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diff --git a/pkg/lisafs/README.md b/pkg/lisafs/README.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..51d0d40e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/lisafs/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +# Replacing 9P + +## Background + +The Linux filesystem model consists of the following key aspects (modulo mounts, +which are outside the scope of this discussion): + +- A `struct inode` represents a "filesystem object", such as a directory or a + regular file. "Filesystem object" is most precisely defined by the practical + properties of an inode, such as an immutable type (regular file, directory, + symbolic link, etc.) and its independence from the path originally used to + obtain it. + +- A `struct dentry` represents a node in a filesystem tree. Semantically, each + dentry is immutably associated with an inode representing the filesystem + object at that position. (Linux implements optimizations involving reuse of + unreferenced dentries, which allows their associated inodes to change, but + this is outside the scope of this discussion.) + +- A `struct file` represents an open file description (hereafter FD) and is + needed to perform I/O. Each FD is immutably associated with the dentry + through which it was opened. + +The current gVisor virtual filesystem implementation (hereafter VFS1) closely +imitates the Linux design: + +- `struct inode` => `fs.Inode` + +- `struct dentry` => `fs.Dirent` + +- `struct file` => `fs.File` + +gVisor accesses most external filesystems through a variant of the 9P2000.L +protocol, including extensions for performance (`walkgetattr`) and for features +not supported by vanilla 9P2000.L (`flushf`, `lconnect`). The 9P protocol family +is inode-based; 9P fids represent a file (equivalently "file system object"), +and the protocol is structured around alternatively obtaining fids to represent +files (with `walk` and, in gVisor, `walkgetattr`) and performing operations on +those fids. + +In the sections below, a **shared** filesystem is a filesystem that is *mutably* +accessible by multiple concurrent clients, such that a **non-shared** filesystem +is a filesystem that is either read-only or accessible by only a single client. + +## Problems + +### Serialization of Path Component RPCs + +Broadly speaking, VFS1 traverses each path component in a pathname, alternating +between verifying that each traversed dentry represents an inode that represents +a searchable directory and moving to the next dentry in the path. + +In the context of a remote filesystem, the structure of this traversal means +that - modulo caching - a path involving N components requires at least N-1 +*sequential* RPCs to obtain metadata for intermediate directories, incurring +significant latency. (In vanilla 9P2000.L, 2(N-1) RPCs are required: N-1 `walk` +and N-1 `getattr`. We added the `walkgetattr` RPC to reduce this overhead.) On +non-shared filesystems, this overhead is primarily significant during +application startup; caching mitigates much of this overhead at steady state. On +shared filesystems, where correct caching requires revalidation (requiring RPCs +for each revalidated directory anyway), this overhead is consistently ruinous. + +### Inefficient RPCs + +9P is not exceptionally economical with RPCs in general. In addition to the +issue described above: + +- Opening an existing file in 9P involves at least 2 RPCs: `walk` to produce + an unopened fid representing the file, and `lopen` to open the fid. + +- Creating a file also involves at least 2 RPCs: `walk` to produce an unopened + fid representing the parent directory, and `lcreate` to create the file and + convert the fid to an open fid representing the created file. In practice, + both the Linux and gVisor 9P clients expect to have an unopened fid for the + created file (necessitating an additional `walk`), as well as attributes for + the created file (necessitating an additional `getattr`), for a total of 4 + RPCs. (In a shared filesystem, where whether a file already exists can + change between RPCs, a correct implementation of `open(O_CREAT)` would have + to alternate between these two paths (plus `clunk`ing the temporary fid + between alternations, since the nature of the `fid` differs between the two + paths). Neither Linux nor gVisor implement the required alternation, so + `open(O_CREAT)` without `O_EXCL` can spuriously fail with `EEXIST` on both.) + +- Closing (`clunk`ing) a fid requires an RPC. VFS1 issues this RPC + asynchronously in an attempt to reduce critical path latency, but scheduling + overhead makes this not clearly advantageous in practice. + +- `read` and `readdir` can return partial reads without a way to indicate EOF, + necessitating an additional final read to detect EOF. + +- Operations that affect filesystem state do not consistently return updated + filesystem state. In gVisor, the client implementation attempts to handle + this by tracking what it thinks updated state "should" be; this is complex, + and especially brittle for timestamps (which are often not arbitrarily + settable). In Linux, the client implemtation invalidates cached metadata + whenever it performs such an operation, and reloads it when a dentry + corresponding to an inode with no valid cached metadata is revalidated; this + is simple, but necessitates an additional `getattr`. + +### Dentry/Inode Ambiguity + +As noted above, 9P's documentation tends to imply that unopened fids represent +an inode. In practice, most filesystem APIs present very limited interfaces for +working with inodes at best, such that the interpretation of unopened fids +varies: + +- Linux's 9P client associates unopened fids with (dentry, uid) pairs. When + caching is enabled, it also associates each inode with the first fid opened + writably that references that inode, in order to support page cache + writeback. + +- gVisor's 9P client associates unopened fids with inodes, and also caches + opened fids in inodes in a manner similar to Linux. + +- The runsc fsgofer associates unopened fids with both "dentries" (host + filesystem paths) and "inodes" (host file descriptors); which is used + depends on the operation invoked on the fid. + +For non-shared filesystems, this confusion has resulted in correctness issues +that are (in gVisor) currently handled by a number of coarse-grained locks that +serialize renames with all other filesystem operations. For shared filesystems, +this means inconsistent behavior in the presence of concurrent mutation. + +## Design + +Almost all Linux filesystem syscalls describe filesystem resources in one of two +ways: + +- Path-based: A filesystem position is described by a combination of a + starting position and a sequence of path components relative to that + position, where the starting position is one of: + + - The VFS root (defined by mount namespace and chroot), for absolute paths + + - The VFS position of an existing FD, for relative paths passed to `*at` + syscalls (e.g. `statat`) + + - The current working directory, for relative paths passed to non-`*at` + syscalls and `*at` syscalls with `AT_FDCWD` + +- File-description-based: A filesystem object is described by an existing FD, + passed to a `f*` syscall (e.g. `fstat`). + +Many of our issues with 9P arise from its (and VFS') interposition of a model +based on inodes between the filesystem syscall API and filesystem +implementations. We propose to replace 9P with a protocol that does not feature +inodes at all, and instead closely follows the filesystem syscall API by +featuring only path-based and FD-based operations, with minimal deviations as +necessary to ameliorate deficiencies in the syscall interface (see below). This +approach addresses the issues described above: + +- Even on shared filesystems, most application filesystem syscalls are + translated to a single RPC (possibly excepting special cases described + below), which is a logical lower bound. + +- The behavior of application syscalls on shared filesystems is + straightforwardly predictable: path-based syscalls are translated to + path-based RPCs, which will re-lookup the file at that path, and FD-based + syscalls are translated to FD-based RPCs, which use an existing open file + without performing another lookup. (This is at least true on gofers that + proxy the host local filesystem; other filesystems that lack support for + e.g. certain operations on FDs may have different behavior, but this + divergence is at least still predictable and inherent to the underlying + filesystem implementation.) + +Note that this approach is only feasible in gVisor's next-generation virtual +filesystem (VFS2), which does not assume the existence of inodes and allows the +remote filesystem client to translate whole path-based syscalls into RPCs. Thus +one of the unavoidable tradeoffs associated with such a protocol vs. 9P is the +inability to construct a Linux client that is performance-competitive with +gVisor. + +### File Permissions + +Many filesystem operations are side-effectual, such that file permissions must +be checked before such operations take effect. The simplest approach to file +permission checking is for the sentry to obtain permissions from the remote +filesystem, then apply permission checks in the sentry before performing the +application-requested operation. However, this requires an additional RPC per +application syscall (which can't be mitigated by caching on shared filesystems). +Alternatively, we may delegate file permission checking to gofers. In general, +file permission checks depend on the following properties of the accessor: + +- Filesystem UID/GID + +- Supplementary GIDs + +- Effective capabilities in the accessor's user namespace (i.e. the accessor's + effective capability set) + +- All UIDs and GIDs mapped in the accessor's user namespace (which determine + if the accessor's capabilities apply to accessed files) + +We may choose to delay implementation of file permission checking delegation, +although this is potentially costly since it doubles the number of required RPCs +for most operations on shared filesystems. We may also consider compromise +options, such as only delegating file permission checks for accessors in the +root user namespace. + +### Symbolic Links + +gVisor usually interprets symbolic link targets in its VFS rather than on the +filesystem containing the symbolic link; thus e.g. a symlink to +"/proc/self/maps" on a remote filesystem resolves to said file in the sentry's +procfs rather than the host's. This implies that: + +- Remote filesystem servers that proxy filesystems supporting symlinks must + check if each path component is a symlink during path traversal. + +- Absolute symlinks require that the sentry restart the operation at its + contextual VFS root (which is task-specific and may not be on a remote + filesystem at all), so if a remote filesystem server encounters an absolute + symlink during path traversal on behalf of a path-based operation, it must + terminate path traversal and return the symlink target. + +- Relative symlinks begin target resolution in the parent directory of the + symlink, so in theory most relative symlinks can be handled automatically + during the path traversal that encounters the symlink, provided that said + traversal is supplied with the number of remaining symlinks before `ELOOP`. + However, the new path traversed by the symlink target may cross VFS mount + boundaries, such that it's only safe for remote filesystem servers to + speculatively follow relative symlinks for side-effect-free operations such + as `stat` (where the sentry can simply ignore results that are inapplicable + due to crossing mount boundaries). We may choose to delay implementation of + this feature, at the cost of an additional RPC per relative symlink (note + that even if the symlink target crosses a mount boundary, the sentry will + need to `stat` the path to the mount boundary to confirm that each traversed + component is an accessible directory); until it is implemented, relative + symlinks may be handled like absolute symlinks, by terminating path + traversal and returning the symlink target. + +The possibility of symlinks (and the possibility of a compromised sentry) means +that the sentry may issue RPCs with paths that, in the absence of symlinks, +would traverse beyond the root of the remote filesystem. For example, the sentry +may issue an RPC with a path like "/foo/../..", on the premise that if "/foo" is +a symlink then the resulting path may be elsewhere on the remote filesystem. To +handle this, path traversal must also track its current depth below the remote +filesystem root, and terminate path traversal if it would ascend beyond this +point. + +### Path Traversal + +Since path-based VFS operations will translate to path-based RPCs, filesystem +servers will need to handle path traversal. From the perspective of a given +filesystem implementation in the server, there are two basic approaches to path +traversal: + +- Inode-walk: For each path component, obtain a handle to the underlying + filesystem object (e.g. with `open(O_PATH)`), check if that object is a + symlink (as described above) and that that object is accessible by the + caller (e.g. with `fstat()`), then continue to the next path component (e.g. + with `openat()`). This ensures that the checked filesystem object is the one + used to obtain the next object in the traversal, which is intuitively + appealing. However, while this approach works for host local filesystems, it + requires features that are not widely supported by other filesystems. + +- Path-walk: For each path component, use a path-based operation to determine + if the filesystem object currently referred to by that path component is a + symlink / is accessible. This is highly portable, but suffers from quadratic + behavior (at the level of the underlying filesystem implementation, the + first path component will be traversed a number of times equal to the number + of path components in the path). + +The implementation should support either option by delegating path traversal to +filesystem implementations within the server (like VFS and the remote filesystem +protocol itself), as inode-walking is still safe, efficient, amenable to FD +caching, and implementable on non-shared host local filesystems (a sufficiently +common case as to be worth considering in the design). + +Both approaches are susceptible to race conditions that may permit sandboxed +filesystem escapes: + +- Under inode-walk, a malicious application may cause a directory to be moved + (with `rename`) during path traversal, such that the filesystem + implementation incorrectly determines whether subsequent inodes are located + in paths that should be visible to sandboxed applications. + +- Under path-walk, a malicious application may cause a non-symlink file to be + replaced with a symlink during path traversal, such that following path + operations will incorrectly follow the symlink. + +Both race conditions can, to some extent, be mitigated in filesystem server +implementations by synchronizing path traversal with the hazardous operations in +question. However, shared filesystems are frequently used to share data between +sandboxed and unsandboxed applications in a controlled way, and in some cases a +malicious sandboxed application may be able to take advantage of a hazardous +filesystem operation performed by an unsandboxed application. In some cases, +filesystem features may be available to ensure safety even in such cases (e.g. +[the new openat2() syscall](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/openat2.2.html)), +but it is not clear how to solve this problem in general. (Note that this issue +is not specific to our design; rather, it is a fundamental limitation of +filesystem sandboxing.) + +### Filesystem Multiplexing + +A given sentry may need to access multiple distinct remote filesystems (e.g. +different volumes for a given container). In many cases, there is no advantage +to serving these filesystems from distinct filesystem servers, or accessing them +through distinct connections (factors such as maximum RPC concurrency should be +based on available host resources). Therefore, the protocol should support +multiplexing of distinct filesystem trees within a single session. 9P supports +this by allowing multiple calls to the `attach` RPC to produce fids representing +distinct filesystem trees, but this is somewhat clunky; we propose a much +simpler mechanism wherein each message that conveys a path also conveys a +numeric filesystem ID that identifies a filesystem tree. + +## Alternatives Considered + +### Additional Extensions to 9P + +There are at least three conceptual aspects to 9P: + +- Wire format: messages with a 4-byte little-endian size prefix, strings with + a 2-byte little-endian size prefix, etc. Whether the wire format is worth + retaining is unclear; in particular, it's unclear that the 9P wire format + has a significant advantage over protobufs, which are substantially easier + to extend. Note that the official Go protobuf implementation is widely known + to suffer from a significant number of performance deficiencies, so if we + choose to switch to protobuf, we may need to use an alternative toolchain + such as `gogo/protobuf` (which is also widely used in the Go ecosystem, e.g. + by Kubernetes). + +- Filesystem model: fids, qids, etc. Discarding this is one of the motivations + for this proposal. + +- RPCs: Twalk, Tlopen, etc. In addition to previously-described + inefficiencies, most of these are dependent on the filesystem model and + therefore must be discarded. + +### FUSE + +The FUSE (Filesystem in Userspace) protocol is frequently used to provide +arbitrary userspace filesystem implementations to a host Linux kernel. +Unfortunately, FUSE is also inode-based, and therefore doesn't address any of +the problems we have with 9P. + +### virtio-fs + +virtio-fs is an ongoing project aimed at improving Linux VM filesystem +performance when accessing Linux host filesystems (vs. virtio-9p). In brief, it +is based on: + +- Using a FUSE client in the guest that communicates over virtio with a FUSE + server in the host. + +- Using DAX to map the host page cache into the guest. + +- Using a file metadata table in shared memory to avoid VM exits for metadata + updates. + +None of these improvements seem applicable to gVisor: + +- As explained above, FUSE is still inode-based, so it is still susceptible to + most of the problems we have with 9P. + +- Our use of host file descriptors already allows us to leverage the host page + cache for file contents. + +- Our need for shared filesystem coherence is usually based on a user + requirement that an out-of-sandbox filesystem mutation is guaranteed to be + visible by all subsequent observations from within the sandbox, or vice + versa; it's not clear that this can be guaranteed without a synchronous + signaling mechanism like an RPC. |