diff options
author | Googler <noreply@google.com> | 2018-04-27 10:37:02 -0700 |
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committer | Adin Scannell <ascannell@google.com> | 2018-04-28 01:44:26 -0400 |
commit | d02b74a5dcfed4bfc8f2f8e545bca4d2afabb296 (patch) | |
tree | 54f95eef73aee6bacbfc736fffc631be2605ed53 /pkg/seccomp/seccomp.go | |
parent | f70210e742919f40aa2f0934a22f1c9ba6dada62 (diff) |
Check in gVisor.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 194583126
Change-Id: Ica1d8821a90f74e7e745962d71801c598c652463
Diffstat (limited to 'pkg/seccomp/seccomp.go')
-rw-r--r-- | pkg/seccomp/seccomp.go | 210 |
1 files changed, 210 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/seccomp/seccomp.go b/pkg/seccomp/seccomp.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7ee63140c --- /dev/null +++ b/pkg/seccomp/seccomp.go @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +// Copyright 2018 Google Inc. +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +// You may obtain a copy of the License at +// +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +// +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +// limitations under the License. + +// Package seccomp provides basic seccomp filters. +package seccomp + +import ( + "fmt" + "sort" + + "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/abi/linux" + "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/bpf" + "gvisor.googlesource.com/gvisor/pkg/log" +) + +const ( + // violationLabel is added to the program to take action on a violation. + violationLabel = "violation" + + // allowLabel is added to the program to allow the syscall to take place. + allowLabel = "allow" +) + +// Install generates BPF code based on the set of syscalls provided. It only +// allows syscalls that conform to the specification (*) and generates SIGSYS +// trap unless kill is set. +// +// (*) The current implementation only checks the syscall number. It does NOT +// validate any of the arguments. +func Install(syscalls []uintptr, kill bool) error { + // Sort syscalls and remove duplicates to build the BST. + sort.Slice(syscalls, func(i, j int) bool { return syscalls[i] < syscalls[j] }) + syscalls = filterUnique(syscalls) + + log.Infof("Installing seccomp filters for %d syscalls (kill=%t)", len(syscalls), kill) + for _, s := range syscalls { + log.Infof("syscall filter: %v", s) + } + + instrs, err := buildProgram(syscalls, kill) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if log.IsLogging(log.Debug) { + programStr, err := bpf.DecodeProgram(instrs) + if err != nil { + programStr = fmt.Sprintf("Error: %v\n%s", err, programStr) + } + log.Debugf("Seccomp program dump:\n%s", programStr) + } + + if err := seccomp(instrs); err != nil { + return err + } + + log.Infof("Seccomp filters installed.") + return nil +} + +// buildProgram builds a BPF program that whitelists all given syscalls. +// +// Precondition: syscalls must be sorted and unique. +func buildProgram(syscalls []uintptr, kill bool) ([]linux.BPFInstruction, error) { + const archOffset = 4 // offsetof(seccomp_data, arch) + program := bpf.NewProgramBuilder() + violationAction := uint32(linux.SECCOMP_RET_KILL) + if !kill { + violationAction = linux.SECCOMP_RET_TRAP + } + + // Be paranoid and check that syscall is done in the expected architecture. + // + // A = seccomp_data.arch + // if (A != AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64) goto violation + program.AddStmt(bpf.Ld|bpf.Abs|bpf.W, archOffset) + program.AddJumpFalseLabel(bpf.Jmp|bpf.Jeq|bpf.K, linux.AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 0, violationLabel) + + if err := buildIndex(syscalls, program); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // violation: return violationAction + if err := program.AddLabel(violationLabel); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + program.AddStmt(bpf.Ret|bpf.K, violationAction) + + // allow: return SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW + if err := program.AddLabel(allowLabel); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + program.AddStmt(bpf.Ret|bpf.K, linux.SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) + + return program.Instructions() +} + +// filterUnique filters unique system calls. +// +// Precondition: syscalls must be sorted. +func filterUnique(syscalls []uintptr) []uintptr { + filtered := make([]uintptr, 0, len(syscalls)) + for i := 0; i < len(syscalls); i++ { + if len(filtered) > 0 && syscalls[i] == filtered[len(filtered)-1] { + // This call has already been inserted, skip. + continue + } + filtered = append(filtered, syscalls[i]) + } + return filtered +} + +// buildIndex builds a BST to quickly search through all syscalls that are whitelisted. +// +// Precondition: syscalls must be sorted and unique. +func buildIndex(syscalls []uintptr, program *bpf.ProgramBuilder) error { + root := createBST(syscalls) + + // Load syscall number into A and run through BST. + // + // A = seccomp_data.nr + program.AddStmt(bpf.Ld|bpf.Abs|bpf.W, 0) + return root.buildBSTProgram(program, true) +} + +// createBST converts sorted syscall slice into a balanced BST. +// Panics if syscalls is empty. +func createBST(syscalls []uintptr) *node { + i := len(syscalls) / 2 + parent := node{value: syscalls[i]} + if i > 0 { + parent.left = createBST(syscalls[:i]) + } + if i+1 < len(syscalls) { + parent.right = createBST(syscalls[i+1:]) + } + return &parent +} + +// node represents a tree node. +type node struct { + value uintptr + left *node + right *node +} + +// label returns the label corresponding to this node. If node is nil (syscall not present), +// violationLabel is returned for convenience. +func (n *node) label() string { + if n == nil { + return violationLabel + } + return fmt.Sprintf("index_%v", n.value) +} + +// buildBSTProgram converts a binary tree started in 'root' into BPF code. The ouline of the code +// is as follows: +// +// // SYS_PIPE(22), root +// (A == 22) ? goto allow : continue +// (A > 22) ? goto index_35 : goto index_9 +// +// index_9: // SYS_MMAP(9), leaf +// (A == 9) ? goto allow : goto violation +// +// index_35: // SYS_NANOSLEEP(35), single child +// (A == 35) ? goto allow : continue +// (A > 35) ? goto index_50 : goto violation +// +// index_50: // SYS_LISTEN(50), leaf +// (A == 50) ? goto allow : goto violation +// +func (n *node) buildBSTProgram(program *bpf.ProgramBuilder, root bool) error { + if n == nil { + return nil + } + + // Root node is never referenced by label, skip it. + if !root { + if err := program.AddLabel(n.label()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + // Leaf nodes don't require extra check, they either allow or violate! + if n.left == nil && n.right == nil { + program.AddJumpLabels(bpf.Jmp|bpf.Jeq|bpf.K, uint32(n.value), allowLabel, violationLabel) + return nil + } + + // Non-leaf node. Allows syscall if it matches, check which turn to take otherwise. Note + // that 'violationLabel' is returned for nil children. + program.AddJumpTrueLabel(bpf.Jmp|bpf.Jeq|bpf.K, uint32(n.value), allowLabel, 0) + program.AddJumpLabels(bpf.Jmp|bpf.Jgt|bpf.K, uint32(n.value), n.right.label(), n.left.label()) + + if err := n.left.buildBSTProgram(program, false); err != nil { + return err + } + return n.right.buildBSTProgram(program, false) +} |