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authorgVisor bot <gvisor-bot@google.com>2021-06-30 15:23:33 +0000
committergVisor bot <gvisor-bot@google.com>2021-06-30 15:23:33 +0000
commite75120d9b11f25bf12cf999efb0bd738eb82c662 (patch)
tree98ffaab6e1d7f7ec8f6fe179fb4cd93d06a25291 /pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go
parent5cbcccf1faa9c329ecf8e5ba420692b7fd51a7e8 (diff)
parent6ef268409620c57197b9d573e23be8cb05dbf381 (diff)
Merge release-20210628.0-14-g6ef268409 (automated)
Diffstat (limited to 'pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go')
-rw-r--r--pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go27
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go b/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go
index 29f154ebd..a9067b682 100644
--- a/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go
+++ b/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import (
"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/errors/linuxerr"
"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/auth"
"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sentry/mm"
- "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/syserror"
)
// Credentials returns t's credentials.
@@ -71,7 +70,7 @@ func (t *Task) SetUID(uid auth.UID) error {
// capability) and uid does not match the real UID or saved set-user-ID of
// the calling process."
if kuid != creds.RealKUID && kuid != creds.SavedKUID {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
t.setKUIDsUncheckedLocked(creds.RealKUID, kuid, creds.SavedKUID)
return nil
@@ -102,12 +101,12 @@ func (t *Task) SetREUID(r, e auth.UID) error {
// "Unprivileged processes may only set the effective user ID to the
// real user ID, the effective user ID, or the saved set-user-ID."
if newE != creds.RealKUID && newE != creds.EffectiveKUID && newE != creds.SavedKUID {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
// "Unprivileged users may only set the real user ID to the real user
// ID or the effective user ID."
if newR != creds.RealKUID && newR != creds.EffectiveKUID {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
}
// "If the real user ID is set (i.e., ruid is not -1) or the effective user
@@ -240,7 +239,7 @@ func (t *Task) SetGID(gid auth.GID) error {
return nil
}
if kgid != creds.RealKGID && kgid != creds.SavedKGID {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
t.setKGIDsUncheckedLocked(creds.RealKGID, kgid, creds.SavedKGID)
return nil
@@ -268,10 +267,10 @@ func (t *Task) SetREGID(r, e auth.GID) error {
}
if !creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETGID) {
if newE != creds.RealKGID && newE != creds.EffectiveKGID && newE != creds.SavedKGID {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
if newR != creds.RealKGID && newR != creds.EffectiveKGID {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
}
newS := creds.SavedKGID
@@ -344,7 +343,7 @@ func (t *Task) SetExtraGIDs(gids []auth.GID) error {
defer t.mu.Unlock()
creds := t.Credentials()
if !creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETGID) {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
kgids := make([]auth.KGID, len(gids))
for i, gid := range gids {
@@ -368,25 +367,25 @@ func (t *Task) SetCapabilitySets(permitted, inheritable, effective auth.Capabili
// "Permitted: This is a limiting superset for the effective capabilities
// that the thread may assume." - capabilities(7)
if effective & ^permitted != 0 {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
creds := t.Credentials()
// "It is also a limiting superset for the capabilities that may be added
// to the inheritable set by a thread that does not have the CAP_SETPCAP
// capability in its effective set."
if !creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETPCAP) && (inheritable & ^(creds.InheritableCaps|creds.PermittedCaps) != 0) {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
// "If a thread drops a capability from its permitted set, it can never
// reacquire that capability (unless it execve(2)s ..."
if permitted & ^creds.PermittedCaps != 0 {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
// "... if a capability is not in the bounding set, then a thread can't add
// this capability to its inheritable set, even if it was in its permitted
// capabilities ..."
if inheritable & ^(creds.InheritableCaps|creds.BoundingCaps) != 0 {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
creds = creds.Fork() // The credentials object is immutable. See doc for creds.
creds.PermittedCaps = permitted
@@ -403,7 +402,7 @@ func (t *Task) DropBoundingCapability(cp linux.Capability) error {
defer t.mu.Unlock()
creds := t.Credentials()
if !creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETPCAP) {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
creds = creds.Fork() // The credentials object is immutable. See doc for creds.
creds.BoundingCaps &^= auth.CapabilitySetOf(cp)
@@ -423,7 +422,7 @@ func (t *Task) SetUserNamespace(ns *auth.UserNamespace) error {
// If t just created ns, then t.creds is guaranteed to have CAP_SYS_ADMIN
// in ns (by rule 3 in auth.Credentials.HasCapability).
if !creds.HasCapabilityIn(linux.CAP_SYS_ADMIN, ns) {
- return syserror.EPERM
+ return linuxerr.EPERM
}
creds = creds.Fork() // The credentials object is immutable. See doc for creds.