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authorAdin Scannell <ascannell@google.com>2020-04-27 22:24:58 -0700
committerAdin Scannell <ascannell@google.com>2020-05-06 14:15:18 -0700
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Adapt website to use g3doc sources and bazel.
This adapts the merged website repository to use the image and bazel build framework. It explicitly avoids the container_image rules provided by bazel, opting instead to build with direct docker commands when necessary. The relevant build commands are incorporated into the top-level Makefile.
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+# Overview
+
+gVisor provides a virtualized environment in order to sandbox untrusted
+containers. The system interfaces normally implemented by the host kernel are
+moved into a distinct, per-sandbox user space kernel in order to minimize the
+risk of an exploit. gVisor does not introduce large fixed overheads however,
+and still retains a process-like model with respect to resource utilization.
+
+## How is this different?
+
+Two other approaches are commonly taken to provide stronger isolation than
+native containers.
+
+**Machine-level virtualization**, such as [KVM][kvm] and [Xen][xen], exposes
+virtualized hardware to a guest kernel via a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). This
+virtualized hardware is generally enlightened (paravirtualized) and additional
+mechanisms can be used to improve the visibility between the guest and host
+(e.g. balloon drivers, paravirtualized spinlocks). Running containers in
+distinct virtual machines can provide great isolation, compatibility and
+performance (though nested virtualization may bring challenges in this area),
+but for containers it often requires additional proxies and agents, and may
+require a larger resource footprint and slower start-up times.
+
+![Machine-level virtualization](Machine-Virtualization.png "Machine-level virtualization")
+
+**Rule-based execution**, such as [seccomp][seccomp], [SELinux][selinux] and
+[AppArmor][apparmor], allows the specification of a fine-grained security policy
+for an application or container. These schemes typically rely on hooks
+implemented inside the host kernel to enforce the rules. If the surface can be
+made small enough (i.e. a sufficiently complete policy defined), then this is an
+excellent way to sandbox applications and maintain native performance. However,
+in practice it can be extremely difficult (if not impossible) to reliably define
+a policy for arbitrary, previously unknown applications, making this approach
+challenging to apply universally.
+
+![Rule-based execution](Rule-Based-Execution.png "Rule-based execution")
+
+Rule-based execution is often combined with additional layers for
+defense-in-depth.
+
+**gVisor** provides a third isolation mechanism, distinct from those above.
+
+gVisor intercepts application system calls and acts as the guest kernel, without
+the need for translation through virtualized hardware. gVisor may be thought of
+as either a merged guest kernel and VMM, or as seccomp on steroids. This
+architecture allows it to provide a flexible resource footprint (i.e. one based
+on threads and memory mappings, not fixed guest physical resources) while also
+lowering the fixed costs of virtualization. However, this comes at the price of
+reduced application compatibility and higher per-system call overhead.
+
+![gVisor](Layers.png "gVisor")
+
+On top of this, gVisor employs rule-based execution to provide defense-in-depth
+(details below).
+
+gVisor's approach is similar to [User Mode Linux (UML)][uml], although UML
+virtualizes hardware internally and thus provides a fixed resource footprint.
+
+Each of the above approaches may excel in distinct scenarios. For example,
+machine-level virtualization will face challenges achieving high density, while
+gVisor may provide poor performance for system call heavy workloads.
+
+### Why Go?
+
+gVisor is written in [Go][golang] in order to avoid security pitfalls that can
+plague kernels. With Go, there are strong types, built-in bounds checks, no
+uninitialized variables, no use-after-free, no stack overflow, and a built-in
+race detector. (The use of Go has its challenges too, and isn't free.)
+
+### What about Gofers?
+
+<a name="gofer"></a> <!-- For deep linking. -->
+
+[apparmor]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/AppArmor
+[golang]: https://golang.org
+[kvm]: https://www.linux-kvm.org
+[seccomp]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
+[selinux]: https://selinuxproject.org
+[uml]: http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/
+[xen]: https://www.xenproject.org