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authorGoogler <noreply@google.com>2018-04-27 10:37:02 -0700
committerAdin Scannell <ascannell@google.com>2018-04-28 01:44:26 -0400
commitd02b74a5dcfed4bfc8f2f8e545bca4d2afabb296 (patch)
tree54f95eef73aee6bacbfc736fffc631be2605ed53 /pkg/sentry/kernel/ptrace.go
parentf70210e742919f40aa2f0934a22f1c9ba6dada62 (diff)
Check in gVisor.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 194583126 Change-Id: Ica1d8821a90f74e7e745962d71801c598c652463
Diffstat (limited to 'pkg/sentry/kernel/ptrace.go')
-rw-r--r--pkg/sentry/kernel/ptrace.go1054
1 files changed, 1054 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/kernel/ptrace.go b/pkg/sentry/kernel/ptrace.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..20b1c4cd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pkg/sentry/kernel/ptrace.go
@@ -0,0 +1,1054 @@
+// Copyright 2018 Google Inc.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package kernel
+
+import (
+ "fmt"
+ "syscall"
+
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/abi/linux"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/arch"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/sentry/usermem"
+ "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/syserror"
+)
+
+// ptrace constants from Linux's include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h.
+const (
+ _PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP = 7
+ PTRACE_SEIZE = 0x4206
+ PTRACE_INTERRUPT = 0x4207
+ PTRACE_LISTEN = 0x4208
+ PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO = 0x4209
+ PTRACE_GETSIGMASK = 0x420a
+ PTRACE_SETSIGMASK = 0x420b
+ _PTRACE_O_EXITKILL = 1 << 20
+ _PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP = 1 << _PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
+)
+
+// ptraceOptions are the subset of options controlling a task's ptrace behavior
+// that are set by ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS).
+type ptraceOptions struct {
+ // ExitKill is true if the tracee should be sent SIGKILL when the tracer
+ // exits.
+ ExitKill bool
+
+ // If SysGood is true, set bit 7 in the signal number for
+ // syscall-entry-stop and syscall-exit-stop traps delivered to this task's
+ // tracer.
+ SysGood bool
+
+ // TraceClone is true if the tracer wants to receive PTRACE_EVENT_CLONE
+ // events.
+ TraceClone bool
+
+ // TraceExec is true if the tracer wants to receive PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC
+ // events.
+ TraceExec bool
+
+ // TraceExit is true if the tracer wants to receive PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT
+ // events.
+ TraceExit bool
+
+ // TraceFork is true if the tracer wants to receive PTRACE_EVENT_FORK
+ // events.
+ TraceFork bool
+
+ // TraceSeccomp is true if the tracer wants to receive PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
+ // events.
+ TraceSeccomp bool
+
+ // TraceVfork is true if the tracer wants to receive PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK
+ // events.
+ TraceVfork bool
+
+ // TraceVforkDone is true if the tracer wants to receive
+ // PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE events.
+ TraceVforkDone bool
+}
+
+// ptraceSyscallMode controls the behavior of a ptraced task at syscall entry
+// and exit.
+type ptraceSyscallMode int
+
+const (
+ // ptraceSyscallNone indicates that the task has never ptrace-stopped, or
+ // that it was resumed from its last ptrace-stop by PTRACE_CONT or
+ // PTRACE_DETACH. The task's syscalls will not be intercepted.
+ ptraceSyscallNone ptraceSyscallMode = iota
+
+ // ptraceSyscallIntercept indicates that the task was resumed from its last
+ // ptrace-stop by PTRACE_SYSCALL. The next time the task enters or exits a
+ // syscall, a ptrace-stop will occur.
+ ptraceSyscallIntercept
+
+ // ptraceSyscallEmu indicates that the task was resumed from its last
+ // ptrace-stop by PTRACE_SYSEMU or PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP. The next time
+ // the task enters a syscall, the syscall will be skipped, and a
+ // ptrace-stop will occur.
+ ptraceSyscallEmu
+)
+
+// CanTrace checks that t is permitted to access target's state, as defined by
+// ptrace(2), subsection "Ptrace access mode checking". If attach is true, it
+// checks for access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH; otherwise, it checks for access
+// mode PTRACE_MODE_READ.
+func (t *Task) CanTrace(target *Task, attach bool) bool {
+ // "1. If the calling thread and the target thread are in the same thread
+ // group, access is always allowed." - ptrace(2)
+ //
+ // Note: Strictly speaking, prior to 73af963f9f30 ("__ptrace_may_access()
+ // should not deny sub-threads", first released in Linux 3.12), the rule
+ // only applies if t and target are the same task. But, as that commit
+ // message puts it, "[any] security check is pointless when the tasks share
+ // the same ->mm."
+ if t.tg == target.tg {
+ return true
+ }
+
+ // """
+ // 2. If the access mode specifies PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS (ED: snipped,
+ // doesn't exist until Linux 4.5).
+ //
+ // Otherwise, the access mode specifies PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS, so use the
+ // caller's real UID and GID for the checks in the next step. (Most APIs
+ // that check the caller's UID and GID use the effective IDs. For
+ // historical reasons, the PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS check uses the real IDs
+ // instead.)
+ //
+ // 3. Deny access if neither of the following is true:
+ //
+ // - The real, effective, and saved-set user IDs of the target match the
+ // caller's user ID, *and* the real, effective, and saved-set group IDs of
+ // the target match the caller's group ID.
+ //
+ // - The caller has the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability in the user namespace of
+ // the target.
+ //
+ // 4. Deny access if the target process "dumpable" attribute has a value
+ // other than 1 (SUID_DUMP_USER; see the discussion of PR_SET_DUMPABLE in
+ // prctl(2)), and the caller does not have the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability in
+ // the user namespace of the target process.
+ //
+ // 5. The kernel LSM security_ptrace_access_check() interface is invoked to
+ // see if ptrace access is permitted. The results depend on the LSM(s). The
+ // implementation of this interface in the commoncap LSM performs the
+ // following steps:
+ //
+ // a) If the access mode includes PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS, then use the
+ // caller's effective capability set; otherwise (the access mode specifies
+ // PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS, so) use the caller's permitted capability set.
+ //
+ // b) Deny access if neither of the following is true:
+ //
+ // - The caller and the target process are in the same user namespace, and
+ // the caller's capabilities are a proper superset of the target process's
+ // permitted capabilities.
+ //
+ // - The caller has the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability in the target process's
+ // user namespace.
+ //
+ // Note that the commoncap LSM does not distinguish between
+ // PTRACE_MODE_READ and PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH. (ED: From earlier in this
+ // section: "the commoncap LSM ... is always invoked".)
+ // """
+ callerCreds := t.Credentials()
+ targetCreds := target.Credentials()
+ if callerCreds.HasCapabilityIn(linux.CAP_SYS_PTRACE, targetCreds.UserNamespace) {
+ return true
+ }
+ if cuid := callerCreds.RealKUID; cuid != targetCreds.RealKUID || cuid != targetCreds.EffectiveKUID || cuid != targetCreds.SavedKUID {
+ return false
+ }
+ if cgid := callerCreds.RealKGID; cgid != targetCreds.RealKGID || cgid != targetCreds.EffectiveKGID || cgid != targetCreds.SavedKGID {
+ return false
+ }
+ // TODO: dumpability check
+ if callerCreds.UserNamespace != targetCreds.UserNamespace {
+ return false
+ }
+ if targetCreds.PermittedCaps&^callerCreds.PermittedCaps != 0 {
+ return false
+ }
+ // TODO: Yama LSM
+ return true
+}
+
+// Tracer returns t's ptrace Tracer.
+func (t *Task) Tracer() *Task {
+ return t.ptraceTracer.Load().(*Task)
+}
+
+// hasTracer returns true if t has a ptrace tracer attached.
+func (t *Task) hasTracer() bool {
+ // This isn't just inlined into callers so that if Task.Tracer() turns out
+ // to be too expensive because of e.g. interface conversion, we can switch
+ // to having a separate atomic flag more easily.
+ return t.Tracer() != nil
+}
+
+// ptraceStop is a TaskStop placed on tasks in a ptrace-stop.
+type ptraceStop struct {
+ // If frozen is true, the stopped task's tracer is currently operating on
+ // it, so Task.Kill should not remove the stop.
+ frozen bool
+}
+
+// Killable implements TaskStop.Killable.
+func (s *ptraceStop) Killable() bool {
+ return !s.frozen
+}
+
+// beginPtraceStopLocked initiates an unfrozen ptrace-stop on t. If t has been
+// killed, the stop is skipped, and beginPtraceStopLocked returns false.
+//
+// beginPtraceStopLocked does not signal t's tracer or wake it if it is
+// waiting.
+//
+// Preconditions: The TaskSet mutex must be locked. The caller must be running
+// on the task goroutine.
+func (t *Task) beginPtraceStopLocked() bool {
+ t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Unlock()
+ // This is analogous to Linux's kernel/signal.c:ptrace_stop() => ... =>
+ // kernel/sched/core.c:__schedule() => signal_pending_state() check, which
+ // is what prevents tasks from entering ptrace-stops after being killed.
+ // Note that if t was SIGKILLed and beingPtraceStopLocked is being called
+ // for PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT, the task will have dequeued the signal before
+ // entering the exit path, so t.killable() will no longer return true. This
+ // is consistent with Linux: "Bugs: ... A SIGKILL signal may still cause a
+ // PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT stop before actual signal death. This may be changed
+ // in the future; SIGKILL is meant to always immediately kill tasks even
+ // under ptrace. Last confirmed on Linux 3.13." - ptrace(2)
+ if t.killedLocked() {
+ return false
+ }
+ t.beginInternalStopLocked(&ptraceStop{})
+ return true
+}
+
+// Preconditions: The TaskSet mutex must be locked.
+func (t *Task) ptraceTrapLocked(code int32) {
+ t.ptraceCode = code
+ t.ptraceSiginfo = &arch.SignalInfo{
+ Signo: int32(linux.SIGTRAP),
+ Code: code,
+ }
+ t.ptraceSiginfo.SetPid(int32(t.tg.pidns.tids[t]))
+ t.ptraceSiginfo.SetUid(int32(t.Credentials().RealKUID.In(t.UserNamespace()).OrOverflow()))
+ if t.beginPtraceStopLocked() {
+ tracer := t.Tracer()
+ tracer.signalStop(t, arch.CLD_TRAPPED, int32(linux.SIGTRAP))
+ tracer.tg.eventQueue.Notify(EventTraceeStop)
+ }
+}
+
+// ptraceFreeze checks if t is in a ptraceStop. If so, it freezes the
+// ptraceStop, temporarily preventing it from being removed by a concurrent
+// Task.Kill, and returns true. Otherwise it returns false.
+//
+// Preconditions: The TaskSet mutex must be locked. The caller must be running
+// on the task goroutine of t's tracer.
+func (t *Task) ptraceFreeze() bool {
+ t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Unlock()
+ if t.stop == nil {
+ return false
+ }
+ s, ok := t.stop.(*ptraceStop)
+ if !ok {
+ return false
+ }
+ s.frozen = true
+ return true
+}
+
+// ptraceUnfreeze ends the effect of a previous successful call to
+// ptraceFreeze.
+//
+// Preconditions: t must be in a frozen ptraceStop.
+func (t *Task) ptraceUnfreeze() {
+ // t.tg.signalHandlers is stable because t is in a frozen ptrace-stop,
+ // preventing its thread group from completing execve.
+ t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Unlock()
+ // Do this even if the task has been killed to ensure a panic if t.stop is
+ // nil or not a ptraceStop.
+ t.stop.(*ptraceStop).frozen = false
+ if t.killedLocked() {
+ t.endInternalStopLocked()
+ }
+}
+
+// ptraceUnstop implements ptrace request PTRACE_CONT, PTRACE_SYSCALL,
+// PTRACE_SINGLESTEP, PTRACE_SYSEMU, or PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP depending on
+// mode and singlestep.
+//
+// Preconditions: t must be in a frozen ptrace stop.
+//
+// Postconditions: If ptraceUnstop returns nil, t will no longer be in a ptrace
+// stop.
+func (t *Task) ptraceUnstop(mode ptraceSyscallMode, singlestep bool, sig linux.Signal) error {
+ if sig != 0 && !sig.IsValid() {
+ return syserror.EIO
+ }
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Unlock()
+ t.ptraceCode = int32(sig)
+ t.ptraceSyscallMode = mode
+ t.ptraceSinglestep = singlestep
+ t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Unlock()
+ t.endInternalStopLocked()
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (t *Task) ptraceTraceme() error {
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Unlock()
+ if t.hasTracer() {
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ if t.parent == nil {
+ // In Linux, only init can not have a parent, and init is assumed never
+ // to invoke PTRACE_TRACEME. In the sentry, TGID 1 is an arbitrary user
+ // application that may invoke PTRACE_TRACEME; having no parent can
+ // also occur if all tasks in the parent thread group have exited, and
+ // failed to find a living thread group to reparent to. The former case
+ // is treated as if TGID 1 has an exited parent in an invisible
+ // ancestor PID namespace that is an owner of the root user namespace
+ // (and consequently has CAP_SYS_PTRACE), and the latter case is a
+ // special form of the exited parent case below. In either case,
+ // returning nil here is correct.
+ return nil
+ }
+ if !t.parent.CanTrace(t, true) {
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ if t.parent.exitState != TaskExitNone {
+ // Fail silently, as if we were successfully attached but then
+ // immediately detached. This is consistent with Linux.
+ return nil
+ }
+ t.ptraceTracer.Store(t.parent)
+ t.parent.ptraceTracees[t] = struct{}{}
+ return nil
+}
+
+// ptraceAttach implements ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, target). t is the caller.
+func (t *Task) ptraceAttach(target *Task) error {
+ if t.tg == target.tg {
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ if !t.CanTrace(target, true) {
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Unlock()
+ if target.hasTracer() {
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ // Attaching to zombies and dead tasks is not permitted; the exit
+ // notification logic relies on this. Linux allows attaching to PF_EXITING
+ // tasks, though.
+ if target.exitState >= TaskExitZombie {
+ return syserror.EPERM
+ }
+ target.ptraceTracer.Store(t)
+ t.ptraceTracees[target] = struct{}{}
+ target.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Lock()
+ target.sendSignalLocked(&arch.SignalInfo{
+ Signo: int32(linux.SIGSTOP),
+ Code: arch.SignalInfoUser,
+ }, false /* group */)
+ // Undocumented Linux feature: If the tracee is already group-stopped (and
+ // consequently will not report the SIGSTOP just sent), force it to leave
+ // and re-enter the stop so that it will switch to a ptrace-stop.
+ if target.stop == (*groupStop)(nil) {
+ target.groupStopRequired = true
+ target.endInternalStopLocked()
+ }
+ target.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Unlock()
+ return nil
+}
+
+// ptraceDetach implements ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, target, 0, sig). t is the
+// caller.
+//
+// Preconditions: target must be a tracee of t in a frozen ptrace stop.
+//
+// Postconditions: If ptraceDetach returns nil, target will no longer be in a
+// ptrace stop.
+func (t *Task) ptraceDetach(target *Task, sig linux.Signal) error {
+ if sig != 0 && !sig.IsValid() {
+ return syserror.EIO
+ }
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Unlock()
+ target.ptraceCode = int32(sig)
+ target.forgetTracerLocked()
+ delete(t.ptraceTracees, target)
+ return nil
+}
+
+// exitPtrace is called in the exit path to detach all of t's tracees.
+func (t *Task) exitPtrace() {
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Unlock()
+ for target := range t.ptraceTracees {
+ if target.ptraceOpts.ExitKill {
+ target.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Lock()
+ target.sendSignalLocked(&arch.SignalInfo{
+ Signo: int32(linux.SIGKILL),
+ }, false /* group */)
+ target.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Unlock()
+ }
+ // Leave ptraceCode unchanged so that if the task is ptrace-stopped, it
+ // observes the ptraceCode it set before it entered the stop. I believe
+ // this is consistent with Linux.
+ target.forgetTracerLocked()
+ }
+ // "nil maps cannot be saved"
+ t.ptraceTracees = make(map[*Task]struct{})
+}
+
+// forgetTracerLocked detaches t's tracer and ensures that t is no longer
+// ptrace-stopped.
+//
+// Preconditions: The TaskSet mutex must be locked for writing.
+func (t *Task) forgetTracerLocked() {
+ t.ptraceOpts = ptraceOptions{}
+ t.ptraceSyscallMode = ptraceSyscallNone
+ t.ptraceSinglestep = false
+ t.ptraceTracer.Store((*Task)(nil))
+ if t.exitTracerNotified && !t.exitTracerAcked {
+ t.exitTracerAcked = true
+ t.exitNotifyLocked(true)
+ }
+ // If t is ptrace-stopped, but its thread group is in a group stop and t is
+ // eligible to participate, make it do so. This is essentially the reverse
+ // of the special case in ptraceAttach, which converts a group stop to a
+ // ptrace stop. ("Handling of restart from group-stop is currently buggy,
+ // but the "as planned" behavior is to leave tracee stopped and waiting for
+ // SIGCONT." - ptrace(2))
+ t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Unlock()
+ if t.stop == nil {
+ return
+ }
+ if _, ok := t.stop.(*ptraceStop); ok {
+ if t.exitState < TaskExitInitiated && t.tg.groupStopPhase >= groupStopInitiated {
+ t.groupStopRequired = true
+ }
+ t.endInternalStopLocked()
+ }
+}
+
+// ptraceSignalLocked is called after signal dequeueing to check if t should
+// enter ptrace signal-delivery-stop.
+//
+// Preconditions: The signal mutex must be locked. The caller must be running
+// on the task goroutine.
+func (t *Task) ptraceSignalLocked(info *arch.SignalInfo) bool {
+ if linux.Signal(info.Signo) == linux.SIGKILL {
+ return false
+ }
+ if !t.hasTracer() {
+ return false
+ }
+ // The tracer might change this signal into a stop signal, in which case
+ // any SIGCONT received after the signal was originally dequeued should
+ // cancel it. This is consistent with Linux.
+ if t.tg.groupStopPhase == groupStopNone {
+ t.tg.groupStopPhase = groupStopDequeued
+ }
+ // Can't lock the TaskSet mutex while holding a signal mutex.
+ t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Unlock()
+ defer t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Lock()
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RLock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ tracer := t.Tracer()
+ if tracer == nil {
+ return false
+ }
+ t.ptraceCode = info.Signo
+ t.ptraceSiginfo = info
+ t.Debugf("Entering signal-delivery-stop for signal %d", info.Signo)
+ if t.beginPtraceStopLocked() {
+ tracer.signalStop(t, arch.CLD_TRAPPED, info.Signo)
+ tracer.tg.eventQueue.Notify(EventTraceeStop)
+ }
+ return true
+}
+
+// ptraceSeccomp is called when a seccomp-bpf filter returns action
+// SECCOMP_RET_TRACE to check if t should enter PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP stop. data
+// is the lower 16 bits of the filter's return value.
+func (t *Task) ptraceSeccomp(data uint16) bool {
+ if !t.hasTracer() {
+ return false
+ }
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RLock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ if !t.ptraceOpts.TraceSeccomp {
+ return false
+ }
+ t.Debugf("Entering PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP stop")
+ t.ptraceEventLocked(_PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, uint64(data))
+ return true
+}
+
+// ptraceSyscallEnter is called immediately before entering a syscall to check
+// if t should enter ptrace syscall-enter-stop.
+func (t *Task) ptraceSyscallEnter() (taskRunState, bool) {
+ if !t.hasTracer() {
+ return nil, false
+ }
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RLock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ switch t.ptraceSyscallMode {
+ case ptraceSyscallNone:
+ return nil, false
+ case ptraceSyscallIntercept:
+ t.Debugf("Entering syscall-enter-stop from PTRACE_SYSCALL")
+ t.ptraceSyscallStopLocked()
+ return (*runSyscallAfterSyscallEnterStop)(nil), true
+ case ptraceSyscallEmu:
+ t.Debugf("Entering syscall-enter-stop from PTRACE_SYSEMU")
+ t.ptraceSyscallStopLocked()
+ return (*runSyscallAfterSysemuStop)(nil), true
+ }
+ panic(fmt.Sprintf("Unknown ptraceSyscallMode: %v", t.ptraceSyscallMode))
+}
+
+// ptraceSyscallExit is called immediately after leaving a syscall to check if
+// t should enter ptrace syscall-exit-stop.
+func (t *Task) ptraceSyscallExit() {
+ if !t.hasTracer() {
+ return
+ }
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RLock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ if t.ptraceSyscallMode != ptraceSyscallIntercept {
+ return
+ }
+ t.Debugf("Entering syscall-exit-stop")
+ t.ptraceSyscallStopLocked()
+}
+
+// Preconditions: The TaskSet mutex must be locked.
+func (t *Task) ptraceSyscallStopLocked() {
+ code := int32(linux.SIGTRAP)
+ if t.ptraceOpts.SysGood {
+ code |= 0x80
+ }
+ t.ptraceTrapLocked(code)
+}
+
+type ptraceCloneKind int32
+
+const (
+ // ptraceCloneKindClone represents a call to Task.Clone where
+ // TerminationSignal is not SIGCHLD and Vfork is false.
+ ptraceCloneKindClone ptraceCloneKind = iota
+
+ // ptraceCloneKindFork represents a call to Task.Clone where
+ // TerminationSignal is SIGCHLD and Vfork is false.
+ ptraceCloneKindFork
+
+ // ptraceCloneKindVfork represents a call to Task.Clone where Vfork is
+ // true.
+ ptraceCloneKindVfork
+)
+
+// ptraceClone is called at the end of a clone or fork syscall to check if t
+// should enter PTRACE_EVENT_CLONE, PTRACE_EVENT_FORK, or PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK
+// stop. child is the new task.
+func (t *Task) ptraceClone(kind ptraceCloneKind, child *Task, opts *CloneOptions) bool {
+ if !t.hasTracer() {
+ return false
+ }
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RLock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ event := false
+ if !opts.Untraced {
+ switch kind {
+ case ptraceCloneKindClone:
+ if t.ptraceOpts.TraceClone {
+ t.Debugf("Entering PTRACE_EVENT_CLONE stop")
+ t.ptraceEventLocked(syscall.PTRACE_EVENT_CLONE, uint64(t.tg.pidns.tids[child]))
+ event = true
+ }
+ case ptraceCloneKindFork:
+ if t.ptraceOpts.TraceFork {
+ t.Debugf("Entering PTRACE_EVENT_FORK stop")
+ t.ptraceEventLocked(syscall.PTRACE_EVENT_FORK, uint64(t.tg.pidns.tids[child]))
+ event = true
+ }
+ case ptraceCloneKindVfork:
+ if t.ptraceOpts.TraceVfork {
+ t.Debugf("Entering PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK stop")
+ t.ptraceEventLocked(syscall.PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK, uint64(t.tg.pidns.tids[child]))
+ event = true
+ }
+ default:
+ panic(fmt.Sprintf("Unknown ptraceCloneKind: %v", kind))
+ }
+ }
+ // "If the PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK, PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK, or PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE
+ // options are in effect, then children created by, respectively, vfork(2)
+ // or clone(2) with the CLONE_VFORK flag, fork(2) or clone(2) with the exit
+ // signal set to SIGCHLD, and other kinds of clone(2), are automatically
+ // attached to the same tracer which traced their parent. SIGSTOP is
+ // delivered to the children, causing them to enter signal-delivery-stop
+ // after they exit the system call which created them." - ptrace(2)
+ //
+ // clone(2)'s documentation of CLONE_UNTRACED and CLONE_PTRACE is
+ // confusingly wrong; see kernel/fork.c:_do_fork() => copy_process() =>
+ // include/linux/ptrace.h:ptrace_init_task().
+ if event || opts.InheritTracer {
+ tracer := t.Tracer()
+ if tracer != nil {
+ child.ptraceTracer.Store(tracer)
+ tracer.ptraceTracees[child] = struct{}{}
+ // "Flags are inherited by new tracees created and "auto-attached"
+ // via active PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK, PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK, or
+ // PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE options."
+ child.ptraceOpts = t.ptraceOpts
+ child.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Lock()
+ // If the child is PT_SEIZED (currently not possible in the sentry
+ // because PTRACE_SEIZE is unimplemented, but for future
+ // reference), Linux just sets JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP instead, so the
+ // child skips signal-delivery-stop and goes directly to
+ // group-stop.
+ //
+ // The child will self-t.interrupt() when its task goroutine starts
+ // running, so we don't have to.
+ child.pendingSignals.enqueue(&arch.SignalInfo{
+ Signo: int32(linux.SIGSTOP),
+ })
+ child.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Unlock()
+ }
+ }
+ return event
+}
+
+// ptraceVforkDone is called after the end of a vfork stop to check if t should
+// enter PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE stop. child is the new task's thread ID in t's
+// PID namespace.
+func (t *Task) ptraceVforkDone(child ThreadID) bool {
+ if !t.hasTracer() {
+ return false
+ }
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RLock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ if !t.ptraceOpts.TraceVforkDone {
+ return false
+ }
+ t.Debugf("Entering PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE stop")
+ t.ptraceEventLocked(syscall.PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE, uint64(child))
+ return true
+}
+
+// ptraceExec is called at the end of an execve syscall to check if t should
+// enter PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stop. oldTID is t's thread ID, in its *tracer's* PID
+// namespace, prior to the execve. (If t did not have a tracer at the time
+// oldTID was read, oldTID may be 0. This is consistent with Linux.)
+func (t *Task) ptraceExec(oldTID ThreadID) {
+ if !t.hasTracer() {
+ return
+ }
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RLock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ // Recheck with the TaskSet mutex locked. Most ptrace points don't need to
+ // do this because detaching resets ptrace options, but PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC
+ // is special because both TraceExec and !TraceExec do something if a
+ // tracer is attached.
+ if !t.hasTracer() {
+ return
+ }
+ if t.ptraceOpts.TraceExec {
+ t.Debugf("Entering PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stop")
+ t.ptraceEventLocked(syscall.PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, uint64(oldTID))
+ return
+ }
+ // "If the PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC option is not in effect for the execing
+ // tracee, and if the tracee was PTRACE_ATTACHed rather that [sic]
+ // PTRACE_SEIZEd, the kernel delivers an extra SIGTRAP to the tracee after
+ // execve(2) returns. This is an ordinary signal (similar to one which can
+ // be generated by `kill -TRAP`, not a special kind of ptrace-stop.
+ // Employing PTRACE_GETSIGINFO for this signal returns si_code set to 0
+ // (SI_USER). This signal may be blocked by signal mask, and thus may be
+ // delivered (much) later." - ptrace(2)
+ t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Unlock()
+ t.sendSignalLocked(&arch.SignalInfo{
+ Signo: int32(linux.SIGTRAP),
+ Code: arch.SignalInfoUser,
+ }, false /* group */)
+}
+
+// ptraceExit is called early in the task exit path to check if t should enter
+// PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT stop.
+func (t *Task) ptraceExit() {
+ if !t.hasTracer() {
+ return
+ }
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RLock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ if !t.ptraceOpts.TraceExit {
+ return
+ }
+ t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Lock()
+ status := t.exitStatus.Status()
+ t.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Unlock()
+ t.Debugf("Entering PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT stop")
+ t.ptraceEventLocked(syscall.PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT, uint64(status))
+}
+
+// Preconditions: The TaskSet mutex must be locked.
+func (t *Task) ptraceEventLocked(event int32, msg uint64) {
+ t.ptraceEventMsg = msg
+ // """
+ // PTRACE_EVENT stops are observed by the tracer as waitpid(2) returning
+ // with WIFSTOPPED(status), and WSTOPSIG(status) returns SIGTRAP. An
+ // additional bit is set in the higher byte of the status word: the value
+ // status>>8 will be
+ //
+ // (SIGTRAP | PTRACE_EVENT_foo << 8).
+ //
+ // ...
+ //
+ // """ - ptrace(2)
+ t.ptraceTrapLocked(int32(linux.SIGTRAP) | (event << 8))
+}
+
+// ptraceKill implements ptrace(PTRACE_KILL, target). t is the caller.
+func (t *Task) ptraceKill(target *Task) error {
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Unlock()
+ if target.Tracer() != t {
+ return syserror.ESRCH
+ }
+ target.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Lock()
+ defer target.tg.signalHandlers.mu.Unlock()
+ // "This operation is deprecated; do not use it! Instead, send a SIGKILL
+ // directly using kill(2) or tgkill(2). The problem with PTRACE_KILL is
+ // that it requires the tracee to be in signal-delivery-stop, otherwise it
+ // may not work (i.e., may complete successfully but won't kill the
+ // tracee)." - ptrace(2)
+ if target.stop == nil {
+ return nil
+ }
+ if _, ok := target.stop.(*ptraceStop); !ok {
+ return nil
+ }
+ target.ptraceCode = int32(linux.SIGKILL)
+ target.endInternalStopLocked()
+ return nil
+}
+
+// Ptrace implements the ptrace system call.
+func (t *Task) Ptrace(req int64, pid ThreadID, addr, data usermem.Addr) error {
+ // PTRACE_TRACEME ignores all other arguments.
+ if req == syscall.PTRACE_TRACEME {
+ return t.ptraceTraceme()
+ }
+ // All other ptrace requests operate on a current or future tracee
+ // specified by pid.
+ target := t.tg.pidns.TaskWithID(pid)
+ if target == nil {
+ return syserror.ESRCH
+ }
+
+ // PTRACE_ATTACH (and PTRACE_SEIZE, which is unimplemented) do not require
+ // that target is not already a tracee.
+ if req == syscall.PTRACE_ATTACH {
+ return t.ptraceAttach(target)
+ }
+ // PTRACE_KILL (and PTRACE_INTERRUPT, which is unimplemented) require that
+ // the target is a tracee, but does not require that it is ptrace-stopped.
+ if req == syscall.PTRACE_KILL {
+ return t.ptraceKill(target)
+ }
+ // All other ptrace requests require that the target is a ptrace-stopped
+ // tracee, and freeze the ptrace-stop so the tracee can be operated on.
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RLock()
+ if target.Tracer() != t {
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ return syserror.ESRCH
+ }
+ if !target.ptraceFreeze() {
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ // "Most ptrace commands (all except PTRACE_ATTACH, PTRACE_SEIZE,
+ // PTRACE_TRACEME, PTRACE_INTERRUPT, and PTRACE_KILL) require the
+ // tracee to be in a ptrace-stop, otherwise they fail with ESRCH." -
+ // ptrace(2)
+ return syserror.ESRCH
+ }
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ // Even if the target has a ptrace-stop active, the tracee's task goroutine
+ // may not yet have reached Task.doStop; wait for it to do so. This is safe
+ // because there's no way for target to initiate a ptrace-stop and then
+ // block (by calling Task.block) before entering it.
+ //
+ // Caveat: If tasks were just restored, the tracee's first call to
+ // Task.Activate (in Task.run) occurs before its first call to Task.doStop,
+ // which may block if the tracer's address space is active.
+ t.UninterruptibleSleepStart(true)
+ target.waitGoroutineStoppedOrExited()
+ t.UninterruptibleSleepFinish(true)
+
+ // Resuming commands end the ptrace stop, but only if successful.
+ switch req {
+ case syscall.PTRACE_DETACH:
+ if err := t.ptraceDetach(target, linux.Signal(data)); err != nil {
+ target.ptraceUnfreeze()
+ return err
+ }
+ return nil
+ case syscall.PTRACE_CONT:
+ if err := target.ptraceUnstop(ptraceSyscallNone, false, linux.Signal(data)); err != nil {
+ target.ptraceUnfreeze()
+ return err
+ }
+ return nil
+ case syscall.PTRACE_SYSCALL:
+ if err := target.ptraceUnstop(ptraceSyscallIntercept, false, linux.Signal(data)); err != nil {
+ target.ptraceUnfreeze()
+ return err
+ }
+ return nil
+ case syscall.PTRACE_SINGLESTEP:
+ if err := target.ptraceUnstop(ptraceSyscallNone, true, linux.Signal(data)); err != nil {
+ target.ptraceUnfreeze()
+ return err
+ }
+ return nil
+ case syscall.PTRACE_SYSEMU:
+ if err := target.ptraceUnstop(ptraceSyscallEmu, false, linux.Signal(data)); err != nil {
+ target.ptraceUnfreeze()
+ return err
+ }
+ return nil
+ case syscall.PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP:
+ if err := target.ptraceUnstop(ptraceSyscallEmu, true, linux.Signal(data)); err != nil {
+ target.ptraceUnfreeze()
+ return err
+ }
+ return nil
+ }
+ // All other ptrace requests expect us to unfreeze the stop.
+ defer target.ptraceUnfreeze()
+
+ switch req {
+ case syscall.PTRACE_PEEKTEXT, syscall.PTRACE_PEEKDATA:
+ // "At the system call level, the PTRACE_PEEKTEXT, PTRACE_PEEKDATA, and
+ // PTRACE_PEEKUSER requests have a different API: they store the result
+ // at the address specified by the data parameter, and the return value
+ // is the error flag." - ptrace(2)
+ word := t.Arch().Native(0)
+ if _, err := usermem.CopyObjectIn(t, target.MemoryManager(), addr, word, usermem.IOOpts{
+ IgnorePermissions: true,
+ }); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ _, err := t.CopyOut(data, word)
+ return err
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_POKETEXT, syscall.PTRACE_POKEDATA:
+ _, err := usermem.CopyObjectOut(t, target.MemoryManager(), addr, t.Arch().Native(uintptr(data)), usermem.IOOpts{
+ IgnorePermissions: true,
+ })
+ return err
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_PEEKUSR: // aka PTRACE_PEEKUSER
+ n, err := target.Arch().PtracePeekUser(uintptr(addr))
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ _, err = t.CopyOut(data, n)
+ return err
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_POKEUSR: // aka PTRACE_POKEUSER
+ return target.Arch().PtracePokeUser(uintptr(addr), uintptr(data))
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_GETREGS:
+ // "Copy the tracee's general-purpose ... registers ... to the address
+ // data in the tracer. ... (addr is ignored.) Note that SPARC systems
+ // have the meaning of data and addr reversed ..."
+ _, err := target.Arch().PtraceGetRegs(&usermem.IOReadWriter{
+ Ctx: t,
+ IO: t.MemoryManager(),
+ Addr: data,
+ Opts: usermem.IOOpts{
+ AddressSpaceActive: true,
+ },
+ })
+ return err
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_GETFPREGS:
+ _, err := target.Arch().PtraceGetFPRegs(&usermem.IOReadWriter{
+ Ctx: t,
+ IO: t.MemoryManager(),
+ Addr: data,
+ Opts: usermem.IOOpts{
+ AddressSpaceActive: true,
+ },
+ })
+ return err
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_GETREGSET:
+ // "Read the tracee's registers. addr specifies, in an
+ // architecture-dependent way, the type of registers to be read. ...
+ // data points to a struct iovec, which describes the destination
+ // buffer's location and length. On return, the kernel modifies iov.len
+ // to indicate the actual number of bytes returned." - ptrace(2)
+ ars, err := t.CopyInIovecs(data, 1)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ ar := ars.Head()
+ n, err := target.Arch().PtraceGetRegSet(uintptr(addr), &usermem.IOReadWriter{
+ Ctx: t,
+ IO: t.MemoryManager(),
+ Addr: ar.Start,
+ Opts: usermem.IOOpts{
+ AddressSpaceActive: true,
+ },
+ }, int(ar.Length()))
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ ar.End -= usermem.Addr(n)
+ return t.CopyOutIovecs(data, usermem.AddrRangeSeqOf(ar))
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_SETREGS:
+ _, err := target.Arch().PtraceSetRegs(&usermem.IOReadWriter{
+ Ctx: t,
+ IO: t.MemoryManager(),
+ Addr: data,
+ Opts: usermem.IOOpts{
+ AddressSpaceActive: true,
+ },
+ })
+ return err
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_SETFPREGS:
+ _, err := target.Arch().PtraceSetFPRegs(&usermem.IOReadWriter{
+ Ctx: t,
+ IO: t.MemoryManager(),
+ Addr: data,
+ Opts: usermem.IOOpts{
+ AddressSpaceActive: true,
+ },
+ })
+ return err
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_SETREGSET:
+ ars, err := t.CopyInIovecs(data, 1)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ ar := ars.Head()
+ n, err := target.Arch().PtraceSetRegSet(uintptr(addr), &usermem.IOReadWriter{
+ Ctx: t,
+ IO: t.MemoryManager(),
+ Addr: ar.Start,
+ Opts: usermem.IOOpts{
+ AddressSpaceActive: true,
+ },
+ }, int(ar.Length()))
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ ar.End -= usermem.Addr(n)
+ return t.CopyOutIovecs(data, usermem.AddrRangeSeqOf(ar))
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_GETSIGINFO:
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RLock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ if target.ptraceSiginfo == nil {
+ return syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+ _, err := t.CopyOut(data, target.ptraceSiginfo)
+ return err
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_SETSIGINFO:
+ var info arch.SignalInfo
+ if _, err := t.CopyIn(data, &info); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RLock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ if target.ptraceSiginfo == nil {
+ return syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+ target.ptraceSiginfo = &info
+ return nil
+
+ case PTRACE_GETSIGMASK:
+ if addr != linux.SignalSetSize {
+ return syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+ target.mu.Lock()
+ defer target.mu.Unlock()
+ _, err := t.CopyOut(data, target.tr.SignalMask)
+ return err
+
+ case PTRACE_SETSIGMASK:
+ if addr != linux.SignalSetSize {
+ return syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+ var mask linux.SignalSet
+ if _, err := t.CopyIn(data, &mask); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ // The target's task goroutine is stopped, so this is safe:
+ target.SetSignalMask(mask &^ UnblockableSignals)
+ return nil
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_SETOPTIONS:
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Lock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.Unlock()
+ validOpts := uintptr(_PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD | syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE |
+ syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC | syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT | syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK |
+ _PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP | syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK | syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORKDONE)
+ if uintptr(data)&^validOpts != 0 {
+ return syserror.EINVAL
+ }
+ target.ptraceOpts = ptraceOptions{
+ ExitKill: data&_PTRACE_O_EXITKILL != 0,
+ SysGood: data&syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD != 0,
+ TraceClone: data&syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE != 0,
+ TraceExec: data&syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC != 0,
+ TraceExit: data&syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT != 0,
+ TraceFork: data&syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK != 0,
+ TraceSeccomp: data&_PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP != 0,
+ TraceVfork: data&syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORK != 0,
+ TraceVforkDone: data&syscall.PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORKDONE != 0,
+ }
+ return nil
+
+ case syscall.PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG:
+ t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RLock()
+ defer t.tg.pidns.owner.mu.RUnlock()
+ _, err := t.CopyOut(usermem.Addr(data), target.ptraceEventMsg)
+ return err
+
+ default:
+ // PEEKSIGINFO is unimplemented but seems to have no users anywhere.
+ return syserror.EIO
+ }
+}