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PiperOrigin-RevId: 213504354
Change-Id: Iadd42f0ca4b7e7a9eae780bee9900c7233fb4f3f
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This makes `runsc wait` behave more like waitpid()/wait4() in that:
- Once a process has run to completion, you can wait on it and get its exit
code.
- Processes not waited on will consume memory (like a zombie process)
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213358916
Change-Id: I5b5eca41ce71eea68e447380df8c38361a4d1558
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Stdin/out/err weren't being sent to the sentry.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213307171
Change-Id: Ie4b634a58b1b69aa934ce8597e5cc7a47a2bcda2
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This CL:
1) Fix `runsc wait`, it now also works after the container exits;
2) Generate correct container state in Load;
2) Make sure `Destory` cleanup everything before successfully return.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212900107
Change-Id: Ie129cbb9d74f8151a18364f1fc0b2603eac4109a
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This is different from the existing -pid-file flag, which saves a host pid.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212713968
Change-Id: I2c486de8dd5cfd9b923fb0970165ef7c5fc597f0
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We were previously openining the platform device (i.e. /dev/kvm) inside the
platfrom constructor (i.e. kvm.New). This requires that we have RW access to
the platform device when constructing the platform.
However, now that the runsc sandbox process runs as user "nobody", it is not
able to open the platform device.
This CL changes the kvm constructor to take the platform device FD, rather than
opening the device file itself. The device file is opened outside of the
sandbox and passed to the sandbox process.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212505804
Change-Id: I427e1d9de5eb84c84f19d513356e1bb148a52910
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We must use a context.Context with a Root Dirent that corresponds to the
container's chroot. Previously we were using the root context, which does not
have a chroot.
Getting the correct context required refactoring some of the path-lookup code.
We can't lookup the path without a context.Context, which requires
kernel.CreateProcArgs, which we only get inside control.Execute. So we have to
do the path lookup much later than we previously were.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212064734
Change-Id: I84a5cfadacb21fd9c3ab9c393f7e308a40b9b537
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It was used before gofer was implemented and it's not
supported anymore.
BREAKING CHANGE: proxy-shared and proxy-exclusive options
are now: shared and exclusive.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212017643
Change-Id: If029d4073fe60583e5ca25f98abb2953de0d78fd
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We construct a dir with the executable bind-mounted at /exe, and proc mounted
at /proc. Runsc now executes the sandbox process inside this chroot, thus
limiting access to the host filesystem. The mounts and chroot dir are removed
when the sandbox is destroyed.
Because this requires bind-mounts, we can only do the chroot if we have
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211994001
Change-Id: Ia71c515e26085e0b69b833e71691830148bc70d1
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When starting a sandbox without direct file or network access, we create an
empty user namespace and run the sandbox in there. However, the root user in
that namespace is still mapped to the root user in the parent namespace.
This CL maps the "nobody" user from the parent namespace into the child
namespace, and runs the sandbox process as user "nobody" inside the new
namespace.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211572223
Change-Id: I1b1f9b1a86c0b4e7e5ca7bc93be7d4887678bab6
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This is a prereq for running the sandbox process as user "nobody", when it may
not have permissions to open these files.
Instead, we must open then before starting the sandbox process, and pass them
by FD.
The specutils.ReadSpecFromFile method was fixed to always seek to the beginning
of the file before reading. This allows Files from the same FD to be read
multiple times, as we do in the boot command when the apply-caps flag is set.
Tested with --network=host.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211570647
Change-Id: I685be0a290aa7f70731ebdce82ebc0ebcc9d475c
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 211116429
Change-Id: I446d149c822177dc9fc3c64ce5e455f7f029aa82
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This is a prereq for running the sandbox process as user "nobody", when it may
not have permissions to open these files.
Instead, we must open then before starting the sandbox process, and pass them
by FD.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210995199
Change-Id: I715875a9553290b4a49394a8fcd93be78b1933dd
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Now each container gets its own dedicated gofer that is chroot'd to the
rootfs path. This is done to add an extra layer of security in case the
gofer gets compromised.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210396476
Change-Id: Iba21360a59dfe90875d61000db103f8609157ca0
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This CL adds terminal support for "docker exec". We previously only supported
consoles for the container process, but not exec processes.
The SYS_IOCTL syscall was added to the default seccomp filter list, but only
for ioctls that get/set winsize and termios structs. We need to allow these
ioctl for all containers because it's possible to run "exec -ti" on a
container that was started without an attached console, after the filters
have been installed.
Note that control-character signals are still not properly supported.
Tested with:
$ docker run --runtime=runsc -it alpine
In another terminial:
$ docker exec -it <containerid> /bin/sh
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210185456
Change-Id: I6d2401e53a7697bb988c120a8961505c335f96d9
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This is used when '--overlay=true' to guarantee writes are not sent to gofer.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210116288
Change-Id: I7616008c4c0e8d3668e07a205207f46e2144bf30
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 209647293
Change-Id: I980fca1257ea3fcce796388a049c353b0303a8a5
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Tests get a readonly rootfs mapped to / (which was the case before)
and writable TEST_TMPDIR. This makes it easier to setup containers to
write to files and to share state between test and containers.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 209453224
Change-Id: I4d988e45dc0909a0450a3bb882fe280cf9c24334
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When multiple containers run inside a sentry, each container has its own root
filesystem and set of mounts. Containers are also added after sentry boot rather
than all configured and known at boot time.
The fsgofer needs to be able to serve the root filesystem of each container.
Thus, it must be possible to add filesystems after the fsgofer has already
started.
This change:
* Creates a URPC endpoint within the gofer process that listens for requests to
serve new content.
* Enables the sentry, when starting a new container, to add the new container's
filesystem.
* Mounts those new filesystems at separate roots within the sentry.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 208903248
Change-Id: Ifa91ec9c8caf5f2f0a9eead83c4a57090ce92068
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Previously, gofer filesystems were configured with the default "fscache"
policy, which caches filesystem metadata and contents aggressively. While this
setting is best for performance, it means that changes from inside the sandbox
may not be immediately propagated outside the sandbox, and vice-versa.
This CL changes volumes and the root fs configuration to use a new
"remote-revalidate" cache policy which tries to retain as much caching as
possible while still making fs changes visible across the sandbox boundary.
This cache policy is enabled by default for the root filesystem. The default
value for the "--file-access" flag is still "proxy", but the behavior is
changed to use the new cache policy.
A new value for the "--file-access" flag is added, called "proxy-exclusive",
which turns on the previous aggressive caching behavior. As the name implies,
this flag should be used when the sandbox has "exclusive" access to the
filesystem.
All volume mounts are configured to use the new cache policy, since it is
safest and most likely to be correct. There is not currently a way to change
this behavior, but it's possible to add such a mechanism in the future. The
configurability is a smaller issue for volumes, since most of the expensive
application fs operations (walking + stating files) will likely served by the
root fs.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 208735037
Change-Id: Ife048fab1948205f6665df8563434dbc6ca8cfc9
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 205470108
Change-Id: I226878a887fe1133561005357a9e3b09428b06b6
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Docker expects containers to be created before they are restored.
However, gVisor restoring requires specificactions regarding the kernel
and the file system. These actions were originally in booting the sandbox.
Now setting up the file system is deferred until a call to a call to
runsc start. In the restore case, the kernel is destroyed and a new kernel
is created in the same process, as we need the same process for Docker.
These changes required careful execution of concurrent processes which
required the use of a channel.
Full docker integration still needs the ability to restore into the same
container.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 205161441
Change-Id: Ie1d2304ead7e06855319d5dc310678f701bd099f
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Users can now call "runsc wait <container id>" to wait on a particular process
inside the container. -pid can also be used to wait on a specific PID.
Manually tested the wait subcommand for a single waiter and multiple waiters
(simultaneously 2 processes waiting on the container and 2 processes waiting on
a PID within the container).
PiperOrigin-RevId: 202548978
Change-Id: Idd507c2cdea613c3a14879b51cfb0f7ea3fb3d4c
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Closes #71
PiperOrigin-RevId: 202532762
Change-Id: I80a446ff638672ff08e6fd853cd77e28dd05d540
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 201742160
Change-Id: Ia9fa1442287c5f9e1196fb117c41536a80f6bb31
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Restore creates a new container and uses the given image-path to load a saved
image of a previous container. Restore command is plumbed through container
and sandbox. This command does not work yet - more to come.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 201541229
Change-Id: I864a14c799ce3717d99bcdaaebc764281863d06f
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It prints sandbox stacks to the log to help debug stuckness. I expect
that many more options will be added in the future.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 201405931
Change-Id: I87e560800cd5a5a7b210dc25a5661363c8c3a16e
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Containers are created as processes in the sandbox. Of the many things that
don't work yet, the biggest issue is that the fsgofer is launched with its root
as the sandbox's root directory. Thus, when a container is started and wants to
read anything (including the init binary of the container), the gofer tries to
serve from sandbox's root (which basically just has pause), not the container's.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 201294560
Change-Id: I6423aa8830538959c56ae908ce067e4199d627b1
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Resume checks the status of the container and unpauses the kernel
if its status is paused. Otherwise nothing happens.
Tests were added to ensure that the process is in the correct state
after various commands.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 201251234
Change-Id: Ifd11b336c33b654fea6238738f864fcf2bf81e19
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 201012131
Change-Id: I5cd69e795555129319eb41135ecf26db9a0b1fcb
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Like runc, the pause command will pause the processes of the given container.
It will set that container's status to "paused."
A resume command will be be added to unpause and continue running the process.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 200789624
Change-Id: I72a5d7813d90ecfc4d01cc252d6018855016b1ea
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 200770591
Change-Id: Ifc096d88615b63135210d93c2b4cee2eaecf1eee
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This is the first iteration of checkpoint that actually saves to a file.
Tests for checkpoint are included.
Ran into an issue when private unix sockets are enabled. An error message
was added for this case and the mutex state was set.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 200269470
Change-Id: I28d29a9f92c44bf73dc4a4b12ae0509ee4070e93
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 199808391
Change-Id: Ib37a4fb6193dc85c1f93bc16769d6aa41854b9d4
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Checkpoint command is plumbed through container and sandbox.
Restore has also been added but it is only a stub. None of this
works yet. More changes to come.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 199510105
Change-Id: Ibd08d57f4737847eb25ca20b114518e487320185
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Containerd will start deleting container and rootfs after container
is stopped. However, if gofer is still running, rootfs cleanup will
fail because of device busy.
This CL makes sure that gofer is not running when container state is
stopped.
Change from: lantaol@google.com
PiperOrigin-RevId: 199172668
Change-Id: I9d874eec3ecf74fd9c8edd7f62d9f998edef66fe
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9P socket was being created without CLOEXEC and was being inherited
by the children. This would prevent the gofer from detecting that the
sandbox had exited, because the socket would not be closed.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 199168959
Change-Id: I3ee1a07cbe7331b0aeb1cf2b697e728ce24f85a7
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This is another step towards multi-container support.
Previously, we delivered signals directly to the sandbox process (which then
forwarded the signal to PID 1 inside the sandbox). Similarly, we waited on a
container by waiting on the sandbox process itself. This approach will not work
when there are multiple containers inside the sandbox, and we need to
signal/wait on individual containers.
This CL adds two new messages, ContainerSignal and ContainerWait. These
messages include the id of the container to signal/wait. The controller inside
the sandbox receives these messages and signals/waits on the appropriate
process inside the sandbox.
The container id is plumbed into the sandbox, but it currently is not used. We
still end up signaling/waiting on PID 1 in all cases. Once we actually have
multiple containers inside the sandbox, we will need to keep some sort of map
of container id -> pid (or possibly pid namespace), and signal/kill the
appropriate process for the container.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 197028366
Change-Id: I07b4d5dc91ecd2affc1447e6b4bdd6b0b7360895
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This is a necessary prerequisite for supporting multiple containers in a single
sandbox.
All the commands (in cmd package) now call operations on Containers (container
package). When a Container first starts, it will create a Sandbox with the same
ID.
The Sandbox class is now simpler, as it only knows how to create boot/gofer
processes, and how to forward commands into the running boot process.
There are TODOs sprinkled around for additional support for multiple
containers. Most notably, we need to detect when a container is intended to run
in an existing sandbox (by reading the metadata), and then have some way to
signal to the sandbox to start a new container. Other urpc calls into the
sandbox need to pass the container ID, so the sandbox can run the operation on
the given container. These are only half-plummed through right now.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 196688269
Change-Id: I1ecf4abbb9dd8987a53ae509df19341aaf42b5b0
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Two changes in this CL:
First, make the "boot" process sleep when it encounters an error to give the
controller time to send the error back to the "start" process. Otherwise the
"boot" process exits immediately and the control connection errors with EOF.
Secondly, open the log file with O_APPEND, not O_TRUNC. Docker uses the same
log file for all runtime commands, and setting O_TRUNC causes them to get
destroyed. Furthermore, containerd parses these log files in the event of an
error, and it does not like the file being truncated out from underneath it.
Now, when trying to run a binary that does not exist in the image, the error
message is more reasonable:
$ docker run alpine /not/found
docker: Error response from daemon: OCI runtime start failed: /usr/local/google/docker/runtimes/runscd did not terminate sucessfully: error starting sandbox: error starting application [/not/found]: failed to create init process: no such file or directory
Fixes #32
PiperOrigin-RevId: 196027084
Change-Id: Iabc24c0bdd8fc327237acc051a1655515f445e68
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Closes #35
PiperOrigin-RevId: 195840128
Change-Id: I31c1ad9b51ec53abb6f0b485d35622d4e9764b29
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 195469901
Change-Id: I66d5c7a334bbb8b47e40d266a2661291c2d91c7f
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 195365050
Change-Id: I8754dc7a3fc2975d422cae453762a455478a8e6a
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 195307689
Change-Id: I499f19af49875a43214797d63376f20ae788d2f4
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 194949678
Change-Id: I60a30c4bb7418e17583c66f437273fd17e9e99ba
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 194583126
Change-Id: Ica1d8821a90f74e7e745962d71801c598c652463
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