Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
In order to implement kill --all correctly, the Sentry needs
to track all tasks that belong to a given container. This change
introduces ContainerID to the task, that gets inherited by all
children. 'kill --all' then iterates over all tasks comparing the
ContainerID field to find all processes that need to be signalled.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 214841768
Change-Id: I693b2374be8692d88cc441ef13a0ae34abf73ac6
|
|
This makes the flow slightly simpler (no need to call
Loader.SetRootContainer). And this is required change to tag
tasks with container ID inside the Sentry.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 214795210
Change-Id: I6ff4af12e73bb07157f7058bb15fd5bb88760884
|
|
This CL changes the semantics of the "--file-access" flag so that it only
affects the root filesystem. The default remains "exclusive" which is the
common use case, as neither Docker nor K8s supports sharing the root.
Keeping the root fs as "exclusive" means that the fs-intensive work done during
application startup will mostly be cacheable, and thus faster.
Non-root bind mounts will always be shared.
This CL also removes some redundant FSAccessType validations. We validate this
flag in main(), so we can assume it is valid afterwards.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 214359936
Change-Id: I7e75d7bf52dbd7fa834d0aacd4034868314f3b51
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213908919
Change-Id: I74eff99a5360bb03511b946f4cb5658bb5fc40c7
|
|
Destroy flushes dirent references, which triggers many async close operations.
We must wait for those to finish before returning from Destroy, otherwise we
may kill the gofer, causing a cascade of failing RPCs and leading to an
inconsistent FS state.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213884637
Change-Id: Id054b47fc0f97adc5e596d747c08d3b97a1d1f71
|
|
The issue with the previous change was that the stdin/stdout/stderr passed to
the sentry were dup'd by host.ImportFile. This left a dangling FD that by never
closing caused containerd to timeout waiting on container stop.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213753032
Change-Id: Ia5e4c0565c42c8610d3b59f65599a5643b0901e4
|
|
This method will:
1. Stop the container process if it is still running.
2. Unmount all sanadbox-internal mounts for the container.
3. Delete the contaner root directory inside the sandbox.
Destroy is idempotent, and safe to call concurrantly.
This fixes a bug where after stopping a container, we cannot unmount the
container root directory on the host. This bug occured because the sandbox
dirent cache was holding a dirent with a host fd corresponding to a file inside
the container root on the host. The dirent cache did not know that the
container had exited, and kept the FD open, preventing us from unmounting on
the host.
Now that we unmount (and flush) all container mounts inside the sandbox, any
host FDs donated by the gofer will be closed, and we can unmount the container
root on the host.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213737693
Change-Id: I28c0ff4cd19a08014cdd72fec5154497e92aacc9
|
|
Capabilities.Set() adds capabilities,
but doesn't remove existing ones that might have been loaded. Fixed
the code and added tests.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213726369
Change-Id: Id7fa6fce53abf26c29b13b9157bb4c6616986fba
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213715511
Change-Id: I3e41b583c6138edbdeba036dfb9df4864134fc12
|
|
`docker run --cpuset-cpus=/--cpus=` will generate cpu resource info in config.json
(runtime spec file). When nginx worker_connections is configured as auto, the worker is
generated according to the number of CPUs. If the cgroup is already set on the host, but
it is not displayed correctly in the sandbox, performance may be degraded.
This patch can get cpus info from spec file and apply to sentry on bootup, so the
/proc/cpuinfo can show the correct cpu numbers. `lscpu` and other commands rely on
`/sys/devices/system/cpu/online` are also affected by this patch.
e.g.
--cpuset-cpus=2,3 -> cpu number:2
--cpuset-cpus=4-7 -> cpu number:4
--cpus=2.8 -> cpu number:3
--cpus=0.5 -> cpu number:1
Change-Id: Ideb22e125758d4322a12be7c51795f8018e3d316
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213685199
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213504354
Change-Id: Iadd42f0ca4b7e7a9eae780bee9900c7233fb4f3f
|
|
panic() during init() can be hard to debug.
Updates #100
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213391932
Change-Id: Ic103f1981c5b48f1e12da3b42e696e84ffac02a9
|
|
This makes `runsc wait` behave more like waitpid()/wait4() in that:
- Once a process has run to completion, you can wait on it and get its exit
code.
- Processes not waited on will consume memory (like a zombie process)
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213358916
Change-Id: I5b5eca41ce71eea68e447380df8c38361a4d1558
|
|
Stdin/out/err weren't being sent to the sentry.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213307171
Change-Id: Ie4b634a58b1b69aa934ce8597e5cc7a47a2bcda2
|
|
This CL:
1) Fix `runsc wait`, it now also works after the container exits;
2) Generate correct container state in Load;
2) Make sure `Destory` cleanup everything before successfully return.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212900107
Change-Id: Ie129cbb9d74f8151a18364f1fc0b2603eac4109a
|
|
This is different from the existing -pid-file flag, which saves a host pid.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212713968
Change-Id: I2c486de8dd5cfd9b923fb0970165ef7c5fc597f0
|
|
It was only used by whitelistfs, which was removed in
bc81f3fe4a042a15343d2eab44da32d818ac1ade.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212666374
Change-Id: Ia35e6dc9d68c1a3b015d5b5f71ea3e68e46c5bed
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212557844
Change-Id: I414de848e75d57ecee2c05e851d05b607db4aa57
|
|
We were previously openining the platform device (i.e. /dev/kvm) inside the
platfrom constructor (i.e. kvm.New). This requires that we have RW access to
the platform device when constructing the platform.
However, now that the runsc sandbox process runs as user "nobody", it is not
able to open the platform device.
This CL changes the kvm constructor to take the platform device FD, rather than
opening the device file itself. The device file is opened outside of the
sandbox and passed to the sandbox process.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212505804
Change-Id: I427e1d9de5eb84c84f19d513356e1bb148a52910
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212483372
Change-Id: If95f32a8e41126cf3dc8bd6c8b2fb0fcfefedc6d
|
|
We must use a context.Context with a Root Dirent that corresponds to the
container's chroot. Previously we were using the root context, which does not
have a chroot.
Getting the correct context required refactoring some of the path-lookup code.
We can't lookup the path without a context.Context, which requires
kernel.CreateProcArgs, which we only get inside control.Execute. So we have to
do the path lookup much later than we previously were.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212064734
Change-Id: I84a5cfadacb21fd9c3ab9c393f7e308a40b9b537
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212028121
Change-Id: If9c2c62f3be103e2bb556b8d154c169888e34369
|
|
It was used before gofer was implemented and it's not
supported anymore.
BREAKING CHANGE: proxy-shared and proxy-exclusive options
are now: shared and exclusive.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212017643
Change-Id: If029d4073fe60583e5ca25f98abb2953de0d78fd
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211999211
Change-Id: I5968dd1a8313d3e49bb6e6614e130107495de41d
|
|
We construct a dir with the executable bind-mounted at /exe, and proc mounted
at /proc. Runsc now executes the sandbox process inside this chroot, thus
limiting access to the host filesystem. The mounts and chroot dir are removed
when the sandbox is destroyed.
Because this requires bind-mounts, we can only do the chroot if we have
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211994001
Change-Id: Ia71c515e26085e0b69b833e71691830148bc70d1
|
|
Now, we can kill individual containers rather than the entire sandbox.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211748106
Change-Id: Ic97e91db33d53782f838338c4a6d0aab7a313ead
|
|
With multi-gofers, bind mounts in sub-containers should
just work. Removed restrictions and added test. There are
also a few cleanups along the way, e.g. retry unmounting
in case cleanup races with gofer teardown.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211699569
Change-Id: Ic0a69c29d7c31cd7e038909cc686c6ac98703374
|
|
Remove GetExecutablePath (the non-internal version). This makes path handling
more consistent between exec, root, and child containers.
The new getExecutablePath now uses MountNamespace.FindInode, which is more
robust than Walking the Dirent tree ourselves.
This also removes the last use of lstat(2) in the sentry, so that can be
removed from the filters.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211683110
Change-Id: Ic8ec960fc1c267aa7d310b8efe6e900c88a9207a
|
|
When starting a sandbox without direct file or network access, we create an
empty user namespace and run the sandbox in there. However, the root user in
that namespace is still mapped to the root user in the parent namespace.
This CL maps the "nobody" user from the parent namespace into the child
namespace, and runs the sandbox process as user "nobody" inside the new
namespace.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211572223
Change-Id: I1b1f9b1a86c0b4e7e5ca7bc93be7d4887678bab6
|
|
This is a prereq for running the sandbox process as user "nobody", when it may
not have permissions to open these files.
Instead, we must open then before starting the sandbox process, and pass them
by FD.
The specutils.ReadSpecFromFile method was fixed to always seek to the beginning
of the file before reading. This allows Files from the same FD to be read
multiple times, as we do in the boot command when the apply-caps flag is set.
Tested with --network=host.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211570647
Change-Id: I685be0a290aa7f70731ebdce82ebc0ebcc9d475c
|
|
Go 1.11 replaced it with epoll_pwait.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211510006
Change-Id: I48a6cae95ed3d57a4633895358ad05ad8bf2f633
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211116429
Change-Id: I446d149c822177dc9fc3c64ce5e455f7f029aa82
|
|
This is a prereq for running the sandbox process as user "nobody", when it may
not have permissions to open these files.
Instead, we must open then before starting the sandbox process, and pass them
by FD.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210995199
Change-Id: I715875a9553290b4a49394a8fcd93be78b1933dd
|
|
This is required to increase protection when running in GKE.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210635123
Change-Id: Iaaa8be49e73f7a3a90805313885e75894416f0b5
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210589588
Change-Id: Iba898bc3eb8f13e17c668ceea6dc820fc8180a70
|
|
This is to troubleshoot problems with a hung process that is
not responding to 'runsc debug --stack' command.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210483513
Change-Id: I4377b210b4e51bc8a281ad34fd94f3df13d9187d
|
|
Now each container gets its own dedicated gofer that is chroot'd to the
rootfs path. This is done to add an extra layer of security in case the
gofer gets compromised.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210396476
Change-Id: Iba21360a59dfe90875d61000db103f8609157ca0
|
|
This CL adds terminal support for "docker exec". We previously only supported
consoles for the container process, but not exec processes.
The SYS_IOCTL syscall was added to the default seccomp filter list, but only
for ioctls that get/set winsize and termios structs. We need to allow these
ioctl for all containers because it's possible to run "exec -ti" on a
container that was started without an attached console, after the filters
have been installed.
Note that control-character signals are still not properly supported.
Tested with:
$ docker run --runtime=runsc -it alpine
In another terminial:
$ docker exec -it <containerid> /bin/sh
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210185456
Change-Id: I6d2401e53a7697bb988c120a8961505c335f96d9
|
|
Previously, runsc improperly attempted to find an executable in the container's
PATH.
We now search the PATH via the container's fsgofer rather than the host FS,
eliminating the confusing differences between paths on the host and within a
container.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210159488
Change-Id: I228174dbebc4c5356599036d6efaa59f28ff28d2
|
|
Removed syscalls that are only used by whitelistfs
which has its own set of filters.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 209967259
Change-Id: Idb2e1b9d0201043d7cd25d96894f354729dbd089
|
|
When multiple containers run inside a sentry, each container has its own root
filesystem and set of mounts. Containers are also added after sentry boot rather
than all configured and known at boot time.
The fsgofer needs to be able to serve the root filesystem of each container.
Thus, it must be possible to add filesystems after the fsgofer has already
started.
This change:
* Creates a URPC endpoint within the gofer process that listens for requests to
serve new content.
* Enables the sentry, when starting a new container, to add the new container's
filesystem.
* Mounts those new filesystems at separate roots within the sentry.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 208903248
Change-Id: Ifa91ec9c8caf5f2f0a9eead83c4a57090ce92068
|
|
This file access type is actually called "proxy-shared", but I forgot to update
all locations.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 208832491
Change-Id: I7848bc4ec2478f86cf2de1dcd1bfb5264c6276de
|
|
Previously, gofer filesystems were configured with the default "fscache"
policy, which caches filesystem metadata and contents aggressively. While this
setting is best for performance, it means that changes from inside the sandbox
may not be immediately propagated outside the sandbox, and vice-versa.
This CL changes volumes and the root fs configuration to use a new
"remote-revalidate" cache policy which tries to retain as much caching as
possible while still making fs changes visible across the sandbox boundary.
This cache policy is enabled by default for the root filesystem. The default
value for the "--file-access" flag is still "proxy", but the behavior is
changed to use the new cache policy.
A new value for the "--file-access" flag is added, called "proxy-exclusive",
which turns on the previous aggressive caching behavior. As the name implies,
this flag should be used when the sandbox has "exclusive" access to the
filesystem.
All volume mounts are configured to use the new cache policy, since it is
safest and most likely to be correct. There is not currently a way to change
this behavior, but it's possible to add such a mechanism in the future. The
configurability is a smaller issue for volumes, since most of the expensive
application fs operations (walking + stating files) will likely served by the
root fs.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 208735037
Change-Id: Ife048fab1948205f6665df8563434dbc6ca8cfc9
|
|
Closes #94
PiperOrigin-RevId: 207997580
Change-Id: I19b426f1586b5ec12f8b0cd5884d5b401d334924
|
|
Add option to redirect packet back to netstack if it's destined to itself.
This fixes the problem where connecting to the local NIC address would
not work, e.g.:
echo bar | nc -l -p 8080 &
echo foo | nc 192.168.0.2 8080
PiperOrigin-RevId: 207995083
Change-Id: I17adc2a04df48bfea711011a5df206326a1fb8ef
|
|
SACK is disabled by default and needs to be manually enabled. It not only
improves performance, but also fixes hangs downloading files from certain
websites.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 207906742
Change-Id: I4fb7277b67bfdf83ac8195f1b9c38265a0d51e8b
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 207039273
Change-Id: Ib8f55a6dc302052ab4a10ccd70b07f0d73b373df
|
|
It is unused.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 206798328
Change-Id: I2d7d27c0e4a0ef51264b900f14f1b3fdad17f2c4
|
|
Docker expects containers to be created before they are restored.
However, gVisor restoring requires specificactions regarding the kernel
and the file system. These actions were originally in booting the sandbox.
Now setting up the file system is deferred until a call to a call to
runsc start. In the restore case, the kernel is destroyed and a new kernel
is created in the same process, as we need the same process for Docker.
These changes required careful execution of concurrent processes which
required the use of a channel.
Full docker integration still needs the ability to restore into the same
container.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 205161441
Change-Id: Ie1d2304ead7e06855319d5dc310678f701bd099f
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 204522004
Change-Id: I4819dc025f0a1df03ceaaba7951b1902d44562b3
|