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authorgVisor bot <gvisor-bot@google.com>2019-12-05 21:00:36 +0000
committergVisor bot <gvisor-bot@google.com>2019-12-05 21:00:36 +0000
commit57787d9058eed3d8d60c4f54c0a4346b25608263 (patch)
tree1d873d972bbf0829de967ca71ae3100aeb223ba1 /pkg
parentc1c08a06e7e1bc69340870ba3fa621e5d6e83f24 (diff)
parent02258607f97353932d56bfde9274d50dda18e374 (diff)
Merge release-20191114.0-64-g0225860 (automated)
Diffstat (limited to 'pkg')
-rwxr-xr-xpkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go62
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go b/pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go
index f8e74355c..f1edb0680 100755
--- a/pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go
+++ b/pkg/sentry/vfs/permissions.go
@@ -119,3 +119,65 @@ func MayWriteFileWithOpenFlags(flags uint32) bool {
return false
}
}
+
+// CheckSetStat checks that creds has permission to change the metadata of a
+// file with the given permissions, UID, and GID as specified by stat, subject
+// to the rules of Linux's fs/attr.c:setattr_prepare().
+func CheckSetStat(creds *auth.Credentials, stat *linux.Statx, mode uint16, kuid auth.KUID, kgid auth.KGID) error {
+ if stat.Mask&linux.STATX_MODE != 0 {
+ if !CanActAsOwner(creds, kuid) {
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ // TODO(b/30815691): "If the calling process is not privileged (Linux:
+ // does not have the CAP_FSETID capability), and the group of the file
+ // does not match the effective group ID of the process or one of its
+ // supplementary group IDs, the S_ISGID bit will be turned off, but
+ // this will not cause an error to be returned." - chmod(2)
+ }
+ if stat.Mask&linux.STATX_UID != 0 {
+ if !((creds.EffectiveKUID == kuid && auth.KUID(stat.UID) == kuid) ||
+ HasCapabilityOnFile(creds, linux.CAP_CHOWN, kuid, kgid)) {
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ }
+ if stat.Mask&linux.STATX_GID != 0 {
+ if !((creds.EffectiveKUID == kuid && creds.InGroup(auth.KGID(stat.GID))) ||
+ HasCapabilityOnFile(creds, linux.CAP_CHOWN, kuid, kgid)) {
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ }
+ if stat.Mask&(linux.STATX_ATIME|linux.STATX_MTIME|linux.STATX_CTIME) != 0 {
+ if !CanActAsOwner(creds, kuid) {
+ if (stat.Mask&linux.STATX_ATIME != 0 && stat.Atime.Nsec != linux.UTIME_NOW) ||
+ (stat.Mask&linux.STATX_MTIME != 0 && stat.Mtime.Nsec != linux.UTIME_NOW) ||
+ (stat.Mask&linux.STATX_CTIME != 0 && stat.Ctime.Nsec != linux.UTIME_NOW) {
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ // isDir is irrelevant in the following call to
+ // GenericCheckPermissions since ats == MayWrite means that
+ // CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH does not apply, and CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
+ // applies, regardless of isDir.
+ if err := GenericCheckPermissions(creds, MayWrite, false /* isDir */, mode, kuid, kgid); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return nil
+}
+
+// CanActAsOwner returns true if creds can act as the owner of a file with the
+// given owning UID, consistent with Linux's
+// fs/inode.c:inode_owner_or_capable().
+func CanActAsOwner(creds *auth.Credentials, kuid auth.KUID) bool {
+ if creds.EffectiveKUID == kuid {
+ return true
+ }
+ return creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_FOWNER) && creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKUID(kuid).Ok()
+}
+
+// HasCapabilityOnFile returns true if creds has the given capability with
+// respect to a file with the given owning UID and GID, consistent with Linux's
+// kernel/capability.c:capable_wrt_inode_uidgid().
+func HasCapabilityOnFile(creds *auth.Credentials, cp linux.Capability, kuid auth.KUID, kgid auth.KGID) bool {
+ return creds.HasCapability(cp) && creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKUID(kuid).Ok() && creds.UserNamespace.MapFromKGID(kgid).Ok()
+}