| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
arch_prctl already verified that the new FS_BASE was canonical, but
Task.Clone did not. Centralize these checks in the arch packages.
Failure to validate could cause an error in PTRACE_SET_REGS when we try
to switch to the app.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 224862398
Change-Id: Iefe63b3f9aa6c4810326b8936e501be3ec407f14
|
|
It is always the same as t.initRegs.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 224085550
Change-Id: I5cc4ddc3b481d4748c3c43f6f4bb50da1dbac694
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 218592058
Change-Id: I373a2d813aa6cc362500dd5a894c0b214a1959d7
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 217951017
Change-Id: Ie08bf6987f98467d07457bcf35b5f1ff6e43c035
|
|
This is a defense-in-depth measure. If the sentry is compromised, this prevents
system call injection to the stubs. There is some complexity with respect to
ptrace and seccomp interactions, so this protection is not really available
for kernel versions < 4.8; this is detected dynamically.
Note that this also solves the vsyscall emulation issue by adding in
appropriate trapping for those system calls. It does mean that a compromised
sentry could theoretically inject these into the stub (ignoring the trap and
resume, thereby allowing execution), but they are harmless.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 216647581
Change-Id: Id06c232cbac1f9489b1803ec97f83097fcba8eb8
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 196291289
Change-Id: Ie3487be029850b0b410b82416750853a6c4a2b00
|
|
PiperOrigin-RevId: 194583126
Change-Id: Ica1d8821a90f74e7e745962d71801c598c652463
|
