id: I01476f957bbf29d4ee5a3c11d59d4f863ba9f2df
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 212066419
Change-Id: Icded56e7e117bfd9b644e6541bddcd110460a9b8
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We must use a context.Context with a Root Dirent that corresponds to the
container's chroot. Previously we were using the root context, which does not
have a chroot.
Getting the correct context required refactoring some of the path-lookup code.
We can't lookup the path without a context.Context, which requires
kernel.CreateProcArgs, which we only get inside control.Execute. So we have to
do the path lookup much later than we previously were.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212064734
Change-Id: I84a5cfadacb21fd9c3ab9c393f7e308a40b9b537
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 212059579
Change-Id: I052c2192d3483d7bd0fd2232ef2023a12da66446
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 212058684
Change-Id: I319709b9ffcfccb3231bac98df345d2a20eca24b
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 212028121
Change-Id: If9c2c62f3be103e2bb556b8d154c169888e34369
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It was used before gofer was implemented and it's not
supported anymore.
BREAKING CHANGE: proxy-shared and proxy-exclusive options
are now: shared and exclusive.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212017643
Change-Id: If029d4073fe60583e5ca25f98abb2953de0d78fd
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211999211
Change-Id: I5968dd1a8313d3e49bb6e6614e130107495de41d
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We construct a dir with the executable bind-mounted at /exe, and proc mounted
at /proc. Runsc now executes the sandbox process inside this chroot, thus
limiting access to the host filesystem. The mounts and chroot dir are removed
when the sandbox is destroyed.
Because this requires bind-mounts, we can only do the chroot if we have
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211994001
Change-Id: Ia71c515e26085e0b69b833e71691830148bc70d1
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Docker and containerd do not expose runsc's stderr, so tracking down sentry
panics can be painful.
If we have a debug log file, we should send panics (and all stderr data) to the
log file.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211992321
Change-Id: I5f0d2f45f35c110a38dab86bafc695aaba42f7a3
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211835570
Change-Id: Ied7933732cad5bc60b762e9c964986cb49a8d9b9
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211834411
Change-Id: I52311a6c5407f984e5069359d9444027084e4d2a
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211831396
Change-Id: Id67f182cb43dccb696180ec967f5b96176f252e0
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Now, we can kill individual containers rather than the entire sandbox.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211748106
Change-Id: Ic97e91db33d53782f838338c4a6d0aab7a313ead
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When no capabilities are specified in exec, use the
container's capabilities to match runc's behavior.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211735186
Change-Id: Icd372ed64410c81144eae94f432dffc9fe3a86ce
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With multi-gofers, bind mounts in sub-containers should
just work. Removed restrictions and added test. There are
also a few cleanups along the way, e.g. retry unmounting
in case cleanup races with gofer teardown.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211699569
Change-Id: Ic0a69c29d7c31cd7e038909cc686c6ac98703374
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211693868
Change-Id: Iea340dd78bf26ae6409c310b63c17cc611c2055f
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211686037
Change-Id: I0e776ca760b65ba100e495f471b6e811dbd6590a
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211685288
Change-Id: I7872f2a83fcaaa54f385e6e567af6e72320c5aa0
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Remove GetExecutablePath (the non-internal version). This makes path handling
more consistent between exec, root, and child containers.
The new getExecutablePath now uses MountNamespace.FindInode, which is more
robust than Walking the Dirent tree ourselves.
This also removes the last use of lstat(2) in the sentry, so that can be
removed from the filters.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211683110
Change-Id: Ic8ec960fc1c267aa7d310b8efe6e900c88a9207a
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When starting a sandbox without direct file or network access, we create an
empty user namespace and run the sandbox in there. However, the root user in
that namespace is still mapped to the root user in the parent namespace.
This CL maps the "nobody" user from the parent namespace into the child
namespace, and runs the sandbox process as user "nobody" inside the new
namespace.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211572223
Change-Id: I1b1f9b1a86c0b4e7e5ca7bc93be7d4887678bab6
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This is a prereq for running the sandbox process as user "nobody", when it may
not have permissions to open these files.
Instead, we must open then before starting the sandbox process, and pass them
by FD.
The specutils.ReadSpecFromFile method was fixed to always seek to the beginning
of the file before reading. This allows Files from the same FD to be read
multiple times, as we do in the boot command when the apply-caps flag is set.
Tested with --network=host.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211570647
Change-Id: I685be0a290aa7f70731ebdce82ebc0ebcc9d475c
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211515350
Change-Id: Ia495af57447c799909aa97bb873a50b87bee2625
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Go 1.11 replaced it with epoll_pwait.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211510006
Change-Id: I48a6cae95ed3d57a4633895358ad05ad8bf2f633
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211160120
Change-Id: Ie5f280bdac17afd01cb16562ffff6222b3184c34
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211147521
Change-Id: I9b8b67df50a3ba084c07a48c72a874d7e2007f23
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211116429
Change-Id: I446d149c822177dc9fc3c64ce5e455f7f029aa82
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211111376
Change-Id: I27b8cb4e070d476fa4781ed6ecfa0cf1dcaf85f5
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runsc and runsc-race need the same deps.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211103766
Change-Id: Ib0c97078a469656c1e5b019648589a1d07915625
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It was including the path to the executable twice in the
arguments.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211098311
Change-Id: I5357c51c63f38dfab551b17bb0e04011a0575010
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GoCompile: missing strict dependencies:
/tmpfs/tmp/bazel/sandbox/linux-sandbox/1744/execroot/__main__/runsc/main.go:
import of "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/runsc/specutils"
This was broken in 210995199.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211086595
Change-Id: I166b9a2ed8e4d6e624def944b720190940d7537c
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211011542
Change-Id: Ib5a83a00f8eb6401603c6fb5b59afc93bac52558
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This is a prereq for running the sandbox process as user "nobody", when it may
not have permissions to open these files.
Instead, we must open then before starting the sandbox process, and pass them
by FD.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210995199
Change-Id: I715875a9553290b4a49394a8fcd93be78b1933dd
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This is required to increase protection when running in GKE.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210635123
Change-Id: Iaaa8be49e73f7a3a90805313885e75894416f0b5
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 210589588
Change-Id: Iba898bc3eb8f13e17c668ceea6dc820fc8180a70
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 210579178
Change-Id: Iae20639c5186b1a976cbff6d05bda134cd00d0da
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This is to keep it consistent with other test, and
it's easier to maintain them in single file.
Also increase python test timeout to deflake it.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210575042
Change-Id: I2ef5bcd5d97c08549f0c5f645c4b694253ef0b4d
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This is to troubleshoot problems with a hung process that is
not responding to 'runsc debug --stack' command.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210483513
Change-Id: I4377b210b4e51bc8a281ad34fd94f3df13d9187d
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For readonly filesystems specified via relative path, we were forgetting to
mount relative to the container's bundle directory.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210483388
Change-Id: I84809fce4b1f2056d0e225547cb611add5f74177
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When revalidating a Dirent, if the inode id is the same, then we don't need to
throw away the entire Dirent. We can just update the unstable attributes in
place.
If the inode id has changed, then the remote file has been deleted or moved,
and we have no choice but to throw away the dirent we have a look up another.
In this case, we may still end up losing a mounted dirent that is a child of
the revalidated dirent. However, that seems appropriate here because the entire
mount point has been pulled out from underneath us.
Because gVisor's overlay is at the Inode level rather than the Dirent level, we
must pass the parent Inode and name along with the Inode that is being
revalidated.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210431270
Change-Id: I705caef9c68900234972d5aac4ae3a78c61c7d42
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Previously, we were only using the host inode id as the QID path. But the host
filesystem can have multiple devices with conflicting inode ids. This resulted
in duplicate inode ids in the sentry.
This CL generates a unique QID for each <host inode, host device> pair.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210424813
Change-Id: I16d106f61c7c8f910c0da4ceec562a010ffca2fb
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 210422178
Change-Id: I984dd348d467908bc3180a20fc79b8387fcca05e
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Now each container gets its own dedicated gofer that is chroot'd to the
rootfs path. This is done to add an extra layer of security in case the
gofer gets compromised.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210396476
Change-Id: Iba21360a59dfe90875d61000db103f8609157ca0
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