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authorIan Lewis <ianlewis@google.com>2020-09-15 23:17:36 -0700
committergVisor bot <gvisor-bot@google.com>2020-09-15 23:19:17 -0700
commitdcd532e2e416aa81ca9ac42dc153731855f91418 (patch)
tree1fd10c9c150d8a0aec67e36d8f87c6910e16ff70 /runsc/specutils/seccomp/seccomp_test.go
parentc053c4bb03819a9b9bb4d485000789cb653cd9c7 (diff)
Add support for OCI seccomp filters in the sandbox.
OCI configuration includes support for specifying seccomp filters. In runc, these filter configurations are converted into seccomp BPF programs and loaded into the kernel via libseccomp. runsc needs to be a static binary so, for runsc, we cannot rely on a C library and need to implement the functionality in Go. The generator added here implements basic support for taking OCI seccomp configuration and converting it into a seccomp BPF program with the same behavior as a program generated by libseccomp. - New conditional operations were added to pkg/seccomp to support operations available in OCI. - AllowAny and AllowValue were renamed to MatchAny and EqualTo to better reflect that syscalls matching the conditionals result in the provided action not simply SCMP_RET_ALLOW. - BuildProgram in pkg/seccomp no longer panics if provided an empty list of rules. It now builds a program with the architecture sanity check only. - ProgramBuilder now allows adding labels that are unused. However, backwards jumps are still not permitted. Fixes #510 PiperOrigin-RevId: 331938697
Diffstat (limited to 'runsc/specutils/seccomp/seccomp_test.go')
-rw-r--r--runsc/specutils/seccomp/seccomp_test.go414
1 files changed, 414 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/runsc/specutils/seccomp/seccomp_test.go b/runsc/specutils/seccomp/seccomp_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2079cd2e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/runsc/specutils/seccomp/seccomp_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
+// Copyright 2020 The gVisor Authors.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package seccomp
+
+import (
+ "fmt"
+ "syscall"
+ "testing"
+
+ specs "github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/specs-go"
+ "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/binary"
+ "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/bpf"
+)
+
+type seccompData struct {
+ nr uint32
+ arch uint32
+ instructionPointer uint64
+ args [6]uint64
+}
+
+// asInput converts a seccompData to a bpf.Input.
+func asInput(d seccompData) bpf.Input {
+ return bpf.InputBytes{binary.Marshal(nil, binary.LittleEndian, d), binary.LittleEndian}
+}
+
+// testInput creates an Input struct with given seccomp input values.
+func testInput(arch uint32, syscallName string, args *[6]uint64) bpf.Input {
+ syscallNo, err := lookupSyscallNo(arch, syscallName)
+ if err != nil {
+ // Assume tests set valid syscall names.
+ panic(err)
+ }
+
+ if args == nil {
+ argArray := [6]uint64{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
+ args = &argArray
+ }
+
+ data := seccompData{
+ nr: syscallNo,
+ arch: arch,
+ args: *args,
+ }
+
+ return asInput(data)
+}
+
+// testCase holds a seccomp test case.
+type testCase struct {
+ name string
+ config specs.LinuxSeccomp
+ input bpf.Input
+ expected uint32
+}
+
+var (
+ // seccompTests is a list of speccomp test cases.
+ seccompTests = []testCase{
+ {
+ name: "default_allow",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "read", nil),
+ expected: uint32(allowAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "default_deny",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActErrno,
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "read", nil),
+ expected: uint32(errnoAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "deny_arch",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
+ Syscalls: []specs.LinuxSyscall{
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "getcwd",
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActErrno,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ // Syscall matches but the arch is AUDIT_ARCH_X86 so the return
+ // value is the bad arch action.
+ input: asInput(seccompData{nr: 183, arch: 0x40000003}), //
+ expected: uint32(killThreadAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "match_name_errno",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
+ Syscalls: []specs.LinuxSyscall{
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "getcwd",
+ "chmod",
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActErrno,
+ },
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "write",
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActTrace,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "getcwd", nil),
+ expected: uint32(errnoAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "match_name_trace",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
+ Syscalls: []specs.LinuxSyscall{
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "getcwd",
+ "chmod",
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActErrno,
+ },
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "write",
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActTrace,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "write", nil),
+ expected: uint32(traceAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "no_match_name_allow",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
+ Syscalls: []specs.LinuxSyscall{
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "getcwd",
+ "chmod",
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActErrno,
+ },
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "write",
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActTrace,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "open", nil),
+ expected: uint32(allowAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "simple_match_args",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
+ Syscalls: []specs.LinuxSyscall{
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "clone",
+ },
+ Args: []specs.LinuxSeccompArg{
+ {
+ Index: 0,
+ Value: syscall.CLONE_FS,
+ Op: specs.OpEqualTo,
+ },
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActErrno,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "clone", &[6]uint64{syscall.CLONE_FS}),
+ expected: uint32(errnoAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "match_args_or",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
+ Syscalls: []specs.LinuxSyscall{
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "clone",
+ },
+ Args: []specs.LinuxSeccompArg{
+ {
+ Index: 0,
+ Value: syscall.CLONE_FS,
+ Op: specs.OpEqualTo,
+ },
+ {
+ Index: 0,
+ Value: syscall.CLONE_VM,
+ Op: specs.OpEqualTo,
+ },
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActErrno,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "clone", &[6]uint64{syscall.CLONE_FS}),
+ expected: uint32(errnoAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "match_args_and",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
+ Syscalls: []specs.LinuxSyscall{
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "getsockopt",
+ },
+ Args: []specs.LinuxSeccompArg{
+ {
+ Index: 1,
+ Value: syscall.SOL_SOCKET,
+ Op: specs.OpEqualTo,
+ },
+ {
+ Index: 2,
+ Value: syscall.SO_PEERCRED,
+ Op: specs.OpEqualTo,
+ },
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActErrno,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "getsockopt", &[6]uint64{0, syscall.SOL_SOCKET, syscall.SO_PEERCRED}),
+ expected: uint32(errnoAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "no_match_args_and",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
+ Syscalls: []specs.LinuxSyscall{
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "getsockopt",
+ },
+ Args: []specs.LinuxSeccompArg{
+ {
+ Index: 1,
+ Value: syscall.SOL_SOCKET,
+ Op: specs.OpEqualTo,
+ },
+ {
+ Index: 2,
+ Value: syscall.SO_PEERCRED,
+ Op: specs.OpEqualTo,
+ },
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActErrno,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "getsockopt", &[6]uint64{0, syscall.SOL_SOCKET}),
+ expected: uint32(allowAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "Simple args (no match)",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
+ Syscalls: []specs.LinuxSyscall{
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "clone",
+ },
+ Args: []specs.LinuxSeccompArg{
+ {
+ Index: 0,
+ Value: syscall.CLONE_FS,
+ Op: specs.OpEqualTo,
+ },
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActErrno,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "clone", &[6]uint64{syscall.CLONE_VM}),
+ expected: uint32(allowAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "OpMaskedEqual (match)",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
+ Syscalls: []specs.LinuxSyscall{
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "clone",
+ },
+ Args: []specs.LinuxSeccompArg{
+ {
+ Index: 0,
+ Value: syscall.CLONE_FS,
+ ValueTwo: syscall.CLONE_FS,
+ Op: specs.OpMaskedEqual,
+ },
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActErrno,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "clone", &[6]uint64{syscall.CLONE_FS | syscall.CLONE_VM}),
+ expected: uint32(errnoAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "OpMaskedEqual (no match)",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
+ Syscalls: []specs.LinuxSyscall{
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "clone",
+ },
+ Args: []specs.LinuxSeccompArg{
+ {
+ Index: 0,
+ Value: syscall.CLONE_FS | syscall.CLONE_VM,
+ ValueTwo: syscall.CLONE_FS | syscall.CLONE_VM,
+ Op: specs.OpMaskedEqual,
+ },
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActErrno,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "clone", &[6]uint64{syscall.CLONE_FS}),
+ expected: uint32(allowAction),
+ },
+ {
+ name: "OpMaskedEqual (clone)",
+ config: specs.LinuxSeccomp{
+ DefaultAction: specs.ActErrno,
+ Syscalls: []specs.LinuxSyscall{
+ {
+ Names: []string{
+ "clone",
+ },
+ // This comes from the Docker default seccomp
+ // profile for clone.
+ Args: []specs.LinuxSeccompArg{
+ {
+ Index: 0,
+ Value: 0x7e020000,
+ ValueTwo: 0x0,
+ Op: specs.OpMaskedEqual,
+ },
+ },
+ Action: specs.ActAllow,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ input: testInput(nativeArchAuditNo, "clone", &[6]uint64{0x50f00}),
+ expected: uint32(allowAction),
+ },
+ }
+)
+
+// TestRunscSeccomp generates seccomp programs from OCI config and executes
+// them using runsc's library, comparing against expected results.
+func TestRunscSeccomp(t *testing.T) {
+ for _, tc := range seccompTests {
+ t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+ runscProgram, err := BuildProgram(&tc.config)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("generating runsc BPF: %v", err)
+ }
+
+ if err := checkProgram(runscProgram, tc.input, tc.expected); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("running runsc BPF: %v", err)
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+// checkProgram runs the given program over the given input and checks the
+// result against the expected output.
+func checkProgram(p bpf.Program, in bpf.Input, expected uint32) error {
+ result, err := bpf.Exec(p, in)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ if result != expected {
+ // Include a decoded version of the program in output for debugging purposes.
+ decoded, _ := bpf.DecodeProgram(p)
+ return fmt.Errorf("Unexpected result: got: %d, expected: %d\nBPF Program\n%s", result, expected, decoded)
+ }
+
+ return nil
+}