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+/*
+ * Dropbear - a SSH2 server
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2002,2003 Matt Johnston
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+ * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+ * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE. */
+
+/* Perform RSA operations on data, including reading keys, signing and
+ * verification.
+ *
+ * The format is specified in rfc2437, Applied Cryptography or The Handbook of
+ * Applied Cryptography detail the general algorithm. */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "dbutil.h"
+#include "bignum.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "random.h"
+
+#ifdef DROPBEAR_RSA
+
+static void rsa_pad_em(rsa_key * key,
+ const unsigned char * data, unsigned int len,
+ mp_int * rsa_em);
+
+/* Load a public rsa key from a buffer, initialising the values.
+ * The key will have the same format as buf_put_rsa_key.
+ * These should be freed with rsa_key_free.
+ * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
+int buf_get_rsa_pub_key(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key) {
+
+ int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+ TRACE(("enter buf_get_rsa_pub_key"))
+ dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+ key->e = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
+ key->n = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
+ m_mp_init_multi(key->e, key->n, NULL);
+ key->d = NULL;
+ key->p = NULL;
+ key->q = NULL;
+
+ buf_incrpos(buf, 4+SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN); /* int + "ssh-rsa" */
+
+ if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->e) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE
+ || buf_getmpint(buf, key->n) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+ TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_pub_key: failure"))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (mp_count_bits(key->n) < MIN_RSA_KEYLEN) {
+ dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "rsa key too short");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_pub_key: success"))
+ ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
+out:
+ if (ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+ m_free(key->e);
+ m_free(key->n);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Same as buf_get_rsa_pub_key, but reads private bits at the end.
+ * Loads a private rsa key from a buffer
+ * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
+int buf_get_rsa_priv_key(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key) {
+ int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+
+ TRACE(("enter buf_get_rsa_priv_key"))
+ dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+
+ if (buf_get_rsa_pub_key(buf, key) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+ TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: pub: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE"))
+ return DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ key->d = NULL;
+ key->p = NULL;
+ key->q = NULL;
+
+ key->d = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
+ m_mp_init(key->d);
+ if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->d) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+ TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: d: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE"))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (buf->pos == buf->len) {
+ /* old Dropbear private keys didn't keep p and q, so we will ignore them*/
+ } else {
+ key->p = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
+ key->q = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int));
+ m_mp_init_multi(key->p, key->q, NULL);
+
+ if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->p) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+ TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: p: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE"))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->q) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+ TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: q: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE"))
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
+out:
+ if (ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+ m_free(key->d);
+ m_free(key->p);
+ m_free(key->q);
+ }
+ TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key"))
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/* Clear and free the memory used by a public or private key */
+void rsa_key_free(rsa_key *key) {
+
+ TRACE(("enter rsa_key_free"))
+
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ TRACE(("leave rsa_key_free: key == NULL"))
+ return;
+ }
+ if (key->d) {
+ mp_clear(key->d);
+ m_free(key->d);
+ }
+ if (key->e) {
+ mp_clear(key->e);
+ m_free(key->e);
+ }
+ if (key->n) {
+ mp_clear(key->n);
+ m_free(key->n);
+ }
+ if (key->p) {
+ mp_clear(key->p);
+ m_free(key->p);
+ }
+ if (key->q) {
+ mp_clear(key->q);
+ m_free(key->q);
+ }
+ m_free(key);
+ TRACE(("leave rsa_key_free"))
+}
+
+/* Put the public rsa key into the buffer in the required format:
+ *
+ * string "ssh-rsa"
+ * mp_int e
+ * mp_int n
+ */
+void buf_put_rsa_pub_key(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key) {
+
+ TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_pub_key"))
+ dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+
+ buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN);
+ buf_putmpint(buf, key->e);
+ buf_putmpint(buf, key->n);
+
+ TRACE(("leave buf_put_rsa_pub_key"))
+
+}
+
+/* Same as buf_put_rsa_pub_key, but with the private "x" key appended */
+void buf_put_rsa_priv_key(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key) {
+
+ TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_priv_key"))
+
+ dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+ buf_put_rsa_pub_key(buf, key);
+ buf_putmpint(buf, key->d);
+
+ /* new versions have p and q, old versions don't */
+ if (key->p) {
+ buf_putmpint(buf, key->p);
+ }
+ if (key->q) {
+ buf_putmpint(buf, key->q);
+ }
+
+
+ TRACE(("leave buf_put_rsa_priv_key"))
+
+}
+
+#ifdef DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_VERIFY
+/* Verify a signature in buf, made on data by the key given.
+ * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
+int buf_rsa_verify(buffer * buf, rsa_key *key, const unsigned char* data,
+ unsigned int len) {
+
+ unsigned int slen;
+ DEF_MP_INT(rsa_s);
+ DEF_MP_INT(rsa_mdash);
+ DEF_MP_INT(rsa_em);
+ int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
+
+ TRACE(("enter buf_rsa_verify"))
+
+ dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+
+ m_mp_init_multi(&rsa_mdash, &rsa_s, &rsa_em, NULL);
+
+ slen = buf_getint(buf);
+ if (slen != (unsigned int)mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n)) {
+ TRACE(("bad size"))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (mp_read_unsigned_bin(&rsa_s, buf_getptr(buf, buf->len - buf->pos),
+ buf->len - buf->pos) != MP_OKAY) {
+ TRACE(("failed reading rsa_s"))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* check that s <= n-1 */
+ if (mp_cmp(&rsa_s, key->n) != MP_LT) {
+ TRACE(("s > n-1"))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* create the magic PKCS padded value */
+ rsa_pad_em(key, data, len, &rsa_em);
+
+ if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_s, key->e, key->n, &rsa_mdash) != MP_OKAY) {
+ TRACE(("failed exptmod rsa_s"))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (mp_cmp(&rsa_em, &rsa_mdash) == MP_EQ) {
+ /* signature is valid */
+ TRACE(("success!"))
+ ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+out:
+ mp_clear_multi(&rsa_mdash, &rsa_s, &rsa_em, NULL);
+ TRACE(("leave buf_rsa_verify: ret %d", ret))
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_VERIFY */
+
+/* Sign the data presented with key, writing the signature contents
+ * to the buffer */
+void buf_put_rsa_sign(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key, const unsigned char* data,
+ unsigned int len) {
+
+ unsigned int nsize, ssize;
+ unsigned int i;
+ DEF_MP_INT(rsa_s);
+ DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp1);
+ DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp2);
+ DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp3);
+
+ TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_sign"))
+ dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+
+ m_mp_init_multi(&rsa_s, &rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp2, &rsa_tmp3, NULL);
+
+ rsa_pad_em(key, data, len, &rsa_tmp1);
+
+ /* the actual signing of the padded data */
+
+#ifdef RSA_BLINDING
+
+ /* With blinding, s = (r^(-1))((em)*r^e)^d mod n */
+
+ /* generate the r blinding value */
+ /* rsa_tmp2 is r */
+ gen_random_mpint(key->n, &rsa_tmp2);
+
+ /* rsa_tmp1 is em */
+ /* em' = em * r^e mod n */
+
+ /* rsa_s used as a temp var*/
+ if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->e, key->n, &rsa_s) != MP_OKAY) {
+ dropbear_exit("rsa error");
+ }
+ if (mp_invmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->n, &rsa_tmp3) != MP_OKAY) {
+ dropbear_exit("rsa error");
+ }
+ if (mp_mulmod(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_s, key->n, &rsa_tmp2) != MP_OKAY) {
+ dropbear_exit("rsa error");
+ }
+
+ /* rsa_tmp2 is em' */
+ /* s' = (em')^d mod n */
+ if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->d, key->n, &rsa_tmp1) != MP_OKAY) {
+ dropbear_exit("rsa error");
+ }
+
+ /* rsa_tmp1 is s' */
+ /* rsa_tmp3 is r^(-1) mod n */
+ /* s = (s')r^(-1) mod n */
+ if (mp_mulmod(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp3, key->n, &rsa_s) != MP_OKAY) {
+ dropbear_exit("rsa error");
+ }
+
+#else
+
+ /* s = em^d mod n */
+ /* rsa_tmp1 is em */
+ if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp1, key->d, key->n, &rsa_s) != MP_OKAY) {
+ dropbear_exit("rsa error");
+ }
+
+#endif /* RSA_BLINDING */
+
+ mp_clear_multi(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp2, &rsa_tmp3, NULL);
+
+ /* create the signature to return */
+ buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN);
+
+ nsize = mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n);
+
+ /* string rsa_signature_blob length */
+ buf_putint(buf, nsize);
+ /* pad out s to same length as n */
+ ssize = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&rsa_s);
+ dropbear_assert(ssize <= nsize);
+ for (i = 0; i < nsize-ssize; i++) {
+ buf_putbyte(buf, 0x00);
+ }
+
+ if (mp_to_unsigned_bin(&rsa_s, buf_getwriteptr(buf, ssize)) != MP_OKAY) {
+ dropbear_exit("rsa error");
+ }
+ buf_incrwritepos(buf, ssize);
+ mp_clear(&rsa_s);
+
+#if defined(DEBUG_RSA) && defined(DEBUG_TRACE)
+ printhex("RSA sig", buf->data, buf->len);
+#endif
+
+
+ TRACE(("leave buf_put_rsa_sign"))
+}
+
+/* Creates the message value as expected by PKCS, see rfc2437 etc */
+/* format to be padded to is:
+ * EM = 01 | FF* | 00 | prefix | hash
+ *
+ * where FF is repeated enough times to make EM one byte
+ * shorter than the size of key->n
+ *
+ * prefix is the ASN1 designator prefix,
+ * hex 30 21 30 09 06 05 2B 0E 03 02 1A 05 00 04 14
+ *
+ * rsa_em must be a pointer to an initialised mp_int.
+ */
+static void rsa_pad_em(rsa_key * key,
+ const unsigned char * data, unsigned int len,
+ mp_int * rsa_em) {
+
+ /* ASN1 designator (including the 0x00 preceding) */
+ const unsigned char rsa_asn1_magic[] =
+ {0x00, 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b,
+ 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14};
+ const unsigned int RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN = 16;
+
+ buffer * rsa_EM = NULL;
+ hash_state hs;
+ unsigned int nsize;
+
+ dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
+ dropbear_assert(data != NULL);
+ nsize = mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n);
+
+ rsa_EM = buf_new(nsize-1);
+ /* type byte */
+ buf_putbyte(rsa_EM, 0x01);
+ /* Padding with 0xFF bytes */
+ while(rsa_EM->pos != rsa_EM->size - RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN - SHA1_HASH_SIZE) {
+ buf_putbyte(rsa_EM, 0xff);
+ }
+ /* Magic ASN1 stuff */
+ memcpy(buf_getwriteptr(rsa_EM, RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN),
+ rsa_asn1_magic, RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN);
+ buf_incrwritepos(rsa_EM, RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN);
+
+ /* The hash of the data */
+ sha1_init(&hs);
+ sha1_process(&hs, data, len);
+ sha1_done(&hs, buf_getwriteptr(rsa_EM, SHA1_HASH_SIZE));
+ buf_incrwritepos(rsa_EM, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);
+
+ dropbear_assert(rsa_EM->pos == rsa_EM->size);
+
+ /* Create the mp_int from the encoded bytes */
+ buf_setpos(rsa_EM, 0);
+ bytes_to_mp(rsa_em, buf_getptr(rsa_EM, rsa_EM->size),
+ rsa_EM->size);
+ buf_free(rsa_EM);
+}
+
+#endif /* DROPBEAR_RSA */