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authorKevin Krakauer <krakauer@google.com>2020-06-26 16:23:15 -0700
committergVisor bot <gvisor-bot@google.com>2020-06-26 16:24:39 -0700
commit9cfc15497581824f1c6ba2b9f9ee653d0be0bc5a (patch)
tree0d11a48c87597dc08188437f72733de9da0c9024 /pkg
parente6a90baef1e6921c560c939f4b591163004613b9 (diff)
Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the root user namespace for TTY theft
PiperOrigin-RevId: 318563543
Diffstat (limited to 'pkg')
-rw-r--r--pkg/sentry/kernel/thread_group.go3
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/kernel/thread_group.go b/pkg/sentry/kernel/thread_group.go
index 52849f5b3..4dfd2c990 100644
--- a/pkg/sentry/kernel/thread_group.go
+++ b/pkg/sentry/kernel/thread_group.go
@@ -366,7 +366,8 @@ func (tg *ThreadGroup) SetControllingTTY(tty *TTY, arg int32) error {
// terminal is stolen, and all processes that had it as controlling
// terminal lose it." - tty_ioctl(4)
if tty.tg != nil && tg.processGroup.session != tty.tg.processGroup.session {
- if !auth.CredentialsFromContext(tg.leader).HasCapability(linux.CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || arg != 1 {
+ // Stealing requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the root user namespace.
+ if creds := auth.CredentialsFromContext(tg.leader); !creds.HasCapabilityIn(linux.CAP_SYS_ADMIN, creds.UserNamespace.Root()) || arg != 1 {
return syserror.EPERM
}
// Steal the TTY away. Unlike TIOCNOTTY, don't send signals.