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authorNicolas Lacasse <nlacasse@google.com>2018-09-14 12:28:43 -0700
committerShentubot <shentubot@google.com>2018-09-14 12:29:46 -0700
commitb84bfa570d76e6979d5cfc40c235ffe74de9f9ca (patch)
treeb4d293d11723538830a00fc333d12e724c23a932 /pkg/sentry/syscalls
parent0380bcb3a4125723dc5248f70174ff64fb1942a2 (diff)
Make gVisor hard link check match Linux's.
Linux permits hard-linking if the target is owned by the user OR the target has Read+Write permission. PiperOrigin-RevId: 213024613 Change-Id: If642066317b568b99084edd33ee4e8822ec9cbb3
Diffstat (limited to 'pkg/sentry/syscalls')
-rw-r--r--pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go25
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go
index 3e28d4b8a..97881a1f5 100644
--- a/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go
+++ b/pkg/sentry/syscalls/linux/sys_file.go
@@ -1122,15 +1122,32 @@ func Symlinkat(t *kernel.Task, args arch.SyscallArguments) (uintptr, *kernel.Sys
//
// This corresponds to Linux's fs/namei.c:may_linkat.
func mayLinkAt(t *kernel.Task, target *fs.Inode) error {
+ // Linux will impose the following restrictions on hard links only if
+ // sysctl_protected_hardlinks is enabled. The kernel disables this
+ // setting by default for backward compatibility (see commit
+ // 561ec64ae67e), but also recommends that distributions enable it (and
+ // Debian does:
+ // https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=889098).
+ //
+ // gVisor currently behaves as though sysctl_protected_hardlinks is
+ // always enabled, and thus imposes the following restrictions on hard
+ // links.
+
// Technically Linux is more restrictive in 3.11.10 (requires CAP_FOWNER in
// root user namespace); this is from the later f2ca379642d7 "namei: permit
// linking with CAP_FOWNER in userns".
- if !target.CheckOwnership(t) {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ if target.CheckOwnership(t) {
+ // fs/namei.c:may_linkat: "Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER)
+ // can hardlink all they like."
+ return nil
}
- // Check that the target is not a directory and that permissions are okay.
- if fs.IsDir(target.StableAttr) || target.CheckPermission(t, fs.PermMask{Read: true, Write: true}) != nil {
+ // If we are not the owner, then the file must be regular and have
+ // Read+Write permissions.
+ if !fs.IsRegular(target.StableAttr) {
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ if target.CheckPermission(t, fs.PermMask{Read: true, Write: true}) != nil {
return syserror.EPERM
}