diff options
| author | Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com> | 2019-10-01 15:41:32 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | gVisor bot <gvisor-bot@google.com> | 2019-10-01 15:43:14 -0700 |
| commit | 0d483985c57a2d001039d17bd198e2eca0f4ff7f (patch) | |
| tree | a8c33c51abfa639ce9522387b3b6fe84885c92d7 | |
| parent | 739f53fc17e3e3ed82dc2bc920f49fa91738a437 (diff) | |
Include AT_SECURE in the aux vector
gVisor does not currently implement the functionality that would result in
AT_SECURE = 1, but Linux includes AT_SECURE = 0 in the normal case, so we
should do the same.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 272311488
| -rw-r--r-- | pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | pkg/sentry/loader/loader.go | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | test/syscalls/linux/proc.cc | 5 |
3 files changed, 10 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go b/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go index 78ff14b20..ce3e6ef28 100644 --- a/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go +++ b/pkg/sentry/kernel/task_identity.go @@ -465,8 +465,8 @@ func (t *Task) SetKeepCaps(k bool) { // disables the features we don't support anyway, is always set. This // drastically simplifies this function. // -// - We don't implement AT_SECURE, because no_new_privs always being set means -// that the conditions that require AT_SECURE never arise. (Compare Linux's +// - We don't set AT_SECURE = 1, because no_new_privs always being set means +// that the conditions that require AT_SECURE = 1 never arise. (Compare Linux's // security/commoncap.c:cap_bprm_set_creds() and cap_bprm_secureexec().) // // - We don't check for CAP_SYS_ADMIN in prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), since diff --git a/pkg/sentry/loader/loader.go b/pkg/sentry/loader/loader.go index f6f1ae762..089d1635b 100644 --- a/pkg/sentry/loader/loader.go +++ b/pkg/sentry/loader/loader.go @@ -308,6 +308,9 @@ func Load(ctx context.Context, m *mm.MemoryManager, mounts *fs.MountNamespace, r arch.AuxEntry{linux.AT_EUID, usermem.Addr(c.EffectiveKUID.In(c.UserNamespace).OrOverflow())}, arch.AuxEntry{linux.AT_GID, usermem.Addr(c.RealKGID.In(c.UserNamespace).OrOverflow())}, arch.AuxEntry{linux.AT_EGID, usermem.Addr(c.EffectiveKGID.In(c.UserNamespace).OrOverflow())}, + // The conditions that require AT_SECURE = 1 never arise. See + // kernel.Task.updateCredsForExecLocked. + arch.AuxEntry{linux.AT_SECURE, 0}, arch.AuxEntry{linux.AT_CLKTCK, linux.CLOCKS_PER_SEC}, arch.AuxEntry{linux.AT_EXECFN, execfn}, arch.AuxEntry{linux.AT_RANDOM, random}, diff --git a/test/syscalls/linux/proc.cc b/test/syscalls/linux/proc.cc index 6f07803d9..e4c030bbb 100644 --- a/test/syscalls/linux/proc.cc +++ b/test/syscalls/linux/proc.cc @@ -440,6 +440,11 @@ TEST(ProcSelfAuxv, EntryPresence) { EXPECT_EQ(auxv_entries.count(AT_PHENT), 1); EXPECT_EQ(auxv_entries.count(AT_PHNUM), 1); EXPECT_EQ(auxv_entries.count(AT_BASE), 1); + EXPECT_EQ(auxv_entries.count(AT_UID), 1); + EXPECT_EQ(auxv_entries.count(AT_EUID), 1); + EXPECT_EQ(auxv_entries.count(AT_GID), 1); + EXPECT_EQ(auxv_entries.count(AT_EGID), 1); + EXPECT_EQ(auxv_entries.count(AT_SECURE), 1); EXPECT_EQ(auxv_entries.count(AT_CLKTCK), 1); EXPECT_EQ(auxv_entries.count(AT_RANDOM), 1); EXPECT_EQ(auxv_entries.count(AT_EXECFN), 1); |