summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffhomepage
path: root/libtomcrypt/src/ciphers/safer/saferp.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'libtomcrypt/src/ciphers/safer/saferp.c')
-rw-r--r--libtomcrypt/src/ciphers/safer/saferp.c555
1 files changed, 555 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/libtomcrypt/src/ciphers/safer/saferp.c b/libtomcrypt/src/ciphers/safer/saferp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d0d589
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libtomcrypt/src/ciphers/safer/saferp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,555 @@
+/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
+ *
+ * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
+ * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
+ *
+ * The library is free for all purposes without any express
+ * guarantee it works.
+ *
+ * Tom St Denis, tomstdenis@gmail.com, http://libtomcrypt.org
+ */
+
+/**
+ @file saferp.c
+ SAFER+ Implementation by Tom St Denis
+*/
+#include "tomcrypt.h"
+
+#ifdef SAFERP
+
+const struct ltc_cipher_descriptor saferp_desc =
+{
+ "safer+",
+ 4,
+ 16, 32, 16, 8,
+ &saferp_setup,
+ &saferp_ecb_encrypt,
+ &saferp_ecb_decrypt,
+ &saferp_test,
+ &saferp_done,
+ &saferp_keysize,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
+};
+
+/* ROUND(b,i)
+ *
+ * This is one forward key application. Note the basic form is
+ * key addition, substitution, key addition. The safer_ebox and safer_lbox
+ * are the exponentiation box and logarithm boxes respectively.
+ * The value of 'i' is the current round number which allows this
+ * function to be unrolled massively. Most of SAFER+'s speed
+ * comes from not having to compute indirect accesses into the
+ * array of 16 bytes b[0..15] which is the block of data
+*/
+
+extern const unsigned char safer_ebox[], safer_lbox[];
+
+#define ROUND(b, i) \
+ b[0] = (safer_ebox[(b[0] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][0]) & 255] + skey->saferp.K[i+1][0]) & 255; \
+ b[1] = safer_lbox[(b[1] + skey->saferp.K[i][1]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][1]; \
+ b[2] = safer_lbox[(b[2] + skey->saferp.K[i][2]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][2]; \
+ b[3] = (safer_ebox[(b[3] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][3]) & 255] + skey->saferp.K[i+1][3]) & 255; \
+ b[4] = (safer_ebox[(b[4] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][4]) & 255] + skey->saferp.K[i+1][4]) & 255; \
+ b[5] = safer_lbox[(b[5] + skey->saferp.K[i][5]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][5]; \
+ b[6] = safer_lbox[(b[6] + skey->saferp.K[i][6]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][6]; \
+ b[7] = (safer_ebox[(b[7] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][7]) & 255] + skey->saferp.K[i+1][7]) & 255; \
+ b[8] = (safer_ebox[(b[8] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][8]) & 255] + skey->saferp.K[i+1][8]) & 255; \
+ b[9] = safer_lbox[(b[9] + skey->saferp.K[i][9]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][9]; \
+ b[10] = safer_lbox[(b[10] + skey->saferp.K[i][10]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][10]; \
+ b[11] = (safer_ebox[(b[11] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][11]) & 255] + skey->saferp.K[i+1][11]) & 255; \
+ b[12] = (safer_ebox[(b[12] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][12]) & 255] + skey->saferp.K[i+1][12]) & 255; \
+ b[13] = safer_lbox[(b[13] + skey->saferp.K[i][13]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][13]; \
+ b[14] = safer_lbox[(b[14] + skey->saferp.K[i][14]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][14]; \
+ b[15] = (safer_ebox[(b[15] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][15]) & 255] + skey->saferp.K[i+1][15]) & 255;
+
+/* This is one inverse key application */
+#define iROUND(b, i) \
+ b[0] = safer_lbox[(b[0] - skey->saferp.K[i+1][0]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][0]; \
+ b[1] = (safer_ebox[(b[1] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][1]) & 255] - skey->saferp.K[i][1]) & 255; \
+ b[2] = (safer_ebox[(b[2] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][2]) & 255] - skey->saferp.K[i][2]) & 255; \
+ b[3] = safer_lbox[(b[3] - skey->saferp.K[i+1][3]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][3]; \
+ b[4] = safer_lbox[(b[4] - skey->saferp.K[i+1][4]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][4]; \
+ b[5] = (safer_ebox[(b[5] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][5]) & 255] - skey->saferp.K[i][5]) & 255; \
+ b[6] = (safer_ebox[(b[6] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][6]) & 255] - skey->saferp.K[i][6]) & 255; \
+ b[7] = safer_lbox[(b[7] - skey->saferp.K[i+1][7]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][7]; \
+ b[8] = safer_lbox[(b[8] - skey->saferp.K[i+1][8]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][8]; \
+ b[9] = (safer_ebox[(b[9] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][9]) & 255] - skey->saferp.K[i][9]) & 255; \
+ b[10] = (safer_ebox[(b[10] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][10]) & 255] - skey->saferp.K[i][10]) & 255; \
+ b[11] = safer_lbox[(b[11] - skey->saferp.K[i+1][11]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][11]; \
+ b[12] = safer_lbox[(b[12] - skey->saferp.K[i+1][12]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][12]; \
+ b[13] = (safer_ebox[(b[13] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][13]) & 255] - skey->saferp.K[i][13]) & 255; \
+ b[14] = (safer_ebox[(b[14] ^ skey->saferp.K[i+1][14]) & 255] - skey->saferp.K[i][14]) & 255; \
+ b[15] = safer_lbox[(b[15] - skey->saferp.K[i+1][15]) & 255] ^ skey->saferp.K[i][15];
+
+/* This is a forward single layer PHT transform. */
+#define PHT(b) \
+ b[0] = (b[0] + (b[1] = (b[0] + b[1]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[2] = (b[2] + (b[3] = (b[3] + b[2]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[4] = (b[4] + (b[5] = (b[5] + b[4]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[6] = (b[6] + (b[7] = (b[7] + b[6]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[8] = (b[8] + (b[9] = (b[9] + b[8]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[10] = (b[10] + (b[11] = (b[11] + b[10]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[12] = (b[12] + (b[13] = (b[13] + b[12]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[14] = (b[14] + (b[15] = (b[15] + b[14]) & 255)) & 255;
+
+/* This is an inverse single layer PHT transform */
+#define iPHT(b) \
+ b[15] = (b[15] - (b[14] = (b[14] - b[15]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[13] = (b[13] - (b[12] = (b[12] - b[13]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[11] = (b[11] - (b[10] = (b[10] - b[11]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[9] = (b[9] - (b[8] = (b[8] - b[9]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[7] = (b[7] - (b[6] = (b[6] - b[7]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[5] = (b[5] - (b[4] = (b[4] - b[5]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[3] = (b[3] - (b[2] = (b[2] - b[3]) & 255)) & 255; \
+ b[1] = (b[1] - (b[0] = (b[0] - b[1]) & 255)) & 255; \
+
+/* This is the "Armenian" Shuffle. It takes the input from b and stores it in b2 */
+#define SHUF(b, b2) \
+ b2[0] = b[8]; b2[1] = b[11]; b2[2] = b[12]; b2[3] = b[15]; \
+ b2[4] = b[2]; b2[5] = b[1]; b2[6] = b[6]; b2[7] = b[5]; \
+ b2[8] = b[10]; b2[9] = b[9]; b2[10] = b[14]; b2[11] = b[13]; \
+ b2[12] = b[0]; b2[13] = b[7]; b2[14] = b[4]; b2[15] = b[3];
+
+/* This is the inverse shuffle. It takes from b and gives to b2 */
+#define iSHUF(b, b2) \
+ b2[0] = b[12]; b2[1] = b[5]; b2[2] = b[4]; b2[3] = b[15]; \
+ b2[4] = b[14]; b2[5] = b[7]; b2[6] = b[6]; b2[7] = b[13]; \
+ b2[8] = b[0]; b2[9] = b[9]; b2[10] = b[8]; b2[11] = b[1]; \
+ b2[12] = b[2]; b2[13] = b[11]; b2[14] = b[10]; b2[15] = b[3];
+
+/* The complete forward Linear Transform layer.
+ * Note that alternating usage of b and b2.
+ * Each round of LT starts in 'b' and ends in 'b2'.
+ */
+#define LT(b, b2) \
+ PHT(b); SHUF(b, b2); \
+ PHT(b2); SHUF(b2, b); \
+ PHT(b); SHUF(b, b2); \
+ PHT(b2);
+
+/* This is the inverse linear transform layer. */
+#define iLT(b, b2) \
+ iPHT(b); \
+ iSHUF(b, b2); iPHT(b2); \
+ iSHUF(b2, b); iPHT(b); \
+ iSHUF(b, b2); iPHT(b2);
+
+#ifdef LTC_SMALL_CODE
+
+static void _round(unsigned char *b, int i, symmetric_key *skey)
+{
+ ROUND(b, i);
+}
+
+static void _iround(unsigned char *b, int i, symmetric_key *skey)
+{
+ iROUND(b, i);
+}
+
+static void _lt(unsigned char *b, unsigned char *b2)
+{
+ LT(b, b2);
+}
+
+static void _ilt(unsigned char *b, unsigned char *b2)
+{
+ iLT(b, b2);
+}
+
+#undef ROUND
+#define ROUND(b, i) _round(b, i, skey)
+
+#undef iROUND
+#define iROUND(b, i) _iround(b, i, skey)
+
+#undef LT
+#define LT(b, b2) _lt(b, b2)
+
+#undef iLT
+#define iLT(b, b2) _ilt(b, b2)
+
+#endif
+
+/* These are the 33, 128-bit bias words for the key schedule */
+static const unsigned char safer_bias[33][16] = {
+{ 70, 151, 177, 186, 163, 183, 16, 10, 197, 55, 179, 201, 90, 40, 172, 100},
+{ 236, 171, 170, 198, 103, 149, 88, 13, 248, 154, 246, 110, 102, 220, 5, 61},
+{ 138, 195, 216, 137, 106, 233, 54, 73, 67, 191, 235, 212, 150, 155, 104, 160},
+{ 93, 87, 146, 31, 213, 113, 92, 187, 34, 193, 190, 123, 188, 153, 99, 148},
+{ 42, 97, 184, 52, 50, 25, 253, 251, 23, 64, 230, 81, 29, 65, 68, 143},
+{ 221, 4, 128, 222, 231, 49, 214, 127, 1, 162, 247, 57, 218, 111, 35, 202},
+{ 58, 208, 28, 209, 48, 62, 18, 161, 205, 15, 224, 168, 175, 130, 89, 44},
+{ 125, 173, 178, 239, 194, 135, 206, 117, 6, 19, 2, 144, 79, 46, 114, 51},
+{ 192, 141, 207, 169, 129, 226, 196, 39, 47, 108, 122, 159, 82, 225, 21, 56},
+{ 252, 32, 66, 199, 8, 228, 9, 85, 94, 140, 20, 118, 96, 255, 223, 215},
+{ 250, 11, 33, 0, 26, 249, 166, 185, 232, 158, 98, 76, 217, 145, 80, 210},
+{ 24, 180, 7, 132, 234, 91, 164, 200, 14, 203, 72, 105, 75, 78, 156, 53},
+{ 69, 77, 84, 229, 37, 60, 12, 74, 139, 63, 204, 167, 219, 107, 174, 244},
+{ 45, 243, 124, 109, 157, 181, 38, 116, 242, 147, 83, 176, 240, 17, 237, 131},
+{ 182, 3, 22, 115, 59, 30, 142, 112, 189, 134, 27, 71, 126, 36, 86, 241},
+{ 136, 70, 151, 177, 186, 163, 183, 16, 10, 197, 55, 179, 201, 90, 40, 172},
+{ 220, 134, 119, 215, 166, 17, 251, 244, 186, 146, 145, 100, 131, 241, 51, 239},
+{ 44, 181, 178, 43, 136, 209, 153, 203, 140, 132, 29, 20, 129, 151, 113, 202},
+{ 163, 139, 87, 60, 130, 196, 82, 92, 28, 232, 160, 4, 180, 133, 74, 246},
+{ 84, 182, 223, 12, 26, 142, 222, 224, 57, 252, 32, 155, 36, 78, 169, 152},
+{ 171, 242, 96, 208, 108, 234, 250, 199, 217, 0, 212, 31, 110, 67, 188, 236},
+{ 137, 254, 122, 93, 73, 201, 50, 194, 249, 154, 248, 109, 22, 219, 89, 150},
+{ 233, 205, 230, 70, 66, 143, 10, 193, 204, 185, 101, 176, 210, 198, 172, 30},
+{ 98, 41, 46, 14, 116, 80, 2, 90, 195, 37, 123, 138, 42, 91, 240, 6},
+{ 71, 111, 112, 157, 126, 16, 206, 18, 39, 213, 76, 79, 214, 121, 48, 104},
+{ 117, 125, 228, 237, 128, 106, 144, 55, 162, 94, 118, 170, 197, 127, 61, 175},
+{ 229, 25, 97, 253, 77, 124, 183, 11, 238, 173, 75, 34, 245, 231, 115, 35},
+{ 200, 5, 225, 102, 221, 179, 88, 105, 99, 86, 15, 161, 49, 149, 23, 7},
+{ 40, 1, 45, 226, 147, 190, 69, 21, 174, 120, 3, 135, 164, 184, 56, 207},
+{ 8, 103, 9, 148, 235, 38, 168, 107, 189, 24, 52, 27, 187, 191, 114, 247},
+{ 53, 72, 156, 81, 47, 59, 85, 227, 192, 159, 216, 211, 243, 141, 177, 255},
+{ 62, 220, 134, 119, 215, 166, 17, 251, 244, 186, 146, 145, 100, 131, 241, 51}};
+
+ /**
+ Initialize the SAFER+ block cipher
+ @param key The symmetric key you wish to pass
+ @param keylen The key length in bytes
+ @param num_rounds The number of rounds desired (0 for default)
+ @param skey The key in as scheduled by this function.
+ @return CRYPT_OK if successful
+ */
+int saferp_setup(const unsigned char *key, int keylen, int num_rounds, symmetric_key *skey)
+{
+ unsigned x, y, z;
+ unsigned char t[33];
+ static const int rounds[3] = { 8, 12, 16 };
+
+ LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL);
+ LTC_ARGCHK(skey != NULL);
+
+ /* check arguments */
+ if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen != 32) {
+ return CRYPT_INVALID_KEYSIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* Is the number of rounds valid? Either use zero for default or
+ * 8,12,16 rounds for 16,24,32 byte keys
+ */
+ if (num_rounds != 0 && num_rounds != rounds[(keylen/8)-2]) {
+ return CRYPT_INVALID_ROUNDS;
+ }
+
+ /* 128 bit key version */
+ if (keylen == 16) {
+ /* copy key into t */
+ for (x = y = 0; x < 16; x++) {
+ t[x] = key[x];
+ y ^= key[x];
+ }
+ t[16] = y;
+
+ /* make round keys */
+ for (x = 0; x < 16; x++) {
+ skey->saferp.K[0][x] = t[x];
+ }
+
+ /* make the 16 other keys as a transformation of the first key */
+ for (x = 1; x < 17; x++) {
+ /* rotate 3 bits each */
+ for (y = 0; y < 17; y++) {
+ t[y] = ((t[y]<<3)|(t[y]>>5)) & 255;
+ }
+
+ /* select and add */
+ z = x;
+ for (y = 0; y < 16; y++) {
+ skey->saferp.K[x][y] = (t[z] + safer_bias[x-1][y]) & 255;
+ if (++z == 17) { z = 0; }
+ }
+ }
+ skey->saferp.rounds = 8;
+ } else if (keylen == 24) {
+ /* copy key into t */
+ for (x = y = 0; x < 24; x++) {
+ t[x] = key[x];
+ y ^= key[x];
+ }
+ t[24] = y;
+
+ /* make round keys */
+ for (x = 0; x < 16; x++) {
+ skey->saferp.K[0][x] = t[x];
+ }
+
+ for (x = 1; x < 25; x++) {
+ /* rotate 3 bits each */
+ for (y = 0; y < 25; y++) {
+ t[y] = ((t[y]<<3)|(t[y]>>5)) & 255;
+ }
+
+ /* select and add */
+ z = x;
+ for (y = 0; y < 16; y++) {
+ skey->saferp.K[x][y] = (t[z] + safer_bias[x-1][y]) & 255;
+ if (++z == 25) { z = 0; }
+ }
+ }
+ skey->saferp.rounds = 12;
+ } else {
+ /* copy key into t */
+ for (x = y = 0; x < 32; x++) {
+ t[x] = key[x];
+ y ^= key[x];
+ }
+ t[32] = y;
+
+ /* make round keys */
+ for (x = 0; x < 16; x++) {
+ skey->saferp.K[0][x] = t[x];
+ }
+
+ for (x = 1; x < 33; x++) {
+ /* rotate 3 bits each */
+ for (y = 0; y < 33; y++) {
+ t[y] = ((t[y]<<3)|(t[y]>>5)) & 255;
+ }
+
+ /* select and add */
+ z = x;
+ for (y = 0; y < 16; y++) {
+ skey->saferp.K[x][y] = (t[z] + safer_bias[x-1][y]) & 255;
+ if (++z == 33) { z = 0; }
+ }
+ }
+ skey->saferp.rounds = 16;
+ }
+#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
+ zeromem(t, sizeof(t));
+#endif
+ return CRYPT_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ Encrypts a block of text with SAFER+
+ @param pt The input plaintext (16 bytes)
+ @param ct The output ciphertext (16 bytes)
+ @param skey The key as scheduled
+*/
+void saferp_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *pt, unsigned char *ct, symmetric_key *skey)
+{
+ unsigned char b[16];
+ int x;
+
+ LTC_ARGCHK(pt != NULL);
+ LTC_ARGCHK(ct != NULL);
+ LTC_ARGCHK(skey != NULL);
+
+ /* do eight rounds */
+ for (x = 0; x < 16; x++) {
+ b[x] = pt[x];
+ }
+ ROUND(b, 0); LT(b, ct);
+ ROUND(ct, 2); LT(ct, b);
+ ROUND(b, 4); LT(b, ct);
+ ROUND(ct, 6); LT(ct, b);
+ ROUND(b, 8); LT(b, ct);
+ ROUND(ct, 10); LT(ct, b);
+ ROUND(b, 12); LT(b, ct);
+ ROUND(ct, 14); LT(ct, b);
+ /* 192-bit key? */
+ if (skey->saferp.rounds > 8) {
+ ROUND(b, 16); LT(b, ct);
+ ROUND(ct, 18); LT(ct, b);
+ ROUND(b, 20); LT(b, ct);
+ ROUND(ct, 22); LT(ct, b);
+ }
+ /* 256-bit key? */
+ if (skey->saferp.rounds > 12) {
+ ROUND(b, 24); LT(b, ct);
+ ROUND(ct, 26); LT(ct, b);
+ ROUND(b, 28); LT(b, ct);
+ ROUND(ct, 30); LT(ct, b);
+ }
+ ct[0] = b[0] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][0];
+ ct[1] = (b[1] + skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][1]) & 255;
+ ct[2] = (b[2] + skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][2]) & 255;
+ ct[3] = b[3] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][3];
+ ct[4] = b[4] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][4];
+ ct[5] = (b[5] + skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][5]) & 255;
+ ct[6] = (b[6] + skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][6]) & 255;
+ ct[7] = b[7] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][7];
+ ct[8] = b[8] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][8];
+ ct[9] = (b[9] + skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][9]) & 255;
+ ct[10] = (b[10] + skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][10]) & 255;
+ ct[11] = b[11] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][11];
+ ct[12] = b[12] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][12];
+ ct[13] = (b[13] + skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][13]) & 255;
+ ct[14] = (b[14] + skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][14]) & 255;
+ ct[15] = b[15] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][15];
+#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
+ zeromem(b, sizeof(b));
+#endif
+}
+
+/**
+ Decrypts a block of text with SAFER+
+ @param ct The input ciphertext (16 bytes)
+ @param pt The output plaintext (16 bytes)
+ @param skey The key as scheduled
+*/
+void saferp_ecb_decrypt(const unsigned char *ct, unsigned char *pt, symmetric_key *skey)
+{
+ unsigned char b[16];
+ int x;
+
+ LTC_ARGCHK(pt != NULL);
+ LTC_ARGCHK(ct != NULL);
+ LTC_ARGCHK(skey != NULL);
+
+ /* do eight rounds */
+ b[0] = ct[0] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][0];
+ b[1] = (ct[1] - skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][1]) & 255;
+ b[2] = (ct[2] - skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][2]) & 255;
+ b[3] = ct[3] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][3];
+ b[4] = ct[4] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][4];
+ b[5] = (ct[5] - skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][5]) & 255;
+ b[6] = (ct[6] - skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][6]) & 255;
+ b[7] = ct[7] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][7];
+ b[8] = ct[8] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][8];
+ b[9] = (ct[9] - skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][9]) & 255;
+ b[10] = (ct[10] - skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][10]) & 255;
+ b[11] = ct[11] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][11];
+ b[12] = ct[12] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][12];
+ b[13] = (ct[13] - skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][13]) & 255;
+ b[14] = (ct[14] - skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][14]) & 255;
+ b[15] = ct[15] ^ skey->saferp.K[skey->saferp.rounds*2][15];
+ /* 256-bit key? */
+ if (skey->saferp.rounds > 12) {
+ iLT(b, pt); iROUND(pt, 30);
+ iLT(pt, b); iROUND(b, 28);
+ iLT(b, pt); iROUND(pt, 26);
+ iLT(pt, b); iROUND(b, 24);
+ }
+ /* 192-bit key? */
+ if (skey->saferp.rounds > 8) {
+ iLT(b, pt); iROUND(pt, 22);
+ iLT(pt, b); iROUND(b, 20);
+ iLT(b, pt); iROUND(pt, 18);
+ iLT(pt, b); iROUND(b, 16);
+ }
+ iLT(b, pt); iROUND(pt, 14);
+ iLT(pt, b); iROUND(b, 12);
+ iLT(b, pt); iROUND(pt,10);
+ iLT(pt, b); iROUND(b, 8);
+ iLT(b, pt); iROUND(pt,6);
+ iLT(pt, b); iROUND(b, 4);
+ iLT(b, pt); iROUND(pt,2);
+ iLT(pt, b); iROUND(b, 0);
+ for (x = 0; x < 16; x++) {
+ pt[x] = b[x];
+ }
+#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
+ zeromem(b, sizeof(b));
+#endif
+}
+
+/**
+ Performs a self-test of the SAFER+ block cipher
+ @return CRYPT_OK if functional, CRYPT_NOP if self-test has been disabled
+*/
+int saferp_test(void)
+{
+ #ifndef LTC_TEST
+ return CRYPT_NOP;
+ #else
+ static const struct {
+ int keylen;
+ unsigned char key[32], pt[16], ct[16];
+ } tests[] = {
+ {
+ 16,
+ { 41, 35, 190, 132, 225, 108, 214, 174,
+ 82, 144, 73, 241, 241, 187, 233, 235 },
+ { 179, 166, 219, 60, 135, 12, 62, 153,
+ 36, 94, 13, 28, 6, 183, 71, 222 },
+ { 224, 31, 182, 10, 12, 255, 84, 70,
+ 127, 13, 89, 249, 9, 57, 165, 220 }
+ }, {
+ 24,
+ { 72, 211, 143, 117, 230, 217, 29, 42,
+ 229, 192, 247, 43, 120, 129, 135, 68,
+ 14, 95, 80, 0, 212, 97, 141, 190 },
+ { 123, 5, 21, 7, 59, 51, 130, 31,
+ 24, 112, 146, 218, 100, 84, 206, 177 },
+ { 92, 136, 4, 63, 57, 95, 100, 0,
+ 150, 130, 130, 16, 193, 111, 219, 133 }
+ }, {
+ 32,
+ { 243, 168, 141, 254, 190, 242, 235, 113,
+ 255, 160, 208, 59, 117, 6, 140, 126,
+ 135, 120, 115, 77, 208, 190, 130, 190,
+ 219, 194, 70, 65, 43, 140, 250, 48 },
+ { 127, 112, 240, 167, 84, 134, 50, 149,
+ 170, 91, 104, 19, 11, 230, 252, 245 },
+ { 88, 11, 25, 36, 172, 229, 202, 213,
+ 170, 65, 105, 153, 220, 104, 153, 138 }
+ }
+ };
+
+ unsigned char tmp[2][16];
+ symmetric_key skey;
+ int err, i, y;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(tests) / sizeof(tests[0])); i++) {
+ if ((err = saferp_setup(tests[i].key, tests[i].keylen, 0, &skey)) != CRYPT_OK) {
+ return err;
+ }
+ saferp_ecb_encrypt(tests[i].pt, tmp[0], &skey);
+ saferp_ecb_decrypt(tmp[0], tmp[1], &skey);
+
+ /* compare */
+ if (memcmp(tmp[0], tests[i].ct, 16) || memcmp(tmp[1], tests[i].pt, 16)) {
+ return CRYPT_FAIL_TESTVECTOR;
+ }
+
+ /* now see if we can encrypt all zero bytes 1000 times, decrypt and come back where we started */
+ for (y = 0; y < 16; y++) tmp[0][y] = 0;
+ for (y = 0; y < 1000; y++) saferp_ecb_encrypt(tmp[0], tmp[0], &skey);
+ for (y = 0; y < 1000; y++) saferp_ecb_decrypt(tmp[0], tmp[0], &skey);
+ for (y = 0; y < 16; y++) if (tmp[0][y] != 0) return CRYPT_FAIL_TESTVECTOR;
+ }
+
+ return CRYPT_OK;
+ #endif
+}
+
+/** Terminate the context
+ @param skey The scheduled key
+*/
+void saferp_done(symmetric_key *skey)
+{
+}
+
+/**
+ Gets suitable key size
+ @param keysize [in/out] The length of the recommended key (in bytes). This function will store the suitable size back in this variable.
+ @return CRYPT_OK if the input key size is acceptable.
+*/
+int saferp_keysize(int *keysize)
+{
+ LTC_ARGCHK(keysize != NULL);
+
+ if (*keysize < 16)
+ return CRYPT_INVALID_KEYSIZE;
+ if (*keysize < 24) {
+ *keysize = 16;
+ } else if (*keysize < 32) {
+ *keysize = 24;
+ } else {
+ *keysize = 32;
+ }
+ return CRYPT_OK;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* $Source: /cvs/libtom/libtomcrypt/src/ciphers/safer/saferp.c,v $ */
+/* $Revision: 1.7 $ */
+/* $Date: 2005/05/05 14:35:58 $ */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-27 15:04:40 +0000