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Because the abi will depend on the core types for marshalling (usermem,
context, safemem, safecopy), these need to be flattened from the sentry
directory. These packages contain no sentry-specific details.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 291811289
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* Rename syncutil to sync.
* Add aliases to sync types.
* Replace existing usage of standard library sync package.
This will make it easier to swap out synchronization primitives. For example,
this will allow us to use primitives from github.com/sasha-s/go-deadlock to
check for lock ordering violations.
Updates #1472
PiperOrigin-RevId: 289033387
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This used to be the case, but regressed after a recent change.
Also made a few fixes around it and clean up the code a bit.
Closes #720
PiperOrigin-RevId: 265717496
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Each gofer now has a goroutine that polls on the FDs used
to communicate with the sandbox. The respective gofer is
destroyed if any of the FDs is closed.
Closes #601
PiperOrigin-RevId: 261383725
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 256494243
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When we reopen file by path, we can't be sure that
we will open exactly the same file. The file can be
deleted and another one with the same name can be
created.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 254898594
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This can be merged after:
https://github.com/google/gvisor-website/pull/77
or
https://github.com/google/gvisor-website/pull/78
PiperOrigin-RevId: 253132620
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Parse annotations containing 'gvisor.dev/spec/mount' that gives
hints about how mounts are shared between containers inside a
pod. This information can be used to better inform how to mount
these volumes inside gVisor. For example, a volume that is shared
between containers inside a pod can be bind mounted inside the
sandbox, instead of being two independent mounts.
For now, this information is used to allow the same tmpfs mounts
to be shared between containers which wasn't possible before.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 252704037
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No change in functionaly. Added containerMounter object
to keep state while the mounts are processed. This will
help upcoming changes to share mounts per-pod.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 251350096
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urpc always closes all files once the RPC function returns.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 248406857
Change-Id: I400a8562452ec75c8e4bddc2154948567d572950
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Based on the guidelines at
https://opensource.google.com/docs/releasing/authors/.
1. $ rg -l "Google LLC" | xargs sed -i 's/Google LLC.*/The gVisor Authors./'
2. Manual fixup of "Google Inc" references.
3. Add AUTHORS file. Authors may request to be added to this file.
4. Point netstack AUTHORS to gVisor AUTHORS. Drop CONTRIBUTORS.
Fixes #209
PiperOrigin-RevId: 245823212
Change-Id: I64530b24ad021a7d683137459cafc510f5ee1de9
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 238360231
Change-Id: I5eaf8d26f8892f77d71c7fbd6c5225ef471cedf1
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Runsc wants to mount /tmp using internal tmpfs implementation for
performance. However, it risks hiding files that may exist under
/tmp in case it's present in the container. Now, it only mounts
over /tmp iff:
- /tmp was not explicitly asked to be mounted
- /tmp is empty
If any of this is not true, then /tmp maps to the container's
image /tmp.
Note: checkpoint doesn't have sentry FS mounted to check if /tmp
is empty. It simply looks for explicit mounts right now.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 229607856
Change-Id: I10b6dae7ac157ef578efc4dfceb089f3b94cde06
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The number of symbolic links that are allowed to be followed
are for a full path and not just a chain of symbolic links.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 224047321
Change-Id: I5e3c4caf66a93c17eeddcc7f046d1e8bb9434a40
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Otherwise the gofer's attach point may be different from sandbox when there
symlinks in the path.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 219730492
Change-Id: Ia9c4c2d16228c6a1a9e790e0cb673fd881003fe1
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 217951017
Change-Id: Ie08bf6987f98467d07457bcf35b5f1ff6e43c035
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We were closing the FD directly. If the test then created a new socket pair
with the same FD, in-flight RPCs would get directed to the new socket and break
the test.
Instead, we should use unet.Socket.Close(), which allows any in-flight RPCs to
finish.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 217608491
Change-Id: I8c5a76638899ba30f33ca976e6fac967fa0aadbf
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 216780438
Change-Id: Ide637fe36f8d2a61fea9e5b16d1b3401f2540416
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Sandbox creation uses the limits and reservations configured in the
OCI spec and set cgroup options accordinly. Then it puts both the
sandbox and gofer processes inside the cgroup.
It also allows the cgroup to be pre-configured by the caller. If the
cgroup already exists, sandbox and gofer processes will join the
cgroup but it will not modify the cgroup with spec limits.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 216538209
Change-Id: If2c65ffedf55820baab743a0edcfb091b89c1019
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We were previously using the sandbox process's stdio as the root container's
stdio. This makes it difficult/impossible to distinguish output application
output from sandbox output, such as panics, which are always written to stderr.
Also close the console socket when we are done with it.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 215585180
Change-Id: I980b8c69bd61a8b8e0a496fd7bc90a06446764e0
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This makes the flow slightly simpler (no need to call
Loader.SetRootContainer). And this is required change to tag
tasks with container ID inside the Sentry.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 214795210
Change-Id: I6ff4af12e73bb07157f7058bb15fd5bb88760884
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This makes `runsc wait` behave more like waitpid()/wait4() in that:
- Once a process has run to completion, you can wait on it and get its exit
code.
- Processes not waited on will consume memory (like a zombie process)
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213358916
Change-Id: I5b5eca41ce71eea68e447380df8c38361a4d1558
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We were previously openining the platform device (i.e. /dev/kvm) inside the
platfrom constructor (i.e. kvm.New). This requires that we have RW access to
the platform device when constructing the platform.
However, now that the runsc sandbox process runs as user "nobody", it is not
able to open the platform device.
This CL changes the kvm constructor to take the platform device FD, rather than
opening the device file itself. The device file is opened outside of the
sandbox and passed to the sandbox process.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212505804
Change-Id: I427e1d9de5eb84c84f19d513356e1bb148a52910
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It was used before gofer was implemented and it's not
supported anymore.
BREAKING CHANGE: proxy-shared and proxy-exclusive options
are now: shared and exclusive.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212017643
Change-Id: If029d4073fe60583e5ca25f98abb2953de0d78fd
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Now each container gets its own dedicated gofer that is chroot'd to the
rootfs path. This is done to add an extra layer of security in case the
gofer gets compromised.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 210396476
Change-Id: Iba21360a59dfe90875d61000db103f8609157ca0
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Previously, gofer filesystems were configured with the default "fscache"
policy, which caches filesystem metadata and contents aggressively. While this
setting is best for performance, it means that changes from inside the sandbox
may not be immediately propagated outside the sandbox, and vice-versa.
This CL changes volumes and the root fs configuration to use a new
"remote-revalidate" cache policy which tries to retain as much caching as
possible while still making fs changes visible across the sandbox boundary.
This cache policy is enabled by default for the root filesystem. The default
value for the "--file-access" flag is still "proxy", but the behavior is
changed to use the new cache policy.
A new value for the "--file-access" flag is added, called "proxy-exclusive",
which turns on the previous aggressive caching behavior. As the name implies,
this flag should be used when the sandbox has "exclusive" access to the
filesystem.
All volume mounts are configured to use the new cache policy, since it is
safest and most likely to be correct. There is not currently a way to change
this behavior, but it's possible to add such a mechanism in the future. The
configurability is a smaller issue for volumes, since most of the expensive
application fs operations (walking + stating files) will likely served by the
root fs.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 208735037
Change-Id: Ife048fab1948205f6665df8563434dbc6ca8cfc9
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Docker expects containers to be created before they are restored.
However, gVisor restoring requires specificactions regarding the kernel
and the file system. These actions were originally in booting the sandbox.
Now setting up the file system is deferred until a call to a call to
runsc start. In the restore case, the kernel is destroyed and a new kernel
is created in the same process, as we need the same process for Docker.
These changes required careful execution of concurrent processes which
required the use of a channel.
Full docker integration still needs the ability to restore into the same
container.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 205161441
Change-Id: Ie1d2304ead7e06855319d5dc310678f701bd099f
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The /proc and /sys mounts are "mandatory" in the sense that they should be
mounted in the sandbox even when they are not included in the spec. Runsc
treats /tmp similarly, because it is faster to use the internal tmpfs
implementation instead of proxying to the host.
However, the spec may contain submounts of these mandatory mounts (particularly
for /tmp). In those cases, we must mount our mandatory mounts before the
submount, otherwise the submount will be masked.
Since the mandatory mounts are all top-level directories, we can mount them
right after the root.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 203145635
Change-Id: Id69bae771d32c1a5b67e08c8131b73d9b42b2fbf
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Updated how restoring occurs through boot.go with a separate Restore function.
This prevents a new process and new mounts from being created.
Added tests to ensure the container is restored.
Registered checkpoint and restore commands so they can be used.
Docker support for these commands is still limited.
Working on #80.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 202710950
Change-Id: I2b893ceaef6b9442b1ce3743bd112383cb92af0c
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 201742160
Change-Id: Ia9fa1442287c5f9e1196fb117c41536a80f6bb31
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Before a container can be restored, the mounts must be configured.
The root and submounts and their key information is compiled into a
RestoreEnvironment.
Future code will be added to set this created environment before
restoring a container.
Tests to ensure the correct environment were added.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 201544637
Change-Id: Ia894a8b0f80f31104d1c732e113b1d65a4697087
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A file descriptor was added as a flag to boot so a state file can restore a
container that was checkpointed.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 201068699
Change-Id: I18e96069488ffa3add468861397f3877725544aa
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 200768923
Change-Id: I4b8da10bcac296e8171fe6754abec5aabfec5e65
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The right number to use is the number of processors assigned to the cgroup. But until
we make the sandbox join the respective cgroup, just use the number of processors on
the host.
Closes #65, closes #66
PiperOrigin-RevId: 200725483
Change-Id: I34a566b1a872e26c66f56fa6e3100f42aaf802b1
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 200274828
Change-Id: I956703217df08d8650a881479b7ade8f9f119912
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Container user might not have enough priviledge to walk directories and
mount filesystems. Instead, create superuser to perform these steps of
the configuration.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 197953667
Change-Id: I643650ab654e665408e2af1b8e2f2aa12d58d4fb
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This is another step towards multi-container support.
Previously, we delivered signals directly to the sandbox process (which then
forwarded the signal to PID 1 inside the sandbox). Similarly, we waited on a
container by waiting on the sandbox process itself. This approach will not work
when there are multiple containers inside the sandbox, and we need to
signal/wait on individual containers.
This CL adds two new messages, ContainerSignal and ContainerWait. These
messages include the id of the container to signal/wait. The controller inside
the sandbox receives these messages and signals/waits on the appropriate
process inside the sandbox.
The container id is plumbed into the sandbox, but it currently is not used. We
still end up signaling/waiting on PID 1 in all cases. Once we actually have
multiple containers inside the sandbox, we will need to keep some sort of map
of container id -> pid (or possibly pid namespace), and signal/kill the
appropriate process for the container.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 197028366
Change-Id: I07b4d5dc91ecd2affc1447e6b4bdd6b0b7360895
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Two changes in this CL:
First, make the "boot" process sleep when it encounters an error to give the
controller time to send the error back to the "start" process. Otherwise the
"boot" process exits immediately and the control connection errors with EOF.
Secondly, open the log file with O_APPEND, not O_TRUNC. Docker uses the same
log file for all runtime commands, and setting O_TRUNC causes them to get
destroyed. Furthermore, containerd parses these log files in the event of an
error, and it does not like the file being truncated out from underneath it.
Now, when trying to run a binary that does not exist in the image, the error
message is more reasonable:
$ docker run alpine /not/found
docker: Error response from daemon: OCI runtime start failed: /usr/local/google/docker/runtimes/runscd did not terminate sucessfully: error starting sandbox: error starting application [/not/found]: failed to create init process: no such file or directory
Fixes #32
PiperOrigin-RevId: 196027084
Change-Id: Iabc24c0bdd8fc327237acc051a1655515f445e68
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 194583126
Change-Id: Ica1d8821a90f74e7e745962d71801c598c652463
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