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authorRahat Mahmood <rahat@google.com>2019-03-26 16:15:55 -0700
committerShentubot <shentubot@google.com>2019-03-26 16:16:57 -0700
commit06ec97a3f823f1f5d928fc9c2beb3a11c2c88487 (patch)
treea2b501718c82aede761d7235527492782ef65cc2 /pkg
parent79aca14a0cd70720e8a8f8bd6c1499ab1ffbd8d3 (diff)
Implement memfd_create.
Memfds are simply anonymous tmpfs files with no associated mounts. Also implementing file seals, which Linux only implements for memfds at the moment. PiperOrigin-RevId: 240450031 Change-Id: I31de78b950101ae8d7a13d0e93fe52d98ea06f2f
Diffstat (limited to 'pkg')
-rw-r--r--pkg/abi/linux/file.go18
-rw-r--r--pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs/inode_file.go151
-rw-r--r--pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/BUILD1
-rw-r--r--pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/linux64.go2
-rw-r--r--pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go59
5 files changed, 230 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/abi/linux/file.go b/pkg/abi/linux/file.go
index e5a51a9fd..46b10ca97 100644
--- a/pkg/abi/linux/file.go
+++ b/pkg/abi/linux/file.go
@@ -236,3 +236,21 @@ var fileType = abi.ValueSet{
ModeCharacterDevice: "S_IFCHR",
ModeNamedPipe: "S_IFIFO",
}
+
+// Constants for memfd_create(2). Source: include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
+const (
+ MFD_CLOEXEC = 0x0001
+ MFD_ALLOW_SEALING = 0x0002
+)
+
+// Constants related to file seals. Source: include/uapi/{asm-generic,linux}/fcntl.h
+const (
+ F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE = 1024
+ F_ADD_SEALS = F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9
+ F_GET_SEALS = F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10
+
+ F_SEAL_SEAL = 0x0001 // Prevent further seals from being set.
+ F_SEAL_SHRINK = 0x0002 // Prevent file from shrinking.
+ F_SEAL_GROW = 0x0004 // Prevent file from growing.
+ F_SEAL_WRITE = 0x0008 // Prevent writes.
+)
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs/inode_file.go b/pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs/inode_file.go
index 25bf2b9dd..7c80d711b 100644
--- a/pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs/inode_file.go
+++ b/pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs/inode_file.go
@@ -15,10 +15,12 @@
package tmpfs
import (
+ "fmt"
"io"
"sync"
"time"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/abi/linux"
"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/metric"
"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/context"
"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/fs"
@@ -29,6 +31,7 @@ import (
"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/safemem"
"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/usage"
"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/usermem"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/syserror"
)
var (
@@ -42,6 +45,8 @@ var (
// These files are backed by pages allocated from a platform.Memory, and may be
// directly mapped.
//
+// Lock order: attrMu -> mapsMu -> dataMu.
+//
// +stateify savable
type fileInodeOperations struct {
fsutil.InodeGenericChecker `state:"nosave"`
@@ -74,6 +79,17 @@ type fileInodeOperations struct {
// mappings is protected by mapsMu.
mappings memmap.MappingSet
+ // writableMappingPages tracks how many pages of virtual memory are mapped
+ // as potentially writable from this file. If a page has multiple mappings,
+ // each mapping is counted separately.
+ //
+ // This counter is susceptible to overflow as we can potentially count
+ // mappings from many VMAs. We count pages rather than bytes to slightly
+ // mitigate this.
+ //
+ // Protected by mapsMu.
+ writableMappingPages uint64
+
dataMu sync.RWMutex `state:"nosave"`
// data maps offsets into the file to offsets into platform.Memory() that
@@ -81,6 +97,11 @@ type fileInodeOperations struct {
//
// data is protected by dataMu.
data fsutil.FileRangeSet
+
+ // seals represents file seals on this inode.
+ //
+ // Protected by dataMu.
+ seals uint32
}
var _ fs.InodeOperations = (*fileInodeOperations)(nil)
@@ -91,9 +112,30 @@ func NewInMemoryFile(ctx context.Context, usage usage.MemoryKind, uattr fs.Unsta
attr: uattr,
kernel: kernel.KernelFromContext(ctx),
memUsage: usage,
+ seals: linux.F_SEAL_SEAL,
}
}
+// NewMemfdInode creates a new inode backing a memfd. Memory used by the memfd
+// is backed by platform memory.
+func NewMemfdInode(ctx context.Context, allowSeals bool) *fs.Inode {
+ // Per Linux, mm/shmem.c:__shmem_file_setup(), memfd inodes are set up with
+ // S_IRWXUGO.
+ perms := fs.PermMask{Read: true, Write: true, Execute: true}
+ iops := NewInMemoryFile(ctx, usage.Tmpfs, fs.UnstableAttr{
+ Owner: fs.FileOwnerFromContext(ctx),
+ Perms: fs.FilePermissions{User: perms, Group: perms, Other: perms}}).(*fileInodeOperations)
+ if allowSeals {
+ iops.seals = 0
+ }
+ return fs.NewInode(iops, fs.NewNonCachingMountSource(nil, fs.MountSourceFlags{}), fs.StableAttr{
+ Type: fs.RegularFile,
+ DeviceID: tmpfsDevice.DeviceID(),
+ InodeID: tmpfsDevice.NextIno(),
+ BlockSize: usermem.PageSize,
+ })
+}
+
// Release implements fs.InodeOperations.Release.
func (f *fileInodeOperations) Release(context.Context) {
f.dataMu.Lock()
@@ -170,6 +212,16 @@ func (f *fileInodeOperations) Truncate(ctx context.Context, _ *fs.Inode, size in
f.dataMu.Lock()
oldSize := f.attr.Size
+
+ // Check if current seals allow truncation.
+ switch {
+ case size > oldSize && f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_GROW != 0: // Grow sealed
+ fallthrough
+ case oldSize > size && f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_SHRINK != 0: // Shrink sealed
+ f.dataMu.Unlock()
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+
if oldSize != size {
f.attr.Size = size
// Update mtime and ctime.
@@ -370,6 +422,34 @@ func (rw *fileReadWriter) WriteFromBlocks(srcs safemem.BlockSeq) (uint64, error)
return 0, nil
}
+ // Check if seals prevent either file growth or all writes.
+ switch {
+ case rw.f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_WRITE != 0: // Write sealed
+ return 0, syserror.EPERM
+ case end > rw.f.attr.Size && rw.f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_GROW != 0: // Grow sealed
+ // When growth is sealed, Linux effectively allows writes which would
+ // normally grow the file to partially succeed up to the current EOF,
+ // rounded down to the page boundary before the EOF.
+ //
+ // This happens because writes (and thus the growth check) for tmpfs
+ // files proceed page-by-page on Linux, and the final write to the page
+ // containing EOF fails, resulting in a partial write up to the start of
+ // that page.
+ //
+ // To emulate this behaviour, artifically truncate the write to the
+ // start of the page containing the current EOF.
+ //
+ // See Linux, mm/filemap.c:generic_perform_write() and
+ // mm/shmem.c:shmem_write_begin().
+ if pgstart := int64(usermem.Addr(rw.f.attr.Size).RoundDown()); end > pgstart {
+ end = pgstart
+ }
+ if end <= rw.offset {
+ // Truncation would result in no data being written.
+ return 0, syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ }
+
defer func() {
// If the write ends beyond the file's previous size, it causes the
// file to grow.
@@ -431,7 +511,27 @@ func (rw *fileReadWriter) WriteFromBlocks(srcs safemem.BlockSeq) (uint64, error)
func (f *fileInodeOperations) AddMapping(ctx context.Context, ms memmap.MappingSpace, ar usermem.AddrRange, offset uint64, writable bool) error {
f.mapsMu.Lock()
defer f.mapsMu.Unlock()
+
+ f.dataMu.RLock()
+ defer f.dataMu.RUnlock()
+
+ // Reject writable mapping if F_SEAL_WRITE is set.
+ if f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_WRITE != 0 && writable {
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+
f.mappings.AddMapping(ms, ar, offset, writable)
+ if writable {
+ pagesBefore := f.writableMappingPages
+
+ // ar is guaranteed to be page aligned per memmap.Mappable.
+ f.writableMappingPages += uint64(ar.Length() / usermem.PageSize)
+
+ if f.writableMappingPages < pagesBefore {
+ panic(fmt.Sprintf("Overflow while mapping potentially writable pages pointing to a tmpfs file. Before %v, after %v", pagesBefore, f.writableMappingPages))
+ }
+ }
+
return nil
}
@@ -439,7 +539,19 @@ func (f *fileInodeOperations) AddMapping(ctx context.Context, ms memmap.MappingS
func (f *fileInodeOperations) RemoveMapping(ctx context.Context, ms memmap.MappingSpace, ar usermem.AddrRange, offset uint64, writable bool) {
f.mapsMu.Lock()
defer f.mapsMu.Unlock()
+
f.mappings.RemoveMapping(ms, ar, offset, writable)
+
+ if writable {
+ pagesBefore := f.writableMappingPages
+
+ // ar is guaranteed to be page aligned per memmap.Mappable.
+ f.writableMappingPages -= uint64(ar.Length() / usermem.PageSize)
+
+ if f.writableMappingPages > pagesBefore {
+ panic(fmt.Sprintf("Underflow while unmapping potentially writable pages pointing to a tmpfs file. Before %v, after %v", pagesBefore, f.writableMappingPages))
+ }
+ }
}
// CopyMapping implements memmap.Mappable.CopyMapping.
@@ -501,3 +613,42 @@ func (f *fileInodeOperations) Translate(ctx context.Context, required, optional
func (f *fileInodeOperations) InvalidateUnsavable(ctx context.Context) error {
return nil
}
+
+// GetSeals returns the current set of seals on a memfd inode.
+func GetSeals(inode *fs.Inode) (uint32, error) {
+ if f, ok := inode.InodeOperations.(*fileInodeOperations); ok {
+ f.dataMu.RLock()
+ defer f.dataMu.RUnlock()
+ return f.seals, nil
+ }
+ // Not a memfd inode.
+ return 0, syserror.EINVAL
+}
+
+// AddSeals adds new file seals to a memfd inode.
+func AddSeals(inode *fs.Inode, val uint32) error {
+ if f, ok := inode.InodeOperations.(*fileInodeOperations); ok {
+ f.mapsMu.Lock()
+ defer f.mapsMu.Unlock()
+ f.dataMu.Lock()
+ defer f.dataMu.Unlock()
+
+ if f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_SEAL != 0 {
+ // Seal applied which prevents addition of any new seals.
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+
+ // F_SEAL_WRITE can only be added if there are no active writable maps.
+ if f.seals&linux.F_SEAL_WRITE == 0 && val&linux.F_SEAL_WRITE != 0 {
+ if f.writableMappingPages > 0 {
+ return syserror.EBUSY
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Seals can only be added, never removed.
+ f.seals |= val
+ return nil
+ }
+ // Not a memfd inode.
+ return syserror.EINVAL
+}
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/BUILD b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/BUILD
index 846601881..6e2843b36 100644
--- a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/BUILD
+++ b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/BUILD
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ go_library(
"//pkg/sentry/fs/anon",
"//pkg/sentry/fs/lock",
"//pkg/sentry/fs/timerfd",
+ "//pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs",
"//pkg/sentry/kernel",
"//pkg/sentry/kernel/auth",
"//pkg/sentry/kernel/epoll",
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/linux64.go b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/linux64.go
index e855590e6..888b5aa9f 100644
--- a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/linux64.go
+++ b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/linux64.go
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ var AMD64 = &kernel.SyscallTable{
// 316: Renameat2, TODO
317: Seccomp,
318: GetRandom,
- // 319: MemfdCreate, TODO
+ 319: MemfdCreate,
320: syscalls.CapError(linux.CAP_SYS_BOOT), // KexecFileLoad, infeasible to support
321: syscalls.CapError(linux.CAP_SYS_ADMIN), // Bpf, requires cap_sys_admin for all commands
// 322: Execveat, TODO
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go
index cf6fdc190..3193718b5 100644
--- a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go
+++ b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import (
"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/context"
"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/fs"
"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/fs/lock"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/fs/tmpfs"
"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel"
"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/auth"
"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/fasync"
@@ -933,6 +934,15 @@ func Fcntl(t *kernel.Task, args arch.SyscallArguments) (uintptr, *kernel.Syscall
case linux.F_SETOWN:
fSetOwn(t, file, args[2].Int())
return 0, nil, nil
+ case linux.F_GET_SEALS:
+ val, err := tmpfs.GetSeals(file.Dirent.Inode)
+ return uintptr(val), nil, err
+ case linux.F_ADD_SEALS:
+ if !file.Flags().Write {
+ return 0, nil, syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ err := tmpfs.AddSeals(file.Dirent.Inode, args[2].Uint())
+ return 0, nil, err
default:
// Everything else is not yet supported.
return 0, nil, syserror.EINVAL
@@ -2066,3 +2076,52 @@ func Sendfile(t *kernel.Task, args arch.SyscallArguments) (uintptr, *kernel.Sysc
// arbitrarily.
return uintptr(n), nil, handleIOError(t, n != 0, err, kernel.ERESTARTSYS, "sendfile", inFile)
}
+
+const (
+ memfdPrefix = "/memfd:"
+ memfdAllFlags = uint32(linux.MFD_CLOEXEC | linux.MFD_ALLOW_SEALING)
+ memfdMaxNameLen = linux.NAME_MAX - len(memfdPrefix) + 1
+)
+
+// MemfdCreate implements the linux syscall memfd_create(2).
+func MemfdCreate(t *kernel.Task, args arch.SyscallArguments) (uintptr, *kernel.SyscallControl, error) {
+ addr := args[0].Pointer()
+ flags := args[1].Uint()
+
+ if flags&^memfdAllFlags != 0 {
+ // Unknown bits in flags.
+ return 0, nil, syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+
+ allowSeals := flags&linux.MFD_ALLOW_SEALING != 0
+ cloExec := flags&linux.MFD_CLOEXEC != 0
+
+ name, err := t.CopyInString(addr, syscall.PathMax-len(memfdPrefix))
+ if err != nil {
+ return 0, nil, err
+ }
+ if len(name) > memfdMaxNameLen {
+ return 0, nil, syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+ name = memfdPrefix + name
+
+ inode := tmpfs.NewMemfdInode(t, allowSeals)
+ dirent := fs.NewDirent(inode, name)
+ // Per Linux, mm/shmem.c:__shmem_file_setup(), memfd files are set up with
+ // FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE.
+ file, err := inode.GetFile(t, dirent, fs.FileFlags{Read: true, Write: true})
+ if err != nil {
+ return 0, nil, err
+ }
+
+ defer dirent.DecRef()
+ defer file.DecRef()
+
+ fdFlags := kernel.FDFlags{CloseOnExec: cloExec}
+ newFD, err := t.FDMap().NewFDFrom(0, file, fdFlags, t.ThreadGroup().Limits())
+ if err != nil {
+ return 0, nil, err
+ }
+
+ return uintptr(newFD), nil, nil
+}