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Diffstat (limited to 'test/syscalls/linux/chroot.cc')
| -rw-r--r-- | test/syscalls/linux/chroot.cc | 366 |
1 files changed, 366 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/test/syscalls/linux/chroot.cc b/test/syscalls/linux/chroot.cc new file mode 100644 index 000000000..85ec013d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/syscalls/linux/chroot.cc @@ -0,0 +1,366 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The gVisor Authors. +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <sys/mman.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <syscall.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include <string> +#include <vector> + +#include "gmock/gmock.h" +#include "gtest/gtest.h" +#include "absl/strings/str_cat.h" +#include "absl/strings/str_split.h" +#include "absl/strings/string_view.h" +#include "test/util/capability_util.h" +#include "test/util/cleanup.h" +#include "test/util/file_descriptor.h" +#include "test/util/fs_util.h" +#include "test/util/mount_util.h" +#include "test/util/temp_path.h" +#include "test/util/test_util.h" + +using ::testing::HasSubstr; +using ::testing::Not; + +namespace gvisor { +namespace testing { + +namespace { + +TEST(ChrootTest, Success) { + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(HaveCapability(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))); + + auto temp_dir = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateDir()); + EXPECT_THAT(chroot(temp_dir.path().c_str()), SyscallSucceeds()); +} + +TEST(ChrootTest, PermissionDenied) { + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(HaveCapability(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))); + + // CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH and CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE may override Execute permission on + // directories. + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO(SetCapability(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, false)); + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO(SetCapability(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, false)); + + auto temp_dir = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE( + TempPath::CreateDirWith(GetAbsoluteTestTmpdir(), 0666 /* mode */)); + EXPECT_THAT(chroot(temp_dir.path().c_str()), SyscallFailsWithErrno(EACCES)); +} + +TEST(ChrootTest, NotDir) { + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(HaveCapability(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))); + + auto temp_file = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateFile()); + EXPECT_THAT(chroot(temp_file.path().c_str()), SyscallFailsWithErrno(ENOTDIR)); +} + +TEST(ChrootTest, NotExist) { + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(HaveCapability(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))); + + EXPECT_THAT(chroot("/foo/bar"), SyscallFailsWithErrno(ENOENT)); +} + +TEST(ChrootTest, WithoutCapability) { + // Unset CAP_SYS_CHROOT. + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO(SetCapability(CAP_SYS_CHROOT, false)); + + auto temp_dir = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateDir()); + EXPECT_THAT(chroot(temp_dir.path().c_str()), SyscallFailsWithErrno(EPERM)); +} + +TEST(ChrootTest, CreatesNewRoot) { + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(HaveCapability(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))); + + // Grab the initial cwd. + char initial_cwd[1024]; + ASSERT_THAT(syscall(__NR_getcwd, initial_cwd, sizeof(initial_cwd)), + SyscallSucceeds()); + + auto new_root = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateDir()); + auto file_in_new_root = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateFileIn(new_root.path())); + + // chroot into new_root. + ASSERT_THAT(chroot(new_root.path().c_str()), SyscallSucceeds()); + + // getcwd should return "(unreachable)" followed by the initial_cwd. + char cwd[1024]; + ASSERT_THAT(syscall(__NR_getcwd, cwd, sizeof(cwd)), SyscallSucceeds()); + std::string expected_cwd = "(unreachable)"; + expected_cwd += initial_cwd; + EXPECT_STREQ(cwd, expected_cwd.c_str()); + + // Should not be able to stat file by its full path. + struct stat statbuf; + EXPECT_THAT(stat(file_in_new_root.path().c_str(), &statbuf), + SyscallFailsWithErrno(ENOENT)); + + // Should be able to stat file at new rooted path. + auto basename = std::string(Basename(file_in_new_root.path())); + auto rootedFile = "/" + basename; + ASSERT_THAT(stat(rootedFile.c_str(), &statbuf), SyscallSucceeds()); + + // Should be able to stat cwd at '.' even though it's outside root. + ASSERT_THAT(stat(".", &statbuf), SyscallSucceeds()); + + // chdir into new root. + ASSERT_THAT(chdir("/"), SyscallSucceeds()); + + // getcwd should return "/". + EXPECT_THAT(syscall(__NR_getcwd, cwd, sizeof(cwd)), SyscallSucceeds()); + EXPECT_STREQ(cwd, "/"); + + // Statting '.', '..', '/', and '/..' all return the same dev and inode. + struct stat statbuf_dot; + ASSERT_THAT(stat(".", &statbuf_dot), SyscallSucceeds()); + struct stat statbuf_dotdot; + ASSERT_THAT(stat("..", &statbuf_dotdot), SyscallSucceeds()); + EXPECT_EQ(statbuf_dot.st_dev, statbuf_dotdot.st_dev); + EXPECT_EQ(statbuf_dot.st_ino, statbuf_dotdot.st_ino); + struct stat statbuf_slash; + ASSERT_THAT(stat("/", &statbuf_slash), SyscallSucceeds()); + EXPECT_EQ(statbuf_dot.st_dev, statbuf_slash.st_dev); + EXPECT_EQ(statbuf_dot.st_ino, statbuf_slash.st_ino); + struct stat statbuf_slashdotdot; + ASSERT_THAT(stat("/..", &statbuf_slashdotdot), SyscallSucceeds()); + EXPECT_EQ(statbuf_dot.st_dev, statbuf_slashdotdot.st_dev); + EXPECT_EQ(statbuf_dot.st_ino, statbuf_slashdotdot.st_ino); +} + +TEST(ChrootTest, DotDotFromOpenFD) { + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(HaveCapability(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))); + + auto dir_outside_root = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateDir()); + auto fd = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE( + Open(dir_outside_root.path(), O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + auto new_root = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateDir()); + + // chroot into new_root. + ASSERT_THAT(chroot(new_root.path().c_str()), SyscallSucceeds()); + + // openat on fd with path .. will succeed. + int other_fd; + ASSERT_THAT(other_fd = openat(fd.get(), "..", O_RDONLY), SyscallSucceeds()); + EXPECT_THAT(close(other_fd), SyscallSucceeds()); + + // getdents on fd should not error. + char buf[1024]; + ASSERT_THAT(syscall(SYS_getdents64, fd.get(), buf, sizeof(buf)), + SyscallSucceeds()); +} + +// Test that link resolution in a chroot can escape the root by following an +// open proc fd. Regression test for b/32316719. +TEST(ChrootTest, ProcFdLinkResolutionInChroot) { + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(HaveCapability(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))); + + const TempPath file_outside_chroot = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateFile()); + const FileDescriptor fd = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(Open(file_outside_chroot.path(), O_RDONLY)); + + const FileDescriptor proc_fd = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE( + Open("/proc", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)); + + auto temp_dir = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateDir()); + ASSERT_THAT(chroot(temp_dir.path().c_str()), SyscallSucceeds()); + + // Opening relative to an already open fd to a node outside the chroot works. + const FileDescriptor proc_self_fd = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE( + OpenAt(proc_fd.get(), "self/fd", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)); + + // Proc fd symlinks can escape the chroot if the fd the symlink refers to + // refers to an object outside the chroot. + struct stat s = {}; + EXPECT_THAT( + fstatat(proc_self_fd.get(), absl::StrCat(fd.get()).c_str(), &s, 0), + SyscallSucceeds()); + + // Try to stat the stdin fd. Internally, this is handled differently from a + // proc fd entry pointing to a file, since stdin is backed by a host fd, and + // isn't a walkable path on the filesystem inside the sandbox. + EXPECT_THAT(fstatat(proc_self_fd.get(), "0", &s, 0), SyscallSucceeds()); +} + +// This test will verify that when you hold a fd to proc before entering +// a chroot that any files inside the chroot will appear rooted to the +// base chroot when examining /proc/self/fd/{num}. +TEST(ChrootTest, ProcMemSelfFdsNoEscapeProcOpen) { + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(HaveCapability(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))); + + // Get a FD to /proc before we enter the chroot. + const FileDescriptor proc = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(Open("/proc", O_RDONLY)); + + // Create and enter a chroot directory. + const auto temp_dir = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateDir()); + ASSERT_THAT(chroot(temp_dir.path().c_str()), SyscallSucceeds()); + + // Open a file inside the chroot at /foo. + const FileDescriptor foo = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(Open("/foo", O_CREAT | O_RDONLY, 0644)); + + // Examine /proc/self/fd/{foo_fd} to see if it exposes the fact that we're + // inside a chroot, the path should be /foo and NOT {chroot_dir}/foo. + const std::string fd_path = absl::StrCat("self/fd/", foo.get()); + char buf[1024] = {}; + size_t bytes_read = 0; + ASSERT_THAT(bytes_read = + readlinkat(proc.get(), fd_path.c_str(), buf, sizeof(buf) - 1), + SyscallSucceeds()); + + // The link should resolve to something. + ASSERT_GT(bytes_read, 0); + + // Assert that the link doesn't contain the chroot path and is only /foo. + EXPECT_STREQ(buf, "/foo"); +} + +// This test will verify that a file inside a chroot when mmapped will not +// expose the full file path via /proc/self/maps and instead honor the chroot. +TEST(ChrootTest, ProcMemSelfMapsNoEscapeProcOpen) { + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(HaveCapability(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))); + + // Get a FD to /proc before we enter the chroot. + const FileDescriptor proc = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(Open("/proc", O_RDONLY)); + + // Create and enter a chroot directory. + const auto temp_dir = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateDir()); + ASSERT_THAT(chroot(temp_dir.path().c_str()), SyscallSucceeds()); + + // Open a file inside the chroot at /foo. + const FileDescriptor foo = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(Open("/foo", O_CREAT | O_RDONLY, 0644)); + + // Mmap the newly created file. + void* foo_map = mmap(nullptr, kPageSize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, + foo.get(), 0); + ASSERT_THAT(reinterpret_cast<int64_t>(foo_map), SyscallSucceeds()); + + // Always unmap. + auto cleanup_map = Cleanup( + [&] { EXPECT_THAT(munmap(foo_map, kPageSize), SyscallSucceeds()); }); + + // Examine /proc/self/maps to be sure that /foo doesn't appear to be + // mapped with the full chroot path. + const FileDescriptor maps = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(OpenAt(proc.get(), "self/maps", O_RDONLY)); + + size_t bytes_read = 0; + char buf[8 * 1024] = {}; + ASSERT_THAT(bytes_read = ReadFd(maps.get(), buf, sizeof(buf)), + SyscallSucceeds()); + + // The maps file should have something. + ASSERT_GT(bytes_read, 0); + + // Finally we want to make sure the maps don't contain the chroot path + ASSERT_EQ(std::string(buf, bytes_read).find(temp_dir.path()), + std::string::npos); +} + +// Test that mounts outside the chroot will not appear in /proc/self/mounts or +// /proc/self/mountinfo. +TEST(ChrootTest, ProcMountsMountinfoNoEscape) { + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(HaveCapability(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))); + SKIP_IF(!ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(HaveCapability(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))); + + // We are going to create some mounts and then chroot. In order to be able to + // unmount the mounts after the test run, we must chdir to the root and use + // relative paths for all mounts. That way, as long as we never chdir into + // the new root, we can access the mounts via relative paths and unmount them. + ASSERT_THAT(chdir("/"), SyscallSucceeds()); + + // Create nested tmpfs mounts. Note the use of relative paths in Mount calls. + auto const outer_dir = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateDir()); + auto const outer_mount = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(Mount( + "none", JoinPath(".", outer_dir.path()), "tmpfs", 0, "mode=0700", 0)); + + auto const inner_dir = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(TempPath::CreateDirIn(outer_dir.path())); + auto const inner_mount = ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(Mount( + "none", JoinPath(".", inner_dir.path()), "tmpfs", 0, "mode=0700", 0)); + + // Filenames that will be checked for mounts, all relative to /proc dir. + std::string paths[3] = {"mounts", "self/mounts", "self/mountinfo"}; + + for (const std::string& path : paths) { + // We should have both inner and outer mounts. + const std::string contents = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(GetContents(JoinPath("/proc", path))); + EXPECT_THAT(contents, AllOf(HasSubstr(outer_dir.path()), + HasSubstr(inner_dir.path()))); + // We better have at least two mounts: the mounts we created plus the root. + std::vector<absl::string_view> submounts = + absl::StrSplit(contents, '\n', absl::SkipWhitespace()); + EXPECT_GT(submounts.size(), 2); + } + + // Get a FD to /proc before we enter the chroot. + const FileDescriptor proc = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(Open("/proc", O_RDONLY)); + + // Chroot to outer mount. + ASSERT_THAT(chroot(outer_dir.path().c_str()), SyscallSucceeds()); + + for (const std::string& path : paths) { + const FileDescriptor proc_file = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(OpenAt(proc.get(), path, O_RDONLY)); + + // Only two mounts visible from this chroot: the inner and outer. Both + // paths should be relative to the new chroot. + const std::string contents = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(GetContentsFD(proc_file.get())); + EXPECT_THAT(contents, + AllOf(HasSubstr(absl::StrCat(Basename(inner_dir.path()))), + Not(HasSubstr(outer_dir.path())), + Not(HasSubstr(inner_dir.path())))); + std::vector<absl::string_view> submounts = + absl::StrSplit(contents, '\n', absl::SkipWhitespace()); + EXPECT_EQ(submounts.size(), 2); + } + + // Chroot to inner mount. We must use an absolute path accessible to our + // chroot. + const std::string inner_dir_basename = + absl::StrCat("/", Basename(inner_dir.path())); + ASSERT_THAT(chroot(inner_dir_basename.c_str()), SyscallSucceeds()); + + for (const std::string& path : paths) { + const FileDescriptor proc_file = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(OpenAt(proc.get(), path, O_RDONLY)); + const std::string contents = + ASSERT_NO_ERRNO_AND_VALUE(GetContentsFD(proc_file.get())); + + // Only the inner mount visible from this chroot. + std::vector<absl::string_view> submounts = + absl::StrSplit(contents, '\n', absl::SkipWhitespace()); + EXPECT_EQ(submounts.size(), 1); + } + + // Chroot back to ".". + ASSERT_THAT(chroot("."), SyscallSucceeds()); +} + +} // namespace + +} // namespace testing +} // namespace gvisor |