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diff --git a/website/blog/2020-04-02-networking-security.md b/website/blog/2020-04-02-networking-security.md deleted file mode 100644 index 78f0a6714..000000000 --- a/website/blog/2020-04-02-networking-security.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,189 +0,0 @@ -# gVisor Networking Security - -In our -[first blog post](https://gvisor.dev/blog/2019/11/18/gvisor-security-basics-part-1/), -we covered some secure design principles and how they guided the architecture of -gVisor as a whole. In this post, we will cover how these principles guided the -networking architecture of gVisor, and the tradeoffs involved. In particular, we -will cover how these principles culminated in two networking modes, how they -work, and the properties of each. - -## gVisor's security architecture in the context of networking - -Linux networking is complicated. The TCP protocol is over 40 years old, and has -been repeatedly extended over the years to keep up with the rapid pace of -network infrastructure improvements, all while maintaining compatibility. On top -of that, Linux networking has a fairly large API surface. Linux supports -[over 150 options](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/960f6a975b7e44c0efe8fd38c66b02017c4fe137/pkg/sentry/strace/socket.go#L476-L644) -for the most common socket types alone. In fact, the net subsystem is one of the -largest and fastest growing in Linux at approximately 1.1 million lines of code. -For comparison, that is several times the size of the entire gVisor codebase. - -At the same time, networking is increasingly important. The cloud era is -arguably about making everything a network service, and in order to make that -work, the interconnect performance is critical. Adding networking support to -gVisor was difficult, not just due to the inherent complexity, but also because -it has the potential to significantly weaken gVisor's security model. - -As outlined in the previous blog post, gVisor's -[secure design principles](https://gvisor.dev/blog/2019/11/18/gvisor-security-basics-part-1/#design-principles) -are: - -1. Defense in Depth: each component of the software stack trusts each other - component as little as possible. -1. Least Privilege: each software component has only the permissions it needs - to function, and no more. -1. Attack Surface Reduction: limit the surface area of the host exposed to the - sandbox. -1. Secure by Default: the default choice for a user should be safe. - -gVisor manifests these principles as a multi-layered system. An application -running in the sandbox interacts with the Sentry, a userspace kernel, which -mediates all interactions with the Host OS and beyond. The Sentry is written in -pure Go with minimal unsafe code, making it less vulnerable to buffer overflows -and related memory bugs that can lead to a variety of compromises including code -injection. It emulates Linux using only a minimal and audited set of Host OS -syscalls that limit the Host OS's attack surface exposed to the Sentry itself. -The syscall restrictions are enforced by running the Sentry with seccomp -filters, which enforce that the Sentry can only use the expected set of -syscalls. The Sentry runs as an unprivileged user and in namespaces, which, -along with the seccomp filters, ensure that the Sentry is run with the Least -Privilege required. - -gVisor's multi-layered design provides Defense in Depth. The Sentry, which does -not trust the application because it may attack the Sentry and try to bypass it, -is the first layer. The sandbox that the Sentry runs in is the second layer. If -the Sentry were compromised, the attacker would still be in a highly restrictive -sandbox which they must also break out of in order to compromise the Host OS. - -To enable networking functionality while preserving gVisor's security -properties, we implemented a -[userspace network stack](https://github.com/google/gvisor/tree/master/pkg/tcpip) -in the Sentry, which we creatively named Netstack. Netstack is also written in -Go, not only to avoid unsafe code in the network stack itself, but also to avoid -a complicated and unsafe Foreign Function Interface. Having its own integrated -network stack allows the Sentry to implement networking operations using up to -three Host OS syscalls to read and write packets. These syscalls allow a very -minimal set of operations which are already allowed (either through the same or -a similar syscall). Moreover, because packets typically come from off-host (e.g. -the internet), the Host OS's packet processing code has received a lot of -scrutiny, hopefully resulting in a high degree of hardening. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - -Figure 1: Netstack and gVisor - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -## Writing a network stack - -Netstack was written from scratch specifically for gVisor. Because Netstack was -designed and implemented to be modular, flexible and self-contained, there are -now several more projects using Netstack in creative and exciting ways. As we -discussed, a custom network stack has enabled a variety of security-related -goals which would not have been possible any other way. This came at a cost -though. Network stacks are complex and writing a new one comes with many -challenges, mostly related to application compatibility and performance. - -Compatibility issues typically come in two forms: missing features, and features -with behavior that differs from Linux (usually due to bugs). Both of these are -inevitable in an implementation of a complex system spanning many quickly -evolving and ambiguous standards. However, we have invested heavily in this -area, and the vast majority of applications have no issues using Netstack. For -example, -[we now support setting 34 different socket options](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/815df2959a76e4a19f5882e40402b9bbca9e70be/pkg/sentry/socket/netstack/netstack.go#L830-L1764) -versus -[only 7 in our initial git commit](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/d02b74a5dcfed4bfc8f2f8e545bca4d2afabb296/pkg/sentry/socket/epsocket/epsocket.go#L445-L702). -We are continuing to make good progress in this area. - -Performance issues typically come from TCP behavior and packet processing speed. -To improve our TCP behavior, we are working on implementing the full set of TCP -RFCs. There are many RFCs which are significant to performance (e.g. -[RACK](https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-rack-03.html) and -[BBR](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cardwell-iccrg-bbr-congestion-control-00)) -that we have yet to implement. This mostly affects TCP performance with -non-ideal network conditions (e.g. cross continent connections). Faster packet -processing mostly improves TCP performance when network conditions are very good -(e.g. within a datacenter). Our primary strategy here is to reduce interactions -with the Go runtime, specifically the garbage collector (GC) and scheduler. We -are currently optimizing buffer management to reduce the amount of garbage, -which will lower the GC cost. To reduce scheduler interactions, we are -re-architecting the TCP implementation to use fewer goroutines. Performance -today is good enough for most applications and we are making steady -improvements. For example, since May of 2019, we have improved the Netstack -runsc -[iperf3 download benchmark](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/master/benchmarks/suites/network.py) -score by roughly 15% and upload score by around 10,000X. Current numbers are -about 17 Gbps download and about 8 Gbps upload versus about 42 Gbps and 43 Gbps -for native (Linux) respectively. - -## An alternative - -We also offer an alternative network mode: passthrough. This name can be -misleading as syscalls are never passed through from the app to the Host OS. -Instead, the passthrough mode implements networking in gVisor using the Host -OS's network stack. (This mode is called -[hostinet](https://github.com/google/gvisor/tree/master/pkg/sentry/socket/hostinet) -in the codebase.) Passthrough mode can improve performance for some use cases as -the Host OS's network stack has had an enormous number of person-years poured -into making it highly performant. However, there is a rather large downside to -using passthrough mode: it weakens gVisor's security model by increasing the -Host OS's Attack Surface. This is because using the Host OS's network stack -requires the Sentry to use the Host OS's -[Berkeley socket interface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkeley_sockets). The -Berkeley socket interface is a much larger API surface than the packet interface -that our network stack uses. When passthrough mode is in use, the Sentry is -allowed to use -[15 additional syscalls](https://github.com/google/gvisor/blob/b1576e533223e98ebe4bd1b82b04e3dcda8c4bf1/runsc/boot/filter/config.go#L312-L517). -Further, this set of syscalls includes some that allow the Sentry to create file -descriptors, something that -[we don't normally allow](https://gvisor.dev/blog/2019/11/18/gvisor-security-basics-part-1/#sentry-host-os-interface) -as it opens up classes of file-based attacks. - -There are some networking features that we can't implement on top of syscalls -that we feel are safe (most notably those behind -[ioctl](http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl.2.html)) and therefore are -not supported. Because of this, we actually support fewer networking features in -passthrough mode than we do in Netstack, reducing application compatibility. -That's right: using our networking stack provides better overall application -compatibility than using our passthrough mode. - -That said, gVisor with passthrough networking still provides a high level of -isolation. Applications cannot specify host syscall arguments directly, and the -sentry's seccomp policy restricts its syscall use significantly more than a -general purpose seccomp policy. - -## Secure by Default - -The goal of the Secure by Default principle is to make it easy to securely -sandbox containers. Of course, disabling network access entirely is the most -secure option, but that is not practical for most applications. To make gVisor -Secure by Default, we have made Netstack the default networking mode in gVisor -as we believe that it provides significantly better isolation. For this reason -we strongly caution users from changing the default unless Netstack flat out -won't work for them. The passthrough mode option is still provided, but we want -users to make an informed decision when selecting it. - -Another way in which gVisor makes it easy to securely sandbox containers is by -allowing applications to run unmodified, with no special configuration needed. -In order to do this, gVisor needs to support all of the features and syscalls -that applications use. Neither seccomp nor gVisor's passthrough mode can do this -as applications commonly use syscalls which are too dangerous to be included in -a secure policy. Even if this dream isn't fully realized today, gVisor's -architecture with Netstack makes this possible. - -## Give Netstack a Try - -If you haven't already, try running a workload in gVisor with Netstack. You can -find instructions on how to get started in our -[Quick Start](/docs/user_guide/quick_start/docker/). We want to hear about both -your successes and any issues you encounter. We welcome your contributions, -whether that be verbal feedback or code contributions, via our -[Gitter channel](https://gitter.im/gvisor/community), -[email list](https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/gvisor-users), -[issue tracker](https://gvisor.dev/issue/new), and -[Github repository](https://github.com/google/gvisor). Feel free to express -interest in an [open issue](https://gvisor.dev/issue/), or reach out if you -aren't sure where to start. |