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Diffstat (limited to 'test/syscalls/linux/seccomp.cc')
| -rw-r--r-- | test/syscalls/linux/seccomp.cc | 425 |
1 files changed, 425 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/test/syscalls/linux/seccomp.cc b/test/syscalls/linux/seccomp.cc new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ce88d90dd --- /dev/null +++ b/test/syscalls/linux/seccomp.cc @@ -0,0 +1,425 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The gVisor Authors. +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +#include <errno.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/filter.h> +#include <linux/seccomp.h> +#include <pthread.h> +#include <sched.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/prctl.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <ucontext.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include <atomic> + +#include "gmock/gmock.h" +#include "gtest/gtest.h" +#include "absl/base/macros.h" +#include "test/util/logging.h" +#include "test/util/memory_util.h" +#include "test/util/multiprocess_util.h" +#include "test/util/posix_error.h" +#include "test/util/proc_util.h" +#include "test/util/test_util.h" +#include "test/util/thread_util.h" + +#ifndef SYS_SECCOMP +#define SYS_SECCOMP 1 +#endif + +namespace gvisor { +namespace testing { + +namespace { + +// A syscall not implemented by Linux that we don't expect to be called. +#ifdef __x86_64__ +constexpr uint32_t kFilteredSyscall = SYS_vserver; +#elif __aarch64__ +// Use the last of arch_specific_syscalls which are not implemented on arm64. +constexpr uint32_t kFilteredSyscall = __NR_arch_specific_syscall + 15; +#endif + +// Applies a seccomp-bpf filter that returns `filtered_result` for +// `sysno` and allows all other syscalls. Async-signal-safe. +void ApplySeccompFilter(uint32_t sysno, uint32_t filtered_result, + uint32_t flags = 0) { + // "Prior to [PR_SET_SECCOMP], the task must call prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, + // 1) or run with CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges in its namespace." - + // Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt + // + // prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1) may be called repeatedly; calls after the + // first are no-ops. + TEST_PCHECK(prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == 0); + MaybeSave(); + + struct sock_filter filter[] = { + // A = seccomp_data.arch + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_W, 4), +#if defined(__x86_64__) + // if (A != AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64) goto kill + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 0, 4), +#elif defined(__aarch64__) + // if (A != AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64) goto kill + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64, 0, 4), +#else +#error "Unknown architecture" +#endif + // A = seccomp_data.nr + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_W, 0), + // if (A != sysno) goto allow + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, sysno, 0, 1), + // return filtered_result + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, filtered_result), + // allow: return SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), + // kill: return SECCOMP_RET_KILL + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL), + }; + struct sock_fprog prog; + prog.len = ABSL_ARRAYSIZE(filter); + prog.filter = filter; + if (flags) { + TEST_CHECK(syscall(__NR_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &prog) == + 0); + } else { + TEST_PCHECK(prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0) == 0); + } + MaybeSave(); +} + +// Wrapper for sigaction. Async-signal-safe. +void RegisterSignalHandler(int signum, + void (*handler)(int, siginfo_t*, void*)) { + struct sigaction sa = {}; + sa.sa_sigaction = handler; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; + TEST_PCHECK(sigaction(signum, &sa, nullptr) == 0); + MaybeSave(); +} + +// All of the following tests execute in a subprocess to ensure that each test +// is run in a separate process. This avoids cross-contamination of seccomp +// state between tests, and is necessary to ensure that test processes killed +// by SECCOMP_RET_KILL are single-threaded (since SECCOMP_RET_KILL only kills +// the offending thread, not the whole thread group). + +TEST(SeccompTest, RetKillCausesDeathBySIGSYS) { + pid_t const pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + // Register a signal handler for SIGSYS that we don't expect to be invoked. + RegisterSignalHandler( + SIGSYS, +[](int, siginfo_t*, void*) { _exit(1); }); + ApplySeccompFilter(kFilteredSyscall, SECCOMP_RET_KILL); + syscall(kFilteredSyscall); + TEST_CHECK_MSG(false, "Survived invocation of test syscall"); + } + ASSERT_THAT(pid, SyscallSucceeds()); + int status; + ASSERT_THAT(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), SyscallSucceedsWithValue(pid)); + EXPECT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(status) && WTERMSIG(status) == SIGSYS) + << "status " << status; +} + +TEST(SeccompTest, RetKillOnlyKillsOneThread) { + Mapping stack = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE( + MmapAnon(2 * kPageSize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE)); + + pid_t const pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + // Register a signal handler for SIGSYS that we don't expect to be invoked. + RegisterSignalHandler( + SIGSYS, +[](int, siginfo_t*, void*) { _exit(1); }); + ApplySeccompFilter(kFilteredSyscall, SECCOMP_RET_KILL); + // Pass CLONE_VFORK to block the original thread in the child process until + // the clone thread exits with SIGSYS. + // + // N.B. clone(2) is not officially async-signal-safe, but at minimum glibc's + // x86_64 implementation is safe. See glibc + // sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S. + clone( + +[](void* arg) { + syscall(kFilteredSyscall); // should kill the thread + _exit(1); // should be unreachable + return 2; // should be very unreachable, shut up the compiler + }, + stack.endptr(), + CLONE_FILES | CLONE_FS | CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_VM | + CLONE_VFORK, + nullptr); + _exit(0); + } + ASSERT_THAT(pid, SyscallSucceeds()); + int status; + ASSERT_THAT(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), SyscallSucceedsWithValue(pid)); + EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) + << "status " << status; +} + +TEST(SeccompTest, RetTrapCausesSIGSYS) { + pid_t const pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + constexpr uint16_t kTrapValue = 0xdead; + RegisterSignalHandler( + SIGSYS, +[](int signo, siginfo_t* info, void* ucv) { + ucontext_t* uc = static_cast<ucontext_t*>(ucv); + // This is a signal handler, so we must stay async-signal-safe. + TEST_CHECK(info->si_signo == SIGSYS); + TEST_CHECK(info->si_code == SYS_SECCOMP); + TEST_CHECK(info->si_errno == kTrapValue); + TEST_CHECK(info->si_call_addr != nullptr); + TEST_CHECK(info->si_syscall == kFilteredSyscall); +#if defined(__x86_64__) + TEST_CHECK(info->si_arch == AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64); + TEST_CHECK(uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RAX] == kFilteredSyscall); +#elif defined(__aarch64__) + TEST_CHECK(info->si_arch == AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64); + TEST_CHECK(uc->uc_mcontext.regs[8] == kFilteredSyscall); +#endif // defined(__x86_64__) + _exit(0); + }); + ApplySeccompFilter(kFilteredSyscall, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP | kTrapValue); + syscall(kFilteredSyscall); + TEST_CHECK_MSG(false, "Survived invocation of test syscall"); + } + ASSERT_THAT(pid, SyscallSucceeds()); + int status; + ASSERT_THAT(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), SyscallSucceedsWithValue(pid)); + EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) + << "status " << status; +} + +#ifdef __x86_64__ + +constexpr uint64_t kVsyscallTimeEntry = 0xffffffffff600400; + +time_t vsyscall_time(time_t* t) { + return reinterpret_cast<time_t (*)(time_t*)>(kVsyscallTimeEntry)(t); +} + +TEST(SeccompTest, SeccompAppliesToVsyscall) { + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(IsVsyscallEnabled())); + + pid_t const pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + constexpr uint16_t kTrapValue = 0xdead; + RegisterSignalHandler( + SIGSYS, +[](int signo, siginfo_t* info, void* ucv) { + ucontext_t* uc = static_cast<ucontext_t*>(ucv); + // This is a signal handler, so we must stay async-signal-safe. + TEST_CHECK(info->si_signo == SIGSYS); + TEST_CHECK(info->si_code == SYS_SECCOMP); + TEST_CHECK(info->si_errno == kTrapValue); + TEST_CHECK(info->si_call_addr != nullptr); + TEST_CHECK(info->si_syscall == SYS_time); + TEST_CHECK(info->si_arch == AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64); + TEST_CHECK(uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RAX] == SYS_time); + _exit(0); + }); + ApplySeccompFilter(SYS_time, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP | kTrapValue); + vsyscall_time(nullptr); // Should result in death. + TEST_CHECK_MSG(false, "Survived invocation of test syscall"); + } + ASSERT_THAT(pid, SyscallSucceeds()); + int status; + ASSERT_THAT(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), SyscallSucceedsWithValue(pid)); + EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) + << "status " << status; +} + +TEST(SeccompTest, RetKillVsyscallCausesDeathBySIGSYS) { + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(IsVsyscallEnabled())); + + pid_t const pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + // Register a signal handler for SIGSYS that we don't expect to be invoked. + RegisterSignalHandler( + SIGSYS, +[](int, siginfo_t*, void*) { _exit(1); }); + ApplySeccompFilter(SYS_time, SECCOMP_RET_KILL); + vsyscall_time(nullptr); // Should result in death. + TEST_CHECK_MSG(false, "Survived invocation of test syscall"); + } + ASSERT_THAT(pid, SyscallSucceeds()); + int status; + ASSERT_THAT(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), SyscallSucceedsWithValue(pid)); + EXPECT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(status) && WTERMSIG(status) == SIGSYS) + << "status " << status; +} + +#endif // defined(__x86_64__) + +TEST(SeccompTest, RetTraceWithoutPtracerReturnsENOSYS) { + pid_t const pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + ApplySeccompFilter(kFilteredSyscall, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE); + TEST_CHECK(syscall(kFilteredSyscall) == -1 && errno == ENOSYS); + _exit(0); + } + ASSERT_THAT(pid, SyscallSucceeds()); + int status; + ASSERT_THAT(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), SyscallSucceedsWithValue(pid)); + EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) + << "status " << status; +} + +TEST(SeccompTest, RetErrnoReturnsErrno) { + pid_t const pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + // ENOTNAM: "Not a XENIX named type file" + ApplySeccompFilter(kFilteredSyscall, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | ENOTNAM); + TEST_CHECK(syscall(kFilteredSyscall) == -1 && errno == ENOTNAM); + _exit(0); + } + ASSERT_THAT(pid, SyscallSucceeds()); + int status; + ASSERT_THAT(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), SyscallSucceedsWithValue(pid)); + EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) + << "status " << status; +} + +TEST(SeccompTest, RetAllowAllowsSyscall) { + pid_t const pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + ApplySeccompFilter(kFilteredSyscall, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW); + TEST_CHECK(syscall(kFilteredSyscall) == -1 && errno == ENOSYS); + _exit(0); + } + ASSERT_THAT(pid, SyscallSucceeds()); + int status; + ASSERT_THAT(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), SyscallSucceedsWithValue(pid)); + EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) + << "status " << status; +} + +// This test will validate that TSYNC will apply to all threads. +TEST(SeccompTest, TsyncAppliesToAllThreads) { + Mapping stack = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE( + MmapAnon(2 * kPageSize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE)); + + // We don't want to apply this policy to other test runner threads, so fork. + const pid_t pid = fork(); + + if (pid == 0) { + // First check that we receive a ENOSYS before the policy is applied. + TEST_CHECK(syscall(kFilteredSyscall) == -1 && errno == ENOSYS); + + // N.B. clone(2) is not officially async-signal-safe, but at minimum glibc's + // x86_64 implementation is safe. See glibc + // sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S. + clone( + +[](void* arg) { + ApplySeccompFilter(kFilteredSyscall, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | ENOTNAM, + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC); + return 0; + }, + stack.endptr(), + CLONE_FILES | CLONE_FS | CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_VM | + CLONE_VFORK, + nullptr); + + // Because we're using CLONE_VFORK this thread will be blocked until + // the second thread has released resources to our virtual memory, since + // we're not execing that will happen on _exit. + + // Now verify that the policy applied to this thread too. + TEST_CHECK(syscall(kFilteredSyscall) == -1 && errno == ENOTNAM); + _exit(0); + } + + ASSERT_THAT(pid, SyscallSucceeds()); + int status = 0; + ASSERT_THAT(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), SyscallSucceedsWithValue(pid)); + EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) + << "status " << status; +} + +// This test will validate that seccomp(2) rejects unsupported flags. +TEST(SeccompTest, SeccompRejectsUnknownFlags) { + constexpr uint32_t kInvalidFlag = 123; + ASSERT_THAT( + syscall(__NR_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, kInvalidFlag, nullptr), + SyscallFailsWithErrno(EINVAL)); +} + +TEST(SeccompTest, LeastPermissiveFilterReturnValueApplies) { + // This is RetKillCausesDeathBySIGSYS, plus extra filters before and after the + // one that causes the kill that should be ignored. + pid_t const pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + RegisterSignalHandler( + SIGSYS, +[](int, siginfo_t*, void*) { _exit(1); }); + ApplySeccompFilter(kFilteredSyscall, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE); + ApplySeccompFilter(kFilteredSyscall, SECCOMP_RET_KILL); + ApplySeccompFilter(kFilteredSyscall, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | ENOTNAM); + syscall(kFilteredSyscall); + TEST_CHECK_MSG(false, "Survived invocation of test syscall"); + } + ASSERT_THAT(pid, SyscallSucceeds()); + int status; + ASSERT_THAT(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), SyscallSucceedsWithValue(pid)); + EXPECT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(status) && WTERMSIG(status) == SIGSYS) + << "status " << status; +} + +// Passed as argv[1] to cause the test binary to invoke kFilteredSyscall and +// exit. Not a real flag since flag parsing happens during initialization, +// which may create threads. +constexpr char kInvokeFilteredSyscallFlag[] = "--seccomp_test_child"; + +TEST(SeccompTest, FiltersPreservedAcrossForkAndExecve) { + ExecveArray const grandchild_argv( + {"/proc/self/exe", kInvokeFilteredSyscallFlag}); + + pid_t const pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + ApplySeccompFilter(kFilteredSyscall, SECCOMP_RET_KILL); + pid_t const grandchild_pid = fork(); + if (grandchild_pid == 0) { + execve(grandchild_argv.get()[0], grandchild_argv.get(), + /* envp = */ nullptr); + TEST_PCHECK_MSG(false, "execve failed"); + } + int status; + TEST_PCHECK(waitpid(grandchild_pid, &status, 0) == grandchild_pid); + TEST_CHECK(WIFSIGNALED(status) && WTERMSIG(status) == SIGSYS); + _exit(0); + } + ASSERT_THAT(pid, SyscallSucceeds()); + int status; + ASSERT_THAT(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), SyscallSucceedsWithValue(pid)); + EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) + << "status " << status; +} + +} // namespace + +} // namespace testing +} // namespace gvisor + +int main(int argc, char** argv) { + if (argc >= 2 && + strcmp(argv[1], gvisor::testing::kInvokeFilteredSyscallFlag) == 0) { + syscall(gvisor::testing::kFilteredSyscall); + exit(0); + } + + gvisor::testing::TestInit(&argc, &argv); + return gvisor::testing::RunAllTests(); +} |