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diff --git a/website/blog/2019-11-18-security-basics.md b/website/blog/2019-11-18-security-basics.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ed6d97ffe --- /dev/null +++ b/website/blog/2019-11-18-security-basics.md @@ -0,0 +1,319 @@ +# gVisor Security Basics - Part 1 + +This blog is a space for engineers and community members to share perspectives +and deep dives on technology and design within the gVisor project. Though our +logo suggests we're in the business of space exploration (or perhaps fighting +sea monsters), we're actually in the business of sandboxing Linux containers. +When we created gVisor, we had three specific goals in mind; _container-native +security_, _resource efficiency_, and _platform portability_. To put it simply, +gVisor provides _efficient defense-in-depth for containers anywhere_. + +This post addresses gVisor's _container-native security_, specifically how +gVisor provides strong isolation between an application and the host OS. Future +posts will address _resource efficiency_ (how gVisor preserves container +benefits like fast starts, smaller snapshots, and less memory overhead than VMs) +and _platform portability_ (run gVisor wherever Linux OCI containers run). +Delivering on each of these goals requires careful security considerations and a +robust design. + +## What does "sandbox" mean? + +gVisor allows the execution of untrusted containers, preventing them from +adversely affecting the host. This means that the untrusted container is +prevented from attacking or spying on either the host kernel or any other peer +userspace processes on the host. + +For example, if you are a cloud container hosting service, running containers +from different customers on the same virtual machine means that compromises +expose customer data. Properly configured, gVisor can provide sufficient +isolation to allow different customers to run containers on the same host. There +are many aspects to the proper configuration, including limiting file and +network access, which we will discuss in future posts. + +## The cost of compromise + +gVisor was designed around the premise that any security boundary could +potentially be compromised with enough time and resources. We tried to optimize +for a solution that was as costly and time-consuming for an attacker as +possible, at every layer. + +Consequently, gVisor was built through a combination of intentional design +principles and specific technology choices that work together to provide the +security isolation needed for running hostile containers on a host. We'll dig +into it in the next section! + +# Design Principles + +gVisor was designed with some +[common secure design principles](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Security_by_Design_Principles) +in mind: Defense-in-Depth, Principle of Least-Privilege, Attack Surface +Reduction and Secure-by-Default[^1]. + +In general, Design Principles outline good engineering practices, but in the +case of security, they also can be thought of as a set of tactics. In a +real-life castle, there is no single defensive feature. Rather, there are many +in combination: redundant walls, scattered draw bridges, small bottle-neck +entrances, moats, etc. + +A simplified version of the design is below +([more detailed version](/docs/architecture_guide/))[^2]: + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + + +Figure 1: Simplified design of gVisor. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +In order to discuss design principles, the following components are important to +know: + +* runsc - binary that packages the Sentry, platform, and Gofer(s) that run + containers. runsc is the drop-in binary for running gVisor in Docker and + Kubernetes. +* Untrusted Application - container running in the sandbox. Untrusted + application/container are used interchangeably in this article. +* Platform Syscall Switcher - intercepts syscalls from the application and + passes them to the Sentry with no further handling. +* Sentry - The "application kernel" in userspace that serves the untrusted + application. Each application instance has its own Sentry. The Sentry + handles syscalls, routes I/O to gofers, and manages memory and CPU, all in + userspace. The Sentry is allowed to make limited, filtered syscalls to the + host OS. +* Gofer - a process that specifically handles different types of I/O for the + Sentry (usually disk I/O). Gofers are also allowed to make filtered syscalls + to the Host OS. +* Host OS - the actual OS on which gVisor containers are running, always some + flavor of Linux (sorry, Windows/MacOS users). + +It is important to emphasize what is being protected from the untrusted +application in this diagram: the host OS and other userspace applications. + +In this post, we are only discussing security-related features of gVisor, and +you might ask, "What about performance, compatibility and stability?" We will +cover these considerations in future posts. + +## Defense-in-Depth + +For gVisor, Defense-in-Depth means each component of the software stack trusts +the other components as little as possible. + +It may seem strange that we would want our own software components to distrust +each other. But by limiting the trust between small, discrete components, each +component is forced to defend itself against potentially malicious input. And +when you stack these components on top of each other, you can ensure that +multiple security barriers must be overcome by an attacker. + +And this leads us to how Defense-in-Depth is applied to gVisor: no single +vulnerability should compromise the host. + +In the "Attacker's Advantage / Defender's Dilemma," the defender must succeed +all the time while the attacker only needs to succeed once. Defense in Depth +inverts this principle: once the attacker successfully compromises any given +software component, they are immediately faced with needing to compromise a +subsequent, distinct layer in order to move laterally or acquire more privilege. + +For example, the untrusted container is isolated from the Sentry. The Sentry is +isolated from host I/O operations by serving those requests in separate +processes called Gofers. And both the untrusted container and its associated +Gofers are isolated from the host process that is running the sandbox. + +An additional benefit is that this generally leads to more robust and stable +software, forcing interfaces to be strictly defined and tested to ensure all +inputs are properly parsed and bounds checked. + +## Least-Privilege + +The principle of Least-Privilege implies that each software component has only +the permissions it needs to function, and no more. + +Least-Privilege is applied throughout gVisor. Each component and more +importantly, each interface between the components, is designed so that only the +minimum level of permission is required for it to perform its function. +Specifically, the closer you are to the untrusted application, the less +privilege you have. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + + +Figure 2: runsc components and their privileges. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +This is evident in how runsc (the drop in gVisor binary for Docker/Kubernetes) +constructs the sandbox. The Sentry has the least privilege possible (it can't +even open a file!). Gofers are only allowed file access, so even if it were +compromised, the host network would be unavailable. Only the runsc binary itself +has full access to the host OS, and even runsc's access to the host OS is often +limited through capabilities / chroot / namespacing. + +Designing a system with Defense-in-Depth and Least-Privilege in mind encourages +small, separate, single-purpose components, each with very restricted +privileges. + +## Attack Surface Reduction + +There are no bugs in unwritten code. In other words, gVisor supports a feature +if and only if it is needed to run host Linux containers. + +### Host Application/Sentry Interface: + +There are a lot of things gVisor does not need to do. For example, it does not +need to support arbitrary device drivers, nor does it need to support video +playback. By not implementing what will not be used, we avoid introducing +potential bugs in our code. + +That is not to say gVisor has limited functionality! Quite the opposite, we +analyzed what is actually needed to run Linux containers and today the Sentry +supports 237 syscalls[^3]<sup>,</sup>[^4], along with the range of critical +/proc and /dev files. However, gVisor does not support every syscall in the +Linux kernel. There are about 350 syscalls[^5] within the 5.3.11 version of the +Linux kernel, many of which do not apply to Linux containers that typically host +cloud-like workloads. For example, we don't support old versions of epoll +(epoll_ctl_old, epoll_wait_old), because they are deprecated in Linux and no +supported workloads use them. + +Furthermore, any exploited vulnerabilities in the implemented syscalls (or +Sentry code in general) only apply to gaining control of the Sentry. More on +this in a later post. + +### Sentry/Host OS Interface: + +The Sentry's interactions with the Host OS are restricted in many ways. For +instance, no syscall is "passed-through" from the untrusted application to the +host OS. All syscalls are intercepted and interpreted. In the case where the +Sentry needs to call the Host OS, we severely limit the syscalls that the Sentry +itself is allowed to make to the host kernel[^6]. + +For example, there are many file-system based attacks, where manipulation of +files or their paths, can lead to compromise of the host[^7]. As a result, the +Sentry does not allow any syscall that creates or opens a file descriptor. All +file descriptors must be donated to the sandbox. By disallowing open or creation +of file descriptors, we eliminate entire categories of these file-based attacks. + +This does not affect functionality though. For example, during startup, runsc +will donate FDs the Sentry that allow for mapping STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR to the +sandboxed application. Also the Gofer may donate an FD to the Sentry, allowing +for direct access to some files. And most files will be remotely accessed +through the Gofers, in which case no FDs are donated to the Sentry. + +The Sentry itself is only allowed access to specific +[whitelisted syscalls](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/master/runsc/boot/config.go). +Without networking, the Sentry needs 53 host syscalls in order to function, and +with networking, it uses an additional 15[^8]. By limiting the whitelist to only +these needed syscalls, we radically reduce the amount of host OS attack surface. +If any attempts are made to call something outside the whitelist, it is +immediately blocked and the sandbox is killed by the Host OS. + +### Sentry/Gofer Interface: + +The Sentry communicates with the Gofer through a local unix domain socket (UDS) +via a version of the 9P protocol[^9]. The UDS file descriptor is passed to the +sandbox during initialization and all communication between the Sentry and Gofer +happens via 9P. We will go more into how Gofers work in future posts. + +### End Result + +So, of the 350 syscalls in the Linux kernel, the Sentry needs to implement only +237 of them to support containers. At most, the Sentry only needs to call 68 of +the host Linux syscalls. In other words, with gVisor, applications get the vast +majority (and growing) functionality of Linux containers for only 68 possible +syscalls to the Host OS. 350 syscalls to 68 is attack surface reduction. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + + +Figure 3: Reduction of Attack Surface of the Syscall Table. Note that the +Senty's Syscall Emulation Layer keeps the Containerized Process from ever +calling the Host OS. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Secure-by-default + +The default choice for a user should be safe. If users need to run a less secure +configuration of the sandbox for the sake of performance or application +compatibility, they must make the choice explicitly. + +An example of this might be a networking application that is performance +sensitive. Instead of using the safer, Go-based Netstack in the Sentry, the +untrusted container can instead use the host Linux networking stack directly. +However, this means the untrusted container will be directly interacting with +the host, without the safety benefits of the sandbox. It also means that an +attack could directly compromise the host through his path. + +These less secure configurations are **not** the default. In fact, the user must +take action to change the configuration and run in a less secure mode. +Additionally, these actions make it very obvious that a less secure +configuration is being used. + +This can be as simple as forcing a default runtime flag option to the secure +option. gVisor does this by always using its internal netstack by default. +However, for certain performance sensitive applications, we allow the usage of +the host OS networking stack, but it requires the user to actively set a +flag[^10]. + +# Technology Choices + +Technology choices for gVisor mainly involve things that will give us a security +boundary. + +At a higher level, boundaries in software might be describing a great many +things. It may be discussing the boundaries between threads, boundaries between +processes, boundaries between CPU privilege levels, and more. + +Security boundaries are interfaces that are designed and built so that entire +classes of bugs/vulnerabilities are eliminated. + +For example, the Sentry and Gofers are implemented using Go. Go was chosen for a +number of the features it provided. Go is a fast, statically-typed, compiled +language that has efficient multi-threading support, garbage collection and a +constrained set of "unsafe" operations. + +Using these features enabled safe array and pointer handling. This means entire +classes of vulnerabilities were eliminated, such as buffer overflows and +use-after-free. + +Another example is our use of very strict syscall switching to ensure that the +Sentry is always the first software component that parses and interprets the +calls being made by the untrusted container. Here is an instance where different +platforms use different solutions, but all of them share this common trait, +whether it is through the use of ptrace "a la PTRACE_ATTACH"[^11] or kvm's +ring0[^12]. + +Finally, one of the most restrictive choices was to use seccomp, to restrict the +Sentry from being able to open or create a file descriptor on the host. All file +I/O is required to go through Gofers. Preventing the opening or creation of file +descriptions eliminates whole categories of bugs around file permissions +[like this one](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4557)[^13]. + +# To be continued - Part 2 + +In part 2 of this blog post, we will explore gVisor from an attacker's point of +view. We will use it as an opportunity to examine the specific strengths and +weaknesses of each gVisor component. + +We will also use it to introduce Google's Vulnerability Reward Program[^14], and +other ways the community can contribute to help make gVisor safe, fast and +stable. + +## Notes + +[^1]: [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Security_by_Design_Principles](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Security_by_Design_Principles) +[^2]: [https://gvisor.dev/docs/architecture_guide](https://gvisor.dev/docs/architecture_guide/) +[^3]: [https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/master/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/linux64_amd64.go](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/master/pkg/sentry/syscalls/syscalls.go) +[^4]: Internally that is, it doesn't call to the Host OS to implement them, in + fact that is explicitly disallowed, more on that in the future. +[^5]: [https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl#L345](https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl#L345) +[^6]: [https://github.com/google/gvisor/tree/master/runsc/boot/filter](https://github.com/google/gvisor/tree/master/runsc/boot/filter) +[^7]: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_COW](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_COW) +[^8]: [https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/master/runsc/boot/config.go](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/master/runsc/boot/config.go) +[^9]: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9P_(protocol)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9P_\(protocol\)) +[^10]: [https://gvisor.dev/docs/user_guide/networking/#network-passthrough](https://gvisor.dev/docs/user_guide/networking/#network-passthrough) +[^11]: [https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/c7e901f47a09eaac56bd4813227edff016fa6bff/pkg/sentry/platform/ptrace/subprocess.go#L390](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/c7e901f47a09eaac56bd4813227edff016fa6bff/pkg/sentry/platform/ptrace/subprocess.go#L390) +[^12]: [https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/c7e901f47a09eaac56bd4813227edff016fa6bff/pkg/sentry/platform/ring0/kernel_amd64.go#L182](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/c7e901f47a09eaac56bd4813227edff016fa6bff/pkg/sentry/platform/ring0/kernel_amd64.go#L182) +[^13]: [https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4557](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4557) +[^14]: [https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/reward-program/index.html](https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/reward-program/index.html) diff --git a/website/blog/2020-04-02-networking-security.md b/website/blog/2020-04-02-networking-security.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..78f0a6714 --- /dev/null +++ b/website/blog/2020-04-02-networking-security.md @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +# gVisor Networking Security + +In our +[first blog post](https://gvisor.dev/blog/2019/11/18/gvisor-security-basics-part-1/), +we covered some secure design principles and how they guided the architecture of +gVisor as a whole. In this post, we will cover how these principles guided the +networking architecture of gVisor, and the tradeoffs involved. In particular, we +will cover how these principles culminated in two networking modes, how they +work, and the properties of each. + +## gVisor's security architecture in the context of networking + +Linux networking is complicated. The TCP protocol is over 40 years old, and has +been repeatedly extended over the years to keep up with the rapid pace of +network infrastructure improvements, all while maintaining compatibility. On top +of that, Linux networking has a fairly large API surface. Linux supports +[over 150 options](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/960f6a975b7e44c0efe8fd38c66b02017c4fe137/pkg/sentry/strace/socket.go#L476-L644) +for the most common socket types alone. In fact, the net subsystem is one of the +largest and fastest growing in Linux at approximately 1.1 million lines of code. +For comparison, that is several times the size of the entire gVisor codebase. + +At the same time, networking is increasingly important. The cloud era is +arguably about making everything a network service, and in order to make that +work, the interconnect performance is critical. Adding networking support to +gVisor was difficult, not just due to the inherent complexity, but also because +it has the potential to significantly weaken gVisor's security model. + +As outlined in the previous blog post, gVisor's +[secure design principles](https://gvisor.dev/blog/2019/11/18/gvisor-security-basics-part-1/#design-principles) +are: + +1. Defense in Depth: each component of the software stack trusts each other + component as little as possible. +1. Least Privilege: each software component has only the permissions it needs + to function, and no more. +1. Attack Surface Reduction: limit the surface area of the host exposed to the + sandbox. +1. Secure by Default: the default choice for a user should be safe. + +gVisor manifests these principles as a multi-layered system. An application +running in the sandbox interacts with the Sentry, a userspace kernel, which +mediates all interactions with the Host OS and beyond. The Sentry is written in +pure Go with minimal unsafe code, making it less vulnerable to buffer overflows +and related memory bugs that can lead to a variety of compromises including code +injection. It emulates Linux using only a minimal and audited set of Host OS +syscalls that limit the Host OS's attack surface exposed to the Sentry itself. +The syscall restrictions are enforced by running the Sentry with seccomp +filters, which enforce that the Sentry can only use the expected set of +syscalls. The Sentry runs as an unprivileged user and in namespaces, which, +along with the seccomp filters, ensure that the Sentry is run with the Least +Privilege required. + +gVisor's multi-layered design provides Defense in Depth. The Sentry, which does +not trust the application because it may attack the Sentry and try to bypass it, +is the first layer. The sandbox that the Sentry runs in is the second layer. If +the Sentry were compromised, the attacker would still be in a highly restrictive +sandbox which they must also break out of in order to compromise the Host OS. + +To enable networking functionality while preserving gVisor's security +properties, we implemented a +[userspace network stack](https://github.com/google/gvisor/tree/master/pkg/tcpip) +in the Sentry, which we creatively named Netstack. Netstack is also written in +Go, not only to avoid unsafe code in the network stack itself, but also to avoid +a complicated and unsafe Foreign Function Interface. Having its own integrated +network stack allows the Sentry to implement networking operations using up to +three Host OS syscalls to read and write packets. These syscalls allow a very +minimal set of operations which are already allowed (either through the same or +a similar syscall). Moreover, because packets typically come from off-host (e.g. +the internet), the Host OS's packet processing code has received a lot of +scrutiny, hopefully resulting in a high degree of hardening. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + + +Figure 1: Netstack and gVisor + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Writing a network stack + +Netstack was written from scratch specifically for gVisor. Because Netstack was +designed and implemented to be modular, flexible and self-contained, there are +now several more projects using Netstack in creative and exciting ways. As we +discussed, a custom network stack has enabled a variety of security-related +goals which would not have been possible any other way. This came at a cost +though. Network stacks are complex and writing a new one comes with many +challenges, mostly related to application compatibility and performance. + +Compatibility issues typically come in two forms: missing features, and features +with behavior that differs from Linux (usually due to bugs). Both of these are +inevitable in an implementation of a complex system spanning many quickly +evolving and ambiguous standards. However, we have invested heavily in this +area, and the vast majority of applications have no issues using Netstack. For +example, +[we now support setting 34 different socket options](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/815df2959a76e4a19f5882e40402b9bbca9e70be/pkg/sentry/socket/netstack/netstack.go#L830-L1764) +versus +[only 7 in our initial git commit](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/d02b74a5dcfed4bfc8f2f8e545bca4d2afabb296/pkg/sentry/socket/epsocket/epsocket.go#L445-L702). +We are continuing to make good progress in this area. + +Performance issues typically come from TCP behavior and packet processing speed. +To improve our TCP behavior, we are working on implementing the full set of TCP +RFCs. There are many RFCs which are significant to performance (e.g. +[RACK](https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-rack-03.html) and +[BBR](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cardwell-iccrg-bbr-congestion-control-00)) +that we have yet to implement. This mostly affects TCP performance with +non-ideal network conditions (e.g. cross continent connections). Faster packet +processing mostly improves TCP performance when network conditions are very good +(e.g. within a datacenter). Our primary strategy here is to reduce interactions +with the Go runtime, specifically the garbage collector (GC) and scheduler. We +are currently optimizing buffer management to reduce the amount of garbage, +which will lower the GC cost. To reduce scheduler interactions, we are +re-architecting the TCP implementation to use fewer goroutines. Performance +today is good enough for most applications and we are making steady +improvements. For example, since May of 2019, we have improved the Netstack +runsc +[iperf3 download benchmark](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/master/benchmarks/suites/network.py) +score by roughly 15% and upload score by around 10,000X. Current numbers are +about 17 Gbps download and about 8 Gbps upload versus about 42 Gbps and 43 Gbps +for native (Linux) respectively. + +## An alternative + +We also offer an alternative network mode: passthrough. This name can be +misleading as syscalls are never passed through from the app to the Host OS. +Instead, the passthrough mode implements networking in gVisor using the Host +OS's network stack. (This mode is called +[hostinet](https://github.com/google/gvisor/tree/master/pkg/sentry/socket/hostinet) +in the codebase.) Passthrough mode can improve performance for some use cases as +the Host OS's network stack has had an enormous number of person-years poured +into making it highly performant. However, there is a rather large downside to +using passthrough mode: it weakens gVisor's security model by increasing the +Host OS's Attack Surface. This is because using the Host OS's network stack +requires the Sentry to use the Host OS's +[Berkeley socket interface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkeley_sockets). The +Berkeley socket interface is a much larger API surface than the packet interface +that our network stack uses. When passthrough mode is in use, the Sentry is +allowed to use +[15 additional syscalls](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/b1576e533223e98ebe4bd1b82b04e3dcda8c4bf1/runsc/boot/filter/config.go#L312-L517). +Further, this set of syscalls includes some that allow the Sentry to create file +descriptors, something that +[we don't normally allow](https://gvisor.dev/blog/2019/11/18/gvisor-security-basics-part-1/#sentry-host-os-interface) +as it opens up classes of file-based attacks. + +There are some networking features that we can't implement on top of syscalls +that we feel are safe (most notably those behind +[ioctl](http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl.2.html)) and therefore are +not supported. Because of this, we actually support fewer networking features in +passthrough mode than we do in Netstack, reducing application compatibility. +That's right: using our networking stack provides better overall application +compatibility than using our passthrough mode. + +That said, gVisor with passthrough networking still provides a high level of +isolation. Applications cannot specify host syscall arguments directly, and the +sentry's seccomp policy restricts its syscall use significantly more than a +general purpose seccomp policy. + +## Secure by Default + +The goal of the Secure by Default principle is to make it easy to securely +sandbox containers. Of course, disabling network access entirely is the most +secure option, but that is not practical for most applications. To make gVisor +Secure by Default, we have made Netstack the default networking mode in gVisor +as we believe that it provides significantly better isolation. For this reason +we strongly caution users from changing the default unless Netstack flat out +won't work for them. The passthrough mode option is still provided, but we want +users to make an informed decision when selecting it. + +Another way in which gVisor makes it easy to securely sandbox containers is by +allowing applications to run unmodified, with no special configuration needed. +In order to do this, gVisor needs to support all of the features and syscalls +that applications use. Neither seccomp nor gVisor's passthrough mode can do this +as applications commonly use syscalls which are too dangerous to be included in +a secure policy. Even if this dream isn't fully realized today, gVisor's +architecture with Netstack makes this possible. + +## Give Netstack a Try + +If you haven't already, try running a workload in gVisor with Netstack. You can +find instructions on how to get started in our +[Quick Start](/docs/user_guide/quick_start/docker/). We want to hear about both +your successes and any issues you encounter. We welcome your contributions, +whether that be verbal feedback or code contributions, via our +[Gitter channel](https://gitter.im/gvisor/community), +[email list](https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/gvisor-users), +[issue tracker](https://gvisor.dev/issue/new), and +[Github repository](https://github.com/google/gvisor). Feel free to express +interest in an [open issue](https://gvisor.dev/issue/), or reach out if you +aren't sure where to start. diff --git a/website/blog/BUILD b/website/blog/BUILD new file mode 100644 index 000000000..01c1f5a6e --- /dev/null +++ b/website/blog/BUILD @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +load("//website:defs.bzl", "doc", "docs") + +package( + default_visibility = ["//website:__pkg__"], + licenses = ["notice"], +) + +exports_files(["index.html"]) + +doc( + name = "security_basics", + src = "2019-11-18-security-basics.md", + authors = [ + "jsprad", + "zkoopmans", + ], + layout = "post", + permalink = "/blog/2019/11/18/gvisor-security-basics-part-1/", +) + +doc( + name = "networking_security", + src = "2020-04-02-networking-security.md", + authors = [ + "igudger", + ], + layout = "post", + permalink = "/blog/2020/04/02/gvisor-networking-security/", +) + +docs( + name = "posts", + deps = [ + ":" + rule + for rule in existing_rules() + ], +) diff --git a/website/blog/index.html b/website/blog/index.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5c67c95fc --- /dev/null +++ b/website/blog/index.html @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +--- +title: Blog +layout: blog +feed: true +pagination: + enabled: true +--- + +{% for post in paginator.posts %} +<div> + <h2><a href="{{ post.url }}">{{ post.title }}</a></h2> + <div class="blog-meta"> + {% include byline.html authors=post.authors date=post.date %} + </div> + <p>{{ post.excerpt | strip_html }}</p> + <p><a href="{{ post.url }}">Full Post »</a></p> +</div> +{% endfor %} + +{% if paginator.total_pages > 1 %} +{% include paginator.html %} +{% endif %} |