gvisor - Container Runtime Sandbox

Age	Commit message (Collapse)	Author
2019-06-13	Update canonical repository.	Adin Scannell
	This can be merged after: https://github.com/google/gvisor-website/pull/77 or https://github.com/google/gvisor-website/pull/78 PiperOrigin-RevId: 253132620
2019-06-12	Allow 'runsc do' to run without root	Fabricio Voznika
	'--rootless' flag lets a non-root user execute 'runsc do'. The drawback is that the sandbox and gofer processes will run as root inside a user namespace that is mapped to the caller's user, intead of nobody. And network is defaulted to '--network=host' inside the root network namespace. On the bright side, it's very convenient for testing: runsc --rootless do ls runsc --rootless do curl www.google.com PiperOrigin-RevId: 252840970
2019-04-29	Change copyright notice to "The gVisor Authors"	Michael Pratt
	Based on the guidelines at https://opensource.google.com/docs/releasing/authors/. 1. $ rg -l "Google LLC" \| xargs sed -i 's/Google LLC.*/The gVisor Authors./' 2. Manual fixup of "Google Inc" references. 3. Add AUTHORS file. Authors may request to be added to this file. 4. Point netstack AUTHORS to gVisor AUTHORS. Drop CONTRIBUTORS. Fixes #209 PiperOrigin-RevId: 245823212 Change-Id: I64530b24ad021a7d683137459cafc510f5ee1de9
2019-03-18	Add support for mount propagation	Fabricio Voznika
	Properly handle propagation options for root and mounts. Now usage of mount options shared, rshared, and noexec cause error to start. shared/ rshared breaks sandbox=>host isolation. slave however can be supported because changes propagate from host to sandbox. Root FS setup moved inside the gofer. Apart from simplifying the code, it keeps all mounts inside the namespace. And they are torn down when the namespace is destroyed (DestroyFS is no longer needed). PiperOrigin-RevId: 239037661 Change-Id: I8b5ee4d50da33c042ea34fa68e56514ebe20e6e0
2018-10-19	Use correct company name in copyright header	Ian Gudger
	PiperOrigin-RevId: 217951017 Change-Id: Ie08bf6987f98467d07457bcf35b5f1ff6e43c035
2018-09-28	Switch to root in userns when CAP_SYS_CHROOT is also missing	Fabricio Voznika
	Some tests check current capabilities and re-run the tests as root inside userns if required capabibilities are missing. It was checking for CAP_SYS_ADMIN only, CAP_SYS_CHROOT is also required now. PiperOrigin-RevId: 214949226 Change-Id: Ic81363969fa76c04da408fae8ea7520653266312
2018-09-07	runsc: Run sandbox process inside minimal chroot.	Nicolas Lacasse
	We construct a dir with the executable bind-mounted at /exe, and proc mounted at /proc. Runsc now executes the sandbox process inside this chroot, thus limiting access to the host filesystem. The mounts and chroot dir are removed when the sandbox is destroyed. Because this requires bind-mounts, we can only do the chroot if we have CAP_SYS_ADMIN. PiperOrigin-RevId: 211994001 Change-Id: Ia71c515e26085e0b69b833e71691830148bc70d1
2018-09-04	runsc: Run sandbox as user nobody.	Nicolas Lacasse
	When starting a sandbox without direct file or network access, we create an empty user namespace and run the sandbox in there. However, the root user in that namespace is still mapped to the root user in the parent namespace. This CL maps the "nobody" user from the parent namespace into the child namespace, and runs the sandbox process as user "nobody" inside the new namespace. PiperOrigin-RevId: 211572223 Change-Id: I1b1f9b1a86c0b4e7e5ca7bc93be7d4887678bab6
2018-08-27	Put fsgofer inside chroot	Fabricio Voznika
	Now each container gets its own dedicated gofer that is chroot'd to the rootfs path. This is done to add an extra layer of security in case the gofer gets compromised. PiperOrigin-RevId: 210396476 Change-Id: Iba21360a59dfe90875d61000db103f8609157ca0