Check in gVisor.

PiperOrigin-RevId: 194583126
Change-Id: Ica1d8821a90f74e7e745962d71801c598c652463

1 files changed, 370 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/pkg/sentry/socket/control/control.go b/pkg/sentry/socket/control/control.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cb34cbc85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pkg/sentry/socket/control/control.go
@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
+// Copyright 2018 Google Inc.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+// Package control provides internal representations of socket control
+// messages.
+package control
+
+import (
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/abi/linux"
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/binary"
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/context"
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/fs"
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel"
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/auth"
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/kdefs"
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/usermem"
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/syserror"
+	"gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/transport/unix"
+)
+
+const maxInt = int(^uint(0) >> 1)
+
+// SCMCredentials represents a SCM_CREDENTIALS socket control message.
+type SCMCredentials interface {
+	unix.CredentialsControlMessage
+
+	// Credentials returns properly namespaced values for the sender's pid, uid
+	// and gid.
+	Credentials(t *kernel.Task) (kernel.ThreadID, auth.UID, auth.GID)
+}
+
+// SCMRights represents a SCM_RIGHTS socket control message.
+type SCMRights interface {
+	unix.RightsControlMessage
+
+	// Files returns up to max RightsFiles.
+	Files(ctx context.Context, max int) RightsFiles
+}
+
+// RightsFiles represents a SCM_RIGHTS socket control message. A reference is
+// maintained for each fs.File and is release either when an FD is created or
+// when the Release method is called.
+type RightsFiles []*fs.File
+
+// NewSCMRights creates a new SCM_RIGHTS socket control message representation
+// using local sentry FDs.
+func NewSCMRights(t *kernel.Task, fds []int32) (SCMRights, error) {
+	files := make(RightsFiles, 0, len(fds))
+	for _, fd := range fds {
+		file, _ := t.FDMap().GetDescriptor(kdefs.FD(fd))
+		if file == nil {
+			files.Release()
+			return nil, syserror.EBADF
+		}
+		files = append(files, file)
+	}
+	return &files, nil
+}
+
+// Files implements SCMRights.Files.
+func (fs *RightsFiles) Files(ctx context.Context, max int) RightsFiles {
+	n := max
+	if l := len(*fs); n > l {
+		n = l
+	}
+	rf := (*fs)[:n]
+	*fs = (*fs)[n:]
+	return rf
+}
+
+// Clone implements unix.RightsControlMessage.Clone.
+func (fs *RightsFiles) Clone() unix.RightsControlMessage {
+	nfs := append(RightsFiles(nil), *fs...)
+	for _, nf := range nfs {
+		nf.IncRef()
+	}
+	return &nfs
+}
+
+// Release implements unix.RightsControlMessage.Release.
+func (fs *RightsFiles) Release() {
+	for _, f := range *fs {
+		f.DecRef()
+	}
+	*fs = nil
+}
+
+// rightsFDs gets up to the specified maximum number of FDs.
+func rightsFDs(t *kernel.Task, rights SCMRights, cloexec bool, max int) []int32 {
+	files := rights.Files(t, max)
+	fds := make([]int32, 0, len(files))
+	for i := 0; i < max && len(files) > 0; i++ {
+		fd, err := t.FDMap().NewFDFrom(0, files[0], kernel.FDFlags{cloexec}, t.ThreadGroup().Limits())
+		files[0].DecRef()
+		files = files[1:]
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Warningf("Error inserting FD: %v", err)
+			// This is what Linux does.
+			break
+		}
+
+		fds = append(fds, int32(fd))
+	}
+	return fds
+}
+
+// PackRights packs as many FDs as will fit into the unused capacity of buf.
+func PackRights(t *kernel.Task, rights SCMRights, cloexec bool, buf []byte) []byte {
+	maxFDs := (cap(buf) - len(buf) - linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader) / 4
+	// Linux does not return any FDs if none fit.
+	if maxFDs <= 0 {
+		return buf
+	}
+	fds := rightsFDs(t, rights, cloexec, maxFDs)
+	align := t.Arch().Width()
+	return putCmsg(buf, linux.SCM_RIGHTS, align, fds)
+}
+
+// scmCredentials represents an SCM_CREDENTIALS socket control message.
+type scmCredentials struct {
+	t    *kernel.Task
+	kuid auth.KUID
+	kgid auth.KGID
+}
+
+// NewSCMCredentials creates a new SCM_CREDENTIALS socket control message
+// representation.
+func NewSCMCredentials(t *kernel.Task, cred linux.ControlMessageCredentials) (SCMCredentials, error) {
+	tcred := t.Credentials()
+	kuid, err := tcred.UseUID(auth.UID(cred.UID))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	kgid, err := tcred.UseGID(auth.GID(cred.GID))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if kernel.ThreadID(cred.PID) != t.ThreadGroup().ID() && !t.HasCapabilityIn(linux.CAP_SYS_ADMIN, t.PIDNamespace().UserNamespace()) {
+		return nil, syserror.EPERM
+	}
+	return &scmCredentials{t, kuid, kgid}, nil
+}
+
+// Equals implements unix.CredentialsControlMessage.Equals.
+func (c *scmCredentials) Equals(oc unix.CredentialsControlMessage) bool {
+	if oc, _ := oc.(*scmCredentials); oc != nil && *c == *oc {
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func putUint64(buf []byte, n uint64) []byte {
+	usermem.ByteOrder.PutUint64(buf[len(buf):len(buf)+8], n)
+	return buf[:len(buf)+8]
+}
+
+func putUint32(buf []byte, n uint32) []byte {
+	usermem.ByteOrder.PutUint32(buf[len(buf):len(buf)+4], n)
+	return buf[:len(buf)+4]
+}
+
+// putCmsg writes a control message header and as much data as will fit into
+// the unused capacity of a buffer.
+func putCmsg(buf []byte, msgType uint32, align uint, data []int32) []byte {
+	space := AlignDown(cap(buf)-len(buf), 4)
+
+	// We can't write to space that doesn't exist, so if we are going to align
+	// the available space, we must align down.
+	//
+	// align must be >= 4 and each data int32 is 4 bytes. The length of the
+	// header is already aligned, so if we align to the with of the data there
+	// are two cases:
+	// 1. The aligned length is less than the length of the header. The
+	// unaligned length was also less than the length of the header, so we
+	// can't write anything.
+	// 2. The aligned length is greater than or equal to the length of the
+	// header. We can write the header plus zero or more datas. We can't write
+	// a partial int32, so the length of the message will be
+	// min(aligned length, header + datas).
+	if space < linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader {
+		return buf
+	}
+
+	length := 4*len(data) + linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader
+	if length > space {
+		length = space
+	}
+	buf = putUint64(buf, uint64(length))
+	buf = putUint32(buf, linux.SOL_SOCKET)
+	buf = putUint32(buf, msgType)
+	for _, d := range data {
+		if len(buf)+4 > cap(buf) {
+			break
+		}
+		buf = putUint32(buf, uint32(d))
+	}
+	return alignSlice(buf, align)
+}
+
+// Credentials implements SCMCredentials.Credentials.
+func (c *scmCredentials) Credentials(t *kernel.Task) (kernel.ThreadID, auth.UID, auth.GID) {
+	// "When a process's user and group IDs are passed over a UNIX domain
+	// socket to a process in a different user namespace (see the description
+	// of SCM_CREDENTIALS in unix(7)), they are translated into the
+	// corresponding values as per the receiving process's user and group ID
+	// mappings." - user_namespaces(7)
+	pid := t.PIDNamespace().IDOfTask(c.t)
+	uid := c.kuid.In(t.UserNamespace()).OrOverflow()
+	gid := c.kgid.In(t.UserNamespace()).OrOverflow()
+
+	return pid, uid, gid
+}
+
+// PackCredentials packs the credentials in the control message (or default
+// credentials if none) into a buffer.
+func PackCredentials(t *kernel.Task, creds SCMCredentials, buf []byte) []byte {
+	align := t.Arch().Width()
+
+	// Default credentials if none are available.
+	pid := kernel.ThreadID(0)
+	uid := auth.UID(auth.NobodyKUID)
+	gid := auth.GID(auth.NobodyKGID)
+
+	if creds != nil {
+		pid, uid, gid = creds.Credentials(t)
+	}
+	c := []int32{int32(pid), int32(uid), int32(gid)}
+	return putCmsg(buf, linux.SCM_CREDENTIALS, align, c)
+}
+
+// AlignUp rounds a length up to an alignment. align must be a power of 2.
+func AlignUp(length int, align uint) int {
+	return (length + int(align) - 1) & ^(int(align) - 1)
+}
+
+// AlignDown rounds a down to an alignment. align must be a power of 2.
+func AlignDown(length int, align uint) int {
+	return length & ^(int(align) - 1)
+}
+
+// alignSlice extends a slice's length (up to the capacity) to align it.
+func alignSlice(buf []byte, align uint) []byte {
+	aligned := AlignUp(len(buf), align)
+	if aligned > cap(buf) {
+		// Linux allows unaligned data if there isn't room for alignment.
+		// Since there isn't room for alignment, there isn't room for any
+		// additional messages either.
+		return buf
+	}
+	return buf[:aligned]
+}
+
+// Parse parses a raw socket control message into portable objects.
+func Parse(t *kernel.Task, socketOrEndpoint interface{}, buf []byte) (unix.ControlMessages, error) {
+	var (
+		fds linux.ControlMessageRights
+
+		haveCreds bool
+		creds     linux.ControlMessageCredentials
+	)
+
+	for i := 0; i < len(buf); {
+		if i+linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader > len(buf) {
+			return unix.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+		}
+
+		var h linux.ControlMessageHeader
+		binary.Unmarshal(buf[i:i+linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader], usermem.ByteOrder, &h)
+
+		if h.Length < uint64(linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader) {
+			return unix.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+		}
+		if h.Length > uint64(len(buf)-i) {
+			return unix.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+		}
+		if h.Level != linux.SOL_SOCKET {
+			return unix.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+		}
+
+		i += linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader
+		length := int(h.Length) - linux.SizeOfControlMessageHeader
+
+		// The use of t.Arch().Width() is analogous to Linux's use of
+		// sizeof(long) in CMSG_ALIGN.
+		width := t.Arch().Width()
+
+		switch h.Type {
+		case linux.SCM_RIGHTS:
+			rightsSize := AlignDown(length, linux.SizeOfControlMessageRight)
+			numRights := rightsSize / linux.SizeOfControlMessageRight
+
+			if len(fds)+numRights > linux.SCM_MAX_FD {
+				return unix.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+			}
+
+			for j := i; j < i+rightsSize; j += linux.SizeOfControlMessageRight {
+				fds = append(fds, int32(usermem.ByteOrder.Uint32(buf[j:j+linux.SizeOfControlMessageRight])))
+			}
+
+			i += AlignUp(length, width)
+
+		case linux.SCM_CREDENTIALS:
+			if length < linux.SizeOfControlMessageCredentials {
+				return unix.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+			}
+
+			binary.Unmarshal(buf[i:i+linux.SizeOfControlMessageCredentials], usermem.ByteOrder, &creds)
+			haveCreds = true
+			i += AlignUp(length, width)
+
+		default:
+			// Unknown message type.
+			return unix.ControlMessages{}, syserror.EINVAL
+		}
+	}
+
+	var credentials SCMCredentials
+	if haveCreds {
+		var err error
+		if credentials, err = NewSCMCredentials(t, creds); err != nil {
+			return unix.ControlMessages{}, err
+		}
+	} else {
+		credentials = makeCreds(t, socketOrEndpoint)
+	}
+
+	var rights SCMRights
+	if len(fds) > 0 {
+		var err error
+		if rights, err = NewSCMRights(t, fds); err != nil {
+			return unix.ControlMessages{}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if credentials == nil && rights == nil {
+		return unix.ControlMessages{}, nil
+	}
+
+	return unix.ControlMessages{Credentials: credentials, Rights: rights}, nil
+}
+
+func makeCreds(t *kernel.Task, socketOrEndpoint interface{}) SCMCredentials {
+	if t == nil || socketOrEndpoint == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if cr, ok := socketOrEndpoint.(unix.Credentialer); ok && (cr.Passcred() || cr.ConnectedPasscred()) {
+		tcred := t.Credentials()
+		return &scmCredentials{t, tcred.EffectiveKUID, tcred.EffectiveKGID}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// New creates default control messages if needed.
+func New(t *kernel.Task, socketOrEndpoint interface{}, rights SCMRights) unix.ControlMessages {
+	return unix.ControlMessages{
+		Credentials: makeCreds(t, socketOrEndpoint),
+		Rights:      rights,
+	}
+}