diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go')
| -rw-r--r-- | pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go | 27 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go b/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go index 29f154ebd..a9067b682 100644 --- a/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go +++ b/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import ( "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/errors/linuxerr" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/auth" "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sentry/mm" - "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/syserror" ) // Credentials returns t's credentials. @@ -71,7 +70,7 @@ func (t *Task) SetUID(uid auth.UID) error { // capability) and uid does not match the real UID or saved set-user-ID of // the calling process." if kuid != creds.RealKUID && kuid != creds.SavedKUID { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } t.setKUIDsUncheckedLocked(creds.RealKUID, kuid, creds.SavedKUID) return nil @@ -102,12 +101,12 @@ func (t *Task) SetREUID(r, e auth.UID) error { // "Unprivileged processes may only set the effective user ID to the // real user ID, the effective user ID, or the saved set-user-ID." if newE != creds.RealKUID && newE != creds.EffectiveKUID && newE != creds.SavedKUID { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } // "Unprivileged users may only set the real user ID to the real user // ID or the effective user ID." if newR != creds.RealKUID && newR != creds.EffectiveKUID { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } } // "If the real user ID is set (i.e., ruid is not -1) or the effective user @@ -240,7 +239,7 @@ func (t *Task) SetGID(gid auth.GID) error { return nil } if kgid != creds.RealKGID && kgid != creds.SavedKGID { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } t.setKGIDsUncheckedLocked(creds.RealKGID, kgid, creds.SavedKGID) return nil @@ -268,10 +267,10 @@ func (t *Task) SetREGID(r, e auth.GID) error { } if !creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETGID) { if newE != creds.RealKGID && newE != creds.EffectiveKGID && newE != creds.SavedKGID { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } if newR != creds.RealKGID && newR != creds.EffectiveKGID { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } } newS := creds.SavedKGID @@ -344,7 +343,7 @@ func (t *Task) SetExtraGIDs(gids []auth.GID) error { defer t.mu.Unlock() creds := t.Credentials() if !creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETGID) { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } kgids := make([]auth.KGID, len(gids)) for i, gid := range gids { @@ -368,25 +367,25 @@ func (t *Task) SetCapabilitySets(permitted, inheritable, effective auth.Capabili // "Permitted: This is a limiting superset for the effective capabilities // that the thread may assume." - capabilities(7) if effective & ^permitted != 0 { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } creds := t.Credentials() // "It is also a limiting superset for the capabilities that may be added // to the inheritable set by a thread that does not have the CAP_SETPCAP // capability in its effective set." if !creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETPCAP) && (inheritable & ^(creds.InheritableCaps|creds.PermittedCaps) != 0) { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } // "If a thread drops a capability from its permitted set, it can never // reacquire that capability (unless it execve(2)s ..." if permitted & ^creds.PermittedCaps != 0 { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } // "... if a capability is not in the bounding set, then a thread can't add // this capability to its inheritable set, even if it was in its permitted // capabilities ..." if inheritable & ^(creds.InheritableCaps|creds.BoundingCaps) != 0 { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } creds = creds.Fork() // The credentials object is immutable. See doc for creds. creds.PermittedCaps = permitted @@ -403,7 +402,7 @@ func (t *Task) DropBoundingCapability(cp linux.Capability) error { defer t.mu.Unlock() creds := t.Credentials() if !creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETPCAP) { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } creds = creds.Fork() // The credentials object is immutable. See doc for creds. creds.BoundingCaps &^= auth.CapabilitySetOf(cp) @@ -423,7 +422,7 @@ func (t *Task) SetUserNamespace(ns *auth.UserNamespace) error { // If t just created ns, then t.creds is guaranteed to have CAP_SYS_ADMIN // in ns (by rule 3 in auth.Credentials.HasCapability). if !creds.HasCapabilityIn(linux.CAP_SYS_ADMIN, ns) { - return syserror.EPERM + return linuxerr.EPERM } creds = creds.Fork() // The credentials object is immutable. See doc for creds. |