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Diffstat (limited to 'libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c')
-rw-r--r--libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c187
1 files changed, 143 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c b/libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c
index fa839ef..258e6cb 100644
--- a/libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c
+++ b/libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@
*
* The library is free for all purposes without any express
* guarantee it works.
- *
- * Tom St Denis, tomstdenis@gmail.com, http://libtom.org
*/
#include "tomcrypt.h"
@@ -18,83 +16,184 @@
#ifdef LTC_MDSA
/**
- Verify a DSA key for validity
- @param key The key to verify
+ Validate a DSA key
+
+ Yeah, this function should've been called dsa_validate_key()
+ in the first place and for compat-reasons we keep it
+ as it was (for now).
+
+ @param key The key to validate
@param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid
@return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int dsa_verify_key(dsa_key *key, int *stat)
{
- void *tmp, *tmp2;
- int res, err;
+ int err;
+
+ err = dsa_int_validate_primes(key, stat);
+ if (err != CRYPT_OK || *stat == 0) return err;
+
+ err = dsa_int_validate_pqg(key, stat);
+ if (err != CRYPT_OK || *stat == 0) return err;
+
+ return dsa_int_validate_xy(key, stat);
+}
+
+/**
+ Non-complex part (no primality testing) of the validation
+ of DSA params (p, q, g)
+
+ @param key The key to validate
+ @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid
+ @return CRYPT_OK if successful
+*/
+int dsa_int_validate_pqg(dsa_key *key, int *stat)
+{
+ void *tmp1, *tmp2;
+ int err;
LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL);
-
- /* default to an invalid key */
*stat = 0;
- /* first make sure key->q and key->p are prime */
- if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime(key->q, 8, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) {
- return err;
- }
- if (res == 0) {
+ /* check q-order */
+ if ( key->qord >= LTC_MDSA_MAX_GROUP || key->qord <= 15 ||
+ (unsigned long)key->qord >= mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) ||
+ (mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) - key->qord) >= LTC_MDSA_DELTA ) {
return CRYPT_OK;
}
- if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime(key->p, 8, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) {
- return err;
- }
- if (res == 0) {
+ /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: 1 < g < p */
+ if (mp_cmp_d(key->g, 1) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->g, key->p) != LTC_MP_LT) {
return CRYPT_OK;
}
- /* now make sure that g is not -1, 0 or 1 and <p */
- if (mp_cmp_d(key->g, 0) == LTC_MP_EQ || mp_cmp_d(key->g, 1) == LTC_MP_EQ) {
- return CRYPT_OK;
- }
- if ((err = mp_init_multi(&tmp, &tmp2, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; }
- if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; }
- if (mp_cmp(tmp, key->g) == LTC_MP_EQ || mp_cmp(key->g, key->p) != LTC_MP_LT) {
+ if ((err = mp_init_multi(&tmp1, &tmp2, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; }
+
+ /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: q is a divisor of (p - 1) */
+ if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; }
+ if ((err = mp_div(tmp1, key->q, tmp1, tmp2)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; }
+ if (mp_iszero(tmp2) != LTC_MP_YES) {
err = CRYPT_OK;
goto error;
}
- /* 1 < y < p-1 */
- if (!(mp_cmp_d(key->y, 1) == LTC_MP_GT && mp_cmp(key->y, tmp) == LTC_MP_LT)) {
+ /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: g is a generator of a subgroup of order q in
+ * the multiplicative group of GF(p) - so we make sure that g^q mod p = 1
+ */
+ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->q, key->p, tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; }
+ if (mp_cmp_d(tmp1, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
err = CRYPT_OK;
goto error;
}
- /* now we have to make sure that g^q = 1, and that p-1/q gives 0 remainder */
- if ((err = mp_div(tmp, key->q, tmp, tmp2)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; }
- if (mp_iszero(tmp2) != LTC_MP_YES) {
- err = CRYPT_OK;
- goto error;
+ err = CRYPT_OK;
+ *stat = 1;
+error:
+ mp_clear_multi(tmp2, tmp1, NULL);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/**
+ Primality testing of DSA params p and q
+
+ @param key The key to validate
+ @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid
+ @return CRYPT_OK if successful
+*/
+int dsa_int_validate_primes(dsa_key *key, int *stat)
+{
+ int err, res;
+
+ *stat = 0;
+ LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL);
+ LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL);
+
+ /* key->q prime? */
+ if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime(key->q, LTC_MILLER_RABIN_REPS, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) {
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (res == LTC_MP_NO) {
+ return CRYPT_OK;
}
- if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->q, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; }
- if (mp_cmp_d(tmp, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
- err = CRYPT_OK;
- goto error;
+ /* key->p prime? */
+ if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime(key->p, LTC_MILLER_RABIN_REPS, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) {
+ return err;
}
+ if (res == LTC_MP_NO) {
+ return CRYPT_OK;
+ }
+
+ *stat = 1;
+ return CRYPT_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ Validation of a DSA key (x and y values)
- /* now we have to make sure that y^q = 1, this makes sure y \in g^x mod p */
- if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->y, key->q, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; }
- if (mp_cmp_d(tmp, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
+ @param key The key to validate
+ @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid
+ @return CRYPT_OK if successful
+*/
+int dsa_int_validate_xy(dsa_key *key, int *stat)
+{
+ void *tmp;
+ int err;
+
+ *stat = 0;
+ LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL);
+ LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL);
+
+ /* 1 < y < p-1 */
+ if ((err = mp_init(&tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) {
+ return err;
+ }
+ if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (mp_cmp_d(key->y, 1) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->y, tmp) != LTC_MP_LT) {
err = CRYPT_OK;
goto error;
}
- /* at this point we are out of tests ;-( */
+ if (key->type == PK_PRIVATE) {
+ /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: 0 < x < q */
+ if (mp_cmp_d(key->x, 0) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->x, key->q) != LTC_MP_LT) {
+ err = CRYPT_OK;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: y = g^x mod p */
+ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->x, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (mp_cmp(tmp, key->y) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
+ err = CRYPT_OK;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ /* with just a public key we cannot test y = g^x mod p therefore we
+ * only test that y^q mod p = 1, which makes sure y is in g^x mod p
+ */
+ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->y, key->q, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (mp_cmp_d(tmp, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
+ err = CRYPT_OK;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
err = CRYPT_OK;
*stat = 1;
-error:
- mp_clear_multi(tmp, tmp2, NULL);
+error:
+ mp_clear(tmp);
return err;
}
+
#endif
-/* $Source$ */
-/* $Revision$ */
-/* $Date$ */
+/* ref: $Format:%D$ */
+/* git commit: $Format:%H$ */
+/* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */