diff options
author | gVisor bot <gvisor-bot@google.com> | 2019-12-05 21:00:36 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | gVisor bot <gvisor-bot@google.com> | 2019-12-05 21:00:36 +0000 |
commit | 57787d9058eed3d8d60c4f54c0a4346b25608263 (patch) | |
tree | 1d873d972bbf0829de967ca71ae3100aeb223ba1 /pkg | |
parent | c1c08a06e7e1bc69340870ba3fa621e5d6e83f24 (diff) | |
parent | 02258607f97353932d56bfde9274d50dda18e374 (diff) |
Merge release-20191114.0-64-g0225860 (automated)
Diffstat (limited to 'pkg')
-rwxr-xr-x | pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go | 62 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go b/pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go index f8e74355c..f1edb0680 100755 --- a/pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go +++ b/pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go @@ -119,3 +119,65 @@ func MayWriteFileWithOpenFlags(flags uint32) bool { return false } } + +// CheckSetStat checks that creds has permission to change the metadata of a +// file with the given permissions, UID, and GID as specified by stat, subject +// to the rules of Linux's fs/attr.c:setattr_prepare(). +func CheckSetStat(creds *auth.Credentials, stat *linux.Statx, mode uint16, kuid auth.KUID, kgid auth.KGID) error { + if stat.Mask&linux.STATX_MODE != 0 { + if !CanActAsOwner(creds, kuid) { + return syserror.EPERM + } + // TODO(b/30815691): "If the calling process is not privileged (Linux: + // does not have the CAP_FSETID capability), and the group of the file + // does not match the effective group ID of the process or one of its + // supplementary group IDs, the S_ISGID bit will be turned off, but + // this will not cause an error to be returned." - chmod(2) + } + if stat.Mask&linux.STATX_UID != 0 { + if !((creds.EffectiveKUID == kuid && auth.KUID(stat.UID) == kuid) || + HasCapabilityOnFile(creds, linux.CAP_CHOWN, kuid, kgid)) { + return syserror.EPERM + } + } + if stat.Mask&linux.STATX_GID != 0 { + if !((creds.EffectiveKUID == kuid && creds.InGroup(auth.KGID(stat.GID))) || + HasCapabilityOnFile(creds, linux.CAP_CHOWN, kuid, kgid)) { + return syserror.EPERM + } + } + if stat.Mask&(linux.STATX_ATIME|linux.STATX_MTIME|linux.STATX_CTIME) != 0 { + if !CanActAsOwner(creds, kuid) { + if (stat.Mask&linux.STATX_ATIME != 0 && stat.Atime.Nsec != linux.UTIME_NOW) || + (stat.Mask&linux.STATX_MTIME != 0 && stat.Mtime.Nsec != linux.UTIME_NOW) || + (stat.Mask&linux.STATX_CTIME != 0 && stat.Ctime.Nsec != linux.UTIME_NOW) { + return syserror.EPERM + } + // isDir is irrelevant in the following call to + // GenericCheckPermissions since ats == MayWrite means that + // CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH does not apply, and CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE + // applies, regardless of isDir. + if err := GenericCheckPermissions(creds, MayWrite, false /* isDir */, mode, kuid, kgid); err != nil { + return err + } + } + } + return nil +} + +// CanActAsOwner returns true if creds can act as the owner of a file with the +// given owning UID, consistent with Linux's +// fs/inode.c:inode_owner_or_capable(). +func CanActAsOwner(creds *auth.Credentials, kuid auth.KUID) bool { + if creds.EffectiveKUID == kuid { + return true + } + return creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_FOWNER) && creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKUID(kuid).Ok() +} + +// HasCapabilityOnFile returns true if creds has the given capability with +// respect to a file with the given owning UID and GID, consistent with Linux's +// kernel/capability.c:capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). +func HasCapabilityOnFile(creds *auth.Credentials, cp linux.Capability, kuid auth.KUID, kgid auth.KGID) bool { + return creds.HasCapability(cp) && creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKUID(kuid).Ok() && creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKGID(kgid).Ok() +} |