[syserror] Update syserror to linuxerr for EACCES, EBADF, and EPERM.

Update all instances of the above errors to the faster linuxerr implementation.
With the temporary linuxerr.Equals(), no logical changes are made.

PiperOrigin-RevId: 382306655

1 files changed, 13 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go b/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go
index 29f154ebd..a9067b682 100644
--- a/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go
+++ b/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import (
 	"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/errors/linuxerr"
 	"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sentry/kernel/auth"
 	"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sentry/mm"
-	"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/syserror"
 )
 
 // Credentials returns t's credentials.
@@ -71,7 +70,7 @@ func (t *Task) SetUID(uid auth.UID) error {
 	// capability) and uid does not match the real UID or saved set-user-ID of
 	// the calling process."
 	if kuid != creds.RealKUID && kuid != creds.SavedKUID {
-		return syserror.EPERM
+		return linuxerr.EPERM
 	}
 	t.setKUIDsUncheckedLocked(creds.RealKUID, kuid, creds.SavedKUID)
 	return nil
@@ -102,12 +101,12 @@ func (t *Task) SetREUID(r, e auth.UID) error {
 		// "Unprivileged processes may only set the effective user ID to the
 		// real user ID, the effective user ID, or the saved set-user-ID."
 		if newE != creds.RealKUID && newE != creds.EffectiveKUID && newE != creds.SavedKUID {
-			return syserror.EPERM
+			return linuxerr.EPERM
 		}
 		// "Unprivileged users may only set the real user ID to the real user
 		// ID or the effective user ID."
 		if newR != creds.RealKUID && newR != creds.EffectiveKUID {
-			return syserror.EPERM
+			return linuxerr.EPERM
 		}
 	}
 	// "If the real user ID is set (i.e., ruid is not -1) or the effective user
@@ -240,7 +239,7 @@ func (t *Task) SetGID(gid auth.GID) error {
 		return nil
 	}
 	if kgid != creds.RealKGID && kgid != creds.SavedKGID {
-		return syserror.EPERM
+		return linuxerr.EPERM
 	}
 	t.setKGIDsUncheckedLocked(creds.RealKGID, kgid, creds.SavedKGID)
 	return nil
@@ -268,10 +267,10 @@ func (t *Task) SetREGID(r, e auth.GID) error {
 	}
 	if !creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETGID) {
 		if newE != creds.RealKGID && newE != creds.EffectiveKGID && newE != creds.SavedKGID {
-			return syserror.EPERM
+			return linuxerr.EPERM
 		}
 		if newR != creds.RealKGID && newR != creds.EffectiveKGID {
-			return syserror.EPERM
+			return linuxerr.EPERM
 		}
 	}
 	newS := creds.SavedKGID
@@ -344,7 +343,7 @@ func (t *Task) SetExtraGIDs(gids []auth.GID) error {
 	defer t.mu.Unlock()
 	creds := t.Credentials()
 	if !creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETGID) {
-		return syserror.EPERM
+		return linuxerr.EPERM
 	}
 	kgids := make([]auth.KGID, len(gids))
 	for i, gid := range gids {
@@ -368,25 +367,25 @@ func (t *Task) SetCapabilitySets(permitted, inheritable, effective auth.Capabili
 	// "Permitted: This is a limiting superset for the effective capabilities
 	// that the thread may assume." - capabilities(7)
 	if effective & ^permitted != 0 {
-		return syserror.EPERM
+		return linuxerr.EPERM
 	}
 	creds := t.Credentials()
 	// "It is also a limiting superset for the capabilities that may be added
 	// to the inheritable set by a thread that does not have the CAP_SETPCAP
 	// capability in its effective set."
 	if !creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETPCAP) && (inheritable & ^(creds.InheritableCaps|creds.PermittedCaps) != 0) {
-		return syserror.EPERM
+		return linuxerr.EPERM
 	}
 	// "If a thread drops a capability from its permitted set, it can never
 	// reacquire that capability (unless it execve(2)s ..."
 	if permitted & ^creds.PermittedCaps != 0 {
-		return syserror.EPERM
+		return linuxerr.EPERM
 	}
 	// "... if a capability is not in the bounding set, then a thread can't add
 	// this capability to its inheritable set, even if it was in its permitted
 	// capabilities ..."
 	if inheritable & ^(creds.InheritableCaps|creds.BoundingCaps) != 0 {
-		return syserror.EPERM
+		return linuxerr.EPERM
 	}
 	creds = creds.Fork() // The credentials object is immutable. See doc for creds.
 	creds.PermittedCaps = permitted
@@ -403,7 +402,7 @@ func (t *Task) DropBoundingCapability(cp linux.Capability) error {
 	defer t.mu.Unlock()
 	creds := t.Credentials()
 	if !creds.HasCapability(linux.CAP_SETPCAP) {
-		return syserror.EPERM
+		return linuxerr.EPERM
 	}
 	creds = creds.Fork() // The credentials object is immutable. See doc for creds.
 	creds.BoundingCaps &^= auth.CapabilitySetOf(cp)
@@ -423,7 +422,7 @@ func (t *Task) SetUserNamespace(ns *auth.UserNamespace) error {
 	// If t just created ns, then t.creds is guaranteed to have CAP_SYS_ADMIN
 	// in ns (by rule 3 in auth.Credentials.HasCapability).
 	if !creds.HasCapabilityIn(linux.CAP_SYS_ADMIN, ns) {
-		return syserror.EPERM
+		return linuxerr.EPERM
 	}
 
 	creds = creds.Fork() // The credentials object is immutable. See doc for creds.