diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'website/blog')
| -rw-r--r-- | website/blog/2019-11-18-security-basics.md | 28 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | website/blog/2020-04-02-networking-security.md | 8 |
2 files changed, 5 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/website/blog/2019-11-18-security-basics.md b/website/blog/2019-11-18-security-basics.md index ed6d97ffe..fbdd511dd 100644 --- a/website/blog/2019-11-18-security-basics.md +++ b/website/blog/2019-11-18-security-basics.md @@ -56,15 +56,9 @@ in combination: redundant walls, scattered draw bridges, small bottle-neck entrances, moats, etc. A simplified version of the design is below -([more detailed version](/docs/architecture_guide/))[^2]: +([more detailed version](/docs/))[^2]: --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - -Figure 1: Simplified design of gVisor. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + In order to discuss design principles, the following components are important to know: @@ -134,13 +128,7 @@ minimum level of permission is required for it to perform its function. Specifically, the closer you are to the untrusted application, the less privilege you have. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - -Figure 2: runsc components and their privileges. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + This is evident in how runsc (the drop in gVisor binary for Docker/Kubernetes) constructs the sandbox. The Sentry has the least privilege possible (it can't @@ -222,15 +210,7 @@ the host Linux syscalls. In other words, with gVisor, applications get the vast majority (and growing) functionality of Linux containers for only 68 possible syscalls to the Host OS. 350 syscalls to 68 is attack surface reduction. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - -Figure 3: Reduction of Attack Surface of the Syscall Table. Note that the -Senty's Syscall Emulation Layer keeps the Containerized Process from ever -calling the Host OS. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + ## Secure-by-default diff --git a/website/blog/2020-04-02-networking-security.md b/website/blog/2020-04-02-networking-security.md index 78f0a6714..5a5e38fd7 100644 --- a/website/blog/2020-04-02-networking-security.md +++ b/website/blog/2020-04-02-networking-security.md @@ -69,13 +69,7 @@ a similar syscall). Moreover, because packets typically come from off-host (e.g. the internet), the Host OS's packet processing code has received a lot of scrutiny, hopefully resulting in a high degree of hardening. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - -Figure 1: Netstack and gVisor - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + ## Writing a network stack |