1 files changed, 234 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/kernel/auth/credentials.go b/pkg/sentry/kernel/auth/credentials.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1511a0324
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pkg/sentry/kernel/auth/credentials.go
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The gVisor Authors.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/abi/linux"
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/syserror"
+)
+
+// Credentials contains information required to authorize privileged operations
+// in a user namespace.
+//
+// +stateify savable
+type Credentials struct {
+	// Real/effective/saved user/group IDs in the root user namespace. None of
+	// these should ever be NoID.
+	RealKUID      KUID
+	EffectiveKUID KUID
+	SavedKUID     KUID
+	RealKGID      KGID
+	EffectiveKGID KGID
+	SavedKGID     KGID
+
+	// Filesystem user/group IDs are not implemented. "... setfsuid() is
+	// nowadays unneeded and should be avoided in new applications (likewise
+	// for setfsgid(2))." - setfsuid(2)
+
+	// Supplementary groups used by set/getgroups.
+	//
+	// ExtraKGIDs slices are immutable, allowing multiple Credentials with the
+	// same ExtraKGIDs to share the same slice.
+	ExtraKGIDs []KGID
+
+	// The capability sets applicable to this set of credentials.
+	PermittedCaps   CapabilitySet
+	InheritableCaps CapabilitySet
+	EffectiveCaps   CapabilitySet
+	BoundingCaps    CapabilitySet
+	// Ambient capabilities are not introduced until Linux 4.3.
+
+	// KeepCaps is the flag for PR_SET_KEEPCAPS which allow capabilities to be
+	// maintained after a switch from root user to non-root user via setuid().
+	KeepCaps bool
+
+	// The user namespace associated with the owner of the credentials.
+	UserNamespace *UserNamespace
+}
+
+// NewAnonymousCredentials returns a set of credentials with no capabilities in
+// any user namespace.
+func NewAnonymousCredentials() *Credentials {
+	// Create a new root user namespace. Since the new namespace's owner is
+	// KUID 0 and the returned credentials have non-zero KUID/KGID, the
+	// returned credentials do not have any capabilities in the new namespace.
+	// Since the new namespace is not part of any existing user namespace
+	// hierarchy, the returned credentials do not have any capabilities in any
+	// other namespace.
+	return &Credentials{
+		RealKUID:      NobodyKUID,
+		EffectiveKUID: NobodyKUID,
+		SavedKUID:     NobodyKUID,
+		RealKGID:      NobodyKGID,
+		EffectiveKGID: NobodyKGID,
+		SavedKGID:     NobodyKGID,
+		UserNamespace: NewRootUserNamespace(),
+	}
+}
+
+// NewRootCredentials returns a set of credentials with KUID and KGID 0 (i.e.
+// global root) in user namespace ns.
+func NewRootCredentials(ns *UserNamespace) *Credentials {
+	// I can't find documentation for this anywhere, but it's correct for the
+	// inheritable capability set to be initially empty (the capabilities test
+	// checks for this property).
+	return &Credentials{
+		RealKUID:      RootKUID,
+		EffectiveKUID: RootKUID,
+		SavedKUID:     RootKUID,
+		RealKGID:      RootKGID,
+		EffectiveKGID: RootKGID,
+		SavedKGID:     RootKGID,
+		PermittedCaps: AllCapabilities,
+		EffectiveCaps: AllCapabilities,
+		BoundingCaps:  AllCapabilities,
+		UserNamespace: ns,
+	}
+}
+
+// NewUserCredentials returns a set of credentials based on the given UID, GIDs,
+// and capabilities in a given namespace. If all arguments are their zero
+// values, this returns the same credentials as NewRootCredentials.
+func NewUserCredentials(kuid KUID, kgid KGID, extraKGIDs []KGID, capabilities *TaskCapabilities, ns *UserNamespace) *Credentials {
+	creds := NewRootCredentials(ns)
+
+	// Set the UID.
+	uid := kuid
+	creds.RealKUID = uid
+	creds.EffectiveKUID = uid
+	creds.SavedKUID = uid
+
+	// Set GID.
+	gid := kgid
+	creds.RealKGID = gid
+	creds.EffectiveKGID = gid
+	creds.SavedKGID = gid
+
+	// Set additional GIDs.
+	creds.ExtraKGIDs = append(creds.ExtraKGIDs, extraKGIDs...)
+
+	// Set capabilities.
+	if capabilities != nil {
+		creds.PermittedCaps = capabilities.PermittedCaps
+		creds.EffectiveCaps = capabilities.EffectiveCaps
+		creds.BoundingCaps = capabilities.BoundingCaps
+		creds.InheritableCaps = capabilities.InheritableCaps
+		// TODO(nlacasse): Support ambient capabilities.
+	} else {
+		// If no capabilities are specified, grant capabilities consistent with
+		// setresuid + setresgid from NewRootCredentials to the given uid and
+		// gid.
+		if kuid == RootKUID {
+			creds.PermittedCaps = AllCapabilities
+			creds.EffectiveCaps = AllCapabilities
+		} else {
+			creds.PermittedCaps = 0
+			creds.EffectiveCaps = 0
+		}
+		creds.BoundingCaps = AllCapabilities
+	}
+
+	return creds
+}
+
+// Fork generates an identical copy of a set of credentials.
+func (c *Credentials) Fork() *Credentials {
+	nc := new(Credentials)
+	*nc = *c // Copy-by-value; this is legal for all fields.
+	return nc
+}
+
+// InGroup returns true if c is in group kgid. Compare Linux's
+// kernel/groups.c:in_group_p().
+func (c *Credentials) InGroup(kgid KGID) bool {
+	if c.EffectiveKGID == kgid {
+		return true
+	}
+	for _, extraKGID := range c.ExtraKGIDs {
+		if extraKGID == kgid {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// HasCapabilityIn returns true if c has capability cp in ns.
+func (c *Credentials) HasCapabilityIn(cp linux.Capability, ns *UserNamespace) bool {
+	for {
+		// "1. A process has a capability inside a user namespace if it is a member
+		// of that namespace and it has the capability in its effective capability
+		// set." - user_namespaces(7)
+		if c.UserNamespace == ns {
+			return CapabilitySetOf(cp)&c.EffectiveCaps != 0
+		}
+		// "3. ... A process that resides in the parent of the user namespace and
+		// whose effective user ID matches the owner of the namespace has all
+		// capabilities in the namespace."
+		if c.UserNamespace == ns.parent && c.EffectiveKUID == ns.owner {
+			return true
+		}
+		// "2. If a process has a capability in a user namespace, then it has that
+		// capability in all child (and further removed descendant) namespaces as
+		// well."
+		if ns.parent == nil {
+			return false
+		}
+		ns = ns.parent
+	}
+}
+
+// HasCapability returns true if c has capability cp in its user namespace.
+func (c *Credentials) HasCapability(cp linux.Capability) bool {
+	return c.HasCapabilityIn(cp, c.UserNamespace)
+}
+
+// UseUID checks that c can use uid in its user namespace, then translates it
+// to the root user namespace.
+//
+// The checks UseUID does are common, but you should verify that it's doing
+// exactly what you want.
+func (c *Credentials) UseUID(uid UID) (KUID, error) {
+	// uid must be mapped.
+	kuid := c.UserNamespace.MapToKUID(uid)
+	if !kuid.Ok() {
+		return NoID, syserror.EINVAL
+	}
+	// If c has CAP_SETUID, then it can use any UID in its user namespace.
+	if c.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETUID) {
+		return kuid, nil
+	}
+	// Otherwise, c must already have the UID as its real, effective, or saved
+	// set-user-ID.
+	if kuid == c.RealKUID || kuid == c.EffectiveKUID || kuid == c.SavedKUID {
+		return kuid, nil
+	}
+	return NoID, syserror.EPERM
+}
+
+// UseGID checks that c can use gid in its user namespace, then translates it
+// to the root user namespace.
+func (c *Credentials) UseGID(gid GID) (KGID, error) {
+	kgid := c.UserNamespace.MapToKGID(gid)
+	if !kgid.Ok() {
+		return NoID, syserror.EINVAL
+	}
+	if c.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETGID) {
+		return kgid, nil
+	}
+	if kgid == c.RealKGID || kgid == c.EffectiveKGID || kgid == c.SavedKGID {
+		return kgid, nil
+	}
+	return NoID, syserror.EPERM
+}