Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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As open syscall is not support on ARM64, change syscall
from 'open' to 'openat' in no_match_name_allow
Signed-off-by: Howard Zhang <howard.zhang@arm.com>
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OCI configuration includes support for specifying seccomp filters. In runc,
these filter configurations are converted into seccomp BPF programs and loaded
into the kernel via libseccomp. runsc needs to be a static binary so, for
runsc, we cannot rely on a C library and need to implement the functionality
in Go.
The generator added here implements basic support for taking OCI seccomp
configuration and converting it into a seccomp BPF program with the same
behavior as a program generated by libseccomp.
- New conditional operations were added to pkg/seccomp to support operations
available in OCI.
- AllowAny and AllowValue were renamed to MatchAny and EqualTo to better reflect
that syscalls matching the conditionals result in the provided action not
simply SCMP_RET_ALLOW.
- BuildProgram in pkg/seccomp no longer panics if provided an empty list of
rules. It now builds a program with the architecture sanity check only.
- ProgramBuilder now allows adding labels that are unused. However, backwards
jumps are still not permitted.
Fixes #510
PiperOrigin-RevId: 331938697
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This allows runsc flags to be set per sandbox instance. For
example, K8s pod annotations can be used to enable
--debug for a single pod, making troubleshoot much easier.
Similarly, features like --vfs2 can be enabled for
experimentation without affecting other pods in the node.
Closes #3494
PiperOrigin-RevId: 329542815
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 321053634
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The previous format skipped many important structs that
are pointers, especially for cgroups. Change to print
as json, removing parts of the spec that are not relevant.
Also removed debug message from gofer that can be very
noisy when directories are large.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 316713267
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- Add /tmp handling
- Apply mount options
- Enable more container_test tests
- Forward signals to child process when test respaws process
to run as root inside namespace.
Updates #1487
PiperOrigin-RevId: 314263281
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 313663382
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 313636920
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Signed-off-by: moricho <ikeda.morito@gmail.com>
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noNewPrivileges is ignored if set to false since gVisor assumes that
PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is always enabled.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 305991947
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Issue #2270
Issue #1765
PiperOrigin-RevId: 305385436
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When the sandbox runs in attached more, e.g. runsc do, runsc run, the
sandbox lifetime is controlled by the parent process. This wasn't working
in all cases because PR_GET_PDEATHSIG doesn't propagate through execve
when the process changes uid/gid. So it was getting dropped when the
sandbox execve's to change to user nobody.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 300601247
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 291745021
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 276172466
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Obligatory https://xkcd.com/927
Fixes #626
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 274042343
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 272262368
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'docker exec' was getting CAP_NET_RAW even when --net-raw=false
because it was not filtered out from when copying container's
capabilities.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 272260451
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Signed-off-by: Kenta Tada <Kenta.Tada@sony.com>
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- Sandbox logs are generated when running tests
- Kokoro uploads the sandbox logs
- Supports multiple parallel runs
- Revive script to install locally built runsc with docker
PiperOrigin-RevId: 269337274
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This is done because the root container for CRI is the infrastructure (pause)
container and always gets a low oom_score_adj. We do this to ensure that only
the oom_score_adj of user containers is used to calculated the sandbox
oom_score_adj.
Implemented in runsc rather than the containerd shim as it's a bit cleaner to
implement here (in the shim it would require overwriting the oomScoreAdj and
re-writing out the config.json again). This processing is Kubernetes(CRI)
specific but we are currently only supporting CRI for multi-container support
anyway.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 267507706
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Each gofer now has a goroutine that polls on the FDs used
to communicate with the sandbox. The respective gofer is
destroyed if any of the FDs is closed.
Closes #601
PiperOrigin-RevId: 261383725
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Addresses obvious typos, in the documentation only.
COPYBARA_INTEGRATE_REVIEW=https://github.com/google/gvisor/pull/443 from Pixep:fix/documentation-spelling 4d0688164eafaf0b3010e5f4824b35d1e7176d65
PiperOrigin-RevId: 255477779
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This can be merged after:
https://github.com/google/gvisor-website/pull/77
or
https://github.com/google/gvisor-website/pull/78
PiperOrigin-RevId: 253132620
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'--rootless' flag lets a non-root user execute 'runsc do'.
The drawback is that the sandbox and gofer processes will
run as root inside a user namespace that is mapped to the
caller's user, intead of nobody. And network is defaulted
to '--network=host' inside the root network namespace. On
the bright side, it's very convenient for testing:
runsc --rootless do ls
runsc --rootless do curl www.google.com
PiperOrigin-RevId: 252840970
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Parse annotations containing 'gvisor.dev/spec/mount' that gives
hints about how mounts are shared between containers inside a
pod. This information can be used to better inform how to mount
these volumes inside gVisor. For example, a volume that is shared
between containers inside a pod can be bind mounted inside the
sandbox, instead of being two independent mounts.
For now, this information is used to allow the same tmpfs mounts
to be shared between containers which wasn't possible before.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 252704037
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Signed-off-by: Liu Hua <sdu.liu@huawei.com>
Change-Id: I11a4620394a10a7d92036b0341e0c21ad50bd122
PiperOrigin-RevId: 248621810
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Based on the guidelines at
https://opensource.google.com/docs/releasing/authors/.
1. $ rg -l "Google LLC" | xargs sed -i 's/Google LLC.*/The gVisor Authors./'
2. Manual fixup of "Google Inc" references.
3. Add AUTHORS file. Authors may request to be added to this file.
4. Point netstack AUTHORS to gVisor AUTHORS. Drop CONTRIBUTORS.
Fixes #209
PiperOrigin-RevId: 245823212
Change-Id: I64530b24ad021a7d683137459cafc510f5ee1de9
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 245818639
Change-Id: I03703ef0fb9b6675955637b9fe2776204c545789
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 245511019
Change-Id: Ia9562a301b46458988a6a1f0bbd5f07cbfcb0615
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https://github.com/google/gvisor/issues/145
PiperOrigin-RevId: 242044115
Change-Id: I8f140fe05e32ecd438b6be218e224e4b7fe05878
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 241421671
Change-Id: Ic0cebfe3efd458dc42c49f7f812c13318705199a
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 239425816
Change-Id: I3b1479c61b4222c3931a416c4efc909157044330
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Properly handle propagation options for root and mounts. Now usage of
mount options shared, rshared, and noexec cause error to start. shared/
rshared breaks sandbox=>host isolation. slave however can be supported
because changes propagate from host to sandbox.
Root FS setup moved inside the gofer. Apart from simplifying the code,
it keeps all mounts inside the namespace. And they are torn down when
the namespace is destroyed (DestroyFS is no longer needed).
PiperOrigin-RevId: 239037661
Change-Id: I8b5ee4d50da33c042ea34fa68e56514ebe20e6e0
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Nothing reads them and they can simply get stale.
Generated with:
$ sed -i "s/licenses(\(.*\)).*/licenses(\1)/" **/BUILD
PiperOrigin-RevId: 231818945
Change-Id: Ibc3f9838546b7e94f13f217060d31f4ada9d4bf0
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 230437407
Change-Id: Id9d8ceeb018aad2fe317407c78c6ee0f4b47aa2b
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The original code assumed that it was safe to join and not restore cgroup,
but Container.Run will not exit after calling start, making cgroup cleanup
fail because there were still processes inside the cgroup.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 228529199
Change-Id: I12a48d9adab4bbb02f20d71ec99598c336cbfe51
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 224886231
Change-Id: I0fccb4d994601739d8b16b1d4e6b31f40297fb22
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 221848471
Change-Id: I882fbe5ce7737048b2e1f668848e9c14ed355665
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 221462069
Change-Id: Id469ed21fe12e582c78340189b932989afa13c67
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 221343421
Change-Id: I418b5204c5ed4fe1e0af25ef36ee66b9b571928e
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This change also adds extensive testing to the p9 package via mocks. The sanity
checks and type checks are moved from the gofer into the core package, where
they can be more easily validated.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 218296768
Change-Id: I4fc3c326e7bf1e0e140a454cbacbcc6fd617ab55
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 217951017
Change-Id: Ie08bf6987f98467d07457bcf35b5f1ff6e43c035
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It's hard to resolve symlinks inside the sandbox because rootfs and mounts
may be read-only, forcing us to create mount points inside lower layer of an
overlay, **before** the volumes are mounted.
Since the destination must already be resolved outside the sandbox when creating
mounts, take this opportunity to rewrite the spec with paths resolved.
"runsc boot" will use the "resolved" spec to load mounts. In addition, symlink
traversals were disabled while mounting containers inside the sandbox.
It haven't been able to write a good test for it. So I'm relying on manual tests
for now.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 217749904
Change-Id: I7ac434d5befd230db1488446cda03300cc0751a9
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This is a breaking change if you're using --debug-log-dir.
The fix is to replace it with --debug-log and add a '/' at
the end:
--debug-log-dir=/tmp/runsc ==> --debug-log=/tmp/runsc/
PiperOrigin-RevId: 216761212
Change-Id: I244270a0a522298c48115719fa08dad55e34ade1
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Sandbox creation uses the limits and reservations configured in the
OCI spec and set cgroup options accordinly. Then it puts both the
sandbox and gofer processes inside the cgroup.
It also allows the cgroup to be pre-configured by the caller. If the
cgroup already exists, sandbox and gofer processes will join the
cgroup but it will not modify the cgroup with spec limits.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 216538209
Change-Id: If2c65ffedf55820baab743a0edcfb091b89c1019
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Some tests check current capabilities and re-run the tests as root inside
userns if required capabibilities are missing. It was checking for
CAP_SYS_ADMIN only, CAP_SYS_CHROOT is also required now.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 214949226
Change-Id: Ic81363969fa76c04da408fae8ea7520653266312
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Capabilities.Set() adds capabilities,
but doesn't remove existing ones that might have been loaded. Fixed
the code and added tests.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213726369
Change-Id: Id7fa6fce53abf26c29b13b9157bb4c6616986fba
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`docker run --cpuset-cpus=/--cpus=` will generate cpu resource info in config.json
(runtime spec file). When nginx worker_connections is configured as auto, the worker is
generated according to the number of CPUs. If the cgroup is already set on the host, but
it is not displayed correctly in the sandbox, performance may be degraded.
This patch can get cpus info from spec file and apply to sentry on bootup, so the
/proc/cpuinfo can show the correct cpu numbers. `lscpu` and other commands rely on
`/sys/devices/system/cpu/online` are also affected by this patch.
e.g.
--cpuset-cpus=2,3 -> cpu number:2
--cpuset-cpus=4-7 -> cpu number:4
--cpus=2.8 -> cpu number:3
--cpus=0.5 -> cpu number:1
Change-Id: Ideb22e125758d4322a12be7c51795f8018e3d316
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213685199
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We must use a context.Context with a Root Dirent that corresponds to the
container's chroot. Previously we were using the root context, which does not
have a chroot.
Getting the correct context required refactoring some of the path-lookup code.
We can't lookup the path without a context.Context, which requires
kernel.CreateProcArgs, which we only get inside control.Execute. So we have to
do the path lookup much later than we previously were.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212064734
Change-Id: I84a5cfadacb21fd9c3ab9c393f7e308a40b9b537
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