diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'test/syscalls/linux/seccomp.cc')
| -rw-r--r-- | test/syscalls/linux/seccomp.cc | 42 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/test/syscalls/linux/seccomp.cc b/test/syscalls/linux/seccomp.cc index cf6499f8b..ce88d90dd 100644 --- a/test/syscalls/linux/seccomp.cc +++ b/test/syscalls/linux/seccomp.cc @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ namespace { constexpr uint32_t kFilteredSyscall = SYS_vserver; #elif __aarch64__ // Use the last of arch_specific_syscalls which are not implemented on arm64. -constexpr uint32_t kFilteredSyscall = SYS_arch_specific_syscall + 15; +constexpr uint32_t kFilteredSyscall = __NR_arch_specific_syscall + 15; #endif // Applies a seccomp-bpf filter that returns `filtered_result` for @@ -70,20 +70,27 @@ void ApplySeccompFilter(uint32_t sysno, uint32_t filtered_result, MaybeSave(); struct sock_filter filter[] = { - // A = seccomp_data.arch - BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_W, 4), - // if (A != AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64) goto kill - BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 0, 4), - // A = seccomp_data.nr - BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_W, 0), - // if (A != sysno) goto allow - BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, sysno, 0, 1), - // return filtered_result - BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, filtered_result), - // allow: return SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW - BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), - // kill: return SECCOMP_RET_KILL - BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL), + // A = seccomp_data.arch + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_W, 4), +#if defined(__x86_64__) + // if (A != AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64) goto kill + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 0, 4), +#elif defined(__aarch64__) + // if (A != AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64) goto kill + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64, 0, 4), +#else +#error "Unknown architecture" +#endif + // A = seccomp_data.nr + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_W, 0), + // if (A != sysno) goto allow + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, sysno, 0, 1), + // return filtered_result + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, filtered_result), + // allow: return SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), + // kill: return SECCOMP_RET_KILL + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL), }; struct sock_fprog prog; prog.len = ABSL_ARRAYSIZE(filter); @@ -179,9 +186,12 @@ TEST(SeccompTest, RetTrapCausesSIGSYS) { TEST_CHECK(info->si_errno == kTrapValue); TEST_CHECK(info->si_call_addr != nullptr); TEST_CHECK(info->si_syscall == kFilteredSyscall); -#ifdef __x86_64__ +#if defined(__x86_64__) TEST_CHECK(info->si_arch == AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64); TEST_CHECK(uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RAX] == kFilteredSyscall); +#elif defined(__aarch64__) + TEST_CHECK(info->si_arch == AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64); + TEST_CHECK(uc->uc_mcontext.regs[8] == kFilteredSyscall); #endif // defined(__x86_64__) _exit(0); }); |