diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go')
-rw-r--r-- | pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go | 148 |
1 files changed, 131 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go b/pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go index f8e74355c..f9647f90e 100644 --- a/pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go +++ b/pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go @@ -15,8 +15,12 @@ package vfs import ( + "math" + "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/abi/linux" + "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/context" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/auth" + "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sentry/limits" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/syserror" ) @@ -25,23 +29,44 @@ type AccessTypes uint16 // Bits in AccessTypes. const ( + MayExec AccessTypes = 1 + MayWrite AccessTypes = 2 MayRead AccessTypes = 4 - MayWrite = 2 - MayExec = 1 ) +// OnlyRead returns true if access _only_ allows read. +func (a AccessTypes) OnlyRead() bool { + return a == MayRead +} + +// MayRead returns true if access allows read. +func (a AccessTypes) MayRead() bool { + return a&MayRead != 0 +} + +// MayWrite returns true if access allows write. +func (a AccessTypes) MayWrite() bool { + return a&MayWrite != 0 +} + +// MayExec returns true if access allows exec. +func (a AccessTypes) MayExec() bool { + return a&MayExec != 0 +} + // GenericCheckPermissions checks that creds has the given access rights on a // file with the given permissions, UID, and GID, subject to the rules of -// fs/namei.c:generic_permission(). isDir is true if the file is a directory. -func GenericCheckPermissions(creds *auth.Credentials, ats AccessTypes, isDir bool, mode uint16, kuid auth.KUID, kgid auth.KGID) error { +// fs/namei.c:generic_permission(). +func GenericCheckPermissions(creds *auth.Credentials, ats AccessTypes, mode linux.FileMode, kuid auth.KUID, kgid auth.KGID) error { // Check permission bits. - perms := mode + perms := uint16(mode.Permissions()) if creds.EffectiveKUID == kuid { perms >>= 6 } else if creds.InGroup(kgid) { perms >>= 3 } if uint16(ats)&perms == uint16(ats) { + // All permission bits match, access granted. return nil } @@ -53,7 +78,7 @@ func GenericCheckPermissions(creds *auth.Credentials, ats AccessTypes, isDir boo } // CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH allows the caller to read and search arbitrary // directories, and read arbitrary non-directory files. - if (isDir && (ats&MayWrite == 0)) || ats == MayRead { + if (mode.IsDir() && !ats.MayWrite()) || ats.OnlyRead() { if creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) { return nil } @@ -61,7 +86,7 @@ func GenericCheckPermissions(creds *auth.Credentials, ats AccessTypes, isDir boo // CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE allows arbitrary access to directories, read/write // access to non-directory files, and execute access to non-directory files // for which at least one execute bit is set. - if isDir || (ats&MayExec == 0) || (mode&0111 != 0) { + if mode.IsDir() || !ats.MayExec() || (mode.Permissions()&0111 != 0) { if creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) { return nil } @@ -74,27 +99,31 @@ func GenericCheckPermissions(creds *auth.Credentials, ats AccessTypes, isDir boo // the set of accesses permitted for the opened file: // // - O_TRUNC causes MayWrite to be set in the returned AccessTypes (since it -// mutates the file), but does not permit the opened to write to the file +// mutates the file), but does not permit writing to the open file description // thereafter. // // - "Linux reserves the special, nonstandard access mode 3 (binary 11) in // flags to mean: check for read and write permission on the file and return a // file descriptor that can't be used for reading or writing." - open(2). Thus -// AccessTypesForOpenFlags returns MayRead|MayWrite in this case, but -// filesystems are responsible for ensuring that access is denied. +// AccessTypesForOpenFlags returns MayRead|MayWrite in this case. // // Use May{Read,Write}FileWithOpenFlags() for these checks instead. -func AccessTypesForOpenFlags(flags uint32) AccessTypes { - switch flags & linux.O_ACCMODE { +func AccessTypesForOpenFlags(opts *OpenOptions) AccessTypes { + ats := AccessTypes(0) + if opts.FileExec { + ats |= MayExec + } + + switch opts.Flags & linux.O_ACCMODE { case linux.O_RDONLY: - if flags&linux.O_TRUNC != 0 { - return MayRead | MayWrite + if opts.Flags&linux.O_TRUNC != 0 { + return ats | MayRead | MayWrite } - return MayRead + return ats | MayRead case linux.O_WRONLY: - return MayWrite + return ats | MayWrite default: - return MayRead | MayWrite + return ats | MayRead | MayWrite } } @@ -119,3 +148,88 @@ func MayWriteFileWithOpenFlags(flags uint32) bool { return false } } + +// CheckSetStat checks that creds has permission to change the metadata of a +// file with the given permissions, UID, and GID as specified by stat, subject +// to the rules of Linux's fs/attr.c:setattr_prepare(). +func CheckSetStat(ctx context.Context, creds *auth.Credentials, stat *linux.Statx, mode linux.FileMode, kuid auth.KUID, kgid auth.KGID) error { + if stat.Mask&linux.STATX_SIZE != 0 { + limit, err := CheckLimit(ctx, 0, int64(stat.Size)) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if limit < int64(stat.Size) { + return syserror.ErrExceedsFileSizeLimit + } + } + if stat.Mask&linux.STATX_MODE != 0 { + if !CanActAsOwner(creds, kuid) { + return syserror.EPERM + } + // TODO(b/30815691): "If the calling process is not privileged (Linux: + // does not have the CAP_FSETID capability), and the group of the file + // does not match the effective group ID of the process or one of its + // supplementary group IDs, the S_ISGID bit will be turned off, but + // this will not cause an error to be returned." - chmod(2) + } + if stat.Mask&linux.STATX_UID != 0 { + if !((creds.EffectiveKUID == kuid && auth.KUID(stat.UID) == kuid) || + HasCapabilityOnFile(creds, linux.CAP_CHOWN, kuid, kgid)) { + return syserror.EPERM + } + } + if stat.Mask&linux.STATX_GID != 0 { + if !((creds.EffectiveKUID == kuid && creds.InGroup(auth.KGID(stat.GID))) || + HasCapabilityOnFile(creds, linux.CAP_CHOWN, kuid, kgid)) { + return syserror.EPERM + } + } + if stat.Mask&(linux.STATX_ATIME|linux.STATX_MTIME|linux.STATX_CTIME) != 0 { + if !CanActAsOwner(creds, kuid) { + if (stat.Mask&linux.STATX_ATIME != 0 && stat.Atime.Nsec != linux.UTIME_NOW) || + (stat.Mask&linux.STATX_MTIME != 0 && stat.Mtime.Nsec != linux.UTIME_NOW) || + (stat.Mask&linux.STATX_CTIME != 0 && stat.Ctime.Nsec != linux.UTIME_NOW) { + return syserror.EPERM + } + if err := GenericCheckPermissions(creds, MayWrite, mode, kuid, kgid); err != nil { + return err + } + } + } + return nil +} + +// CanActAsOwner returns true if creds can act as the owner of a file with the +// given owning UID, consistent with Linux's +// fs/inode.c:inode_owner_or_capable(). +func CanActAsOwner(creds *auth.Credentials, kuid auth.KUID) bool { + if creds.EffectiveKUID == kuid { + return true + } + return creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_FOWNER) && creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKUID(kuid).Ok() +} + +// HasCapabilityOnFile returns true if creds has the given capability with +// respect to a file with the given owning UID and GID, consistent with Linux's +// kernel/capability.c:capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). +func HasCapabilityOnFile(creds *auth.Credentials, cp linux.Capability, kuid auth.KUID, kgid auth.KGID) bool { + return creds.HasCapability(cp) && creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKUID(kuid).Ok() && creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKGID(kgid).Ok() +} + +// CheckLimit enforces file size rlimits. It returns error if the write +// operation must not proceed. Otherwise it returns the max length allowed to +// without violating the limit. +func CheckLimit(ctx context.Context, offset, size int64) (int64, error) { + fileSizeLimit := limits.FromContext(ctx).Get(limits.FileSize).Cur + if fileSizeLimit > math.MaxInt64 { + return size, nil + } + if offset >= int64(fileSizeLimit) { + return 0, syserror.ErrExceedsFileSizeLimit + } + remaining := int64(fileSizeLimit) - offset + if remaining < size { + return remaining, nil + } + return size, nil +} |