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OCI configuration includes support for specifying seccomp filters. In runc,
these filter configurations are converted into seccomp BPF programs and loaded
into the kernel via libseccomp. runsc needs to be a static binary so, for
runsc, we cannot rely on a C library and need to implement the functionality
in Go.
The generator added here implements basic support for taking OCI seccomp
configuration and converting it into a seccomp BPF program with the same
behavior as a program generated by libseccomp.
- New conditional operations were added to pkg/seccomp to support operations
available in OCI.
- AllowAny and AllowValue were renamed to MatchAny and EqualTo to better reflect
that syscalls matching the conditionals result in the provided action not
simply SCMP_RET_ALLOW.
- BuildProgram in pkg/seccomp no longer panics if provided an empty list of
rules. It now builds a program with the architecture sanity check only.
- ProgramBuilder now allows adding labels that are unused. However, backwards
jumps are still not permitted.
Fixes #510
PiperOrigin-RevId: 331938697
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Updates #2972
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 280075805
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Based on the guidelines at
https://opensource.google.com/docs/releasing/authors/.
1. $ rg -l "Google LLC" | xargs sed -i 's/Google LLC.*/The gVisor Authors./'
2. Manual fixup of "Google Inc" references.
3. Add AUTHORS file. Authors may request to be added to this file.
4. Point netstack AUTHORS to gVisor AUTHORS. Drop CONTRIBUTORS.
Fixes #209
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Change-Id: I64530b24ad021a7d683137459cafc510f5ee1de9
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Change-Id: Ie08bf6987f98467d07457bcf35b5f1ff6e43c035
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This is a defense-in-depth measure. If the sentry is compromised, this prevents
system call injection to the stubs. There is some complexity with respect to
ptrace and seccomp interactions, so this protection is not really available
for kernel versions < 4.8; this is detected dynamically.
Note that this also solves the vsyscall emulation issue by adding in
appropriate trapping for those system calls. It does mean that a compromised
sentry could theoretically inject these into the stub (ignoring the trap and
resume, thereby allowing execution), but they are harmless.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 216647581
Change-Id: Id06c232cbac1f9489b1803ec97f83097fcba8eb8
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 214040901
Change-Id: I74d79497a053da3624921ad2b7c5193ca4a87942
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 210131001
Change-Id: I285707c5143b3e4c9a6948c1d1a452b6f16e65b7
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PiperOrigin-RevId: 198919043
Change-Id: I7f1f0a3b3430cd0936a4ee4fc6859aab71820bdf
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